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Copyright © 2025 by Eva Dou

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Cover design: Brian Lemus

Cover image: Fansquaresss / Shutterstock (A building modeled after Germany’s Heidelberg Castle on Huawei’s R&D campus in Dongguan, China)

Author photograph: Denis Largeron

Book design by Chris Welch, adapted for ebook by Kelly Brennan

Map by Daniel Lagin

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Dou, Eva, author.

Title: House of Huawei : the secret history of China’s most powerful company / Eva Dou.

Description: [New York] : Portfolio / Penguin, [2025] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “The epic story of Huawei, China’s most powerful company, and its reclusive founder, Ren Zhengfei” —Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: LCCN 2024028798 (print) | LCCN 2024028799 (ebook) | ISBN 9780593544631 (hardcover) | ISBN 9780593852262 (international edition) | ISBN 9780593544648 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Hua wei ji shu you xian gong si—History. | Telecommunication—Management—China. | International business enterprises—China. | Ren, Zhengfei, 1944–

Classification: LCC HE8430.H83 D68 2025 (print) | LCC HE8430.H83 (ebook) | DDC 338.8/872139167—dc23/eng/20240716

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024028798

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024028799

Ebook ISBN 9780593544648

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Contents

目录

A Note on Names

关于姓名的说明

Cast of Characters

人物表

Selected Photos

精选照片

Author’s Note

作者自序

Introduction

引言

Part I

第一部分

1 The Bookseller
The Ren Family: 1937–1968

1 书商
任氏家族：1937–1968

2 The Factory in the Cave
Ren’s Military Years: 1968–1982

2 洞窟工厂
任正非的军旅生涯：1968–1982

3 A New Start
China’s Economic Reforms Begin: 1976–1984

3 新的起点
中国经济改革开启：1976–1984

4 The Special Economic Zone
Huawei’s Origins: 1980–1989

4 经济特区
华为的起源：1980–1989

5 A Homegrown Switch
Early R&D: 1993–1994

5 自研交换机
早期研发：1993–1994

6 A Shared Interest
Huawei Forges Ties to the State: 1994–1996

6 共同利益
华为与国家建立联系：1994–1996

7 Pack of Wolves
Huawei’s Sales Machine: 1990s

7 狼群
华为的销售机器：20 世纪 90 年代

8 Farewell to the Paramount Leader
Deng Xiaoping’s Death and the Hong Kong
Handover: 1997

8 告别最高领袖
邓小平逝世与香港
回归：1997

Part II

第二部分

9 Iron Army
Huawei Abroad: 1996–1999

9 铁军
华为在海外：1996–1999

10 Huawei’s Basic Law
Management Reforms: 1996–1999

10 华为基本法
管理变革：1996–1999

11 Winter
Dot-Com Bubble Burst: 1999–2001

11 冬天
互联网泡沫破裂：1999–2001

12 Sudden and Acute
Iraq, SARS, and Cisco: 2003–2004

12 突发与急性
伊拉克、非典与思科：2003–2004

13 The Roads to Empire
Global Expansion: 2004–2008

13 帝国之路
全球扩张：2004–2008

14 Separation of Powers
Management Evolution: 2006–2008

14 三权分立
管理演进：2006–2008

15 The Torch
Beijing Olympics: 2008

15 火炬
北京奥运会：2008

16 The Western Front
Washington and London: 2009–2010

16 西线战场
华盛顿与伦敦：2009–2010

17 Revolution
The Arab Spring: 2011

17 革命
阿拉伯之春：2011

18 The Hearing
House Investigation: 2012

18 听证会
众议院调查：2012

19 Low Visibility
The Iran Affair: 2013

19 低能见度
伊朗事务：2013

20 Shotgiant
The Snowden Leaks: 2013–2014

20 “猎巨人”计划
斯诺登泄密案：2013–2014

Part III

第三部分

21 Sharp Eyes
Big Data Arrives: 2015–2016

21 雪亮眼睛
大数据时代来临：2015–2016

22 A Thing of Beauty
Huawei’s Smartphone Triumph: 2016–2017

22 美之器
华为智能手机的胜利：2016–2017

23 The Listening State
The Modern Surveillance Era: 2017–2018

23 监听之国
现代监控时代：2017–2018

24 Hostage Diplomacy
Several Detentions: December 2018

24 人质外交
多起拘留事件：2018 年 12 月

25 Waterloo
The Trade War: 2019–2020

25 滑铁卢
贸易战：2019–2020

26 The Trial
Meng’s Extradition Case: 2019–2021

26 审判
孟晚舟引渡案：2019–2021

27 A Hero’s Welcome
Meng’s Return: 2021–2023

27 英雄般的欢迎
孟晚舟归来：2021–2023

28 Black Swan
Huawei’s Future: 2023–

28 黑天鹅
华为的未来：2023–

Acknowledgments

致谢

Huawei’s Corporate Structure

华为组织架构

Timeline of Events

大事记

Additional Reading

延伸阅读

Photo Credits

图片来源

Index

索引

To view the endnotes, please visit www.houseofhuawei.com/endnotes.

欲查看尾注，请访问 www.houseofhuawei.com/endnotes。

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To Ma Ding

致马丁

As a military man I have known many clever and truly outstanding strategists. I have rarely come across an individual more strategically oriented than Ren.[1]

作为一名军人，我结识过许多聪明且真正杰出的战略家。但我很少遇到比任正非更具战略导向的人。[1]

—Admiral William A. Owens,

——威廉·A·欧文斯上将，

former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

前参谋长联席会议副主席

A Note on Names

关于人名的说明

The Chinese names in the text are transliterated in the pinyin system, which has been used in China since the 1950s. In pronunciation, a zh can be approximated by the English j (Ren Zhengfei = “Rin Jung-fay”), an x by the English sh (Ren Moxun = “Rin Moh-shyun”), and a q by the English ch (Zhou Daiqi = “Joe Dye-chi”).

书中的中文姓名采用拼音系统转写，该系统自 20 世纪 50 年代起在中国使用。在发音上，zh 接近英语中的 j（任正非 = “Rin Jung-fay”），x 接近英语中的 sh（任摩逊 = “Rin Moh-shyun”），q 接近英语中的 ch（周代琪 = “Joe Dye-chi”）。

Surnames precede given names in Chinese, and this often remains the case in anglicized versions. Some Chinese individuals who move abroad choose to adopt the Westernized convention of putting surnames second.

在中文里，姓氏位于名字之前，在英文版本中通常也保留这一习惯。一些移居海外的中国人会选择遵循西方惯例，将姓氏放在名字之后。

Many Huawei executives have adopted English names for their professional work, and this text frequently uses English names for broader accessibility.

许多华为高管在职业工作中采用了英文名，为了更广泛的易读性，本书经常使用这些英文名。

The Cast of Characters lists executives by prominent titles they have held that figure into this story. Huawei’s executives tend to rotate roles and responsibilities every few years, and some have since progressed to other titles.

“人物表”中列出的高管职衔是他们在本书故事中所担任过的显要职位。华为的高管往往每隔几年就会轮换角色和职责，其中一些人此后已晋升至其他职位。

Cast of Characters

人物表

The Ren Family

任氏家族

Ren Zhengfei / 任正非: Founder of Huawei Technologies Co., the world’s largest supplier of telecommunications equipment.

任正非：华为技术有限公司创始人，该公司是全球最大的电信设备供应商。

Meng Wanzhou / 孟晚舟 (a.k.a. Cathy Meng and Sabrina Meng): Daughter of Ren Zhengfei and Meng Jun; Huawei’s chief financial officer.

孟晚舟（又名 Cathy Meng 和 Sabrina Meng）：任正非与孟军之女；华为首席财务官。

Ren Moxun / 任摩逊: Ren Zhengfei’s father; dean of Duyun Normal College for Nationalities and principal of Duyun No. 1 Middle School.

任摩逊：任正非之父；都匀民族师范专科学校副校长，都匀一中校长。

Cheng Yuanzhao / 程远昭: Ren Zhengfei’s mother; math teacher at Duyun No. 1 Middle School.

程远昭：任正非之母；都匀一中数学教师。

Steven Ren (a.k.a. Ren Shulu / 任树录): Ren Zhengfei’s younger brother; Huawei’s chief logistics officer.

Steven Ren（又名任树录）：任正非之弟；华为首席后勤官。

Zheng Li / 郑黎: Ren Zhengfei’s younger sister; a finance executive at Huawei.

郑黎：任正非之妹；华为财务高管。

Meng Jun / 孟军: Ren Zhengfei’s first wife.

孟军：任正非第一任妻子。

Meng Dongbo / 孟东波: Meng Jun’s father and Ren Zhengfei’s first father-in-law; Sichuan Province’s vice-governor.

孟东波：孟军之父，任正非的第一任岳父；四川省副省长。

Ren Ping / 任平 (a.k.a. Meng Ping / 孟平): Son of Ren Zhengfei and Meng Jun.

任平（又名孟平）：任正非与孟军之子。

Yao Ling / 姚凌: Ren Zhengfei’s second wife; mother of Annabel Yao.

姚凌：任正非第二任妻子；姚安娜之母。

Annabel Yao (a.k.a. Yao Anna / 姚安娜 and Yao Siwei / 姚思为): Daughter of Ren Zhengfei and Yao Ling.

姚安娜（又名姚思为）：任正非与姚凌之女。

Carlos Liu (a.k.a. Liu Xiaozong / 刘晓棕): Meng Wanzhou’s husband.

刘晓棕（Carlos Liu）：孟晚舟之夫。

Key Huawei Executives

华为核心高管

Sun Yafang / 孙亚芳: Huawei’s chairwoman from 1999 to 2018.

孙亚芳：1999 年至 2018 年担任华为董事长。

Guo Ping / 郭平: One of Huawei’s three rotating chairpersons; member of the company’s early engineering team; oversaw Huawei’s international M&As and legal cases.

郭平：华为三位轮值董事长之一；公司早期工程团队成员；负责华为的国际并购和法律案件。

Ken Hu (a.k.a. Hu Houkun / 胡厚崑): One of Huawei’s three rotating chairpersons; oversaw Huawei’s international cybersecurity.

胡厚崑（Ken Hu）：华为三位轮值董事长之一；负责华为的国际网络安全。

Eric Xu (a.k.a. Xu Zhijun / 徐直军): One of Huawei’s three rotating chairpersons; led Huawei’s wireless division during its early internationalization.

徐直军（Eric Xu）：华为三位轮值董事长之一；在华为早期国际化期间领导无线部门。

Zheng Baoyong / 郑宝用: Huawei’s chief engineer in early years and later an executive vice president; also president of Huawei’s US division in the late 1990s.

郑宝用：华为早期总工程师，后任常务副总裁；20 世纪 90 年代末曾任华为美国分公司总裁。

Li Yinan / 李一男: Huawei’s “boy genius” engineer in the early years; founder of the rival router maker Harbour Networks.

李一男：华为早期的“天才少年”工程师；竞争对手路由器制造商港湾网络的创始人。

William Xu (a.k.a. Xu Wenwei / 徐文伟): Senior Huawei executive and board member who did chip engineering for the company’s early telephone switches.

徐文伟（William Xu）：华为高级高管及董事会成员，曾为公司早期电话交换机进行芯片工程设计。

Chen Zhufang / 陈珠芳: Huawei’s party secretary from the late 1990s through around 2007.

陈珠芳：20 世纪 90 年代末至 2007 年左右担任华为党委书记。

Zhou Daiqi / 周代期: Huawei’s party secretary starting around 2008.

周代期：2008 年左右开始担任华为党委书记。

Jiang Xisheng / 江西生: Early Huawei executive who negotiated the exit of the company’s five original investors.

江西生：华为早期高管，曾负责公司最初五位投资者的退出谈判。

James Yan (a.k.a. Yan Jingli / 阎景立): Huawei’s first US representative in the 1990s.

阎景立（James Yan）：20 世纪 90 年代华为首位驻美代表。

Matt Bross: British Telecom CTO who selected Huawei for its first major contract in the West in 2005; later joined Huawei as global CTO.

马特·布罗斯 (Matt Bross)： 英国电信首席技术官，2005 年为华为选择了其在西方的首个重大合同；后加入华为担任全球首席技术官。

Teresa He (a.k.a. He Tingbo / 何庭波): Head of Huawei’s chip unit, HiSilicon.

何庭波（Teresa He）：华为芯片部门海思半导体负责人。

Wen Tong / 童文: Huawei’s lead 5G scientist; former head of Nortel’s Network Technology Labs.

童文（Wen Tong）：华为 5G 首席科学家；曾任北电网络技术实验室负责人。

Charles Ding (a.k.a. Ding Shaohua / 丁少华): Huawei’s chief US representative during the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s 2012 hearing on Huawei and ZTE.

丁少华（Charles Ding）：2012 年美国众议院情报常设特别委员会举行华为与中兴听证会期间的华为首席驻美代表。

Richard Yu (a.k.a. Yu Chengdong / 余承东): Huawei’s smartphone head.

余承东（Richard Yu）：华为智能手机业务负责人。

Catherine Chen (a.k.a. Chen Lifang / 陈黎芳): Head of Huawei’s public affairs during the US-China trade war; her husband, Cao Yi’an, was one of Huawei’s early engineers.

陈黎芳（Catherine Chen）：中美贸易战期间华为公共事务负责人；其夫曹毅安是华为早期工程师之一。

Domestic Rivals

国内竞争对手

Shen Dingxing / 沈定兴: Founder of Zhuhai Telecom; one of Huawei’s original five investors.

沈定兴：珠海电信创始人；华为最初的五位投资者之一。

Wan Runnan / 万润南: Founder of the Stone Group Corporation, China’s most promising early private tech company, dubbed “China’s IBM”; he went into exile in France after supporting pro-democracy student protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

万润南：四通集团创始人，该公司是中国早期最有前途的民营科技公司，被称为“中国的 IBM”；1989 年因支持天安门广场的民主示威学生后流亡法国。

Wu Jiangxing / 邬江兴: Military engineer who developed the “04 switch,” China’s first homegrown advanced digital telephone switch, in 1991; founder of the switching company Great Dragon; he was a director of the Information Engineering Academy of the PLA’s General Staff Department, a title that Ren Zhengfei has been mistakenly cited as holding.

邬江兴：军事工程师，1991 年开发了中国首台国产先进数字电话交换机“04 机”；巨龙通信创始人；他曾任解放军信息工程学院院长，任正非曾被误传担任过此职。

Hou Weigui / 侯为贵: Founder of ZTE.

侯为贵：中兴通讯创始人。

Liu Chuanzhi / 柳传志: Founder of Lenovo.

柳传志：联想创始人。

International Industry Executives

国际行业高管

John Chambers: CEO of Cisco when the company filed an intellectual-property lawsuit against Huawei.

约翰·钱伯斯 (John Chambers)：思科公司对华为提起知识产权诉讼时的首席执行官。

Bruce Claflin: 3Com CEO; set up a joint-venture company with Huawei to help it defend itself against the Cisco lawsuit.

布鲁斯·克拉夫林 (Bruce Claflin)：3Com 首席执行官；与华为建立合资公司，帮助华为应对思科的诉讼。

Mike Zafirovski: Motorola COO who tried to negotiate a merger with Huawei in 2003.

迈克·扎菲罗夫斯基 (Mike Zafirovski)：摩托罗拉首席运营官，2003 年曾试图谈判与华为合并。

William A. “Bill” Owens: Former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; former Nortel CEO; represented Huawei in its 2010 bid for a place in a Sprint contract.

威廉·A·“比尔”·欧文斯 (William A. “Bill” Owens)：前参谋长联席会议副主席；前北电首席执行官；2010 年代表华为竞标 Sprint 合同。

Daniel “Dan” Hesse: Sprint Nextel CEO.

丹尼尔·“丹”·赫塞 (Daniel “Dan” Hesse)：Sprint Nextel 首席执行官。

Chinese Government Officials

中国政府官员

Note: The title of China’s top leader fluctuated before 1997. Mao Zedong led China under the title “chairman of the Communist Party of China” from 1949 until his death in 1976. After a brief interregnum, Deng Xiaoping took over the helm under a range of titles, including “paramount leader,” then just “comrade” in the years before his death in 1997. Since then, starting with Jiang Zemin, the nation’s top leader has ruled as “general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party” while also doubling as the nation’s “president” on a staggered schedule. For instance, Xi Jinping became China’s leader in November 2012, when he assumed the post of general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, then gained the additional title “president of China” in March 2013. The premier is the nation’s number-two official.

注： 1997 年以前，中国最高领导人的头衔有所波动。毛泽东从 1949 年起以“中国共产党中央委员会主席”的头衔领导中国，直至 1976 年逝世。经过短暂的过渡期后，邓小平以包括“最高领导人”在内的多种头衔掌舵，在 1997 年逝世前的几年里仅被称为“同志”。此后，从江泽民开始，国家最高领导人担任“中国共产党中央委员会总书记”，同时按交错的时间表兼任国家“主席”。例如，习近平于 2012 年 11 月就任中国共产党中央委员会总书记，成为中国领导人，随后于 2013 年 3 月获得“国家主席”头衔。国务院总理是国家的二号官员。

Mao Zedong / 毛泽东: Founder of the People’s Republic of China, chairman of the Communist Party of China (CCP), and the nation’s leader from 1949 until his death in 1976.

毛泽东：中华人民共和国创始人，中国共产党（CCP）主席，1949 年至 1976 年逝世期间的国家领导人。

Deng Xiaoping / 邓小平: China’s leader from 1978 to 1997. He retired his formal government titles in the late 1980s but continued to be regarded as the nation’s de facto leader until his death. He is credited with engineering China’s economic renaissance through market reforms following Mao’s Cultural Revolution.

邓小平：1978 年至 1997 年间的中国领导人。他在 20 世纪 80 年代末辞去了正式政府职务，但直到逝世前一直被视为国家的实际最高领导人。他被认为是在毛泽东的文化大革命之后，通过市场改革策划了中国经济复兴的功臣。

Zhao Ziyang / 赵紫阳: China’s premier from 1980 to 1987 and general secretary of the CCP from 1987 to 1989. He was deposed after sympathizing with the pro-democracy student protesters of Tiananmen Square in 1989. Earlier in his career, he was the leader of Sichuan Province as it began its experimentation in market reforms.

赵紫阳：1980 年至 1987 年任中国国务院总理，1987 年至 1989 年任中共中央总书记。1989 年因同情天安门广场要求民主的学生抗议者而被撤职。在其职业生涯早期，他是四川省的领导人，当时该省正开始进行市场改革试点。

Li Peng / 李鹏: China’s premier from 1987 to 1998. A security hard-liner who backed the use of force against the Tiananmen Square protesters in 1989.

李鹏：1987 年至 1998 年任中国国务院总理。他是安全领域的强硬派，支持在 1989 年对天安门广场的抗议者动用武力。

Hu Yaobang / 胡耀邦: General secretary of the CCP from 1982 to 1987. His death in April 1989 sparked student protests in Beijing that escalated into the Tiananmen Square protests.

胡耀邦：1982 年至 1987 年任中共中央总书记。他于 1989 年 4 月的逝世引发了北京的学生抗议，随后演变为天安门广场抗议活动。

Jiang Zemin / 江泽民: General secretary of the CCP from 1989 to 2002. He oversaw China’s freewheeling boom in private business, as well as the nation’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Outranked by Deng Xiaoping during the first part of his tenure as general secretary, he became China’s top leader following Deng’s death in 1997. Ren’s meeting with Jiang in 1994 is often cited as an early highlight for Huawei.

江泽民：1989 年至 2002 年任中共中央总书记。他监督了中国私营企业的自由发展热潮，以及中国在 2001 年加入世界贸易组织（WTO）。在他担任总书记的前期，其地位低于邓小平，在 1997 年邓小平逝世后，他成为中国的最高领导人。任正非在 1994 年与江泽民的会面常被视为华为早期的重要时刻。

Zhu Rongji / 朱镕基: China’s premier from 1998 to 2003. He was a leading proponent of China’s economic liberalization and negotiated the country’s entry into the WTO. Following Zhu’s visit to Huawei in 1996, the company gained easier access to financing from the state-owned banking system.

朱镕基：1998 年至 2003 年任中国国务院总理。他是中国经济自由化的主要倡导者，并就中国加入世贸组织进行了谈判。在 1996 年朱镕基视察华为后，该公司从国有银行系统获得融资变得更加容易。

Hu Jintao / 胡锦涛: China’s leader from 2002 to 2012, he presided over a period of rapid globalization. Ren Zhengfei accompanied him on a state visit to Iran in 2001.

胡锦涛：2002 年至 2012 年任中国领导人，他主持了一个全球化飞速发展的时期。2001 年，任正非陪同他出访伊朗。

Wu Bangguo / 吴邦国: China’s vice-premier from 1995 to 2003 and chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress from 2003 to 2013. He was one of Huawei’s supporters in Beijing and the official whom the company sought out for help when it came under scrutiny from national auditors in the early 2000s.

吴邦国：1995 年至 2003 年任中国国务院副总理，2003 年至 2013 年任全国人大常委会委员长。他是华为在北京的支持者之一，也是该公司在 21 世纪初受到国家审计机构审查时寻求帮助的官员。

Wen Jiabao / 温家宝: China’s premier from 2003 to 2013.

温家宝：2003 年至 2013 年任中国国务院总理。

Zhang Gaoli / 张高丽: China’s vice-premier from 2013 to 2018. He visited Huawei in 1998 during his tenure as Shenzhen’s party secretary.

张高丽：2013 年至 2018 年任中国国务院副总理。1998 年在他担任深圳市委书记期间曾视察华为。

Xi Jinping / 习近平: China’s current leader and general secretary of the CCP since 2012.

习近平：中国现任领导人，自 2012 年起担任中共中央总书记。

Selected Photos

精选照片

[picture]

A street in Shenzhen, China, on August 3, 1981, a year after the city was named the nation’s first “special economic zone,” giving it the green light to experiment with capitalism. Bicycles were still the most common mode of transportation.

1981 年 8 月 3 日的中国深圳街头。一年前，这座城市被命名为中国首个“经济特区”，获准进行资本主义实验。当时，自行车仍是最主要的交通工具。

[picture]

Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei (right), speaks with China’s premier, Wen Jiabao, at Huawei’s software development center in Bangalore, India, on April 10, 2005.

华为创始人任正非（右）于 2005 年 4 月 10 日在印度班加罗尔的华为软件开发中心与中国总理温家宝交谈。

[picture]

Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei (front row, second left), speaks to former vice-premier Wu Bangguo (center) and the International Telecommunication Union’s secretary-general, Yoshio Utsumi (front row, third right), at the Huawei booth of a trade show in Hong Kong on December 3, 2006. Eric Xu, who became one of Huawei’s three rotating CEOs, stands (first row, left).Wu was one of Huawei’s supporters in Beijing.

2006 年 12 月 3 日，华为创始人任正非（前排左二）在香港举办的一场贸易展的华为展台上，向原副总理吴邦国（正中）和国际电信联盟秘书长内海善雄（前排右三）进行讲解。曾担任华为三位轮值 CEO 之一的徐直军站在（前排左一）。吴邦国是华为在北京的支持者之一。

[picture]

Guo Ping (front row, right), who started out as one of Huawei’s earliest engineers and later became one of the company’s three rotating CEOs, meets with Ewon Ebin (center), Malaysia’s minister of science, technology, and innovation, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on June 18, 2013, as Huawei signs an agreement with the Malaysian government to promote digital education.

郭平 （前排右一），他最初是华为最早的一批工程师之一，后来成为公司的三位轮值 CEO 之一。2013 年 6 月 18 日，在华为与马来西亚政府签署推广数字教育协议之际，他在马来西亚吉隆坡会见了马来西亚科学、技术与创新部部长埃翁·埃宾 （正中）。

[picture]

Huawei’s longest-serving chairwoman, Sun Yafang, meets with Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Cairo, Egypt, on April 13, 2017. Sun handled many of the company’s high-level diplomatic meetings.

2017 年 4 月 13 日，华为任职时间最长的董事长孙亚芳在埃及开罗会见埃及总统阿卜杜勒-法塔赫·塞西。孙亚芳负责处理公司的许多高层外交会晤。

[picture]

Ken Hu (left), one of Huawei’s three rotating CEOs and head of the company’s international cybersecurity policy work, meets with the Czech Republic’s prime minister, Andrej Babiš, in Davos on January 25, 2019, as the Czech government announced it was studying potential cybersecurity risks in Huawei’s equipment.

胡厚崑 （左），华为三位轮值 CEO 之一，也是公司国际网络安全政策工作的负责人。2019 年 1 月 25 日，他在达沃斯会见了捷克共和国总理安德烈·巴比什。当时捷克政府宣布正在研究华为设备中潜在的网络安全风险。

[picture]

Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s CFO and eldest daughter of founder Ren Zhengfei, meets with former Italian prime minister Mario Monti (left), in Milan, Italy, on May 9, 2018.

2018 年 5 月 9 日，华为首席财务官、创始人任正非的长女孟晚舟在意大利米兰会见意大利前总理马里奥·蒙蒂 （左）。

[picture]

An employee of Chinese mobile operator China Telecom shows a Huawei 5G base station on the roof of a high-rise in Shenzhen, China, on January 21, 2019.

2019 年 1 月 21 日，中国移动运营商中国电信的一名员工在中国深圳的一栋高层建筑楼顶展示华为 5G 基站。

[picture]

Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei (second left), shows China’s leader, Xi Jinping (second right), around the company’s offices in London on October 20, 2015. Huawei has benefited from Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative for global infrastructure construction.

华为创始人任正非（左二）于 2015 年 10 月 20 日带领中国领导人习近平（右二）参观公司位于伦敦的办公室。华为受益于习近平旨在全球基础设施建设的“一带一路”倡议。

[picture]

A man inspects Huawei surveillance cameras displayed at the China Public Security Expo in Shenzhen, China, on October 29, 2019. Huawei is a major global vendor of video-surveillance systems.

2019 年 10 月 29 日，中国深圳，一名男子正在参观中国国际社会公共安全博览会上展示的华为监控摄像头。华为是全球主要的视频监控系统供应商。

[picture]

Huawei displays its Safe City surveillance system at a trade show in Barcelona, Spain, on November 15, 2016. The system allows authorities to view footage from individual surveillance cameras, as well as traffic information and other analytics, on a big screen.

2016 年 11 月 15 日，华为在西班牙巴塞罗那的一场贸易展上展示其“平安城市”监控系统。该系统允许当局在大屏幕上查看单个监控摄像头的画面，以及交通信息和其他分析数据。

[picture]

Annabel Yao (front row, second right), the youngest daughter of Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, attends Le Bal des Débutantes in Paris, France, on November 24, 2018. Yao studied computer science at Harvard University but decided to pursue a career as a pop singer and an actor.

姚安娜 （前排右二），华为创始人任正非的小女儿，于 2018 年 11 月 24 日参加法国巴黎名媛舞会。姚安娜曾在哈佛大学攻读计算机科学，但后来决定追求流行歌手和演员的职业生涯。

[picture]

A building inspired by Germany’s Heidelberg Castle sits on Huawei’s sprawling Ox Horn Campus in Dongguan, China. The 1.2-square-kilometer grounds of the R&D center were designed to look like twelve European cities and regions in miniature.

一座灵感源自德国海德堡城堡的建筑，坐落在华为位于中国东莞庞大的溪流背坡村园区内。这座占地 1.2 平方公里的研发中心，其景观设计旨在微缩呈现十二个欧洲城市与地区的风貌。

[picture]

A row of caryatids, Greek-style pillars sculpted to look like women, in a hall where Huawei receives guests at the company’s headquarters in Shenzhen, China.

在华为深圳总部接待客人的大厅里，矗立着一排女像柱，即雕刻成女性形象的希腊式支柱，中国。

[picture]

Huawei’s CFO, Meng Wanzhou, leaves her house in Vancouver, British Columbia, on May 8, 2019. While under house arrest, she was allowed outside with a tracking anklet and a security escort.

2019 年 5 月 8 日，华为首席财务官孟晚舟离开她在不列颠哥伦比亚省温哥华的住所。在软禁期间，她被允许在佩戴追踪脚镣和有安保随行的条件下外出。

[picture]

Huawei’s CFO, Meng Wanzhou, arrives in Shenzhen, China, by chartered flight on September 25, 2021, after spending nearly three years under house arrest in Canada. The following year, she was promoted to rotating CEO of Huawei, a title she shares with two others.

2021 年 9 月 25 日，华为首席财务官孟晚舟在加拿大被软禁近三年后，乘坐包机抵达中国深圳。次年，她被提拔为华为轮值董事长，与另外两人共同担任这一职务。

Author’s Note

作者注

This is a work of journalism, which means that nothing is invented or fictionalized. Much of the dialogue and many of the details are drawn from official meeting minutes, speech transcripts, video recordings, government reports, and other contemporaneous records. Some information is also derived from the recollections of firsthand participants. Details on sources can be found in the endnotes, which are accessible at www.houseofhuawei.com/endnotes.

这是一部新闻纪实作品，这意味着书中没有任何虚构或杜撰的内容。大部分对话和细节均取材于官方会议纪要、演讲稿、视频录像、政府报告以及其他同时期的记录。部分信息也源自当事人的回忆。关于资料来源的详情可见尾注，可通过访问 www.houseofhuawei.com/endnotes 获取。

The goal of this project was to chronicle the historic path of the most successful company in China’s modern history, Huawei Technologies, in the belief that it could contribute to the conversation about how we arrived at this current moment in history—and what comes next.

本项目的目标是记录中国现代史上最成功的公司——华为技术有限公司的历史轨迹，并坚信这有助于探讨我们是如何走到当前这一历史时刻的，以及未来将走向何方。

This is an independent project, which means it does not have the endorsement of, and was not commissioned by, Huawei, any other tech company, or any government. Penguin’s Portfolio imprint was the sole source of funding. The Washington Post supported the endeavor through a book leave. This book also draws on interviews and research I did as a reporter for The Post and The Wall Street Journal.

这是一个独立项目，这意味着它没有获得华为、任何其他科技公司或任何政府的认可，也不是受其委托编写的。企鹅兰登书屋旗下的 Portfolio 出版社是唯一的资金来源。《华盛顿邮报》 通过提供写书假支持了这一事业。本书还参考了我作为《邮报》和《华尔街日报》记者期间所做的采访和研究。

The reconstruction of this narrative was made possible through the generous time and insights of many industry executives, policymakers, and scholars of China. I have tried to faithfully reflect the diversity of their perspectives in these pages. Any errors, misunderstandings, or oversights are solely my own. I hope that readers will enjoy their foray into the astonishing world of telecommunications as much as I did mine.

本书叙事的重构得益于许多行业高管、政策制定者和中国问题学者的慷慨分享与见解。我已尽力在书中忠实地反映他们多元的观点。任何错误、误解或疏漏均由我个人承担。我希望读者能像我一样，享受这段进入令人惊叹的电信世界的探索之旅。

Introduction

引言

The woman’s flight from Hong Kong arrived in Vancouver on December 1, 2018, at 11:10 a.m., a few minutes ahead of schedule.[1] Dressed comfortably in a dark hooded tracksuit and sneakers,[2] her shiny black hair hanging loose around her shoulders, she was planning a quick stop at one of her family homes, then heading on to Buenos Aires. As it happened, the most powerful men and women in the world were gathering just then in the Argentine capital for the G20 summit. It was—by her account—a coincidence.

这名女子的航班于 2018 年 12 月 1 日上午 11:10 从香港抵达温哥华，比预定时间提前了几分钟。[1] 她穿着一套深色连帽运动服和运动鞋，打扮得很舒适，[2] 乌黑亮丽的长发披在肩上。她计划在自家的一个住处稍作停留，然后前往布宜诺斯艾利斯。碰巧的是，当时世界上最有权势的男女政要正聚集在阿根廷首都参加二十国集团（G20）峰会。据她所说，这纯属巧合。

As she stepped off the Cathay Pacific flight at the Vancouver International Airport, something was not quite right. An officer was checking passports as the passengers emerged from the jetway at gate 65. When she reached him, she showed him her Hong Kong passport, a fairly new one, her seventh in eleven years. The officer called over a colleague, who asked her to hand over her mobile phones. Her lawyers would later say she could have resisted. But she was jet-lagged and caught off guard, so it didn’t occur to her to resist. She handed over her iPhone and a red-cased smartphone made by her father’s company. The officers put them into a thick bag designed to block cell-phone signals and make it difficult for anyone to wipe them remotely.

当她走下国泰航空的航班进入温哥华国际机场时，情况有些不对劲。当乘客从 65 号登机口的廊桥走出来时，一名官员正在检查护照。当她走到他面前时，她出示了自己的香港护照，这是一本相当新的护照，是她十一年里的第七本。那名官员叫来了一位同事，后者要求她交出手机。她的律师后来会说她本可以反抗。但由于长途飞行的时差反应且猝不及防，她并没想过要反抗。她交出了一部 iPhone 和一部由她父亲公司制造的红色外壳智能手机。官员们将手机放入一个特制的厚袋子中，这种袋子旨在屏蔽手机信号，防止任何人远程抹除数据。

After following her to baggage claim, the two officers rifled through her luggage, pulling out more electronics: a pink MacBook, a rose-gold iPad, a 256-gigabyte USB drive. One of them asked her for the phones’ passwords and scribbled the numbers on a loose sheet of paper. The questioning continued. One hour passed, then two. Finally, three hours after she’d gotten off the plane, a third man appeared and told her she was under arrest. She was facing charges of fraud in the United States.

在跟随她前往行李领取处后，两名官员翻查了她的行李，搜出了更多的电子设备：一台粉色 MacBook、一台玫瑰金 iPad 和一个 256GB 的 USB 驱动器。其中一人向她索要手机密码，并将数字草草写在一张散纸上。询问仍在继续。一个小时过去了，然后是两个小时。最后，在她下飞机三个小时后，第三个男人出现了，告诉她她被捕了。她在美国面临欺诈指控。

“You’re saying you’re going to arrest me?”

“你是说你要逮捕我？”

“Right.”

“没错。”

“And then send me to the United States?”

“然后把我送到美国？”

“Right.”[3]

“没错。”[3]

It was now undeniable that this was not a random airport check. This was a highly planned operation. As the officer explained that they were going to book her into jail and fingerprint her, he advised Huawei’s CFO, Meng Wanzhou, also known as Cathy Meng, also known as Sabrina Meng, to get a lawyer.

现在已无可否认，这并非随机的机场检查。这是一次经过周密计划的行动。当官员解释说他们要将她关进监狱并采集指纹时，他建议华为的首席财务官孟晚舟（又名 Cathy Meng，又名 Sabrina Meng）去找个律师。

—

Huawei had been on Washington’s radar for some time. The company had emerged as China’s leading high-tech firm, trouncing its Western rivals in bids for major contracts on the strength of its sales team’s ferocious “wolf culture.” Huawei was now number one in the lucrative trade of building the “pipes” that made up the world’s phone and internet networks. Its pockets seemed endlessly deep, as it scooped up top engineers from across the globe.

华为进入华盛顿的视线已经有一段时间了。该公司已成为中国领先的高科技企业，凭借其销售团队凶悍的“狼性文化”，在重大合同的竞标中击败了西方对手。华为目前在利润丰厚的“管道”建设贸易中排名第一，这些管道构成了全球的电话和互联网网络。它的财力似乎深不可测，从全球各地网罗顶尖工程师。

Meng Wanzhou’s father—Huawei’s reclusive founder, Ren Zhengfei—was a corporate legend in China. He had a reputation as a long-term strategist, and his military-esque aphorisms were widely quoted. Starting from humble beginnings, Ren had worked his way up through the military before setting up a humble telephone switch venture that had shot straight to the top. It was either an astonishing feat of innovation or, as some people muttered, too good to be true. There were rumors about the company pursuing obscured projects in Iran and North Korea. There were fears that Huawei products might contain “back doors” that could let overseas spies burrow their way in. There were questions of whether the company was controlled by China’s government, despite Huawei’s protests that it was an independent, privately owned company. Some US officials, with a touch of melodrama, were calling Huawei no less than the greatest threat to American democracy.[4]

孟晚舟的父亲——华为深居简出的创始人任正非——是中国企业界的传奇人物。他以长期战略家著称，其军事化的格言被广泛引用。任正非出身寒微，在军队中一路晋升，随后创办了一家简陋的电话交换机企业，并直冲云霄。这要么是一次惊人的创新壮举，要么正如某些人私下议论的那样，好得令人难以置信。有传言称该公司在伊朗和朝鲜从事不透明的项目。有人担心华为产品可能包含“后门”，让海外间谍得以潜入。尽管华为坚称自己是一家独立的私营公司，但仍有人质疑该公司是否受中国政府控制。一些美国官员带着几分夸张的色彩，称华为无异于美国民主面临的最大威胁。[4]

Ren protested that he couldn’t possibly be involved in such things. He was, he said, only a maker of pipes—a humble vocation not unlike that of a plumber. Not everyone saw things this way. Sure, Huawei might make pipes of a sort, but it was not water flowing through them. What flowed through these pipes was telephone calls, emails, internet traffic, text messages, video calls, corporate accounting, medical records, wills and testaments, love letters, family photographs, police intelligence, government secrets. In a word: data. The most valuable commodity of the information age. And Huawei was the largest supplier of these pipes—by a long shot.

任正非辩称，他不可能参与此类事务。他说，他只是管道的制造者——一个类似于水管工的卑微职业。并非所有人都这么看。诚然，华为制造的或许是某种管道，但其中流动的并非水。流经这些管道的是电话、电子邮件、互联网流量、短信、视频通话、企业会计、医疗记录、遗嘱、情书、家庭照片、警察情报、政府机密。简而言之：数据。信息时代最宝贵的商品。而华为是这些管道最大的供应商——且遥遥领先。

And there was something else here. The question of Huawei wasn’t merely a question of business; it was also a question of belief. When the Soviets had sent Sputnik 1 into the skies in 1957, it had shaken Americans to the core. There was nationwide soul-searching: How could Moscow have gained the technological edge with its stodgy Communist methods? The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to put that debate to rest, affirming the brittleness of Communist rule and the superiority of Western liberal democracy. As for China, it had been a technological leader centuries ago, inventing the compass, gunpowder, and paper. But it had fallen behind in the fifteenth century, and the prospect that it would ever catch up again seemed unlikely. Until now. The world was having another Sputnik moment. And this time the Sputnik was Huawei.

这里还有别的东西。华为问题不仅仅是一个商业问题；它也是一个信仰问题。当苏联在 1957 年将“史普尼克 1 号”（Sputnik 1）送入太空时，它彻底震撼了美国人。全美上下都在进行反思：莫斯科是如何通过其呆板的共产主义方式获得技术优势的？苏联的解体似乎平息了那场辩论，肯定了共产主义统治的脆弱性和西方自由民主的优越性。至于中国，它在几个世纪前曾是技术领导者，发明了指南针、火药和造纸术。但它在 15 世纪落后了，而它能再次赶上的前景似乎微乎其微。直到现在。世界正经历另一个“史普尼克时刻”。而这一次的史普尼克就是华为。

Huawei was filing more patent applications than any other company on earth. Huawei was number one in 5G. Huawei was number one in smartphones. It was breaking ground in artificial intelligence. It pulled in more in annual sales than Disney and Nike combined, and it employed more people than Apple. The rise of such an absolute corporate juggernaut was not supposed to be possible through Communism. But it had happened. It was the kind of thing that made people reconsider what they knew to be true. They were reconsidering if free trade really made everyone wealthier. They were reconsidering if history did end with Western-style democracy. They were reconsidering if the source of innovation really was college dropouts’ garages and not the state picking winners and losers. Because if so, then how did a company like Huawei exist?

华为提交的专利申请比地球上任何其他公司都多。华为在 5G 领域排名第一。华为在智能手机领域排名第一。它在人工智能领域取得了突破。它的年销售额超过了迪士尼和耐克的总和，雇佣的员工比苹果还多。这样一个绝对的企业巨头的崛起，本不该通过共产主义实现。但它确实发生了。这种事情让人们重新审视他们所认知的真理。他们正在重新审视自由贸易是否真的让每个人都变得更富有。他们正在重新审视历史是否真的终结于西方模式的民主。他们正在重新审视创新的源泉是否真的是大学辍学者的车库，而不是由国家来选定胜者和败者。因为如果是这样，那么像华为这样的公司又是如何存在的呢？

—

Days after Meng’s detention, Beijing struck back. Two Canadians, both named Michael, were detained in China, thrown into solitary detention, and accused of espionage. The simmering US-China trade war had exploded into full-fledged hostage diplomacy.

孟晚舟被拘押几天后，北京方面发起了反击。两名都叫迈克尔的加拿大人在中国被拘留，被关入单人牢房，并被指控从事间谍活动。暗流涌动的美中贸易战已演变成全面的“人质外交”。

Amid the fear and uncertainty that followed, something strange happened. Invitations began trickling out to major news organizations: The New York Times, The Washington Post, CNN, BBC. They were all invited to come to China and meet Ren Zhengfei himself. It was the first time in his life that Huawei’s secretive founder had thrown open his doors to the foreign press. So it was with a great deal of intrigue, and a little trepidation, that the journalists arrived, one after another, in the megacity of Shenzhen on China’s southern coast.

在随之而来的恐惧和不确定性中，发生了一件奇怪的事情。各大新闻机构开始陆续收到邀请：《纽约时报》、《华盛顿邮报》、CNN、BBC。他们都被邀请前往中国会见任正非本人。这是华为这位神秘创始人平生第一次向外国媒体敞开大门。于是，记者们带着极大的好奇和些许不安，陆续抵达了中国南海岸的特大城市深圳。

As they drove through the smoggy outskirts of Shenzhen, the sea of factories must have seemed to go on forever. There was one assembly line after another, churning out yo-yos, ziplock bags, scuba wet suits, electric toothbrushes, ultrasonic plastic welders, arch-support insoles, and everything in between. This was the place called the world’s factory floor. Finally, the foreign reporters emerged at a lakeside hill. This was where Ren had built his Garden of Eden. There was a life-size replica of Versailles, with statues of white horses galloping around a fountain at its entrance. Nearby, the red turrets of Heidelberg Castle soared. A little red train chugged cheerfully from castle to castle. One hundred and fifty Russian painters had been hired to paint the walls and ceilings of the massive halls with Renaissance-style murals. In one hall, there was a re-creation of the caryatids from Delphi, the mysterious female figures holding up the sky with their heads. Exquisitely dressed young women playing the lute. There was also a sprawling vista of the Battle of Waterloo. Outside, black swans glided on a lake—a reminder from Ren to his employees to always be on the lookout for a “black-swan event,” a term for an extremely unlikely but disastrous occurrence.

当他们驱车穿过深圳烟雾缭绕的郊区时，那片工厂的海洋似乎永无止境。一条接一条的流水线正在源源不断地生产着溜溜球、密封袋、潜水服、电动牙刷、超声波塑料焊接机、足弓支撑鞋垫，以及介于其中的一切。这里被称为“世界工厂”。最终，外国记者们来到了一座湖边的山丘。这是任正非建造的伊甸园。那里有一座按原比例复制的凡尔赛宫，入口处的喷泉周围矗立着白马奔腾的雕像。不远处，海德堡城堡的红色塔楼耸立。一列红色的小火车欢快地穿梭于各个城堡之间。公司聘请了 150 名俄罗斯画家，在宏伟的大厅墙壁和天花板上绘制文艺复兴风格的壁画。在一座大厅里，还再现了德尔斐的女像柱，即那些用头顶起天空的神秘女性形象。还有穿着考究的年轻女子在弹奏琵琶。此外，还有一幅描绘滑铁卢战役的壮阔全景图。室外，黑天鹅在湖面上滑行——这是任正非对员工的提醒，要时刻警惕“黑天鹅事件”，即那些极不可能发生但一旦发生就会造成灾难性后果的事件。

“Welcome,” the Huawei staffers said, “to Huawei’s R&D campus.”

“欢迎，”华为的工作人员说，“来到华为的研发园区。”

Now out walked Ren himself. If you believed some folks in Washington, he was one of the most dangerous men in the world. He didn’t look so standing before them: a wizened little old man in a blue leisure suit and pastel shirt, spouting aphorisms and jokes through a translator.

接着，任正非本人走了出来。如果你相信华盛顿某些人的说法，他就是世界上最危险的人物之一。但他站在记者面前时看起来并非如此：一个消瘦的小老头，穿着蓝色休闲西装和浅色衬衫，通过翻译滔滔不绝地讲着格言和笑话。

The visiting journalists were keen to ask Ren about his background, about Huawei’s ownership, about the psychedelic vision of the European castles, about Huawei’s business in Iran, about the detention of his daughter. But most of all, they wanted to ask him over and over, in every possible permutation, the unanswerable question: Did Huawei help the Chinese government spy?

来访的记者们急于询问任正非的背景、华为的所有权、那些如幻境般的欧洲城堡、华为在伊朗的业务，以及他女儿被拘押的情况。但最重要的是，他们想以各种可能的措辞反复询问那个无法回答的问题：华为是否协助中国政府进行间谍活动？

“We are a company that sells water taps and pipes,” Ren said. “How can anyone ask for water from a hardware store like us?”[5]

“我们是一家销售水龙头和水管的公司，”任正非说，“怎么会有人向我们这种五金店要水喝呢？”[5]

Part I

第一部分

A country without its own program-controlled switches is like one without an army.[1]

一个没有自己程控交换机的国家，就如同一个没有军队的国家。[1]

—Ren Zhengfei, July 20, 1994

——任正非，1994 年 7 月 20 日

1

1

The Bookseller

书商

The Ren Family: 1937–1968

任氏家族：1937–1968

Ren Moxun[1] sold “good books.”[2] That was what he and his friends called patriotic literature. They were seeking to inspire their countrymen to heroism at a time when it was urgently needed. They’d considered names like Advancement Bookstore and Pioneering Bookstore before finally settling on July Seventh Bookstore. The reference was obvious: Earlier that year, on July 7, 1937, Japanese troops had crossed the Marco Polo Bridge, captured the capital, and continued their invasion of China. World War II would not come for Europe for another two years, when Adolf Hitler invaded Poland. But here in China, the war was already upon them. Ren Moxun opened up the bookstore in the small town of Rongxian,[3] in southern Guangxi Province, and threw himself into the war effort.

任摩逊[1]卖的是“好书”。[2]这是他和朋友们对爱国文学的称呼。在那个迫切需要英雄主义的时代，他们寻求以此激励同胞。在最终定名为“七七书店”之前，他们曾考虑过“前进书店”和“先锋书店”等名字。其中的寓意显而易见：就在那一年，即 1937 年 7 月 7 日，日军跨过卢沟桥，占领了北平，并继续侵略中国。直到两年后阿道夫·希特勒入侵波兰，第二次世界大战才在欧洲爆发。但在中国，战争已经降临。任摩逊在广西省南部的容县小镇[3]开办了这家书店，投身于抗战事业。

Ren Moxun was around twenty-seven at this time, and he had a high forehead, long cheeks, and bushy eyebrows.[4] The only one among his siblings to have attended university,[5] he cultivated a professorial air and wore horn-rimmed spectacles. He revered books, schooling, and the written word, a predisposition he would pass down to his seven children.[6] At the time he opened his bookstore, reading was still a hobby for the privileged elite. If you pulled five people off the street at random, you’d be lucky if one could read.[7] Chinese script was difficult to learn: it had no alphabet, and you had to memorize each word, one by one. Still, there was enough interest in Rongxian for a bookstore. Ren Moxun stocked revolutionary titles[8] from a supplier in Guilin: Karl Marx’s Das Kapital, Vladimir Lenin’s The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, the complete works of the modern Chinese thinker Lu Xun. He and his colleagues placed a bench at the front so that frugal students could sit and read for free.[9] Outside the bookstore, they propped up a blackboard to scrawl news of the war, something of an unofficial village newspaper. They started a political reading club too, which gathered for spirited discussions.

此时的任摩逊大约二十七岁，额头宽阔，脸型瘦长，眉毛浓密。[4]他是兄弟姐妹中唯一上过大学的人，[5]他身上透着一股教授气质，戴着黑框眼镜。他崇敬书籍、教育和文字，这种倾向后来传给了他的七个子女。[6]在他开办书店时，阅读仍是特权精英阶层的爱好。如果你在街上随机拉住五个人，能有一个识字的就算幸运了。[7]汉字很难学：它没有字母表，你必须一个字一个字地死记硬背。尽管如此，容县对书店的需求依然存在。任摩逊从桂林的供应商那里进货，[8]储备了一些革命书籍：卡尔·马克思的《资本论》、弗拉基米尔·列宁的《无产阶级革命和叛徒考茨基》，以及中国现代思想家鲁迅的全集。他和同事们在书店前放了一条长凳，以便手头拮据的学生可以免费坐下来阅读。[9]书店外，他们支起一块黑板，涂写战争新闻，这在某种程度上成了村里的非官方报纸。他们还成立了一个政治读书会，定期聚集在一起进行激烈的讨论。

In his day job, Ren Moxun served as an accountant for a Nationalist military factory supporting the fight against Japan. The Nationalists, China’s rulers at the time, were also embroiled in a civil war against Mao Zedong’s Communists, who were seeking to overthrow them with the help of the peasantry. As they fought Japan’s invasion, the two sides had brokered a delicate truce, an agreement Ren Moxun strongly endorsed. When one faction of Communist revolutionaries in his town began advocating to end the détente with the Nationalists, he denounced them as traitors.[10] These were tense times. People disagreed on what was the right path for the nation, on who was friend or foe, on whether a book was a “good book” or not. One day in March 1938, some Nationalist officers searched the bookstore and pulled out a big pile of books that they demanded not be sold. Ren Moxun and his colleagues found a clever workaround.[11] They piled the banned books into a vitrine and scrawled a sign on it: Inside This Cabinet Are Banned Books. As it turned out, the books inside the cabinet sold briskly.

在日常工作中，任摩逊在一家支持抗日的国民党军工厂担任会计。当时中国的统治者国民党，正陷入与毛泽东领导的共产党的内战中，后者正寻求在农民的帮助下推翻国民党。在抵抗日本侵略的过程中，双方达成了脆弱的停战协议，任摩逊对此深表赞同。当他所在城镇的一派共产党革命者开始主张结束与国民党的缓和状态时，他谴责他们为叛徒。[10]那是局势紧张的时期。人们在国家该走什么样的道路、谁是朋友或敌人、以及一本书是否是“好书”等问题上存在分歧。1938 年 3 月的一天，一些国民党军官搜查了书店，搬出一大堆书，要求不得出售。任摩逊和同事们想出了一个聪明的应对办法。[11]他们把禁书堆进一个玻璃柜，并在上面涂写了一个告示：此柜内为禁书。结果，柜子里的书反而销售火爆。

The July Seventh Bookstore was shut down by the Nationalists in the second half of 1939. Its owners held a fire sale to get a last batch of good books out to the people.[12] Ren Moxun considered traveling to Yan’an to join Mao’s Communists but found the roads impassable. So he crossed to the rolling hills of the neighboring province, Guizhou, where he found work as a teacher.

1939 年下半年，七七书店被国民党关闭。店主们举行了清仓大甩卖，以便将最后一批好书送到民众手中。[12]任摩逊曾考虑前往延安加入毛泽东的共产党，但发现道路无法通行。于是，他翻山越岭来到邻省贵州，在那里找到了一份教职。

Guizhou Province is a hilly region slightly smaller than Missouri, set inland from China’s southwestern border with Vietnam. Monsoons sweep the subtropical region each summer, watering the terraced paddies of sticky rice. Cold drizzles continue through the winter. The area’s indigenous people were the Bouyei, who spoke their own language and also inhabited northern Vietnam. For centuries, China’s emperors considered the area an impoverished borderland[13] where even cooking salt was sometimes in short supply.[14] Even in the modern day, Guizhou retains the reputation of a hardship posting for officials.

贵州省是一个多山的地区，面积比美国的密苏里州略小，位于中国西南边境与越南交界的内陆。每年夏天，季风席卷这个亚热带地区，灌溉着层层叠叠的糯米梯田。寒冷的细雨会持续整个冬天。该地区的土著居民是布依族，他们有自己的语言，也居住在越南北部。几个世纪以来，中国的皇帝一直认为这里是贫瘠的边陲之地，[13]甚至连食盐有时都供应短缺。[14]即使在现代，贵州在官员心目中仍保留着艰苦任职地的名声。

In Guizhou, Ren Moxun met a seventeen-year-old named Cheng Yuanzhao. With big brown eyes,[15] round cheeks, and a broad smile, she was also bright and good with numbers.[16] They married, and Cheng Yuanzhao soon became pregnant.

在贵州，任摩逊遇到了一位名叫程远昭的十七岁少女。她有着棕色的大眼睛，[15]圆圆的脸颊和灿烂的笑容，而且聪明伶俐，擅长算术。[16]他们结婚了，程远昭很快怀了孕。

Their son was born in October 1944,[17] and they named him Ren Zhengfei. It was an ambiguous name. Zheng meant “correct,” and fei meant “not.” “Right or wrong” would be a fair translation. It wasn’t like the common, straightforward boys’ names. Jiabao meant “family treasure.” Jianguo meant “build the nation.” But what did a name like his mean?

他们的儿子出生于 1944 年 10 月，[17]他们给他取名任正非。这是一个含义模糊的名字。正意为“正确”，而非意为“错误”。翻译成“是非”比较贴切。这不像那些常见的、直截了当的男孩名字。家宝意为“家庭的宝贝”。建国意为“建设国家”。但像他这样的名字意味着什么呢？

Japan’s occupation of China ended abruptly the year after Ren Zhengfei’s birth, when the Americans dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For all the efforts of Ren Moxun and his compatriots, it was America’s superior bomb technology that ended the Japanese occupation. In China, there would not yet be peace. Civil war resumed between the Nationalists and Communists. Ren Moxun and Cheng Yuanzhao had six more children, all while both parents worked teaching local students in spare conditions, under the glow of kerosene lamps.[18] Cheng served for a period as an elementary school principal.[19]

任正非出生后的第二年，随着美国在广岛和长崎投下原子弹，日本对中国的占领戛然而止。尽管任摩逊和他的同胞们付出了种种努力，但最终结束日本占领的是美国卓越的炸弹技术。在中国，和平尚未到来。国民党和共产党之间的内战重新爆发。任摩逊和程远昭又生了六个孩子，期间父母两人都在简陋的条件下，在煤油灯的光亮下教当地学生读书。[18]程远昭曾一度担任小学校长。[19]

In 1949, Mao Zedong emerged victorious. It was clear that Ren Moxun had picked the wrong side by working for the Nationalists during the war. It wasn’t yet clear how dire the consequences would be for his family.

1949 年，毛泽东赢得了胜利。显而易见，任摩逊在战争期间为国民党工作是选错了阵营。但当时还不清楚，这将给他的家庭带来多么惨痛的后果。

—

On a foggy morning in 1950, Ren Moxun rode a horse-drawn carriage into the town of Zhenning.[20] The name Zhenning meant “town of peace,” but Ren Moxun, seated in the middle of the cart and surrounded by three armed men who kept their Mauser guns trained outward, arrived with some trepidation. The fog was so thick the men could see only a few meters ahead on the winding dirt road, and they feared that unfriendly locals might attack them. Officials had tasked Ren Moxun with launching a new middle school for Bouyei children in Zhenning, one that would teach them the Mandarin Chinese language and help integrate them into the nascent Communist republic. Mao’s new government was seeking to solidify its control over a sprawling territory that, for most of its history, had been not a unified whole but self-governing fiefdoms speaking different tongues. A unifying language was not just a linguistic issue but a political one.

1950 年一个雾气蒙蒙的早晨，任摩逊乘着马车进入镇宁县城。[20] 镇宁这个名字意为“安宁之镇”，但坐在马车中间、被三名手持毛瑟枪指向外侧的武装人员环绕的任摩逊，抵达时却心怀忐忑。雾大得让人们在蜿蜒的土路上只能看到前方几米远，他们担心不友好的当地人可能会袭击他们。官员们交给任摩逊的任务是在镇宁创办一所新的布依族子弟中学，教授他们普通话，并帮助他们融入初创的共产党共和国。毛泽东的新政府正寻求巩固其对广袤领土的控制，而在其历史的大部分时间里，这片领土并非一个统一的整体，而是说着不同语言、实行自治的领地。统一语言不仅是语言学问题，更是政治问题。

Ren Moxun and his colleagues began setting up a new boarding school, going door-to-door to recruit students across the countryside. Fewer than half of the students spoke fluent Mandarin.[21] Many of the older residents didn’t speak Mandarin at all. Ren Moxun and his staff learned conversational Bouyei. Attendance was a challenge for students who had to travel a great distance.[22] Many families also couldn’t afford the school fees. Ren Moxun and his staff came up with a solution: the students and faculty would make up the budget shortfall through part-time farming.[23] He got the government to give them an acre of land, where the students planted crops and raised pigs. The labor of the students and teachers enabled the school to cover its costs, including meals and a free blue uniform for each student.

任摩逊和他的同事们开始筹建一所新的寄宿学校，走村串户在乡间招收学生。只有不到一半的学生能说流利的普通话。[21] 许多年长的居民根本不会说普通话。任摩逊和他的教职员工便学习了布依语日常会话。对于必须长途跋涉的学生来说，出勤是一个挑战。[22] 许多家庭也负担不起学费。任摩逊和员工们想出了一个办法：师生们通过勤工俭学来弥补预算缺口。[23] 他争取到政府拨给他们一英亩土地，学生们在那里种植庄稼、养猪。师生的劳动使学校能够支付各项开支，包括伙食费和为每位学生免费提供的一套蓝色校服。

Mao’s officials believed they were extending a civilizing influence to the nation’s frontiers—Guizhou in the south, Inner Mongolia in the north, Tibet and Xinjiang in the west. The residents didn’t necessarily see it that way. They had lived for centuries with their own languages and customs, and they were now being compelled to assimilate. There were those who did not like Ren Moxun and his school either. After someone threatened to kill him with a hand grenade—the precise reasons are unclear—the school was issued four rifles to protect the staff and students.[24]

毛泽东的官员们认为，他们正在将文明的影响力扩展到国家的边疆——南部的贵州、北部的内蒙古、西部的西藏和新疆。当地居民未必这么看。他们带着自己的语言和习俗生活了几个世纪，而现在正被迫同化。也有人不喜欢任摩逊和他的学校。在有人威胁要用手榴弹杀掉他之后——具体原因尚不明确——学校获发了四支步枪，用以保护师生。[24]

One of Ren Moxun’s objectives was to inculcate his students with the right beliefs. “Principal Ren, your guiding ideology must be clear,” a visiting official instructed him. “You must make clear who the enemies are, who we are, who are our friends.” Ren Moxun organized rallies for the students to denounce their enemies.[25] The enemies at home were the oppressive landlords. The enemies abroad were the Americans, who were waging war against North Korea, one of China’s allies. Ren Moxun reported that the “scoundrels” hidden among the teachers were successfully caught through these criticism sessions, which were often intense, with students bursting into tears. In the anti-America sessions, students offered up secondhand accounts of atrocities committed by US troops in the area, presumably when they had passed through during World War II. One student said a US soldier had shot a farmer for sport near the Yellow Fruit Waterfall. Another said a classmate’s sister had been dragged into a jeep and raped. It was hard to say what, exactly, had happened years ago with US soldiers, but the resentment against America was certainly real.

任摩逊的目标之一是向学生灌输正确的信仰。“任校长，你的指导思想必须明确，”一位视察的官员指示他，“你必须搞清楚谁是敌人，谁是我们，谁是我们的朋友。”任摩逊组织集会，让学生们谴责敌人。[25] 国内的敌人是压迫人的地主。国外的敌人是美国人，他们正在对中国的盟友之一朝鲜发动战争。任摩逊报告说，通过这些往往非常激烈、甚至让学生放声大哭的批判会，成功抓获了隐藏在教师中的“恶棍”。在反美集会上，学生们转述了美军在该地区犯下的暴行，据推测是他们在二战期间路过时发生的。一名学生说，一名美国士兵在黄果树瀑布附近为了取乐射杀了一名农民。另一名学生说，一个同学的姐姐被拽进吉普车强奸了。很难说几年前美国士兵到底发生了什么，但对美国的怨恨确实是真实的。

Ren Moxun was a man of quiet ambition, and by age forty-five, he was beginning to gain national attention for his work. In 1955, a prominent linguistic journal published a paper of his on teaching Mandarin Chinese to Bouyei children.[26] He outlined their successes in connecting with their pupils by learning their tongue. He noted that the Bouyei language had been changing rapidly since Mao came to power, with new terms like landlord and land reform added. His paper impressed officials at the Ministry of Education enough that they dispatched officials to visit his school. In the autumn of 1955, he was also invited to attend the landmark linguistic conference in Beijing where officials made the controversial decision to simplify the Chinese written language to boost literacy. Arriving in the nation’s capital, he posed proudly for a photo on a tree-lined walkway of Beihai Park.[27]

任摩逊是一个有着沉静抱负的人，到四十五岁时，他的工作开始引起全国关注。1955 年，一家著名的语言学期刊发表了他关于向布依族儿童教授普通话的论文。[26] 他概述了他们通过学习学生母语来建立联系的成功经验。他注意到，自毛泽东掌权以来，布依语发生了迅速变化，增加了“地主”和“土地改革”等新词汇。他的论文给教育部官员留下了深刻印象，以至于他们派官员视察了他的学校。1955 年秋天，他还受邀参加了在北京举行的具有里程碑意义的语言学会议，会上官员们做出了简化汉字以提高识字率的争议性决定。抵达首都后，他在北海公园绿树成荫的小道上自豪地拍了一张照片。[27]

After returning home to Zhenning, Ren Moxun was promoted to dean of the new Duyun Normal College for Nationalities, a teachers’ school for local ethnic minority students. His son Ren Zhengfei, then a middle schooler, was astonished when they moved to the county seat and saw the department store. It was his first time seeing a two-story building.[28]

回到镇宁后，任摩逊被提升为新成立的都匀民族师范学校教务主任，这是一所培养当地少数民族学生的师范学校。他的儿子任正非当时是一名中学生，当他们搬到县城看到百货大楼时感到非常惊讶。那是他第一次见到两层高的建筑。[28]

—

When Ren Moxun took up management of Duyun Normal College for Nationalities in 1958, Mao had just launched an ambitious national campaign dubbed the Great Leap Forward. The previous autumn, the Soviet Union had launched the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, a technological feat that stunned the world. The Soviet Union’s leader, Nikita Khrushchev, set a goal of surpassing the US in industrial output in fifteen years. Mao was inspired to follow suit, declaring that China would catch up with the United Kingdom in fifteen years.

1958 年任摩逊接手都匀民族师范学校的管理工作时，毛泽东刚刚发起了一场雄心勃勃的全国性运动，被称为“大跃进”。前一年秋天，苏联发射了世界上第一颗人造卫星“斯普特尼克 1 号”，这一技术壮举震惊了世界。苏联领导人尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫设定了在十五年内工业产值超过美国的目标。毛泽东受到启发也紧随其后，宣布中国将在十五年内赶上英国。

To meet such an astronomical goal, all of China would have to suspend business as usual for an emergency industrialization push. Duyun Normal College for Nationalities was no exception. Ren Moxun was ordered to halve the four-year curriculum to make time for steelmaking. His staff and students would work nights making steel while continuing their daytime classes, a grueling schedule.[29] The exhausted students could only catch up on sleep during the day, and their coursework suffered.

为了实现这样一个天文数字般的目标，全中国都必须暂停常规业务，投入到紧急的工业化冲刺中。都匀民族师范学校也不例外。任摩逊接到命令，将四年制的课程缩减一半，以便腾出时间炼钢。他的教职员工和学生将在继续白天上课的同时，利用晚上炼钢，这是一个极其艰苦的日程。[29] 疲惫不堪的学生只能在白天补觉，他们的学业受到了影响。

Some steel was produced in the nationwide drive, but a lot of the amateur efforts came to naught. As farmers neglected the fields and melted farming tools to try to meet steel quotas, the crops failed. By 1959, starvation was widespread across Guizhou Province and the nation. In some Guizhou towns, grain rations were reduced to several tablespoons per person per day.[30] Ren Moxun pleaded with local authorities to increase the students’ rations, arguing that they needed more food to complete their workloads. They stretched their rations by growing radishes in the schoolyard and gathering acorns to grind into meal. The dean had Communist Party members among the staff—seen as the most morally upstanding employees—take turns guarding the pantry from theft.[31]

在那场全国性的运动中，虽然生产出了一些钢铁，但许多业余尝试都化为乌有。由于农民疏于耕作，甚至熔化农具以试图完成钢铁指标，导致庄稼歉收。到 1959 年，饥荒已蔓延至贵州省及全国。在贵州的一些城镇，粮食配额被削减到每人每天仅几汤匙。[30] 任摩逊恳求地方当局增加学生的配额，理由是他们需要更多食物才能完成工作量。他们通过在校园里种萝卜和采集橡子磨粉来补充口粮。院长安排教职员工中的共产党员——他们被视为道德最高尚的员工——轮流看守食堂仓库以防被盗。[31]

Outside the schoolyard, the situation was even more dire. Local authorities across Guizhou were receiving reports of a swelling sickness.[32] Farmers’ abdomens were ballooning with fluid until it killed them. Investigations determined that the cause was starvation. By one historian’s estimate, 10 percent of Guizhou’s population died from the famine, one of the highest death rates in the country.[33] The famine coincided with local unrest: At one point, officials instructed Ren Moxun and his students to disperse a crowd of angry ethnic minority villagers, which they did with reluctance. It is not clear what the villagers were protesting.[34]

在校园之外，情况更为严峻。贵州各地的政府部门不断收到有关“肿病”的报告。[32] 农民的腹部因积水而鼓胀，直至死亡。调查确定病因是饥饿。据一位历史学家估计，贵州 10% 的人口死于这场饥荒，是全国死亡率最高的地区之一。[33] 饥荒发生时正值地方动乱：有一次，官员指示任摩逊和他的学生去驱散一群愤怒的少数民族村民，他们虽不情愿但也照做了。目前尚不清楚那些村民在抗议什么。[34]

Ren Moxun’s own family was struggling to put enough food on the table for their seven children. The family foraged wild roots, tasting them gingerly, unsure if they were edible.[35] They ate wild castor beans, which gave them diarrhea. Ren Zhengfei had been an excellent student in middle school, but now he found it hard to concentrate. In his sophomore year of high school, he had to retake the final exams.

任摩逊自己的家庭也在为让七个孩子吃饱饭而挣扎。全家人四处挖掘野根，小心翼翼地品尝，不确定是否可以食用。[35] 他们吃了野蓖麻子，结果导致腹泻。任正非在初中时曾是一名优秀的学生，但现在他发现自己很难集中注意力。在高二那年，他不得不参加期末考试补考。

As Ren prepared for the grueling college entrance exam, the gaokao, his mother encouraged him by slipping him an extra corn cake now and then to ease his hunger pangs.

在任正非准备艰苦的高考时，他的母亲为了缓解他的饥饿感，不时偷偷塞给他一块额外的玉米饼来鼓励他。

[picture]

Excerpted from a 1959 booklet about the Chongqing Institute of Architecture and Engineering, this photo shows a campus building designed and constructed by students.

这张照片摘自一本 1959 年关于重庆建筑工程学院的小册子，展示了一座由学生设计并建造的校园建筑。

—

In 1963, Ren Zhengfei was accepted to the Chongqing Institute of Architecture and Engineering (later merged into Chongqing University).[36] This was not an elite school like Tsinghua or Peking University in the capital. But for a small-town student who had just survived a famine, it was good enough indeed. Chongqing was a major inland city in Sichuan Province, which was known for its mouth-numbingly spicy cuisine and its surrounding bamboo forests, where giant pandas roamed. As a temporary wartime capital for the Nationalists in the early 1940s, it had munitions factories, heavy industry, and engineering schools.

1963 年，任正非考入了重庆建筑工程学院（后并入重庆大学）。[36] 这并不是像首都的清华或北大那样的顶尖学府。但对于一个刚从饥荒中幸存下来的小镇学生来说，这已经足够好了。重庆是四川省的一个重要内陆城市，以麻辣美食和周围大熊猫出没的竹林而闻名。作为 20 世纪 40 年代初国民党的战时陪都，这里拥有军工厂、重工业和工程院校。

The Great Leap Forward and the famine had ended, but Ren’s college experience was still not a normal one. Mao thought young people were spending too much time with their noses in books. They should be learning by building things with their hands, with the peasantry as their tutors. In early 1964, Mao ordered universities to thin out curriculums, making room for students to learn through practical work.[37] The professors at the Chongqing Institute of Architecture and Engineering were obliged to turn lectures into reading handouts and allow students to take open-book tests. Teams of students were sent out for stints on construction sites.[38] Mao also ordered universities to participate in nationwide defense preparations, with students run through militia drills.[39]

“大跃进”和饥荒已经结束，但任正非的大学经历依然不同寻常。毛泽东认为年轻人花太多时间埋头读书。他们应该通过亲手建造东西来学习，并以农民为师。1964 年初，毛泽东下令大学精简课程，为学生通过实践工作学习腾出空间。[37] 重庆建筑工程学院的教授们被迫将讲课改为发放阅读材料，并允许学生进行开卷考试。学生小组被派往建筑工地实习。[38] 毛泽东还下令大学参与全国性的国防准备，让学生进行民兵训练。[39]

On the morning of May 14, 1966, students awoke to find all classes suspended for three days.[40] Mao announced that class enemies had infiltrated the Communist Party and had to be rooted out. The Cultural Revolution had begun. At Ren’s university, students and teachers were told to write “big-character posters,” handwritten signs denouncing individuals as counterrevolutionaries. Before long, some four thousand posters papered the campus.[41] By the summer, the professors were in terror as growing numbers of them were denounced. More and more of Ren’s classmates wore the red armbands of the Red Guards, Mao’s youth paramilitary organization, which was spearheading the hunt for counterrevolutionaries.

1966 年 5 月 14 日上午，学生们醒来发现所有课程停课三天。[40] 毛泽东宣布阶级敌人已经渗透进共产党，必须将其铲除。文化大革命开始了。在任正非所在的大学，师生们被要求写“大字报”，即揭发个人为反革命分子的手写标语。不久，大约四千张大字报贴满了校园。[41] 到了夏天，随着越来越多的教授被批斗，他们陷入了恐惧之中。任正非的同学中，越来越多的人戴上了红卫兵的红色袖章，这是毛泽东的青少年准军事组织，正带头搜捕反革命分子。

As was happening elsewhere across the nation, Red Guards at Ren’s university overthrew the administration, forcing the professors to turn over the keys and official seal. They overthrew the Chongqing government as well. Teachers and students fled. Management of the college remained in chaos for the next two years. In February 1967, some fellow students at Ren’s university kidnapped Luo Guangbin, a local writer.[42] The Red Guards locked Luo up inside a room in the physics building on campus, denouncing him as a traitor who wrote reactionary novels, until he leaped from a window to his death.

正如全国其他地方发生的情况一样，任正非所在大学的红卫兵推翻了校行政部门，强迫教授们交出钥匙和公章。他们还推翻了重庆市政府。师生们四散逃离。在接下来的两年里，学院的管理一直处于混乱状态。1967 年 2 月，任正非学校的一些同学绑架了当地作家 罗广斌。[42] 红卫兵将罗广斌关在校园物理楼的一个房间里，指责他是写反动小说的叛徒，直到他跳窗坠亡。

Beyond the campus walls, Red Guards were staging deadly battles[43] in the streets of Chongqing as rival factions fought for dominance. The students had broken into the city’s military factories, seizing rifles, heavy artillery, and even tanks. Six middle schoolers and a college student were killed in a shootout on August 4, 1967.[44] Four days later, a Red Guard clash along a riverbank left 24 dead, 129 wounded. Chongqing was becoming one of the bloodiest sites of the Cultural Revolution. Some 1,700 Red Guards and civilians had been killed in the city by the time the violence receded in 1968, according to an independent historian’s estimate.[45]

在校园围墙之外，随着敌对派系争夺主导权，红卫兵在重庆街头进行着致命的武斗[43]。学生们闯入城市的军工厂，抢夺步枪、重炮甚至坦克。1967 年 8 月 4 日，六名中学生和一名大学生在一次枪战中丧生。[44] 四天后，江边的一场红卫兵冲突导致 24 人死亡，129 人受伤。重庆正成为文化大革命中流血冲突最严重的地点之一。据一位独立历史学家的估计，到 1968 年暴力平息时，该市约有 1,700 名红卫兵和平民被杀害。[45]

Ren Zhengfei watched from the sidelines with fear and a little envy.[46] His father’s bad political background meant that he could not join the Red Guards even if he wanted to. Instead, he buried himself in books, reading deeply on math and philosophy, as well as self-studying three foreign languages. Ren received letters from his mother periodically; they were largely banal, repeating party slogans. Mail was not private, and people were careful about what they put to paper. It was only through a friend who had met a student from his father’s school that he heard his father, too, was enduring brutal persecution.

任正非在旁带着恐惧和一丝羡慕观察着。[46] 他父亲糟糕的政治背景意味着，即便他想参加，也无法加入红卫兵。于是，他埋头于书丛，深研数学和哲学，并自学了三门外语。任正非定期收到母亲的来信；信件内容大多平淡乏味，重复着党政口号。邮件并非私密，人们对落于纸上的文字谨小慎微。直到通过一位见过他父亲学校学生的同学，他才得知父亲也正在遭受残酷的迫害。

Principal Ren Moxun’s background was all wrong. He’d grown up in material comfort, his father a successful ham maker in coastal Zhejiang Province.[47] The family had lived in a sprawling 1820s estate that was sometimes called the “Thirteen Rooms of the Ren Family.”[48] On the outside, the two-story home looked simple, with whitewashed walls and a gray-tiled roof in the common style. But the interior betrayed the family’s wealth and status: there were intricately carved wooden beams and balconies that surrounded a central courtyard, or siheyuan.[49] This bourgeois background was now a problem for Ren Moxun, along with his work at a Nationalist factory during the war. He had joined the Communist Party in 1958, but that was far too late to expiate these other sins.[50]

校长任摩逊的背景全错了。他在物质优渥的环境中长大，他的父亲是浙江沿海省份一位成功的火腿制造商。[47] 这一家人曾住在一座始建于 19 世纪 20 年代、规模宏大的庄园里，有时被称为“任家十三间”。[48] 从外面看，这座两层建筑显得朴素，有着常见的粉刷墙壁和灰瓦屋顶。但内部却显露了家族的财富和地位：雕梁画栋，回廊环绕着中央庭院，即四合院。[49] 这种布尔乔亚背景，加上他在战争期间曾在国民党工厂工作的经历，现在成了任摩逊的问题。他虽在 1958 年加入了共产党，但这远不足以赎清那些“罪孽”。[50]

Ren Moxun was hauled onto a platform in the school cafeteria, his hands tied, his face smeared with black ink, the tall hat of shame denoting a counterrevolutionary placed on his head.[51] “Studying is useless!” people shouted. “The more knowledge you possess, the more reactionary you are!”[52]

任摩逊被拽上学校食堂的台子，双手被捆绑，脸上涂抹着黑墨水，头上戴着象征反革命分子的耻辱高帽。[51] “读书无用！”人们喊道，“知识越多越反动！”[52]

One of Ren Moxun’s students demanded the principal admit that he’d instilled feudalist thinking in the students, such as by quoting Confucius. According to a recollective essay by Feng Jugao, a different student, when Ren Moxun tried to deny the accusation, the accuser rushed forward with a wooden stick and beat him until the stick broke.[53] “I can’t say if the wooden stick was weak, or if Principal Ren’s backbone was strong,” Feng wrote. “But the wooden stick broke in two across Principal Ren’s back.” Feng recalled his mother being aghast, saying that the students who beat the principal would get their karmic punishment.

任摩逊的一名学生要求校长承认他向学生灌输了封建主义思想，例如引用孔子的话。根据另一名学生冯居高的一篇回忆文章，当任摩逊试图否认指控时，控告者冲上前去，用木棍殴打他，直到木棍折断。[53] “我不知道是木棍太脆弱，还是任校长的脊梁骨太硬，”冯写道，“但木棍在任校长的背上断成了两截。”冯回忆说，他的母亲当时吓坏了，说殴打校长的学生会遭到报应。

Ren Moxun was put on a truck with other “rightists” and driven around town with a sign looped around his neck as a warning.[54] One of his colleagues—the school’s party secretary, Huang Xuanqian—couldn’t endure the torments and committed suicide.[55] Ren Moxun also considered ending his life, but he didn’t want to die before his name was cleared, as it would leave his wife and children with a cloud over them. “If he died,” Ren Zhengfei explained, “his children would have to carry this political burden…. He endured a hundred tortures, but he would not kill himself.”[56] Ren Moxun was sent to a labor camp.[57]

任摩逊和其他“右派”一起被推上卡车，脖子上挂着牌子在镇上游街示众，以儆效尤。[54] 他的一位同事——学校党支部书记黄宣谦——因无法忍受折磨而自杀。[55] 任摩逊也曾考虑过结束生命，但他不想在名誉洗清之前死去，因为那会给他的妻儿留下阴影。 “如果他死了，”任正非解释道，“他的孩子们就必须背负这个政治包袱……他忍受了百般折磨，但绝不自杀。”[56] 任摩逊随后被送往劳改营。[57]

“The Cultural Revolution was a disaster for the nation,” Ren Zhengfei later wrote. “But for us it was a baptism. It made me politically mature, so that I wasn’t just a simple bookworm.”[58]

“文化大革命对国家来说是一场灾难，”任正非后来写道，“但对我们来说是一次洗礼。它让我政治上成熟了，不再仅仅是一个简单的书呆子。”[58]

—

Universities nationwide were banned from matriculating any new students between 1966 and 1976. Ren Zhengfei’s younger siblings were shut out, but through the random luck of his birth year, he’d been able to eke out a college education. In 1968, Ren graduated with a major in heating, gas supply, and ventilation engineering.[59]

1966 年至 1976 年间，全国高校被禁止招收新学生。任正非的弟弟妹妹们被拒之门外，但由于出生年份的偶然运气，他得以勉强完成大学教育。1968 年，任正非毕业，主修供热、供气与通风工程专业。[59]

The year of Ren’s graduation, Mao began his “rusticated youth” campaign, sending millions of urban youths to the countryside to be reeducated by laboring alongside the peasantry. Some of the young people were obliged to farm for years—planting corn, hoeing potatoes—before they were allowed to resume their lives back home. Many others never made it back, having put down roots in the countryside by the time they were allowed to return to the cities.

在任正非毕业的那一年，毛泽东发起了“上山下乡”运动，将数百万城市青年送到农村，通过与农民并肩劳动接受再教育。一些年轻人被迫务农多年——种玉米、锄土豆——才被允许回到城市恢复生活。还有许多人再也没能回来，在被允许返城时，他们已在农村扎下了根。

Ren was also assigned to rural labor, but he was luckier than many. Guizhou Province was a stone’s throw from the border with Vietnam, and for several years already, Mao had been funneling artillery, shells, tanks, radio transmitters, and telephones to Hanoi to aid Vietnam’s fight against the Americans. The hills of Guizhou provided good air cover, so the Chinese military had burrowed in there, building secret air bases and camouflaged factories. Whatever the political rhetoric against science, Mao needed an enormous number of trained engineers to keep the gears turning in the proxy war. And so as Ren left university, he found himself assigned to the familiar hills of Guizhou, not to hoe potatoes or to make steel but to help build a secret military production site code-named 011.[60]

任正非也被分配去农村劳动，但他比许多人更幸运。贵州省距离越南边境仅一步之遥，几年来，毛泽东一直向河内输送大炮、炮弹、坦克、无线电发射机和电话，以援助越南抗击美国。贵州的山区提供了良好的空中掩护，因此中国军队在那里安营扎寨，建造秘密空军基地和伪装工厂。无论针对科学的政治辞令如何，毛泽东都需要大量训练有素的工程师来维持这场代理战争的运转。因此，当任正非离开大学时，他发现自己被分配到了熟悉的贵州群山中，不是去锄土豆或炼钢，而是去协助建设一个代号为“011”的秘密军事生产基地。[60]

2

2

The Factory in the Cave

山洞里的工厂

Ren’s Military Years: 1968–1982

任正非的军旅生涯：1968–1982

Guizhou Province is a land of hills and caves. The thin topsoil sits on pale limestone, eroded over the eons by rain.[1] As underground sinkholes collapsed, they formed an ethereal terrain of caverns, hills, and valleys. Guizhou’s city builders flattened some of the hills and filled in some of the valleys, but there were too many, so they had to build around them. Persistent fog shrouds the region. In ancient times, superstitious travelers from the north believed it to be noxious vapors that caused disease. But now Mao’s troops saw the land from a new perspective: it was the perfect spot to hide a fighter jet factory.

贵州省是一片丘陵和溶洞遍布的土地。薄薄的表层土覆盖在苍白的石灰岩上，历经万古雨水的侵蚀。[1] 随着地下陷坑的塌陷，这里形成了由洞穴、山丘和山谷构成的空灵地貌。贵州的城市建设者铲平了一些山丘，填平了一些山谷，但由于山丘实在太多，他们不得不绕着山走。持久的浓雾笼罩着这一地区。在古代，来自北方的迷信游客认为那是会导致疾病的瘴气。但现在，毛泽东的军队从一个新的视角看待这片土地：这里是隐藏战斗机工厂的绝佳地点。

The project was dubbed 011, and long after it had ceased operation, people still found it mysterious. “ ‘It was a secret unit of China’s in Guizhou,’ ” the local state-run newspaper, Anshun Daily, reported residents saying decades later.[2] “ ‘People say it was a military factory that manufactured aircraft.’ ” According to one former employee, it didn’t have a regular address for receiving mail.[3]

该项目被称为 011 基地，在停止运行很久之后，人们仍然觉得它很神秘。“‘那是中国在贵州的一个秘密单位，’”当地官媒《安顺日报》在数十年后报道了居民们的说法。[2] “‘人们说那是一家制造飞机的军工厂。’”据一位前员工称，它甚至没有一个常规的收信地址。[3]

Ren Zhengfei arrived at Base 011 following his 1968 college graduation. After spending his teenage years in deprivation and turmoil, he had emerged a compact young man, with the same tall forehead, triangular eyes, and bookish bent as his father. He tended toward melancholy, and he would have a lifelong habit of fearing worst-case scenarios. The worst was happening to many people in the Cultural Revolution, but Ren had been lucky. He’d arrived in one of the few places in the nation where he could continue scientific studies without fear of political peril: the military.

1968 年大学毕业后，任正非来到了 011 基地。在经历了贫困和动荡的青少年时期后，他成长为一个结实的年轻人，有着和父亲一样的高额头、三角眼和书卷气。他倾向于忧郁，并且一生都保持着担心最坏情况发生的习惯。在文化大革命中，最坏的情况正发生在许多人身上，但任正非是幸运的。他来到了全国少数几个可以无须担心政治危险而继续科学研究的地方之一：军队。

Beijing had ordered Base 011’s construction[4] in 1964, as the Vietnam War raged to the south. China’s leaders were anxious to avoid open war with the US, but there was a real risk that the war would spill over the border. So they ordered the construction of Base 011 and other installations as part of a sweeping military-industrial production campaign. Guizhou was not directly on the border but not far removed either. US intelligence observed three new Chinese air bases being constructed.[5] Across the province, residents were ordered to dig bomb shelters. Deng Xiaoping, a senior official who would become one of the nation’s longest-ruling leaders, visited the area himself to survey the preparations.[6]

1964 年，随着南方的越南战争愈演愈烈，北京下令建设 011 基地[4]。中国领导人急于避免与美国发生公开战争，但战争蔓延到边境的风险确实存在。因此，他们下令建设 011 基地和其他设施，作为大规模军工生产运动的一部分。贵州虽不直接位于边境，但也相距不远。美国情报部门观察到中国正在建设三个新的空军基地。[5] 在全省范围内，居民被要求挖掘防空洞。后来成为国家长期领导人之一的高级官员邓小平也亲自视察了该地区，调研备战情况。[6]

Base 011 wasn’t a single manufacturing site; it was a network of dozens of factories scattered across caverns outside the town of Anshun in central Guizhou. The dispersed setup made it harder to see from the air—harder, too, to sabotage. The project covered more than half a square kilometer and cost a staggering 1.1 billion yuan ($160 million in US dollars based on current exchange rates).[7] More than 2,000 employees of the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation were transplanted from the far northeast to set it up, and there were plans for 35,500 people to work there at full capacity.[8] Officials had originally hoped that planes could start rolling out of Base 011 in 1968, the year of Ren’s university graduation. But the schedule was delayed, as rebels seized control of the facility during the Cultural Revolution.[9] Beijing officials were impatient about the delays, ordering Base 011 to produce fighter jets by 1970.[10]

011 基地并非单一的制造场所，而是一个由数十家工厂组成的网络，散布在贵州中部安顺市郊外的溶洞中。这种分散的布局使其更难从空中被发现，也更难被破坏。该项目占地超过半平方公里，耗资高达 11 亿元人民币（按当前汇率计算约为 1.6 亿美元）。[7] 沈阳飞机工业公司的 2000 多名员工从遥远的东北被抽调至此进行建设，并计划在满负荷运转时容纳 35,500 人在此工作。[8] 官方最初希望飞机能在 1968 年（即任正非大学毕业那年）从 011 基地下线。但由于造反派在文化大革命期间夺取了设施的控制权，进度被推迟了。[9] 北京官员对延期感到不耐烦，命令 011 基地必须在 1970 年前生产出战斗机。[10]

According to Ren, he had to work two years as a cook first, since he was an “intellectual” who required reeducation. From there, he progressed to plumber, then to technician. In his spare time, he said, he self-studied electronics. Asked if his work there was related to communications technology, he replied, “What I did back then had nothing to do with communications. I was just an ordinary construction worker, just like today’s migrant workers in cities.”[11]

据任正非称，由于他是需要接受再教育的“知识分子”，他必须先当两年厨师。之后，他晋升为水管工，然后是技术员。他说，在业余时间，他自学了电子学。当被问及他在那里的工作是否与通信技术有关时，他回答说：“我当时所做的与通信毫无关系。我只是一个普通的建筑工人，就像今天城市里的农民工一样。”[11]

At first, living conditions were primitive. The dorms had been hastily erected by piling stones into walls without mortar, so the wind and wet whistled straight through. With no plumbing, workers drew their drinking water straight out of rice paddies.[12] “You cannot imagine how tough it was back then,” one worker recalled to a local magazine. “We all bunked together in the shabby stone houses, and we were hungry.”

起初，生活条件非常简陋。宿舍是用石头堆砌成墙、没有砂浆抹缝的临时建筑，风雨可以直接穿堂而过。由于没有自来水，工人们直接从稻田里取水饮用。[12] “你无法想象当时有多艰苦，”一位工人在接受当地杂志采访时回忆道，“我们都挤在破烂的石屋里，而且很饿。”

To Huawei’s detractors, Ren’s military past would be viewed as his original sin. It led to all the other questions about how closely the company was linked to the Chinese government and the party. It was a reason why officials in Washington began taking an interest in Huawei in the late 1990s, recalled James Lewis, who was working at the US Commerce Department on international technology issues.[13] “That was one of the questions,” Lewis said. “How strong is his connection back to his former employers?”

对于华为的批评者来说，任正非的军方背景被视为他的“原罪”。这引发了关于该公司与中国政府和党联系程度的所有其他质疑。曾在美商务部负责国际技术问题的詹姆斯·刘易斯（James Lewis）回忆说，这也是华盛顿官员在 20 世纪 90 年代末开始对华为产生兴趣的原因之一。[13] “那是核心问题之一，”刘易斯说，“他与前雇主的联系到底有多深？”

Huawei would downplay Ren’s military tenure over the years. “Mr. Ren’s military service did not involve Chinese signal intelligence in any way,” a Huawei executive told the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in a sworn declaration.[14] Huawei said that Ren’s work at Base 011 took place through the Second Company of the State Construction Commission’s Third Bureau.[15] “This company constructed buildings for the 011 factory, but was not actually part of the military. With this company, Mr. Ren was not a soldier,” Huawei’s statement said.

多年来，华为一直淡化任正非的服役经历。“任先生的服役经历完全不涉及中国的信号情报工作，”一位华为高管在向美国联邦通信委员会（FCC）提交的宣誓声明中表示。[14] 华为称，任正非在 011 基地的工作是通过国家建委三局二公司进行的。[15] “这家公司为 011 工厂建造房屋，但实际上并不属于军队。在这家公司工作期间，任先生并不是一名士兵，”华为的声明如是说。

Huawei was probably right in that Ren’s military background was not the key factor in understanding the company’s later connections with China’s government. Over the years, Huawei’s business interests would become intertwined with those of Beijing in numerous ways that did not have any apparent connection to Ren’s early days as an army engineer. But there is no doubt that Ren’s experience in the military helped shape his worldview. He would inculcate Huawei with a military-esque culture, running new hires through army-inspired boot camps and emphasizing discipline and personal sacrifice. He peppered his speeches with military analogies and references to famous battles. Years later, he still carried himself with a soldier’s bearing.

华为或许是对的，任正非的军方背景并非理解该公司后来与中国政府联系的关键因素。多年来，华为的商业利益与北京的利益以多种方式交织在一起，而这些联系与任正非早年担任陆军工程师的经历并无明显关联。但毫无疑问，任正非的参军经历帮助塑造了他的世界观。他为华为注入了军事化的文化，让新员工参加受军队启发的入职培训营，并强调纪律和个人牺牲。他在演讲中充斥着军事类比和对著名战役的引用。多年后，他依然保持着军人的姿态。

—

At some point after his university graduation, Ren was introduced to a young woman named Meng Jun, who was the daughter of Sichuan Province’s vice-governor, Meng Dongbo.[16] According to a history of the Red Guards in Chongqing by the Chinese historian He Shu, Meng Jun had been a student at the Chongqing Medical College.[17] A fellow student recalled her as tall, bespectacled, and not a great beauty, but carrying herself with a noble bearing.[18] “I don’t know what she saw in me,” Ren said, “because she was already somebody and I was nobody.”[19]

在大学毕业后的某个时间点，任正非经人介绍认识了一位名叫孟军的年轻女子，她是四川省副省长孟东波的女儿。[16] 根据中国历史学家何蜀关于重庆红卫兵的历史记载，孟军曾是重庆医学院[17]的学生。一位同学回忆她身材高挑，戴着眼镜，虽非绝色美女，但举手投足间透着一股高贵气质。[18] “我不知道她看上了我什么，”任正非说，“因为她当时已经是个大人物，而我还是个无名小卒。”[19]

Jun meant “military,” and it was an odd name for a young woman. But in Mao’s China, it had become trendy for young women to take on militant names and tomboy styles. Mao had outlawed the crippling practice of foot-binding for girls and encouraged women to take their places on the battlefield and on the assembly line. Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, a former movie star, eschewed makeup and jewelry and wore loose, androgynous clothes. Young women across the nation imitated her. Ren described Meng Jun as “very tough.”[20]

“军”意为“军事”，对一名年轻女性来说，这是一个有些奇怪的名字。但在毛泽东时代的中国，年轻女性取武斗化的名字、走假小子风格已成为一种潮流。毛泽东废除了残害女性的缠足陋习，鼓励妇女走向战场和生产线。毛泽东的妻子江青曾是一名影星，她摒弃了化妆品和珠宝，穿着宽松的中性服装。全国各地的年轻女性纷纷效仿。任正非形容孟军“非常刚强”。[20]

While Ren’s bad political background had ruled him out of membership in Mao’s youth paramilitary group, the Red Guards, Meng Jun was exactly the kind of upstanding youngster whom officials wanted to recruit into the organization. She was appointed deputy political commissar for the Mao Zedong Thought Red Guards, or Thought Guards, a Chongqing-based branch of Red Guards backed by the local government.[21] Ren has said that Meng Jun led some three hundred thousand Red Guards.[22]

虽然任正非糟糕的政治背景让他无法加入毛泽东的青年准军事组织——红卫兵，但孟军正是官方想要招募的那种根正苗红的青年。她被任命为“毛泽东思想红卫兵”（简称“思想兵”）的副政委，这是重庆一个由当地政府支持的红卫兵分支。[21] 任正非曾说，孟军当时领导着大约三十万红卫兵。[22]

Meng Jun’s father, Meng Dongbo, was a large-framed man with a toothy smile[23] and the proletarian background that higher-ups found trustworthy.[24] He’d been raised by his impoverished grandfather in Wuxi, as his widowed mother worked in Shanghai to try to pay off the family’s debts. As a schoolboy in the days of Nationalist rule, Meng Dongbo had begun working for an underground Communist cell, taking on the dangerous task of delivering secret notes sewn into the lining of his jacket. Meng Dongbo was a quick study, and he even picked up some English during a stint working at British American Tobacco in Shanghai as a teenager. After joining Mao’s troops in Yan’an in 1938 at the age of nineteen, he swiftly rose through the ranks.[25] By the time Mao launched his Great Leap Forward steelmaking drive in 1958, Meng Dongbo was head of metallurgy for Sichuan,[26] China’s most populous province. Under orders from his bosses, he oversaw Sichuan’s construction of thousands of primitive kilns to smelt iron across the countryside, a disruption of farming that contributed to the deadly famine that followed.[27]

孟军的父亲孟东波身材魁梧，笑容可掬，[23] 拥有上级信任的无产阶级背景。[24] 他在无锡由贫穷的祖父抚养长大，而他守寡的母亲则在上海打工，试图偿还家里的债务。在国民党统治时期，还是学生的孟东波就开始为共产党地下小组工作，承担起运送缝在夹克衬里里的秘密纸条的危险任务。孟东波好学敏锐，青少年时期在上海英美烟草公司工作期间甚至学会了一些英语。1938 年，19 岁的他在延安参加了毛泽东的部队，随后职级迅速提升。[25] 到 1958 年毛泽东发动“大跃进”炼钢运动时，孟东波已担任中国人口最多的省份——四川省的冶金厅厅长。[26] 在上级的命令下，他监督四川在农村建造了数千座原始土炉来熔炼钢铁，这种对农业生产的破坏导致了随后的致命饥荒。[27]

By the time the Cultural Revolution was beginning in 1966, Meng Dongbo was Sichuan’s vice-governor.[28] As Mao became paranoid of enemies hidden within the party’s ranks, he ordered a purge of senior officials. Meng Dongbo’s boss, Li Jingquan, the tan, gap-toothed Sichuan chief, was now public enemy number one, with massive public rallies held to criticize him.[29] Li was thrown in prison[30] after being accused of ideological crimes ranging from opposing the construction of a factory that would print Mao Zedong’s writings[31] to reading salacious novels from the library.[32] His deputies were also implicated. One poster that hung in the street accused Meng Dongbo of scheming to help Li organize pro-government worker groups.[33]

到 1966 年文化大革命开始时，孟东波已是四川省副省长。[28] 随着毛泽东对党内隐藏的敌人变得愈发多疑，他下令清洗高级官员。孟东波的上司、皮肤黝黑且牙缝明显的四川省委第一书记李井泉，成了当时的头号公敌，群众举行了大规模集会对他进行批判。[29] 李井泉被投入监狱，[30] 被指控的意识形态罪名从反对建设印刷毛泽东著作的工厂[31] 到从图书馆阅读黄色小说不等。[32] 他的副手们也受到牵连。街头张贴的一张海报指责孟东波策划帮助李井泉组织亲政府的工人组织。[33]

Meng Dongbo was “brutally persecuted and criticized,” according to the Sichuan Daily, the state-run provincial newspaper.[34] He was sent to a labor camp[35] along with thousands of other officials, where they were stripped of their titles and called “cadets.” The cadets planted crops, fed pigs, built houses, and dug wells.[36]

据省委机关报《四川日报》报道，孟东波遭到了“残酷的迫害和批判”。[34] 他与其他数千名官员一起被送往劳改营，[35] 在那里他们被剥夺了头衔，被称为“学员”。这些学员种庄稼、喂猪、盖房子、挖井。[36]

His daughter Meng Jun also suffered. She and the others in the government-backed Thought Guards had quickly come under attack from more radical student groups that accused them of being puppeteered by corrupt officials. Meng Jun was pressured into denouncing the local government and the Thought Guards, according to several accounts.[37] The Chongqing Red Guard factions soon deteriorated into deadly firefights in the streets.

他的女儿孟军也遭遇了不幸。她和政府支持的“思想兵”中的其他人很快遭到了更激进的学生组织的攻击，后者指责他们是受腐败官员操纵的傀儡。据几份记录显示，孟军被迫公开谴责当地政府和“思想兵”。[37] 重庆的红卫兵派系冲突很快演变成街头的致命武斗。

[picture]

A 1967 public rally in Chengdu to denounce Sichuan’s then party secretary, Li Jingquan.

1967 年成都市举行的一场公开集会，旨在批判当时的四川省委书记李井泉。

The upheaval of the Cultural Revolution had been a great equalizer. In another time, it might have been unlikely for a small-town school principal’s son to find himself in the orbit of a vice-governor’s daughter. But with both their fathers in labor camps, Ren Zhengfei and Meng Jun began courting. At their wedding, Ren’s siblings, who had been assigned to manual labor like digging sand and building railroads, scraped together a modest sum of cash for a gift.[38]

文化大革命的动荡成了巨大的平等器。在另一个时代，一个小镇校长的儿子几乎不可能进入副省长女儿的社交圈。但由于两人的父亲都在劳改营，任正非和孟军开始交往。在他们的婚礼上，任正非那些被分配去挖沙子、修铁路等体力劳动的兄弟姐妹们，凑了一小笔钱作为贺礼。[38]

—

On September 18, 1970, Base 011 delivered on Beijing officials’ demands. Its first fighter jet, a Shenyang J-6 III, based on a Soviet design, made a successful test flight.[39] It was a small plane, cigar-shaped, with an engine under each wing and a clear bubble around the cockpit. That first flight must have been a magical moment for everyone there. From caves in the backcountry, they had produced a hulking piece of metal that could float through the air.

1970 年 9 月 18 日，011 基地交付了北京官员要求的成果。其首架基于苏联设计的战斗机——歼-6 III 型成功试飞。[39] 那是一架雪茄形状的小型飞机，两翼下方各有一个发动机，驾驶舱上方覆盖着透明的圆顶罩。在那个时刻，对于现场的每一个人来说，首飞一定是个神奇的瞬间。在偏远山区的山洞里，他们制造出了一件能在空中漂浮的庞大金属机器。

Base 011 became more sophisticated over the years. One former employee recalled a unit of technological intelligence officers conversant in foreign languages working there on research projects ranging from jet engine construction to mining explosives.[40]

随着时间的推移，011 基地的技术水平日益精进。一位前员工回忆说，那里有一个精通外语的技术情报官单位，从事的研究项目涵盖了从喷气发动机制造到采矿炸药等各个领域。[40]

In 1972, Ren and Meng Jun welcomed their first child, Meng Wanzhou. Wanzhou meant “evening boat,” and the name was part of a Chinese idiom describing a beautiful scene at sunset. Days later, Richard Nixon set foot in Beijing, a historic first visit to Communist China by a US president. The United Nations had also recognized Mao’s People’s Republic of China after years of clinging to recognition of the defeated Nationalists, who had fled to the island of Taiwan at the end of the civil war. After decades of being international pariahs, China’s Communists were finding acceptance into the world.

1972 年，任正非和孟军迎来了他们的第一个孩子孟晚舟。晚舟意为“傍晚的小船”，这个名字取自形容日落美景的中文成语。几天后，理查德·尼克松踏上北京的土地，这是美国总统对共产主义中国的首次历史性访问。在多年坚持承认战败并逃往台湾岛的国民党政权后，联合国也承认了毛泽东领导的中华人民共和国。在经历了数十年的国际孤立后，中国的共产党人正逐渐被世界所接纳。

By 1974, Ren had been transferred to Xi’an, the ancient gate of the Silk Road and the capital of Shaanxi Province, to train at the Xi’an Instruments Factory,[41] which made thermometers, pressure gauges, and other specialized gadgets used in scientific labs and industry. It was there, through a university lecture by the Chinese computing pioneer Wu Jikang, that he learned about computers for the first time.[42] Ren didn’t understand much of the lecture, but he felt inspired.

到 1974 年，任正非被调往丝绸之路的古老门户、陕西省省会西安，在西安仪表厂[41]接受培训。该厂生产温度计、压力表以及用于科学实验室和工业的其他专业设备。正是在那里，通过中国计算机先驱吴几康的一场大学讲座，他第一次了解了计算机。[42] 任正非对讲座内容理解不多，但他深受启发。

That same year, Ren was dispatched to Liaoyang in the frigid northeast, a remote site about one hundred miles from China’s border with North Korea, as part of a construction arm of the People’s Liberation Army called the Engineering Corps.[43] His wife stayed behind in Chengdu with their two-year-old daughter, Meng Wanzhou, whom Ren affectionately nicknamed Piggy.[44] Their son, Ren Ping, was born about a year into Ren’s Liaoyang posting. He had only a month’s home leave each year, preventing him from forming a closer bond with his children.

同年，任正非作为中国人民解放军基建工程兵的一员，被派往寒冷的东北地区辽阳，那是距离中朝边境约一百英里的偏远地带。[43] 他的妻子留在成都，带着两岁的女儿孟晚舟，任正非亲昵地给女儿起外号叫“猪猪”。[44] 他们的儿子任平在任正非驻扎辽阳约一年后出生。他每年只有一个月的探亲假，这使他无法与孩子们建立更亲密的关系。

Ren’s troops had been tasked with helping China manufacture nylon and polyester, which had been invented in the United States in the 1930s[45] and which were still mysterious foreign textiles that no Chinese company could produce. This was a top-level project ordered by Mao himself.[46] If China could weave textiles out of petrochemicals, it could alleviate the dire shortage of cotton cloth, which was still rationed. Ren himself had grown up without enough shirts: as a high schooler, he had to wear the same thick shirts year-round.[47] Nylon was also useful for the military, with US troops using it for everything from parachutes to aircraft fuel tanks to flak jackets.

任正非所在的部队接到的任务是帮助中国制造尼龙和涤纶。这些材料于 20 世纪 30 年代在美国发明[45]，当时对中国企业而言仍是无法生产的神秘外国纺织品。这是毛泽东亲自下令的顶级项目。[46] 如果中国能用石油化工产品织出布料，就能缓解当时仍需凭票供应的棉布严重短缺的问题。任正非自己就是在缺衣少穿的环境下长大的：读高中时，他一年四季都不得不穿着同样厚重的衬衫。[47] 尼龙对军事也大有裨益，美军将其广泛应用于从降落伞到飞机油箱再到防弹背心的各种装备。

A number of foreign companies had lobbied for the lucrative factory project. In a nod to diplomatic considerations, Mao’s government awarded the contract to France’s Technip and Speichim: France had been the first Western power to recognize Mao as China’s leader.[48] The project was hailed as the largest ever between France and Mao’s China.[49]

许多外国公司曾为这个利润丰厚的工厂项目进行游说。出于外交考量，毛泽东政府将合同授予了法国的德希尼布（Technip）和斯派西姆（Speichim）公司：法国是第一个承认毛泽东为中国领导人的西方大国。[48] 该项目被誉为当时法国与毛泽东领导下的中国之间规模最大的合作。[49]

There were ambitious plans to build a factory town with capacity for hundreds of French engineers and some seventy thousand Chinese workers. But when Ren and his colleagues arrived, there was still no housing, and they had to camp in the grass.[50] Ren later said he ended up in Liaoyang because the government was having trouble staffing the project. “No team answered the call,” he said. “Therefore, the government had to mobilize military teams to build the factory.”[51] Some of the workers were also drawn from reeducation camps for local officials, who were promised a second chance if they worked hard.[52]

当时有一项宏伟计划，要建造一座能容纳数百名法国工程师和约七万名中国工人的工厂小镇。但当任正非和同事们到达时，那里还没有住房，他们不得不露宿草地。[50] 任正非后来表示，他之所以去辽阳，是因为政府在为该项目招募人员时遇到了困难。“没有队伍响应号召，”他说，“因此，政府不得不动员军队来建设工厂。”[51] 部分工人还来自当地官员的再教育营，他们被许诺如果努力工作就能获得重新开始的机会。[52]

The project was woefully behind schedule. The construction teams had neglected to first lay down the pipes for carrying corrosive chemicals, which had to run underneath everything else. When they realized their mistake, they had to tear everything up and start again. “It was a mess,” the factory’s party secretary, Qi Yushun, recalled.[53] The delays were so severe that the project was publicly criticized in the People’s Daily, the party’s mouthpiece paper in Beijing, as an example of the failures that resulted from the “reactionary nature” and “wolfish ambition to restore capitalism” of Deng Xiaoping—then a senior Beijing official who was in the process of being purged from Mao’s inner circle.[54]

项目进度严重滞后。施工队忽略了先铺设输送腐蚀性化学物质的管道，而这些管道必须埋在所有设施的最底层。当他们意识到错误时，不得不拆除一切重新开始。“那真是一团糟，”工厂党委书记齐玉顺回忆道。[53] 延误情况非常严重，以至于该项目在党在北京的喉舌报纸《人民日报》上遭到公开批评，被当作邓小平——当时正处于被清洗出毛泽东核心圈子过程中的北京高级官员——的“反动本质”和“复辟资本主义的狼子野心”所导致失败的典型案例。[54]

The staff dorms had been constructed hastily, and the walls soon cracked, letting the chill wind through. They shivered in the cold in their dark-green cotton uniforms. The hot water supply was spotty in the dorms. It was hard to even get vegetables beyond pickled cabbage and radish in the cold months,[55] let alone grape wine, a privation felt deeply by the French engineers stationed in Liaoyang for the project.[56] Still, Ren was appreciative of his time there. “The factory was like an oasis in the desert,” Ren later said. “It was really difficult to find a place in China at the time where reading technical books wouldn’t be treated as a political mistake.”[57]

员工宿舍盖得很仓促，墙壁很快就裂开了，寒风直往里灌。他们穿着深绿色的棉军装在寒冷中瑟瑟发抖。宿舍的热水供应也断断续续。在寒冷的月份里，除了酸菜和萝卜，甚至很难吃到其他蔬菜[55]，更不用说葡萄酒了，这让驻扎在辽阳参与项目的法国工程师深感匮乏。[56] 尽管如此，任正非依然很感激那段时光。“那个工厂就像沙漠里的一片绿洲，”任正非后来回忆道，“在当时的中国，很难找到一个读技术书籍不会被视为政治错误的地方。”[57]

Ren’s unit was assigned to test and calibrate the imported French factory equipment. These devices were things like differential pressure transmitters, gauges that measured the rate of flow through a pipe.[58] To test them, Ren needed a machine that could produce a precise amount of air pressure, with any variations smaller than a twentieth of a percentage point. Ren’s team had only crude Soviet-made mercury gauges from the 1950s. After learning about a precision version made by the US company Ametek with a floating ball over a nozzle, Ren determined that he would make his own, becoming obsessed with the research project.[59]

任正非所在的部队被指派负责调试和校准进口的法国工厂设备。这些设备包括差压变送器，即测量管道流量的仪表。[58] 为了测试这些设备，任正非需要一台能产生精确气压的机器，其误差必须小于百分之零点零五。任正非的团队当时只有 20 世纪 50 年代苏联制造的粗糙水银压力计。在了解到美国阿美特克（Ametek）公司生产的一种带有喷嘴浮球的精密型号后，任正非决定自己研制一台，并对这个研究项目到了痴迷的地步。[59]

“He was so devoted to his research that he worked night and day, and lost all track of time,” read a profile of him in the PLA Engineering Corps’ internal newspaper. “As a result, he was suffering from hair loss, insomnia, and bad appetite. Wrinkles were deeply etched on his forehead already, though he was only at the age of 33.”[60]

“他潜心钻研，废寝忘食，到了忘我的境地，”解放军基建工程兵的一份内部报纸在关于他的简介中写道。“由于长期劳累，他头发脱落，失眠，食欲不振。尽管年仅 33 岁，额头上已刻下了深深的皱纹。”[60]

3

3

A New Start

一个新的开始

China’s Economic Reforms Begin: 1976–1984

中国经济改革拉开序幕：1976–1984

The fortunes of the Ren and Meng families changed abruptly on September 9, 1976. At 4:00 p.m., radios across the country carried the solemn announcement that Mao Zedong had died. Within weeks, Mao’s wife and her allies had been arrested. The Cultural Revolution was over.

1976 年 9 月 9 日，任家和孟家的命运发生了骤变。下午 4 点，全国各地的收音机里传来了庄严的公告：毛泽东逝世。几周之内，毛的妻子及其盟友被捕。文化大革命结束了。

It was a new lease on life for Ren Zhengfei’s father, Ren Moxun, and his father-in-law, Meng Dongbo. Both had suffered in labor camps and were now allowed to resume their work and lives. Ren Moxun was sixty-six. It was bitter for him to accept that some of the prime years of his career had been lost so senselessly. “Like Don Quixote, they set up all sorts of imaginary enemies,” he wrote about the campaign. “They endlessly pursued a ‘class struggle’ that distorted facts.”[1] His wife, Cheng Yuanzhao, had also survived, but she had severe hearing loss after a bout of untreated tuberculosis.[2]

这对任正非的父亲任摩逊和岳父孟东波来说，是获得了新生。两人都曾在劳改营中受苦，现在获准恢复工作和生活。任摩逊当时六十六岁。对他来说，接受职业生涯中一些黄金岁月就这样毫无意义地流逝是痛苦的。“他们像唐·吉诃德一样，树立了各种假想敌，”他在谈到这场运动时写道，“他们无休止地追求‘阶级斗争’，歪曲事实。”[1] 他的妻子程远昭也幸存了下来，但在经历了一场未经治疗的肺结核后，她的听力严重受损。[2]

Ren Moxun emerged from the Cultural Revolution with a demotion. Freed from the labor camp, the former university dean was named principal of Duyun No. 1 Middle School in 1979.[3] The school was in a sad state. Red Guards had trashed much of its equipment, which symbolized old ideas and old customs. Most of the desks and chairs had gone missing. Teachers had tried to hide cartloads of the school’s books, but these had been found and burned. Around half the teachers, some thirty instructors, had been denounced and persecuted. Two math teachers had been killed, and a history teacher had died of illness during forced labor.[4] Well into his sixties, Ren Moxun was past retirement age in China, but he did not want to retire. He could finally work again. “I am proud of the political caliber of the older generation,” he later wrote. “As soon as they were let out of the labor camps, as soon as they’d recovered organizational life, they worked as hard as they could.”[5]

任摩逊从文革中走出来时被降了职。1979 年，这位前大学教务长从劳改营获释，被任命为都匀一中的校长。[3] 当时的学校状况凄惨。红卫兵捣毁了大部分设备，因为这些设备象征着旧思想和旧习俗。大部分课桌椅都不见了。老师们曾试图藏起成车的学校藏书，但还是被发现并焚烧了。大约一半的教师，约三十名教员，曾遭到谴责和迫害。两名数学老师被杀害，一名历史老师在强迫劳动期间病逝。[4] 任摩逊已年过六旬，在中国已过了退休年龄，但他不想退休。他终于可以再次工作了。“我为老一辈的政治素质感到自豪，”他后来写道，“他们一走出劳改营，一恢复组织生活，就竭尽全力地工作。”[5]

In Duyun, first the farmers were allowed to keep extra crops after paying state quotas,[6] and then others could start small businesses.[7] At the local department store, sales of plastic slippers, hot water thermoses, wristwatches, and sewing machines surged.[8] It was a sudden change for everyone, adults and children alike. Ren Moxun followed the official line, teaching his students that their system in China was fundamentally different from exploitative capitalist systems overseas. “Capitalists provide workers with electric refrigerators and cars on credit, putting 8% to 12% interest on the bill, and tell you to pay in installments,” Ren Moxun taught the students. “After paying for several months, if you can’t pay anymore, they’ll take the stuff back. They won’t return your money.”[9] His pupils studied an essay by a Chinese woman living in Japan who described the heavy burdens of life in a capitalist system. She wrote that she had to change outfits several times a day to avoid being ridiculed or losing her job. One student remarked that they now understood why people changed outfits so often in foreign movies. “In the past we thought it was a luxury, but now we understand it’s nothing to envy.”[10]

在都匀，首先是农民在缴纳国家定额后被允许保留多余的庄稼，[6] 接着其他人可以开始经营小生意。[7] 在当地百货商店，塑料拖鞋、热水瓶、手表和缝纫机的销量激增。[8] 对所有人来说，无论大人还是孩子，这都是一个突然的变化。任摩逊遵循官方口径，教导学生中国的制度与海外剥削性的资本主义制度有本质区别。“资本家通过信用贷款向工人提供电冰箱和汽车，账单上加收 8%到 12%的利息，并让你分期付款，”任摩逊这样教导学生，“付了几个月后，如果你付不起了，他们就会把东西收回去。他们不会退还你的钱。”[9] 他的学生们学习了一篇由旅日中国女性撰写的文章，文中描述了资本主义制度下生活的沉重负担。她写道，她每天不得不换好几次衣服，以免被嘲笑或失去工作。一名学生评论说，他们现在明白了为什么外国电影里的人换衣服这么勤。“过去我们认为那是奢侈，但现在我们明白这没什么好羡慕的。”[10]

In around 1977, when Meng Wanzhou was about five, she was told that she was being sent to live with her father’s parents in Guizhou.[11] It was a common arrangement for elderly grandparents to take on the child-rearing in Communist China, with both women and men working outside the home. It is unclear why the decision was made for Meng to go to her paternal grandparents instead of staying with her mother’s politically connected parents in Chengdu.

大约在 1977 年，孟晚舟五岁左右时，她被告知要被送往贵州和祖父母一起生活。[11] 在当时的中国，由年迈的祖父母承担抚养孩子的责任是很常见的安排，因为男女都要在外面工作。目前尚不清楚为什么决定让孟晚舟去父系祖父母家，而不是留在成都与她那拥有政治背景的母系外祖父母在一起。

Meng struggled to adjust in Guizhou, far from her parents. Her grandparents lived more simply. Candy was a rare treat, and there often wasn’t meat for dinner. Her grandparents enrolled her two years early in Duyun No. 3 Elementary School, where she struggled to keep up with the older students. Math homework was especially painful. Her grandmother would help her with her sums but would occasionally remark, “How does Feifei have such a dumb daughter!”[12]

孟晚舟在贵州很难适应远离父母的生活。她的祖父母生活得比较简朴。糖果是罕见的零食，晚餐经常没有肉。祖父母让她提前两年进入都匀三小就读，在那里她很难跟上高年级学生的进度。数学作业尤其令人痛苦。她的祖母会帮她算数，但偶尔会评论道：“非非怎么会有这么笨的女儿！”[12]

Meng’s view of herself as a bad student lingered into adulthood. “When I was in grade school, I was very, very dumb. I couldn’t sing and I couldn’t draw, and I was the kind of student that teachers didn’t like,” she wrote in an essay published internally at Huawei.[13] Recalling her mother’s patience with her, she quoted an idiom: “Mothers don’t mind if their children are ugly.”

孟晚舟对自己是差生的看法一直持续到成年。“我读小学的时候，非常非常笨。我不会唱歌，也不会画画，是那种老师不喜欢的学生，”她在华为内部发表的一篇文章中写道。[13] 回想起母亲对她的耐心，她引用了一句俗语：“儿不嫌母丑，母不嫌儿笨。”

—

After his release from the labor camp, Ren’s father-in-law, Meng Dongbo, was reinstated as Sichuan’s vice-governor. Sichuan was now the focus of the nation’s reforms. Deng Xiaoping—the diminutive Sichuanese official whom Mao had purged and whose “wolfish ambition to restore capitalism” was used as a scapegoat for the delays at Ren’s nylon factory—had now emerged as the nation’s new leader. Deng indeed believed that Mao’s communes and political witch hunts were wrongheaded, and that Western-style capitalism would save the nation. Deng encouraged his home province, Sichuan, to start experimenting under the new party secretary Zhao Ziyang, a long-faced man with a widow’s peak.

从劳改营获释后，任正非的岳父孟东波恢复了四川省副省长的职务。四川当时是全国改革的焦点。邓小平——这位曾被毛泽东清洗、其“复辟资本主义的狼子野心”曾被用作任正非尼龙厂延期开工替罪羊的矮个子四川官员——现在已成为国家的新领导人。邓小平确实认为毛泽东的人民公社和政治政治迫害是错误的，而西方式的资本主义将拯救国家。邓小平鼓励他的家乡四川在省委书记赵紫阳的领导下开始实验，赵紫阳是一位长脸、有美人尖的男子。

As one of Zhao’s deputies, Meng helped dismantle the communes and restore private farming across Sichuan. In 1980, they launched the radical experiment of letting several Sichuan factories operate privately, managing their own accounts and keeping their profits after paying a state profit tax.[14] A cotton mill, a clockmaker, and a print shop were among the first. When the editor of the People’s Daily, the party’s press organ, visited from Beijing, Meng discussed with him how far they could push the reforms, and the two even floated the idea of the government charging the businesses rent.[15]

作为赵紫阳的副手之一，孟东波协助废除了公社制度，并在四川全省恢复了私人耕作。1980 年，他们启动了一项激进的实验，允许几家四川工厂私营化运作，自主核算，并在缴纳国家利润税后保留利润。[14] 一家棉纺厂、一家钟表厂和一家印刷厂是首批试点。当党报《人民日报》的总编辑从北京来访时，孟东波与他讨论了改革可以推进到什么程度，两人甚至提出了政府向企业收取租金的想法。[15]

As China opened up to the world, they were hosting a growing stream of foreign visitors. Officials from Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and North Korea arrived in Chengdu in quick succession, with Zhao, Meng, and their colleagues preparing banquets in the guests’ honor.[16] There was even an American visitor, Helen Milliken, Michigan’s first lady, who arrived in 1982 to sign a friendship pact between Michigan and Sichuan Province.[17]

随着中国向世界开放，接待的外国访客也日益增多。来自瑞士、南斯拉夫、扎伊尔和朝鲜的官员接踵而至抵达成都，赵紫阳、孟东波及其同事为这些客人准备了欢迎宴会。[16] 1982 年，甚至有一位美国访客——密歇根州第一夫人海伦·米利肯来到这里，签署了密歇根州与四川省的友好省州协议。[17]

In 1979, Meng got a rare chance to see the world through a three-week tour of Britain, Switzerland, and France along with Zhao and nine other Sichuan officials.[18] After years of wearing plain clothing in line with the Communist ethos, Meng donned a sky-blue Western-style three-piece suit for the trip.[19] It was an eye-opening excursion. They saw up close how market economies operated, meeting with senior officials like British Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Minister Peter Blaker.[20] They found it remarkable how different countries specialized in different crops based on their climates, trading for greater wealth: grapes in arid parts of France, wheat on England’s sunny east coast. Upon their return, Zhao advocated for China’s provinces to adopt a similar system of trade. These international encounters must have fired up the imaginations of Meng Dongbo’s family members at a time when overseas travel was strictly controlled.

1979 年，孟东波获得了一个难得的看世界的机会，他与赵紫阳及其他九名四川官员一起对英国、瑞士和法国进行了为期三周的访问。[18] 在多年穿着符合共产主义精神的朴素服装后，孟东波为这次旅行穿上了一套天蓝色的西式三件套西装。[19] 这是一次大开眼界的远行。他们近距离观察了市场经济的运作方式，并会见了英国外交和联邦事务部国务大臣彼得·布莱克等高级官员。[20] 他们发现，不同国家根据气候条件专注于不同农作物的生产，并通过贸易创造更大的财富，这令他们印象深刻：法国干旱地区的葡萄，英格兰阳光充足的东海岸的小麦。回国后，赵紫阳提倡中国各省也应采取类似的贸易体系。在海外旅行受到严格控制的年代，这些国际交往一定激发了孟东波家人的想象力。

Later on, Ren would rarely mention his first wife and first father-in-law. Perhaps it was awkward to acknowledge a high-level political connection when Huawei had cultivated the myth of being a scrappy little company that had always pulled itself up by its own bootstraps. In truth, having a certain amount of political patronage was probably a requirement for survival in China’s chaotic early market economy. And a vice-governor was not that high up the ladder, comparatively speaking: Wan Runnan, the founder of Stone Group, China’s leading high-tech company of the 1980s, had married the daughter of Liu Shaoqi, the nation’s head of state himself.[21]

后来，任正非很少提及他的第一任妻子和第一任岳父。或许，在华为刻意塑造其作为一家白手起家、艰苦奋斗的小公司神话时，承认高层的政治关系会显得尴尬。事实上，在中国早期混乱的市场经济中，拥有一定的政治庇护可能是生存的必要条件。而且，相比之下，副省长在官阶序列中并不算特别高：20 世纪 80 年代中国领先的高科技公司四通集团的创始人万润南，娶的可是国家主席刘少奇的女儿。[21]

There was never any proof that the Meng family’s political connections helped Ren get Huawei off the ground—and indeed Ren and Meng Jun divorced around the time that he was starting the company. But the Meng family’s standing must have opened political doors to a young Ren that otherwise would have remained closed, and helped open the mind of a schoolteacher’s son to audacious dreams.

尽管从未有证据表明孟家的政治关系帮助任正非创办了华为——事实上，任正非和孟军在他创办公司前后就离婚了。但孟家的地位一定为年轻的任正非打开了原本可能关闭的政治大门，并帮助这位教师之子开启了敢于梦想的胸襟。

[picture]

A Floating-Ball Precision Pressure Generator, Ren Zhengfei’s 1979 book about his pressure generator invention.

《空气压力精密发生器》，任正非 1979 年出版的关于他发明的压力发生器的著作。

—

After much effort, Ren succeeded at building a precision air-pressure generator in 1977. His breakthrough was well timed. With Deng Xiaoping as the nation’s leader, scientific research was suddenly encouraged. News of Ren’s invention was splashed across state media. “Only a few countries in the world with advanced industry are able to manufacture it,” the official Xinhua newswire boasted.[22] Ren published a slim paperback book of equations and diagrams to explain how the pressure generator worked.[23] “Compared to the American company Ametek’s products, it’s at an advanced level,” he wrote. “It fills a blank space in our nation’s technology.”[24]

经过多番努力，任正非于 1977 年成功研制出一台精密气压发生器。他的突破正逢其时。随着邓小平成为国家领导人，科学研究突然受到了鼓励。任正非发明的消息登上了官方媒体。“世界上只有少数工业发达国家能够制造它，”官方的新华社自豪地报道。[22] 任正非出版了一本包含公式和图表的薄薄的平装书，解释压力发生器的工作原理。[23] 他写道：“与美国阿美特克（Ametek）公司的产品相比，它处于先进水平。它填补了我国技术的一项空白。”[24]

Ren had previously found himself passed over for promotions and awards due to his family’s suspect political background. Membership in the Chinese Communist Party would have helped with career advancement, but he had not been able to join. In Deng’s China, Ren now found himself getting a second chance. When Deng held the nation’s first National Science Conference in March 1978, a thirty-three-year-old Ren was invited, making him one of the youngest among the six thousand scientists and engineers in attendance.[25] In a rousing speech, Deng told the scientists that they were not part of the bourgeoisie, as they had been previously labeled, but part of the working class. “Everyone who works, whether with his hands or with his brain, is part of the working people in a socialist society,” Deng declared.[26] The scientists’ applause was thunderous. Some pumped their fists in the air. Many eyes were wet.[27] “We were moved to tears because we were finally recognized as the ‘sons’ of this country,” Ren later recalled. “We were overjoyed to be part of the working class rather than the capitalist or intellectual class.”[28]

此前，任正非曾因家庭政治背景问题在晋升和评奖中屡屡受挫。加入中国共产党本会有助于职业发展，但他一直未能入党。在邓小平时代的中国，任正非发现自己获得了第二次机会。1978 年 3 月，当邓小平主持召开全国科学大会时，33 岁的任正非受邀参加，成为 6000 名参会的科学家和工程师中最年轻的成员之一。[25] 邓小平在一次令人振奋的讲话中告诉科学家们，他们不再是以前被打上标签的资产阶级，而是工人阶级的一部分。邓小平宣布：“不论是体力劳动还是脑力劳动，凡是为社会主义社会服务的，都是社会主义社会的劳动者。”[26] 科学家的掌声雷动。有人在空中挥舞拳头。许多人热泪盈眶。[27] “我们感动得流下眼泪，因为我们终于被承认是这个国家的‘儿子’，”任正非后来回忆道，“我们非常高兴能成为工人阶级的一员，而不是资产阶级或知识分子阶层。”[28]

The National Science Conference of 1978 proved pivotal to Ren’s career: it allowed him to join the Chinese Communist Party.[29] During the conference, an official impressed by Ren’s potential took it upon himself to make a phone call to push for him to be allowed into the club. In response, the PLA Engineering Corps assigned Xu Guotai, a journalist for the corps’ internal newspaper, to probe Ren and his family background. Xu was impressed and charmed by Ren’s dedication to his research and ended up serving as a reference for Ren’s membership application.[30] Xu also penned a favorable profile of Ren for the corps’ newspaper that praised him for persevering with his research during the Cultural Revolution, despite the political risks of being seen as an intellectual.[31] “Neither the pressure from the Gang of Four nor the well-intentioned persuasion of his relatives, friends and colleagues stopped him from study and research,” the profile said. “He loves his country, its people and science more than his family and himself.”

1978 年的全国科学大会被证明是任正非职业生涯的关键转折点：它使他得以加入中国共产党。[29] 会议期间，一位被任正非的潜力所打动的官员主动打来电话，推动让他入党。作为回应，解放军基建工程兵指派其内部报纸的记者徐国泰对任正非及其家庭背景进行调查。徐国泰被任正非对研究的专注所打动和吸引，最终担任了任正非入党申请的介绍人。[30] 徐国泰还为部队报纸撰写了一篇关于任正非的正面报道，赞扬他在文化大革命期间，尽管面临被视为知识分子的政治风险，仍坚持进行科学研究。[31] 报道称：“无论是‘四人帮’的压力，还是亲朋好友、同事们的善意劝说，都没有阻止他的学习和研究。他爱祖国、爱人民、爱科学，胜过爱他的家庭和他自己。”

In February 1979, the Engineering Corps’ newspaper carried an article by Xu on the front page: Inventor of the Precision Pressure Generator Ren Zhengfei Joins the Party. The article said that Ren Zhengfei of Troop 00229 had honorably joined the party after multiple failed applications, and after his family members had suffered false accusations due to the interference of the “Gang of Four.” It noted that Ren had been promoted to the role of “Engineer.”[32]

1979 年 2 月，基建工程兵报纸在头版刊登了徐国泰的文章：《精密压力发生器的发明者任正非入党》。文章称，00229 部队的任正非在多次申请失败后，在其家人因“四人帮”干扰而遭受诬告后，光荣入党。文章还提到，任正非已被提升为“工程师”。[32]

Ren would later tell colleagues at Huawei that he had wasted time in those years when he was outside the establishment. “As a soldier for all those years, I didn’t join the party. My life was full of adversity,” he told his staff. “When I think of all that wasted time, I wonder, How could I have been so naive and ridiculous that I didn’t understand at all being open, compromise, and shades of gray?”[33]

任正非后来曾对华为的同事说，他在体制外的那些年浪费了时间。“当了这么多年兵，我都没入党。我的生活充满了逆境，”他告诉员工，“想到那些虚度的光阴，我不禁自问，我怎么会那么幼稚和荒唐，竟然完全不懂得开放、妥协和灰度？”[33]

—

With the bulk of the construction of the Liaoyang factory complete, Ren’s unit began moving south in November 1978.[34] The destination was Jinan, the capital of Shandong Province, a cultural hub famed for its bubbling natural springs. Troop 00229 set up a research institute in Jinan,[35] and Ren was appointed deputy director, with a staff of about twenty.[36] This move had the benefit of uniting Ren’s family. His wife received preferential approval to join the military in Jinan,[37] and the couple were rejoined with their children. Meng Wanzhou, who was around seven years old, was enrolled in an elementary school on the city’s rural outskirts.[38] She considered it a happy period, a time when she was under little pressure to study and often played in the fields, catching grasshoppers.[39]

随着辽阳化纤厂的大部分建设工作完成，任正非所在的部队于 1978 年 11 月开始南迁。[34] 目的地是山东省省会济南，一座以天然泉水喷涌而闻名的文化名城。00229 部队在济南成立了一个研究所，[35] 任正非被任命为副所长，下属约二十人。[36] 这次调动让任正非一家得以团聚。他的妻子获得特批在济南参军，[37] 夫妻俩与孩子们重聚。当时约七岁的孟晚舟就读于该市郊区的一所小学。[38] 她认为那是段快乐的时光，学习压力很小，经常在田野里玩耍捉蚂蚱。[39]

Ren worked to commercialize his pressure generator, coordinating with factories in Taiyuan, Dalian, Shenyang, and the Jiangsu Province county of Yangzhong.[40] One local official in Yangzhong recalled him speaking excitedly about competing in the nascent market economy, saying that a sales team should be like a pack of wolves: “The wolves must be hungry if they are to voluntarily hunt for food and compete for food,” he remembered Ren saying. “We must encourage salespeople to proactively go on the offensive, to go on more work trips and visit customers, to fight for more sales, to win more bonuses.”[41]

任正非致力于将他的压力计商品化，并与太原、大连、沈阳以及江苏省扬中县的工厂进行协调。[40] 扬中当地的一位官员回忆起他曾兴奋地谈论在萌芽阶段的市场经济中竞争，说销售团队应该像狼群一样：“狼必须挨饿，才能主动猎食和争夺食物，”他记得任正非曾这样说，“我们必须鼓励销售人员主动出击，多出差、多拜访客户，争取更多销量，赢得更多奖金。”[41]

In September 1982, a thirty-seven-year-old Ren attended the Twelfth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, a twice-a-decade meeting where the nation’s top leaders made governance plans for the next five years.[42] At the time, it was an enormous honor to be invited. It would later become a liability for Ren, with foreign officials questioning how close Huawei’s ties were to the party. Later on, Ren would avoid appearances at high-level government meetings.

1982 年 9 月，三十七岁的任正非参加了中国共产党第十二次全国代表大会，这是每五年举行两次的国家最高领导层制定未来五年治理计划的会议。[42] 在当时，受邀参会是巨大的荣誉。但这在后来成了任正非的一种负担，外国官员据此质疑华为与党的联系有多紧密。此后，任正非开始避免在政府高层会议上露面。

The congress also marked the abrupt end of Ren’s military career. Deng was making a tectonic shift toward private enterprise, and this included the decommissioning of the PLA Engineering Corps.[43] For Ren, there was excitement about the nation’s progress but also reluctance to give up the only career he had ever known.

这次大会也标志着任正非军旅生涯的突然终结。邓小平正向私营企业进行结构性转型，这其中就包括撤销解放军基建工程兵部队。[43] 对任正非来说，既有对国家进步的兴奋，也有对放弃这份他唯一从事过的职业的不舍。

—

With the end of the army’s Engineering Corps, Ren and Meng Jun were assigned to work on the southern coast in a place called Shenzhen, where an experimental “special economic zone” was being built from the ground up. The children, Meng Wanzhou and Ren Ping, were sent for a second time to live with Ren’s parents in Guizhou.[44]

随着陆军基建工程兵的撤销，任正非和孟军被分配到南方沿海一个叫深圳的地方工作，那里正从零开始建设一个实验性的“经济特区”。孩子们——孟晚舟和任平——第二次被送往贵州，与任正非的父母一起生活。[44]

Eleven-year-old Meng Wanzhou had fallen behind in schoolwork while living in Jinan, and back under her grandparents’ watch, she struggled at first. She was enrolled at Duyun No. 1 Middle School, where her grandfather was the principal and her grandmother taught math. On her first test, she scored the lowest grade in the class, an embarrassment to her and her grandparents.[45] Her grades improved over time. She once even got a perfect score on a geometry test. When she was selected as the head of a city youth committee, her mother mailed her a sky-blue outfit, writing that she would look like a little white dove flying free.

十一岁的孟晚舟在济南生活期间学业落后了，回到祖父母身边后，她起初感到很吃力。她就读于都匀一中，她的祖父是该校校长，祖母教数学。在第一次考试中，她的成绩是全班最低的，这让她和祖父母都感到难堪。[45] 随着时间的推移，她的成绩有所提高。有一次她甚至在几何考试中得了满分。当她被选为市少先队负责人时，她的母亲给她寄了一套天蓝色的衣服，并写信说她看起来会像一只自由飞翔的小白鸽。

Ren Moxun retired from Duyun No. 1 Middle School in the summer of 1984 at age seventy-five.[46] By then, he was often in ill health,[47] but he refused to stop working. Appointed head of the Cultural and Historical Materials Committee of the Duyun City People’s Consultative Conference, Ren Moxun set about compiling a history of the local schools. One day, one of his old students visited him and recalled the struggle session where a classmate had beaten Ren Moxun with a wooden stick until it broke. Ren Moxun smiled grimly. “I have to thank that piece of wood,” he said. “Had it been sturdier, I surely would have been beaten until there was something wrong with me.”[48]

任摩逊于 1984 年夏天以七十五岁高龄从都匀一中退休。[46] 那时他身体状况不佳，[47] 但他拒绝停止工作。任摩逊被任命为都匀市政协文史资料委员会主任，开始着手编纂当地学校的历史。一天，他的一位老学生来看望他，回忆起那场批斗会，当时一名同学用木棍殴打任摩逊，直到木棍折断。任摩逊苦涩地笑了笑。“我得感谢那根木头，”他说，“如果它再结实点，我肯定会被打出毛病来。”[48]

4

4

The Special Economic Zone

经济特区

Huawei’s Origins: 1980–1989

华为的起源：1980–1989

In the early 1980s, a vast construction zone was materializing on the southern coast of China. This new city being built from scratch, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ), would cover 126 square miles, nearly the size of Philadelphia. Not long ago, it had been mostly just grassland here, surrounding a sleepy town that stank from garbage-filled ditches.[1] Now the city’s first skyscraper, the Guomao Building, was materializing at the astonishing pace of one floor every three days. Local officials proudly declared that this was “The Shenzhen speed!”[2] China was embarking on its grand experiment in capitalism, and Shenzhen was ground zero.

20 世纪 80 年代初，中国南海岸正在兴建一个巨大的建设区。这座从零开始建设的新城市——深圳经济特区（SEZ），占地 126 平方英里，面积几乎与费城相当。不久前，这里还大多是草地，环绕着一个因垃圾满沟而臭气熏天的寂静小镇。[1] 如今，这座城市的第一座摩天大楼——国贸大厦，正以三天一层的惊人速度拔地而起。当地官员自豪地宣称，这就是“深圳速度！”[2] 中国正在开启其宏大的资本主义实验，而深圳就是策源地。

The Shenzhen SEZ was not designed like a traditional Chinese city, a circle surrounded by a circular wall, ideal for defense against invaders. It was a long, thin strip,[3] extending west to east along mainland China’s border with the British colony of Hong Kong. On a map, it looked like a snake, its long belly lying across the border, its tail curling to the east around Mirs Bay, its head jutting westward into a promontory aptly called Shekou, or Snake’s Mouth. Such a city was not built for the convenience of its inhabitants. Denizens had to jostle around on a bus for hours to get from one side to the other. The SEZ’s form followed its function: it was to be a buffer zone between China and the rest of the world, one that would absorb capital and technology from Hong Kong and let it percolate into a safe zone while minimizing the spread of capitalism’s “moral corruption” to the rest of the nation. If the experiment proved unsatisfactory, it could be shut down; the SEZ was walled off from the rest of China by barbed-wire fences,[4] the entrances patrolled by paramilitary guards.

深圳特区的规划并不像传统的中国城市那样——圆形的城区被圆形的城墙环绕，以抵御入侵者。它是一条狭长的地带，[3] 沿着中国大陆与英属殖民地香港的边界由西向东延伸。在地图上，它看起来像一条蛇，长长的腹部横跨边界，尾部向东卷曲在的大鹏湾周围，头部向西伸入一个被称为“蛇口”的岬角。这样一座城市的建设并非为了居民的便利。居民们不得不挤在公共汽车上颠簸数小时才能从一端到达另一端。特区的形式服从于其功能：它要成为中国与世界其他地区之间的缓冲区，吸收来自香港的资本和技术，让其在安全区内渗透，同时尽量减少资本主义的“精神污染”向全国其他地区扩散。如果实验证明不理想，它可以被关闭；特区与中国其他地区由铁丝网围栏隔开，[4] 入口处有武装警察巡逻。

Ren has alternately recalled arriving in Shenzhen in 1982 and in 1984,[5] and either way, he would have been approaching forty. It was exhilarating and disorienting. Ren was astonished to discover that average laborers in the city made some five hundred yuan a month, more than double what he had been making as a mid-career military engineer.[6] He learned about a foreign style of shop called a “supermarket” and strolled the gleaming aisles of one for the first time.[7] A sweet, fizzy drink called Pepsi was rolling off the assembly line at the city’s first joint-venture factory with an American company.[8] Yet amid the wonders, Ren was also nervous. A new world was opening up, but it was unclear if he could keep up. “People of my age group were the most worthless,” he reflected. “We didn’t understand computers, and our English was not good.”[9]

任正非曾先后回忆过自己在 1982 年和 1984 年到达深圳，[5] 无论哪种情况，他当时都已接近四十岁。那是令人兴奋也令人迷茫的。任正非惊讶地发现，这座城市的普通劳工每月能挣约五百元，是他作为一名职业中期军方工程师收入的两倍多。[6] 他了解到了这种被称为“超市”的外式商店，并第一次在灯火通明的货架间漫步。[7] 在该市第一家与美国公司合资的工厂里，一种名为百事可乐的甜味碳酸饮料正从流水线下线。[8] 然而，在这些奇迹面前，任正非也感到紧张。一个新世界正在开启，但不清楚他是否能跟上脚步。“我们这个年龄段的人是最没用的，”他反思道，“我们不懂电脑，英语也不好。”[9]

Shenzhen was a city for young people. There were fortunes to be made if you could remake yourself fast enough, and if you were willing to take the risk. The young people in Shenzhen took their fashion cues from the British colony of Hong Kong, just across the border, switching out their plain blue Mao suits for dandy black Western-style suits and scandalously short skirts with stockings. At night, they snuck fishbone antennae up onto their roofs to watch uncensored Hong Kong TV shows, then retracted the antennae in the morning to circumvent crackdowns.[10] They took pride in their worldliness, calling the rest of China “the inland.” A growing number of them were getting the opportunity to study abroad, and they came back fluent in foreign languages and with the latest in technical training.

深圳是一座属于年轻人的城市。如果你能足够快地重塑自我，并且愿意承担风险，这里就有财富可寻。深圳的年轻人从一境之隔的英属殖民地香港汲取时尚灵感，脱下朴素的蓝色中山装，换上时髦的黑色西装和惊世骇俗的超短裙配丝袜。晚上，他们偷偷在屋顶架起鱼骨天线观看未经审查的香港电视节目，早晨再收回天线以规避查禁。[10] 他们以自己的见多识广为荣，称中国其他地区为“内地”。他们中越来越多的人获得了出国留学的机会，归来时已能流利使用外语，并掌握了最前沿的技术培训。

Ren was assigned a job at a company called South Sea Oil Shenzhen Development Service Co.[11] This was a subsidiary of the state-owned enterprise South Sea Oil Corporation, which was building a modern harbor in Shenzhen’s Shekou district to support offshore oil-drilling projects in the South China Sea. Ren’s subsidiary was tasked with the construction of peripheral facilities, including manufacturing zones, shopping centers, and modern apartment complexes.[12] Housing was badly lacking. Meng Wanzhou later recalled her parents living in a “thatched hut” during this time: “When it was raining heavily outside, it would be raining lightly inside; when the neighbors spoke, you could hear everything clearly.”[13]

任正非被分配到一家名为南海石油深圳开发服务公司的企业工作。[11] 这是国企南海石油总公司的子公司，该公司当时正在深圳蛇口区建设一座现代化港口，以支持南海的海上石油钻探项目。任正非所在的子公司负责周边设施的建设，包括工业区、购物中心和现代化公寓楼。[12] 当时住房严重匮乏。孟晚舟后来回忆起父母那段时间住在“茅草屋”里：“外面下大雨，里面下小雨；邻居说话，什么都能听得清清楚楚。”[13]

Ren’s tenure at the company was short and undistinguished—little is known about what exactly his role was there, and there are no apparent local press records of his work, in contrast to the laudatory clippings from his time as a military engineer. One rare report of his work there came from Chen Zhufang, an administrator at what was then called the Huazhong Institute of Technology in the inland city of Wuhan. After she discussed with Ren the possibility of setting up a technological joint venture between Huazhong and South Sea Oil, she came away with a favorable impression. He was a handsome guy, she thought, with a pronounced military bearing, and it was clear that he had high ambitions.[14] Ren would later persuade her to join Huawei. She worked for years as the secretary of its internal Communist Party committee, an important role serving as a liaison between the company and the government.

任正非在该公司的任期短暂且平淡——外界对其具体职责知之甚少，也没有明显的当地媒体记录过他的工作，这与他担任军方工程师时期那些赞誉性的剪报形成了鲜明对比。关于他当时工作的一份罕见报告来自陈珠芳，她是当时位于内地城市武汉的华中工学院的一名管理人员。在与任正非讨论了华中工学院与南海石油建立技术合资企业的可能性后，她留下了良好的印象。她认为他是个英俊的男人，有着明显的军人气质，而且显然雄心勃勃。[14] 任正非后来劝说她加入了华为。她多年担任华为内部党委书记，这是一个负责公司与政府间联络的重要角色。

Ren would later acknowledge he had made mistakes as a deputy manager at South Sea Oil.[15] Indeed, he maintains he was fired after getting tricked in a business deal and losing money for his employer.[16] “Some people offered to sell us TVs, so we gave them money but didn’t receive TVs in return,” Ren later said.[17] He said he spent a lot of time reading legal books and trying to claw back the funds. No corroborating or alternate account of the incident has emerged from his former colleagues.

任正非后来承认，他在担任南海石油副经理期间犯过错误。[15] 事实上，他坚持认为自己是在一桩商业交易中被骗并导致雇主亏损后被解雇的。[16] “有人提出卖电视机给我们，所以我们给了钱，但没有收到电视机，”任正非后来回忆道。[17] 他说他花了大量时间阅读法律书籍，试图追回资金。他的前同事中没有出现关于此事的佐证或不同的说法。

Ren was facing personal challenges during this time as well. His relationship with his wife, Meng Jun, was unraveling, and the two decided to divorce.[18] It is unclear what prompted it, though Ren’s years away in the military could not have helped. It was still rare to divorce in China, with much of society considering it shameful. But divorce rates were rising nationwide, as some progressive Chinese no longer felt required to remain in unhappy unions.[19]

任正非在此期间也面临着个人挑战。他与妻子孟军的关系破裂，两人决定离婚。[18] 尽管目前尚不清楚是什么原因促成了这一决定，但任正非多年在部队服役的经历想必并无助益。当时在中国，离婚仍然罕见，社会大众大多认为这是件丢脸的事。但随着一些思想进步的中国人不再觉得有义务维持不幸福的结合，全国范围内的离婚率正在上升。[19]

As Ren floundered, someone at Shenzhen’s Science and Technology Bureau suggested he try starting a company.[20] Ren was forty-two when he founded Huawei Technologies Co. His first career as a military engineer had ended, and not by choice. His brief second career in the state sector was also at a close. Now Ren decided to make the jump and become that intriguing, scandalous, and dangerous thing: a capitalist.

在任正非陷入困境时，深圳市科技局的一位人士建议他尝试创办一家公司。[20] 任正非创办华为技术有限公司时年四十二岁。他的第一段职业生涯——军事工程师——已经结束，且并非出于自愿。他在国企部门短暂的第二段职业生涯也走到了尽头。现在，任正非决定实现跨越，成为那个令人好奇、充满争议且危险的角色：一个资本家。

—

Shenzhen legalized the establishment of “minjian” (unofficial or, more literally, “among the people”) private technology companies in February 1987 under a pilot program. Applicants poured in from across the country—professors and engineers from Beijing to Kunming.[21] The idea of running your own company in the SEZ was exciting—and risky. Seventy-five percent of the first batch of entrepreneurs asked their state employers for temporary unpaid leave, with the option of reprising their old jobs if their startups didn’t work out.[22]

1987 年 2 月，深圳根据一项试点计划，使建立“民间”（非官方，或字面意思为“在民众之中”）私营科技公司合法化。申请者从全国各地涌入——从北京到昆明的教授和工程师们。[21] 在特区经营自己的公司既令人兴奋又充满风险。第一批创业者中有 75%的人向其国企雇主申请了临时停薪留职，以便在创业失败时可以选择重返旧职。[22]

Ren founded Huawei as a minjian company on September 15, 1987, with twenty-one thousand yuan pooled between himself and five investors. At first, Huawei did not have its own products. It assembled and sold simple telephone switches, fire alarms, and other products on contract for others. Huawei printed out pamphlets touting telephones as the economic engine of the new age, akin to railroads and canals in the eighteenth century: Wishing you an early start on the road to success. Electronic communications are the catalyst for your career.

1987 年 9 月 15 日，任正非以民间公司的形式创立了华为，由他本人和五位投资者共同出资 2.1 万元人民币。起初，华为没有自己的产品。它通过合同为他人组装和销售简单的电话交换机、火灾报警器和其他产品。华为印发了宣传小册子，将电话吹捧为新时代的经济引擎，类似于 18 世纪的铁路和运河：祝您在成功之路上抢占先机。电子通信是您事业的催化剂。

Huawei’s first office was in a residential building built by South Sea Oil in the standard style, with eight floors and a balcony on each unit for drying clothes.[23] An early employee recalled finding his way there in 1989 based on Ren’s business card, which said that Huawei occupied the eighth and ninth floors of the South Sea Oil complex, building 16, District A. “When I got to the ground floor of that building, I realized the building didn’t have nine floors,” he said. “It was only an eight-story building. I thought for sure it was a shell company, scammers.”[24] He later discovered a shabby greenhouse-like structure on the roof. Another early employee who arrived for a job interview recalled Ren telling him to wait while he took a quick shower to cool down.[25]

华为的第一间办公室位于南海石油公司建造的一栋标准风格住宅楼内，楼高八层，每个单元都有一个晾衣服的阳台。[23] 一位早期员工回忆说，1989 年他根据任正非的名片找到了那里，名片上写着华为占据了南海石油综合楼 A 区 16 栋的八层和九层。“当我到达那栋楼的一层时，我发现这栋楼根本没有九层，”他说，“那只是一栋八层楼。我当时确信这是一家空壳公司，是骗子。”[24] 他后来在楼顶发现了一个简陋的温室状结构。另一位前来面试的早期员工回忆说，任正非让他稍等片刻，因为他要先冲个凉降降温。[25]

—

One long-standing curiosity about Huawei’s origins is the silence surrounding its original five investors. None of the five has publicly recounted their version of events. For decades, even the names of these investors would be a mystery to the outside world.

关于华为起源的一个长期令人好奇之处，是围绕其最初五位投资者的沉默。这五人中没有一个公开讲述过他们版本的往事。几十年来，甚至连这些投资者的姓名对外界来说都是一个谜。

In 2019, Huawei finally disclosed them to the Los Angeles Times: Zhang Xiangyang, a member of the Shenzhen Bureau of Development Planning; Wu Huiqing, an accountant at a Shenzhen petrochemical company; Chen Jinyang, a manager in the trade department of Shenzhen’s state-run China Travel Service; Shen Dingxing, founder of Zhuhai Telecom; and Mei Zhongxing, founder of Shenzhen Sanjiang Electronics Co.[26] Little is known about the first three. Shen and Mei appear here and there in archival records.

2019 年，华为终于向《洛杉矶时报》披露了他们的身份：深圳市发展计划局成员张向阳；深圳一家石化公司的会计吴惠卿；深圳国营中国旅行社贸易部经理陈金阳；珠海电信创始人沈定兴；以及深圳三江电子有限公司创始人梅中星。[26] 对前三人的情况知之甚少。沈和梅的名字则零星出现在档案记录中。

Born in Shanghai and eight years older than Ren, Shen had worked at the telecom bureau in Yining, in China’s far-west Xinjiang region, then at a military telecommunications factory in southern Guilin before moving to the southern coast and wading into entrepreneurship.[27] Shen had launched his own startup, Zhuhai Telecom, just across the bay from Shenzhen after developing a telephone switch called the BH-01. The BH-01 was something called a private branch exchange, or PBX, a microwave-sized box that could hook up twenty-four to eighty telephones. In those days of scarce telephone lines, a small business or hotel would use a PBX to hook multiple telephones up to a single line.

沈定兴出生于上海，比任正非大八岁，曾在中国偏远的西部新疆地区的伊宁电信局工作，随后在南方的桂林一家军事电信工厂工作，之后移居南方沿海并投身创业。[27] 在开发出一种名为 BH-01 的电话交换机后，沈定兴在与深圳隔海相望的珠海创办了自己的初创公司——珠海电信。BH-01 是一种被称为程控交换机（PBX）的设备，是一个微波炉大小的盒子，可以连接 24 到 80 部电话。在那个电话线路稀缺的年代，小企业或酒店会使用 PBX 将多部电话连接到单一线路上。

Shen quickly became a minor business celebrity, with his BH-01 lauded as a highlight in local innovation. The city of Zhuhai showered him with $40,000 in cash, a new apartment, and an Audi luxury sedan as a prize for his invention. Some were scandalized that a supposedly Communist government would throw money around so vulgarly. Local officials defended it as being in line with Deng’s mandate for bold economic experimentation. Huawei struck a deal to manufacture and sell the BH-01 on Zhuhai Telecom’s behalf, along with the switches of Hung Nien, a Hong Kong company.[28] Shen’s company was a key early source of technological know-how for a fledgling Huawei.

沈定兴很快成为了一名小有名气的商业名人，他的 BH-01 被赞誉为当地创新的亮点。珠海市奖励了他 4 万美元现金、一套新公寓和一辆奥迪豪华轿车，作为对他这项发明的奖赏。一些人对所谓的共产党政府如此庸俗地挥霍金钱感到愤慨。当地官员辩护称，这符合邓小平大胆进行经济实验的授权。华为达成了一项协议，代表珠海电信制造和销售 BH-01，同时也销售香港鸿年公司的交换机。[28] 沈的公司是初创期华为技术诀窍的一个关键早期来源。

Mei came to Shenzhen after spending years in the cold far-northeastern province of Liaoning working for Liaoning Radio Factory No. 3, a state-owned fire-alarm manufacturer, according to a profile in China Entrepreneur magazine.[29] In 1985, Mei and six colleagues moved south to Shenzhen to set up a joint venture for Liaoning Radio Factory No. 3. “After the first month, the seven of them didn’t even have any salary,” the profile said. “But they still worked during the day, at night, and also on holidays…. Three months later, they finally developed their first ionization smoke detector.”

根据《中国企业家》杂志的一篇人物专访，梅中星在寒冷的东北省份辽宁工作多年后，从国营火灾报警器制造商辽宁无线电三厂来到了深圳。[29] 1985 年，梅中星和六名同事南下深圳，为辽宁无线电三厂建立一家合资企业。“第一个月后，他们七个人甚至连工资都没有，”专访中写道，“但他们仍然白天、黑夜以及节假日都在工作……三个月后，他们终于研制出了第一台离子感烟探测器。”

According to local records in Shenzhen, Mei’s joint-venture company, Shenzhen Sanjiang Electronics Co., soon branched out from fire alarms into chips for audio recorders and video-surveillance systems,[30] fields that Huawei later also ventured into. Shenzhen Sanjiang Electronics was half-owned by the state-run factory in Liaoning that had dispatched Mei, with the other half owned by a subsidiary of South Sea Oil, the South Sea Oil Shenzhen Development Service Co.[31] This was Ren’s employer before he founded Huawei. It meant that Mei and Ren had been colleagues at South Sea Oil, though it isn’t clear whether or not they knew each other or worked together there.

根据深圳当地记载，梅忠兴的合资公司——深圳三江电子有限公司，很快从火灾报警器业务扩展到录音机和视频监控系统的芯片领域，[30] 这些也是华为后来涉足的领域。深圳三江电子的一半股份由派遣梅忠兴的辽宁省属工厂持有，另一半由南海石油的子公司——南海石油深圳开发服务公司持有。[31] 这是任正非创办华为之前的雇主。这意味着梅忠兴和任正非曾是南海石油的同事，尽管目前尚不清楚两人当时是否相识或共事。

One more detail about Mei—a key one—would not emerge until 2021. The Chinese scholar Tian Tao, who had studied Huawei in great detail for years, published a volume of his transcribed interviews with Huawei executives, writing that recent health troubles had sparked his wish to share his research with others.[32] Tian’s interviews offered many fresh insights into the company’s early history, including this remark from the early Huawei executive Jiang Xisheng: “When the company was first founded, Mr. Ren wasn’t even the chairman. Mei Zhongxing was the chairman.”[33] In all these years of Huawei telling its story to the world, this looked to be the first mention that Mei was Huawei’s first chairman. It was a notable omission from Huawei’s story of itself.

关于梅忠兴的另一个细节——也是关键的一个——直到 2021 年才浮出水面。多年来对华为进行深入研究的中国学者田涛出版了一本他与华为高管的访谈录，他在书中写道，近期的健康问题促使他希望与他人分享自己的研究成果。[32] 田涛的访谈为公司的早期历史提供了许多新鲜视角，其中包括华为早期高管姜西生的一段话：“公司刚成立时，任总甚至不是董事长。梅忠兴才是董事长。”[33] 在华为向世界讲述其故事的这么多年里，这似乎是首次提到梅忠兴是华为的首任董事长。在华为的自我叙述中，这是一个显著的遗漏。

In local government yearbooks, Mei continued to be named as the legal representative of Shenzhen Sanjiang Electronics, the South Sea Oil subsidiary, at least through 1989, a couple of years after Huawei was founded.[34] This suggested, perhaps, that Ren’s break with his former state-run employer may not have been as clean and simple as often told.

在地方政府年鉴中，梅忠兴至少到 1989 年（即华为成立几年后）仍被列为南海石油子公司深圳三江电子的法定代表人。[34] 这或许表明，任正非与前国企雇主之间的决裂，可能并不像通常讲述的那样干脆和简单。

In retrospect, one might guess that the invisibility of Huawei’s original investors in later years might have something to do with this messiness. Huawei was founded at a time when the rules of China’s new market economy were still emerging, and business ties were often a convoluted web. Later on, as Huawei sought to introduce itself to the world as a clear-and-simple private company, this early history became inconvenient. Huawei’s executives stopped talking about it.

回想起来，人们可能会猜测，华为最初的投资者在后来的岁月里销声匿迹，或许与这种复杂性有关。华为创立之时，中国新市场经济的规则仍在形成中，商业联系往往是错综复杂的网络。后来，当华为寻求以一家清晰简单的私营公司形象向世界介绍自己时，这段早期历史变得不合时宜。华为的高管们不再谈论它了。

—

There was something that Ren had not told his original investors up front: He had no intention of remaining a contract manufacturer. He wanted to build his own telephone switch.

有件事任正非没有预先告诉他最初的投资者：他无意一直做代工厂商。他想制造自己的电话交换机。

Ren arrived in the inland city of Wuhan in the spring of 1988 in search of engineers.[35] Dubbed “the Chicago of China,”[36] Wuhan was a bustling industrial city on the Yangtze River. The Huazhong Institute of Technology had been founded here in the 1950s,[37] and three decades later, conditions at the university were still spare: Students bunked six to a room in the dorms and took cold-water showers.[38] There was no air-conditioning or heat. But there was a professor who was knowledgeable about telephone switching, and Ren hoped he could help Huawei build a switch.

1988 年春天，任正非来到内陆城市武汉寻找工程师。[35] 武汉被誉为“中国的芝加哥”，[36] 是长江边上一座繁华的工业城市。华中工学院于 20 世纪 50 年代在此创立，[37] 三十年后，大学的条件依然简陋：学生在宿舍里六人一间，洗冷水澡。[38] 没有空调或暖气。但那里有一位精通电话交换技术的教授，任正非希望他能帮助华为制造交换机。

At Huazhong’s main entrance stood a sixteen-meter-tall white concrete sculpture of Mao Zedong, one arm raised.[39] During the Cultural Revolution, the institute’s president and his wife had been accused of showing insufficient reverence to images of Mao. He was sent to a labor camp; she was locked in the university cafeteria for two months.[40] The hulking Mao statue was erected around that time, and there it stayed. After the Cultural Revolution, the institute had experienced a renaissance. The university president, Zhu Jiusi, had declared ambitions to build a Chinese MIT.[41] He’d sent his professors around the world to study the latest technologies.[42]

在华中工学院的正门，矗立着一座 16 米高的毛泽东白色混凝土雕像，一只手臂高举。[39] 文革期间，该学院的院长及其妻子被指控对毛泽东像缺乏足够的敬畏。他被送往劳改营；她被关在大学食堂里两个月。[40] 巨大的毛泽东像大约就在那时落成，并一直留在那里。文革结束后，学院经历了复兴。院长朱九思宣布了建立“中国版麻省理工”的雄心。[41] 他派教授们到世界各地学习最新技术。[42]

Ren had crossed paths with the institute in the early 1980s, when its administrators had sought out a partnership with Ren’s employer, South Sea Oil.[43] Now Ren had come to see a professor named Zhou Xi, who had recently developed software for tabulating users’ telephone fees.[44] In Professor Zhou’s lab, Ren met a twenty-two-year-old graduate student with large eyes, a tan complexion, and a dense thicket of hair. His name was Guo Ping.[45] A native of Ganzhou in Jiangxi Province,[46] the nation’s capital for navel oranges, Guo was curious about the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on the southern coast. So was his girlfriend, which helped seal the deal.[47] Guo agreed to go to Huawei for an internship.

任正非在 20 世纪 80 年代初曾与该学院有过交集，当时学院的管理层寻求与任正非的雇主南海石油建立合作关系。[43] 现在，任正非来拜访一位名叫周希的教授，他最近开发了一套用于计算用户电话费[44]的软件。在周教授的实验室里，任正非见到了一名 22 岁的研究生，他眼睛很大，皮肤黝黑，头发浓密。他的名字叫郭平。[45] 郭平是江西赣州人，[46] 那里是中国的脐橙之乡，他对南方沿海的深圳经济特区充满好奇。他的女朋友也是如此，这促成了最终的决定。[47] 郭平同意去华为实习。

Guo found himself invigorated by the work. He was thrown straight into the deep end of switch engineering, and he crammed to try to catch up. “At the time I hadn’t even used a telephone to make calls that many times, and somehow I was responsible for switches,” he said.[48] After his internship, Guo worked at the electric power bureau in Wuhan, but he found it uninspiring.[49] He was soon back at Huawei.

郭平发现这项工作让他充满活力。他直接被投入到交换机工程最具挑战性的环节中，为了赶上进度而拼命学习。“当时我甚至都没用电话打过几次电话，不知怎么的我就要负责交换机了，”他说。[48] 实习结束后，郭平在武汉的电力局工作，但他觉得那里枯燥乏味。[49] 不久后，他回到了华为。

When word got out that Ren was building his own switch, there was disagreement among Huawei’s investors, some of whom preferred the company to remain a contractor. The precise sequence of events is fuzzy, but around this time, Shen, one of Ren’s five original investors, abruptly cut Huawei off from further supply of the BH-01 switch, which Huawei had been selling on contract.[50] The Huawei executive Jiang Xisheng recounted to scholar Tian Tao that there was intense conflict at a 1990 Huawei shareholder meeting, after which little trust remained between Ren and his investors.[51]

当任正非正在研制自己的交换机的消息传开后，华为的投资者之间产生了分歧，其中一些人更希望公司继续做代理商。事件的确切顺序已模糊不清，但大约就在此时，任正非最初的五位投资者之一沈某，突然切断了华为一直代理销售的 BH-01 交换机的后续供应。[50] 华为高管姜西生向学者田涛回忆称，在 1990 年的华为股东会上发生了激烈的冲突，此后任正非与投资者之间几乎不再有信任。[51]

Huawei’s first switch was called the BH-03, and Ren has admitted that there were more than a few similarities to Shen’s BH-01, a copycat phenomenon not uncommon during that Wild West era of lax to nonexistent intellectual-property protections in China. Once, in an internal speech, Ren recalled that his engineers used a copier to make “exact one-to-one printed copies” of circuit boards to make the BH-03, explaining that they were struggling to find a way to fulfill customers’ orders after their supply was cut off.[52] He also remembered an official at the Petroleum Ministry urging him to first stake his claim in the market, then sort out the rest later. “What you need to control is the market,” the official told Ren. “No one can keep hold of the technology in the long run. It will be opened up, don’t worry.”[53] The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications later ordered Zhuhai Telecom to license its switch technology to other companies. “Our imitation was also legalized,” Ren said.[54]

华为的第一款交换机名为 BH-03，任正非曾承认，这款产品与沈阳的 BH-01 有诸多相似之处。在当时中国知识产权保护极其匮乏的“草莽时代”，这种抄袭现象并不罕见。任正非曾在一次内部讲话中回忆道，他的工程师们曾使用复印机对电路板进行“一比一的精确复印”来制造 BH-03，并解释说，在供应被切断后，他们正艰难地寻找履行客户订单的方法。[52] 他还记得石油部的一位官员曾敦促他先占领市场，然后再处理其他问题。“你需要控制的是市场，”该官员告诉任正非，“从长远来看，没有人能守住技术。它迟早会开放的，别担心。”[53] 邮电部后来命令珠海电信将其交换机技术授权给其他公司。“我们的模仿也合法化了，”任正非说。[54]

—

Meng Wanzhou had rejoined her parents in Shenzhen by the late 1980s, enrolling in a new high school run by South Sea Oil.[55] She was a familiar presence at Huawei, using the printer in her father’s office for her homework and chatting with the engineers, whom she called, respectfully, “uncle.”[56] At age sixteen, she decided to adopt her mother’s surname, which was not uncommon in the new Communist China, with its emphasis on gender parity.[57] It’s unclear why she made the change.

到 20 世纪 80 年代末，孟晚舟已回到深圳与父母团聚，就读于南海石油公司创办的一所新高中。[55] 她是华为的常客，经常在她父亲的办公室里用打印机做作业，并与工程师们聊天，她礼貌地称呼他们为“叔叔”。[56] 十六岁时，她决定改随母姓，这在强调男女平等的“新中国”并不罕见。[57] 目前尚不清楚她为何做出这一改变。

Youth unrest was stirring in Shenzhen and across the nation. “Everyone’s thinking was really lively,” Jiang told Tian, remarking on Shenzhen in that era.[58] At least some of the young workers in Shenzhen—and even some local officials—saw their experiments in economic reforms as being linked to political change, including Western ideals like free speech and democracy. In 1988, Shenzhen made national headlines when local workers clashed with Beijing scholars over their motivation, with the young people declaring that they worked only for profit, not patriotism. Shenzhen officials defended the young people’s right to free speech, with one saying they “could not allow speech to become a crime.”[59] In an even more startling act of disobedience, the Shenzhen Youth News, a local state-run paper, ran a front-page editorial that called on the nation’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, to retire.[60]

深圳乃至全国都在酝酿着青年的躁动。“每个人的思想都非常活跃，”江向田谈到那个时代的深圳时评论道。[58] 深圳至少有一部分年轻工人和当地官员认为，他们的经济改革实验与政治变革息息相关，包括言论自由和民主等西方理想。1988 年，深圳因当地工人和北京学者就工作动机发生冲突而登上全国头条，年轻人宣称他们只为利润而非爱国主义工作。深圳官员捍卫了年轻人的言论自由权，其中一人表示，他们“不能允许言论入罪”。[59] 在一次更令人震惊的抗命行动中，当地官办报纸《深圳青年报》在头版发表社论，呼吁国家领导人邓小平退休。[60]

Then came the turmoil of 1989. The protests began in April in Beijing, with gatherings to mourn the death of General Secretary Hu Yaobang, seen as a reformer and a symbol of anti-corruption. They quickly snowballed into calls for democratic elections and for eighty-four-year-old Deng to step down. Protests broke out nationwide, from Shanghai to Gansu, with students staging a hunger strike in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. As Reuters reported, some one hundred thousand factory workers, engineers, students, and other residents marched through the streets of Shenzhen on May 22 in support of the Beijing students.[61] Shenzhen University’s students gathered more than twenty thousand signatures in a petition calling for Deng’s resignation.[62]

随后是 1989 年的动荡。抗议活动于 4 月在北京开始，人们聚集在一起悼念被视为改革派和反腐象征的总书记胡耀邦。抗议迅速演变为要求民主选举和要求八十四岁的邓小平下台的呼声。从上海到甘肃，全国各地都爆发了抗议活动，学生们在北京天安门广场举行绝食抗议。据路透社报道，5 月 22 日，约有十万名工厂工人、工程师、学生和其他居民在深圳街头游行，支持北京学生。[61] 深圳大学的学生收集了超过两万个签名，要求邓小平辞职。[62]

[picture]

The Stone Group’s founder, Wan Runnan (right), and his wife, Li Yu.

四通集团创始人万润南（右）和他的妻子李玉。

The student protesters had influential supporters. Among them was Shenzhen University’s founder and president, Luo Zhengqi, who joined in the calls for Deng’s resignation.[63] In Beijing, the nation’s preeminent tech entrepreneur, Wan Runnan, also threw his support behind the students. Wan’s company, the Stone Group, was China’s breakout success story in the nascent private sector, with the press nicknaming it “China’s IBM.” Wan believed that private enterprise could help push the government toward political change. He sent the protesters food and drink and even helped them broker meetings with the government. Zhao Ziyang, who had spearheaded economic reforms in Sichuan Province in the late 1970s and been the boss of Meng’s grandfather, was also sympathetic to the students. As general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhao was now China’s top leader on paper, and he favored a nonviolent resolution. But Deng Xiaoping, still in control behind the curtain, overruled the pacifists.

学生抗议者拥有颇具影响力的支持者。其中包括深圳大学的创办人兼校长罗征启，他也加入了要求邓小平辞职的行列。[63] 在北京，全国最杰出的科技企业家万润南也对学生表示支持。万润南的公司四通集团是中国新兴私营部门中突围成功的典范，被媒体昵称为“中国的 IBM”。万润南相信私营企业可以帮助推动政府进行政治变革。他向抗议者运送食物和饮料，甚至帮助他们斡旋与政府的会面。曾在 20 世纪 70 年代末领导四川省经济改革、并曾是孟晚舟祖父上司的赵紫阳也对学生表示同情。作为中国共产党的总书记，赵紫阳名义上是中国最高领导人，他主张非暴力解决。但仍在幕后掌控局势的邓小平否决了和平派的意见。

Shenzhen residents woke up on the morning of June 5, 1989, to shocking news across the front of the Shenzhen Special Zone Daily: Martial Law Troops Quell Counterrevolutionary Riot. The article cast the pro-democracy protesters as the instigators, saying they had kidnapped and beat soldiers to death. But even this sanitized version acknowledged that students had been killed.

1989 年 6 月 5 日早晨，深圳居民醒来后在《深圳特区报》头版看到了令人震惊的消息：《戒严部队平息反革命暴乱》。文章将亲民主抗议者描绘成煽动者，称他们绑架并殴打致死士兵。但即使是这个经过粉饰的版本也承认有学生被杀。

Zhao was deposed and put under house arrest. Police began a nationwide crackdown. Political dissidents from across the country flooded into Shenzhen to make a dash for the safety of Hong Kong. Wan, the Stone Group’s founder, snuck into Shenzhen under a friend’s ID a few days after the crackdown. Luo, the Shenzhen University president who had supported the protesters, came to see Wan at his hotel, with the two bewailing the calamity.[64] Wan made it safely into Hong Kong a day before Beijing put out a warrant for his arrest, accusing him of a criminal attempt to overthrow the government. In Beijing, military troops took up residence in the Stone Group’s offices and shut down the company’s think tank, which had advocated for democratic reforms.[65] Wan would never be able to return to China.

赵紫阳被罢免并被软禁。警方开始在全国范围内进行镇压。来自全国各地的政治异见人士涌入深圳，冲向安全的香港。四通集团创始人万润南在镇压发生几天后，持朋友的身份证潜入深圳。曾支持抗议者的深圳大学校长罗征启去酒店看望万润南，两人共同哀悼这场灾难。[64] 在北京发布逮捕令的前一天，万润南安全抵达香港。逮捕令指控他犯有企图推翻政府的罪行。在北京，军队进驻了四通集团的办公室，并关闭了该公司曾倡导民主改革的智库。[65] 万润南此后未能再回到中国。

Meng graduated from high school in 1990 and enrolled as an accounting major at Shenzhen University. The school had a reputation for radical open-mindedness: Luo had allowed his students to run their own “court” to determine punishments for peers’ infractions, and even to launch their own bank.[66] Now it was under tense control. Luo was fired and cast out of the party for supporting the calls for Deng’s resignation.[67] Amid rumors that Luo was being held in isolation to prevent him from fleeing, Luo’s successor confirmed that he was “studying” at his home on campus due to his political misunderstandings.[68] Police questioned students involved in the protests.[69]

孟于 1990 年高中毕业，进入深圳大学会计专业就读。这所学校曾以激进的开放思想著称：罗征启曾允许学生建立自己的“法庭”来裁决同窗的违规行为，甚至允许他们创办自己的银行。[66] 如今，学校正处于严密的管控之下。罗因支持要求邓辞职的呼吁而被撤职并开除党籍。[67] 当时有传言称罗被隔离审查以防外逃，其继任者则证实，由于政治认识错误，他正在校内家中“学习”。[68] 警方对参与抗议的学生进行了盘问。[69]

For Meng—and her cohort at Huawei—the events at Tiananmen must have been a formative experience. Many in her generation would grow up to retreat reflexively from political expression. Former Huawei spokesman William Plummer, who worked with Meng on preparations for some finance conferences, called her “very conservative.” “I think she has sort of an old-school ‘I don’t want to do something wrong, I might be punished’ attitude,” he said. “In certain environments, like China, being punished can be bad. She’s a smart woman, but she had this guardedness. She’s her father’s daughter.”[70]

对于孟——以及她在华为的同僚——天安门事件一定是一次塑造性格的经历。她这一代人中的许多人在成长过程中，都会本能地回避政治表达。曾与孟共同筹备过几场财经会议的华为前发言人威廉·普拉默称她“非常保守”。“我认为她有一种老派的‘我不想做错事，我可能会受罚’的态度，”他说，“在某些环境下，比如中国，受罚可能后果很严重。她是个聪明的女性，但她带有这种戒备心。她是她父亲的女儿。”[70]

As for Ren, he was practical. He told his staff that patriotism was a fundamental requirement for working at Huawei. “The company requires every employee to love their motherland, to love this nation of ours that is just starting to rejuvenate,” he wrote in a letter to new employees in 1998. “In no time or place may you do anything that disappoints the motherland or disappoints the nation.”[71] He counseled younger workers that they could not be too idealistic. “True, absolute fairness does not exist. Your hopes cannot be too high in this regard.”[72]

至于任正非，他很务实。他告诉员工，爱国主义是进入华为工作的基本要求。“公司要求每一位员工都要热爱自己的祖国，热爱我们这个正在走向振兴的民族，”他在 1998 年写给新员工的信中写道，“在任何时间、任何地点，都不得做对不起祖国、对不起民族的事情。”[71] 他告诫年轻员工不能太理想主义。“真正的、绝对的公平是没有的。你们在这方面不要抱太高的期望。”[72]

Ren would later describe freedom as the understanding of objectivity. Freedom, Ren said, was a train running back and forth on a track without overturning.[73]

任正非后来将自由描述为对客观规律的理解。任说，自由就像一列在轨道上往复运行而不翻车的火车。[73]

5

5

A Homegrown Switch

自研交换机

Early R&D: 1993–1994

早期研发：1993–1994

Ren Zhengfei looked out the window of the conference room and threatened to jump.[1] If this project failed, he told the scrawny young engineers gathered around him, he’d fling himself out. He and his team were trying to build their first advanced telephone switch, and they weren’t sure if they could succeed. He had arranged financing for the project at usurious rates. They would either succeed or go bankrupt trying.

任正非望向会议室窗外，威胁要跳下去。[1] 他告诉围在身边的瘦削年轻工程师们，如果这个项目失败了，他就从这里跳下去。他和团队正试图研制他们的第一台先进电话交换机，而他们并不确定能否成功。他为这个项目筹集了高利贷资金。他们要么成功，要么在尝试中破产。

Ren’s team had been making simple analog switches that could handle forty, eighty, or, at most, a couple hundred phone calls at once.[2] Their early attempt at a more complex one-thousand-line switch was a failure, suffering from serious cross talk, dropped calls, and a tendency to catch fire from lightning strikes.

任正非的团队此前一直在生产简单的模拟交换机，一次只能处理 40 条、80 条，或者最多一两百条电话通话。[2] 他们早期尝试研发更复杂的千门交换机失败了，存在严重的串音、掉话问题，而且容易因雷击起火。

Now, in 1993, they were trying to build a digital switch that could handle ten thousand telephone calls at once. This would catapult them into the big leagues. They would no longer be selling to hotels and small offices; they would be selling directly to the telephone switching centers for entire cities. And instead of the traditional analog switching technology, they were attempting to make the jump to digital switching, which converted the sound of people’s voices into zeros and ones, allowing the data to be transmitted more efficiently.

现在，在 1993 年，他们正试图研制一种能同时处理一万门电话通话的数字交换机。这将使他们一举进入顶级行列。他们将不再是向酒店和小办公室销售产品，而是直接向整个城市的电话交换中心销售。而且，他们正尝试从传统的模拟交换技术跨越到数字交换技术，后者将人的声音转化为 0 和 1，使数据传输更加高效。

Ren had built a promising engineering team by this point, even if many of his engineers were very young. Two engineers in particular were becoming indispensable to Huawei’s early R&D efforts, both of them graduates of the Huazhong Institute. The first was Zheng Baoyong, a sturdily built twenty-nine-year-old with a round face and a booming voice.[3] Ever since Guo Ping had recruited him from the Huazhong Institute,[4] Ren had taken to him like a brother, nicknaming him A-Bao, teasing him gently for his illegible handwriting,[5] and declaring him the equal of ten thousand others in engineering ability.[6] In Huawei’s employee numbering system, which accorded roughly with seniority, Ren was Employee No. 0001, and Zheng was Employee No. 0002. The other engineer was Li Yinan, a pale, spindly “young prodigy” who had joined Huawei in the summer of 1993. Li had been part of an early enrollment program for gifted youngsters at the Huazhong Institute and had graduated early. Li was so frail-looking that a visiting senior government official commented that he should eat more.[7] But he quickly made a name for himself as a brilliant engineer. Li would win a string of government prizes, including “Outstanding Technology Worker” from Shenzhen’s Science and Technology Bureau, and number two in a national contest. Ren promoted him rapidly and took him under his wing, almost like a godson.

此时，任正非已经建立了一支大有前途的工程团队，尽管他的许多工程师都非常年轻。有两位工程师在华为早期的研发工作中变得不可或缺，他们都毕业于华中工学院。第一位是郑宝用，29 岁，身材魁梧，圆脸，嗓门洪亮。[3] 自从郭平将他从华中工学院招入麾下后，[4] 任正非待他如亲兄弟，亲昵地叫他“阿宝”，经常拿他那难以辨认的字迹开玩笑，[5] 并宣称他的工程能力抵得上一万个人。[6] 在华为大致按资历排列的员工工号系统中，任正非是 0001 号员工，郑宝用是 0002 号。另一位工程师是李一男，一个面色苍白、身形单薄的“天才少年”，于 1993 年夏天加入华为。李一男曾是华中工学院少年班的成员，并提前毕业。李一男看起来非常瘦弱，以至于一位来访的高级政府官员评论说他应该多吃点。[7] 但他很快就以天才工程师的身份成名。李一男曾获得一系列政府奖项，包括深圳市科技局颁发的“优秀科技工作者”称号，并在一次全国竞赛中获得第二名。任正非对他破格提拔，并对他关怀备至，几乎视其为义子。

Ren had rented the third floor of an industrial building on Shenzhen’s outskirts for his fledgling R&D team.[8] There was no air-conditioning, only electric fans, and they took cold showers to try to keep cool. They rigged up nets to try to escape the ferocious mosquitoes. A dozen cots lined the wall. The engineers worked day and night, flopping down on mattresses to sleep for a few hours when they reached exhaustion, which led to the saying that Huawei had a “mattress culture.”[9] One engineer worked so hard that his cornea detached, requiring emergency surgery.[10]

任正非在深圳郊区租下了一栋工业建筑的三层，供他初创的研发团队使用。[8] 那里没有空调，只有电风扇，他们洗冷水澡来降温。他们架起蚊帐以躲避凶猛的蚊子。墙边排着十几张小床。工程师们没日没夜地工作，精疲力竭时就倒在床垫上睡几个小时，这演变成了华为拥有“床垫文化”的说法。[9] 一位工程师工作太拼命，导致视网膜脱落，不得不进行急诊手术。[10]

After dinner, the engineers would pull up their stools and Ren would sit there telling war stories. He hadn’t fought in the famous battles himself, but he recounted them vividly. He told them about the Battle of Triangle Hill during the Korean War, in which Chinese soldiers won a costly victory over US and UN troops. “He told it with great passion and enthusiasm, and we listened with such excitement our blood was practically boiling,” a Huawei executive recalled in an essay.[11]

晚饭后，工程师们会拉起凳子坐好，任正非就坐在那里讲战争故事。他自己并没有参加过那些著名的战役，但他描述得栩栩如生。他给他们讲抗美援朝战争中的上甘岭战役，中国士兵在那场战役中付出了巨大代价，战胜了美军和联合国军。“他讲得非常有激情和热忱，我们听得热血沸腾，”一位华为高管在文章中回忆道。[11]

—

Starting in Huawei’s early days, Ren asked employees to purchase shares in the company. He badly needed the cash to fund Huawei’s budding R&D projects, and he believed that the shares would make employees feel invested in the company’s success, encouraging them to work harder—similar to the reasoning behind the stock options offered by Silicon Valley startups to founding executives. Accounts of Huawei employees buying shares date back to at least 1989. According to early finance manager Zheng Aizhu, she and her husband gave Ren their life savings—eight thousand yuan—when they joined Huawei in February 1989. Ren gifted them seven thousand yuan worth of shares on top of that. “We had tied our entire family’s fate to the company,” she said.[12]

从华为成立初期开始，任正非就要求员工购买公司股份。他急需现金来资助华为萌芽中的研发项目，而且他相信股份会让员工感到自己与公司的成功息息相关，从而激励他们更加努力工作——这与硅谷初创公司向创始高管提供股票期权的逻辑类似。华为员工购买股份的记录至少可以追溯到 1989 年。据早期财务经理郑爱菊回忆，她和丈夫在 1989 年 2 月加入华为时，把全部积蓄——8000 元人民币——都交给了任正非。任正非在此基础上又赠送了他们价值 7000元的股份。“我们全家的命运都和公司捆绑在了一起，”她说。[12]

These were not ownership shares in the modern sense. Employees couldn’t use their shares to vote out management, nor could they sell their shares to others. If they left the company, they could only sell them back to the company at a low price. This stock was simply a way to share the wealth with employees in the form of dividends. There wasn’t exactly a legal basis for Ren to be issuing these shares, with Chinese corporate law still nascent. But no one was stopping him.

这些并不是现代意义上的所有权股份。员工不能利用股份投票罢免管理层，也不能将股份卖给他人。如果他们离开公司，只能以低价将股份卖回给公司。这种股票仅仅是一种以分红形式与员工分享财富的方式。由于中国公司法当时尚处于起步阶段，任正非发行这些股份并没有确切的法律依据。但没有人阻止他。

By 1991, Huawei had ten million yuan in fixed assets and was churning out eighty million yuan worth of switches a year.[13] It had 105 employees, the majority of whom were shareholders. That year, Huawei’s shareholders did something curious: after proudly launching themselves in 1987 as one of Shenzhen’s first wave of “minjian” private tech companies, they voted unanimously to stop being one.

到 1991 年，华为拥有 1000 万元固定资产，每年产出价值 8000 万元的交换机。[13] 公司拥有 105 名员工，其中大多数是股东。那一年，华为的股东们做了一件奇怪的事：在 1987 年作为深圳第一批“民间”民营科技公司自豪地起步后，他们一致投票决定不再做民营公司。

From 1992 to 1997, Huawei would be a jitisuoyouzhi, or a “collectively owned enterprise,” something that was neither “private” nor “state-owned” in the modern senses of the words. Indeed, such companies were most similar in spirit to the Mao-era communes: Beijing defined them as “socialist economic organizations whose property is collectively owned by the working people, who practice joint labor, and whose distribution method is based on distribution according to labor.”[14] While collectively owned businesses had been used in the countryside to mixed success, China’s national government had, in 1991, just formalized guidelines for urban collective companies.

从 1992 年到 1997 年，华为是一家“集体所有制”企业，这在现代语境下既非“私有”也非“国有”。事实上，这类公司在精神上与毛泽东时代的公社最为相似：北京将其定义为“财产归劳动群众集体所有、实行共同劳动、分配方式以按劳分配为主的社会主义经济组织”。[14] 虽然集体所有制企业在农村的应用成效参半，但中国中央政府在 1991 年刚刚正式出台了城镇集体企业的管理条例。

Putting on the “red hat” of a collective was popular among startups then as a way to obtain political protection.[15] The Stone Group—hailed as “China’s IBM” in the 1980s—had been a trailblazer in this regard, successfully switching to a “collectively owned enterprise” in 1986.[16] The 1991 national guidelines stipulated that collectively owned enterprises could enjoy preferential treatment in national policies and apply for loans from specialized banks.[17] The guidelines also ordered government authorities nationwide to incorporate the companies into their economic plans in order to ensure the success of the urban collective economy. It remains unclear why Ren and his team decided to switch to a jitisuoyouzhi, though it’s likely that the broader financing opportunities were attractive. Ren would later recall the business environment being challenging in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, with Western nations putting financial sanctions on China. “The Chinese economy was in a downward slide for three years,” Ren said in an internal speech. “The economy was really bad then, almost on the verge of collapse.”

在当时，戴上集体的“红帽子”是初创企业寻求政治保护的一种流行做法。[15] 在 20 世纪 80 年代被誉为“中国 IBM”的四通集团曾是这方面的先驱，于1986 年成功转型为“集体所有制企业”。[16] 1991 年的国家条例规定，集体所有制企业可以享受国家政策的优惠待遇，并向专业银行申请贷款。[17] 条例还要求全国各地政府部门将这些公司纳入经济计划，以确保城镇集体经济的成功。目前尚不清楚任正非及其团队为何决定转向集体所有制，尽管更广泛的融资机会很可能具有吸引力。任正非后来回忆起 1989 年天安门事件后的商业环境充满挑战，西方国家对中国实施了金融制裁。“中国经济连续三年下滑，”任正非在一次内部讲话中说，“当时的经济非常糟糕，几乎处于崩溃的边缘。”

Such a system was implemented at Huawei, and local officials pointed to the company as a success story. After Huawei made the switch to collective ownership, its corporate charter stipulated that 40 percent of after-tax profits would be divvied up as dividends among the shareholders (who were also the employees), local officials reported. Another 30 percent would go into the company’s “common reserve fund,” which was set aside for the company’s expansion and could not be touched for dividends or employee bonuses. The other 30 percent would go into a “welfare fund.” Huawei’s new charter also spelled out how assets would be distributed among the employee shareholders if the company went under.

华为实施了这样一套制度，当地官员将该公司视为成功典范。据当地官员报告，在华为转为集体所有制后，其公司章程规定，税后利润的 40%将作为股息分配给股东（同时也是员工）。另外 30%将进入公司的“公积金”，用于公司扩张，不得用于分红或员工奖金。其余 30%则进入“公益金”。华为的新章程还详细规定了如果公司倒闭，资产将如何在员工股东之间进行分配。

Many of the quirks of jitisuoyouzhi lingered on as part of Huawei’s management style, even after the company became a limited liability one in 1997. The national guidelines for collectively owned companies called for “democratic management,” with workers involved in supervising their elected factory manager through a workers’ committee. They also required remuneration of employees according to the principle of distribution according to work, and dividends to shareholders in years where there were profits. A trade union had to be set up to represent the workers’ interests.

即使在 1997 年华为改制为有限责任公司后，集体所有制的许多特点仍作为华为管理风格的一部分保留了下来。国家关于集体企业的条例要求实行“民主管理”，由工人通过职工委员会监督其选出的厂长。条例还要求根据按劳分配原则给予员工报酬，并在有利润的年份向股东分红。此外，必须成立工会来代表工人的利益。

What “democratic management” meant in a company was that the CEO—or “factory manager”—did not have complete control. Under the guidelines, the factory manager was required to “love the collective” and “connect with the masses,” and if they did not, the workers’ committee could vote them out. The guidelines specified that the workers’ committee was the authority within the company. For major management decisions, the factory manager had to submit a proposal for the approval of the workers’ committee. It’s unclear exactly how the power was divided in Huawei’s case, though the local Shenzhen officials wrote that Huawei was complying with democratic management by instituting a shareholder committee, a board of directors, and a CEO.

公司内部的“民主管理”意味着首席执行官（或“厂长”）并不拥有绝对控制权。根据条例，厂长被要求“热爱集体”并“联系群众”，如果做不到，职工委员会可以通过投票将其罢免。条例明确规定，职工委员会是公司内部的权力机构。对于重大经营决策，厂长必须提交方案经职工委员会批准。目前尚不清楚华为内部权力具体是如何划分的，不过深圳当地官员曾写道，华为通过设立股东大会、董事会和总经理，落实了民主管理。

—

China’s leaders had distrusted foreign telecommunications gear from the start, suspicious that it was a tool of colonialism and surveillance. In 1865, Prince Gong, the ruling regent of the Qing dynasty, said as much in a letter to the Russian minister in Beijing, turning down his request to put up telegraph lines: “They are extremely inconvenient,” Prince Gong wrote. “Therefore, they can never be introduced.”[18]

中国领导人从一开始就对外国电信设备充满不信任，怀疑其是殖民主义和监视的工具。1865 年，清朝摄政王恭亲王在给驻京俄国公使的一封信中表达了这一观点，拒绝了其架设电报线路的请求：“此举极不方便，”恭亲王写道，“因此，断不可行。”[18]

Telegraphs would indeed be introduced, then telephones, but the rollout was slow. By the time Deng Xiaoping was beginning to open up the economy in the late 1970s, many people were still relying on telegraphs and paper mail. High-level government officials each had their own secure red desktop telephone, which only connected to the others and worked much better than those among the public.[19] For everyone else, it was still common for an entire neighborhood to share a single phone, with no expectation of privacy.[20] In 1979, all of Shenzhen had only two public telephones.[21]

电报最终还是引入了，随后是电话，但普及过程十分缓慢。到 20 世纪 70 年代末邓小平开始开放经济时，许多人仍依赖电报和纸质信件。高级政府官员每人都有专属的安全红色桌面电话，仅供彼此联系，且通话质量远优于公众使用的电话。[19] 对于其他人来说，整个社区共用一部电话仍是常态，且毫无隐私可言。[20] 1979 年，整个深圳仅有两部公用电话。[21]

The 1980s saw a telephone boom. Shenzhen jumped from 1,500 registered telephones in 1982 to 43,876 in 1988, with telephone numbers upgraded from four to six digits.[22] Demand was still far outpacing supply: the city’s wait list for telephones ran 37,500 units long. With no domestic company able to make the switches, Chinese telecom bureaus could only buy foreign. “The People’s Republic is described as ‘a gold mine,’ ” an executive at Northern Telecom, the Canadian switchmaker later renamed Nortel, declared to a Canadian newspaper in 1985. Sweden’s Ericsson and Japan’s Fujitsu were leading the sales, aided by their home governments offering huge sums in financing.[23] “In the early days, there was very little money. It was very much a diplomatic game. It was governments and their national champions going to China, doing this complicated dance, and looking to find some advantage,” recalled Ken Zita, who was a China-based telecom analyst in the 1980s.

20 世纪 80 年代见证了电话的热潮。深圳的登记电话数量从 1982 年的 1500 部激增至 1988 年的 43876 部，电话号码也从四位升级为六位。[22] 需求仍远超供应：该市等待安装电话的名单长达 37500 户。由于国内没有公司能制造交换机，中国电信局只能购买外国产品。“中华人民共和国被描述为‘一座金矿’，”加拿大交换机制造商北方电讯（后更名为北电网络）的一位高管在 1985 年对一家加拿大报纸宣称。瑞典的爱立信和日本的富士通在销售方面处于领先地位，这得益于其本国政府提供的大额融资支持。[23] “在早期，资金非常匮乏。这在很大程度上是一场外交博弈。各国政府及其国家冠军企业来到中国，跳起这场复杂的舞蹈，寻求某种优势，”20 世纪 80 年代常驻中国的电信分析师肯·齐塔回忆道。

Beijing wasn’t letting the foreign switchmakers in for free: it was demanding that the companies share some technology with a Chinese partner through a joint-venture partnership. It was hardly a secret that Beijing officials hoped they could learn what they needed to become self-sufficient. The first company to get in line was Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company, a Belgium-based arm of the Bell Telephone Company, which agreed to share technology through a joint venture, Shanghai Bell.[24] Shanghai Bell enjoyed massive sales, leaving everyone else scrambling to follow suit. In the industry, people debated whether China would succeed in learning how to make these advanced technologies. Former Canadian ambassador Guy Saint-Jacques recalled Canadian companies being confident that they could stay a step ahead by transferring only older generations of technology to China while enjoying the sales bonanza. “I always compare this to running toward a cliff. At some point, you will fall down,” Saint-Jacques said.[25] But Ren felt that the foreigners weren’t so simplistic. “Their trick for transferring technology is they expect that after a few years, you will need to import it again, and then import, import, and, again, import,” he once remarked. “In the end, you are not self-sufficient.”[26]

北京并没有让外国交换机厂商免费进入：它要求这些公司通过合资伙伴关系与中国合作伙伴分享技术。北京官员希望借此学习到实现自给自足所需的知识，这早已不是什么秘密。第一家排队进入的公司是贝尔电话制造公司（Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company），它是贝尔电话公司总部位于比利时的分支机构，该公司同意通过合资企业上海贝尔分享技术。[24]上海贝尔获得了巨大的销售额，让其他所有人都争先恐后地效仿。在业内，人们争论中国是否能成功学会如何制造这些先进技术。加拿大前大使赵朴（Guy Saint-Jacques）回忆说，加拿大公司当时很有信心，认为只要向中国转让旧一代技术，同时享受销售盛宴，就能保持领先地位。“我总是把这比作奔向悬崖。在某个时刻，你会掉下去，”赵朴说。[25]但任正非觉得外国人并没有那么简单。“他们转让技术的伎俩是，希望几年后你还需要再次进口，然后进口、进口，再进口，”他曾评价道。“最终，你无法实现自给自足。”[26]

Then, in 1991, China made its first breakthrough in ending its dependence on foreign telephone switches. This achievement was not made by Huawei. It was made by a round-faced Chinese military engineer named Wu Jiangxing. Wu’s “04 switch” was the first in China that could handle thousands of phone calls at once, the kind of large-scale switch needed to run the central telephone exchanges for cities. The breakthrough was perhaps not solely due to domestic innovation. One Chinese tech official later recalled in his memoir visiting a military research institute in 1988 and being told that the military engineers were busy studying the source code of a foreign switch they had acquired “by a chance occurrence”; they were working on a project that he said led to the 04 switch.[27] But however it had happened, China could now build a telephone network without being at the mercy of foreigners.

随后在 1991 年，中国在结束对外国电话交换机的依赖方面取得了首次突破。这一成就并非由华为取得，而是由一位名叫邬江兴的圆脸中国军方工程师实现的。邬江兴的“04 机”是中国第一台能同时处理数万路电话的交换机，这种大规模交换机是运行城市中央电话局所必需的。这一突破或许并非完全源于国内创新。一位中国科技官员后来在回忆录中提到，他在 1988 年访问一家军事研究所时，被告知军方工程师正忙于研究通过“偶然机会”获得的外国交换机源代码；他表示，他们当时正在进行的这个项目促成了 04 机的诞生。[27] 但无论过程如何，中国现在已经可以建立自己的电话网络，而无需受制于外国人。

The breakthrough galvanized Ren’s engineers at Huawei. They decided that they would also try to build an advanced switch akin to the 04, even though the prospects of success were uncertain. One of Ren’s engineers managed to visit the 04 switch factory in Zhengzhou, where the staffers let him take a close look at the device, perhaps arrogantly assuming he could never build such a thing himself.[28] Through an industry contact, Ren also managed to arrange a tour for some of his engineers to see AT&T’s new ten-thousand-line switch in the northern Chinese city of Changchun.[29]

这一突破激励了华为任正非旗下的工程师。他们决定也尝试研制一种类似于 04 机的高级交换机，尽管成功的希望尚不确定。一任正非的一名工程师设法参观了位于郑州的 04 机工厂，那里的工作人员让他近距离观察了该设备，或许是傲慢地认为他永远无法亲手造出这样的东西。[28] 通过行业关系，任正非还设法安排他的一些工程师前往中国北方城市长春，参观了 AT&T 新型的万门交换机。[29]

But they needed financing for such an ambitious R&D project, and it was hard to convince the banks, which were state-owned and risk-averse.[30] Ren’s solution was to launch a joint-venture company called Mobeco Telecom Co. Ltd. in April 1993.[31] Mobeco was a portmanteau of the names of the three forefathers of telecommunications: Samuel Morse, Alexander Graham Bell, and Guglielmo Marconi.[32] The seventeen founding investors in Mobeco were provincial and municipal telecom bureaus, which had put a combined thirty-nine million yuan into the venture, and Huawei promised them 30 percent annual returns, issued in the form of “dividends” on the shares.

但如此雄心勃勃的研发项目需要资金，而要说服那些国有且规避风险的银行并非易事。[30] 任正非的解决方案是在 1993 年 4 月成立了一家名为莫贝克电信有限公司（Mobeco Telecom Co. Ltd.）的合资公司。[31] Mobeco 是电信领域三位先驱名字的缩写组合：萨缪尔·摩尔斯（Samuel Morse）、亚历山大·格拉汉姆·贝尔（Alexander Graham Bell）和古列尔莫·马可尼（Guglielmo Marconi）。[32] 莫贝克的 17 家创始股东是各省市的电信局，他们总共向该合资企业投入了 3900 万元人民币，华为向他们承诺了 30%的年回报率，并以股份“红利”的形式发放。

Internally, Ren and his team dubbed their new advanced digital switch the “06”[33] to one-up AT&T’s flagship No. 5 switch. But this was bravado. It was unclear if they could even make a functioning digital switch, let alone one that could one-up anyone else’s.[34]

在内部，任正非和他的团队将他们的新型高级数字交换机命名为“06 机”[33]，意在超越 AT&T 的旗舰产品 5 号交换机。但这只是一种虚张声势。当时还不清楚他们是否能制造出一台可以运行的数字交换机，更不用说超越别人的产品了。[34]

—

Huawei’s presence in the United States began during this period, as Ren and his team struggled to build their switch. A switch had thousands of pieces that needed to be sourced from dozens of specialized companies.[35] And many of the best component suppliers were in the United States.

华为在美国的足迹始于这一时期，当时任正非和他的团队正艰难地研制他们的交换机。一台交换机有数千个零件，需要从数十家专业公司采购。[35] 而许多最优秀的零部件供应商都位于美国。

Huawei set up a subsidiary in Santa Clara, California, called Ran Boss Technologies on March 4, 1993.[36] The origins of the subsidiary’s name are unclear, though Ren once said Ran Boss meant “the head of the goddess of the sea,” a possible reference to the Norse sea goddess Rán.[37] One account by a former Huawei manager claims the unit was named in tribute to “Boss Ren,” which infuriated Ren when he discovered it.[38] In any case, they hoped that Ran Boss could help them keep abreast of the latest technologies. “This marks the real beginning of Huawei’s international expansion,” Huawei’s main internal newspaper reported.[39] “Ran Boss will mainly serve as an R&D base in the United States, so that we can improve our technical level faster, and guarantee the development of products at an internationally advanced level.” Ren flew over to launch the unit and to visit potential suppliers. His delight in traveling the United States on these early trips would become an indelible part of Huawei’s story. Talking to journalists, Ren recalled flying to the States with $10,000 in cash sewn into his coat, as he didn’t know how much things cost.[40] He was astonished at the vastness of Central Park in New York, the quiet of the Boston suburbs, and the opulence of Las Vegas. Ren marveled at how IBM’s four-hundred-square-mile campus went on and on.[41]

1993 年 3 月 4 日，华为在加利福尼亚州圣克拉拉成立了一家名为 Ran Boss Technologies 的子公司。[36] 该子公司名称的由来尚不明确，尽管任正非曾说 Ran Boss 意为“海神之首”，这可能指代北欧海神兰（Rán）。[37] 一位华为前经理的说法称，该部门是为了向“任老板”（Boss Ren）致敬而命名的，任正非发现后大发雷霆。[38] 无论如何，他们希望 Ran Boss 能帮助他们紧跟最新技术。“这标志着华为国际扩张的真正开始，”华为主要的内部报纸报道称。[39] “Ran Boss 将主要作为在美国的研发基地，以便我们能更快地提高技术水平，保证开发出具有国际先进水平的产品。”任正非飞往美国启动该部门并拜访潜在供应商。他在这些早期旅行中游历美国的愉悦感，后来成为了华为故事中不可磨灭的一部分。在接受记者采访时，任正非回忆起当时带着缝在衣服里的 1 万美元现金飞往美国，因为他不知道那里的物价。[40] 他对纽约中央公园的广阔、波士顿郊区的宁静以及拉斯维加斯的奢华感到惊讶。任正非对 IBM 占地 400 平方英里的园区一眼望不到头感到赞叹不已。[41]

A Huawei engineer named Yan Jingli, or James Yan, was appointed as the company’s first US representative. He toured trade shows, met with component suppliers, and sent dispatches about the latest trends. “The CD-ROM has become a new type of gift for people when celebrating Christmas, New Year’s and birthdays,” Yan reported back after one convention.[42]

一位名叫严兢立（James Yan）的华为工程师被任命为公司首任驻美代表。他巡访各大贸易展，会见零部件供应商，并发送关于最新趋势的简报。“CD-ROM 已成为人们庆祝圣诞节、新年和生日时的一种新型礼品，”严兢立在一次展会后发回的报告中写道。[42]

One key supplier that Huawei landed was Motorola. The US high-tech company was keen on expanding its China business. Tony Kwong, a former sales executive for Motorola’s Hong Kong–based chips business, recalled meeting Huawei’s chief engineer at the time, Zheng Baoyong, in 1993.[43] Zheng told him Huawei was working on a rival to the 04 switch and wanted Motorola’s help, Kwong said. Kwong was impressed by Zheng’s vision and ambition. This is a bunch of guys I would personally like to work together with, he thought.

华为争取到的一个关键供应商是摩托罗拉。这家美国高科技公司当时正热衷于扩张其中国业务。曾任摩托罗拉香港芯片业务销售主管的邝锦强（Tony Kwong）回忆起 1993 年与华为时任总工程师郑宝用的会面。[43] 邝锦强说，郑宝用告诉他华为正在研发一款与 04 机竞争的交换机，并希望得到摩托罗拉的帮助。邝锦强对郑宝用的远见和雄心印象深刻。他心想：这是一群我个人很想与之共事的人。

Kwong persuaded his superiors at Motorola’s headquarters to take Huawei seriously and put it on their priority customer list. That meant Huawei could get free component samples for development and early access to new products, putting it on a level playing field with international brands. Huawei ended up using Motorola chips almost exclusively in its “line cards,” the circuitry that connected to each telephone line in the switch. It was a win for Huawei and a win for Motorola.

邝锦强说服了摩托罗拉总部的上司，让他们重视华为并将其列入优先客户名单。这意味着华为可以获得用于开发的免费元器件样品，并能提前接触到新产品，从而获得了与国际品牌同台竞争的机会。华为最终在“用户板”（交换机中连接每条电话线的电路板）上几乎全部使用了摩托罗拉的芯片。这对华为和摩托罗拉来说是双赢。

During his US travels, Ren was particularly struck by Las Vegas. When he arrived in the city to attend the Consumer Electronics Show, he was dazzled by Caesars Palace, a vision of ancient Rome with its Corinthian columns, gladiators, and winged horses. It was “so beautiful and luxurious,” he thought. Taking in the glow of the neon lights at night, Ren believed that Las Vegas might be the most beautiful city in the United States.[44]

在美国旅行期间，任正非对拉斯维加斯的印象尤为深刻。当他抵达这座城市参加消费电子展（CES）时，他被凯撒皇宫酒店迷住了，那是一座充满了科林斯柱、角斗士和飞马的古罗马幻境。他觉得那里“如此美丽和豪华”。看着夜晚霓虹灯闪烁的光芒，任正非认为拉斯维加斯可能是美国最美丽的城市。[44]

—

By May 1994, Huawei had a prototype of its advanced digital switch, which looked like an enormous row of filing cabinets filled with wires. The company had settled on naming it the “C&C08,” with eight being a lucky number in China. The ampersand-linked Cs, Huawei executives would explain to visitors, stood for both “City & Countryside” and “Computer & Communication.”[45]

到 1994 年 5 月，华为研制出了其先进数字交换机的原型机，它看起来像一排塞满了电线的巨大文件柜。公司决定将其命名为“C&C08”，因为“8”在中国是一个吉利数字。华为的高管们会向访客解释，用“&”连接的两个 C 分别代表“城市与农村”（City & Countryside）以及“计算机与通信”（Computer & Communication）。[45]

They set up their first test unit in Yiwu,[46] a short drive from the Ren family’s ancestral village in Zhejiang Province, where they had managed to wheedle the local telecom officials into giving them a chance. At first, the switch didn’t work. The engineers brought the quilts from their hotel to the switchroom, camping out there night after night to try to fix it. Li Yinan described it as being as finicky as “a coquettish little woman.”[47]

他们在义乌设立了第一个实验局，[46] 那里距离浙江省任氏祖籍村不远，他们设法说服了当地电信官员给他们一个机会。起初，交换机无法正常工作。工程师们把被褥从旅馆搬到机房，在那儿连夜守候进行调试。李一男形容它像“撒娇的小女人”一样难以捉摸。[47]

But Huawei had supporters rooting for it to succeed. Officials from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications took time from their weekends to help the engineers troubleshoot. Wu Jichuan, the telecommunications minister himself, had visited Huawei in December 1993 and encouraged Ren’s team. Wu told them that even though the nation was purchasing technology from abroad, the ultimate goal was to build Chinese brands. “For some critical technologies, after we introduce, digest, and absorb them, we must Sinicize them with Chinese characteristics.”[48]

但华为拥有支持者，希望它能取得成功。邮电部的官员们利用周末时间帮助工程师排除故障。邮电部部长吴基传本人也曾于 1993 年 12 月视察华为，并鼓励任正非的团队。吴基传告诉他们，虽然国家正在从国外采购技术，但最终目标是建立中国品牌。“对于一些关键技术，我们在引进、消化、吸收之后，必须使之具有中国特色，实现国产化。”[48]

At an industry convention in Beijing in October 1994, Huawei’s team was bursting with pride that Huawei was the only Chinese company whose booth stood in the hall for international companies, alongside Siemens and Nortel. The Huawei booth featured the lyrics of “L’Internationale,” the international socialist anthem, which called on workers to stand up and throw off their shackles:

在 1994 年 10 月北京举行的一次行业会议上，华为团队充满了自豪感，因为华为是唯一一家展位设在国际公司展厅的中国公司，与西门子和北电网络并列。华为展位的背景墙上印着《国际歌》的歌词，这首国际社会主义赞歌号召劳动者站起来，挣脱枷锁：

There are no supreme saviors

从来就没有什么救世主

We want neither gods nor emperors

也不靠神仙皇帝

To build a new life

要创造人类的幸福

We must only rely on ourselves.[49]

全靠我们自己。[49]

6

6

A Shared Interest

共同的利益

Huawei Forges Ties to the State: 1994–1996

华为与国家建立联系：1994–1996

On a Sunday afternoon in June 1994, Ren Zhengfei made his way to the Shenzhen Guesthouse[1] to rendezvous with Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, who was on a brief stopover in the Special Economic Zone. Huawei’s C&C08 switch still had glitches, and it had yet to pass government certification for mass production. But local officials had placed their trust in Ren, selecting him as one of only eight Shenzhen entrepreneurs to meet the nation’s leader.

1994 年 6 月的一个周日下午，任正非前往深圳宾馆[1]会见中共中央总书记江泽民，当时江泽民正是在经济特区做短暂逗留。华为的 C&C08 交换机当时仍存在缺陷，尚未通过政府的大规模生产认证。但当地官员对任正非寄予厚望，将他选为仅有的八位会见国家领导人的深圳企业家之一。

Ren was already proving to be politically adept, able to gauge how the political winds would blow and position Huawei accordingly. His father’s persecution during the Cultural Revolution would have made him more sensitive to the potentially dire consequences of misreading the political direction. His meeting with Jiang would reflect his attunement to the needs of Beijing—and to the business opportunities that they presented.

任正非已经证明了自己在政治上的老练，能够洞察政治风向并据此为华为定位。他父亲在文革期间遭受的迫害，使他对于误判政治方向可能带来的惨痛后果更为敏感。他与江泽民的会面反映出他对北京需求的高度敏锐——以及这些需求所蕴含的商业机会。

Sixty-seven-year-old Jiang wore oversize rectangular glasses and combed his hair into a stiff, similarly boxy shape. As an engineer by training who had done an exchange stint at a Soviet auto factory early in his career, he was interested in technology. Jiang had been one of the Beijing officials in charge of the launch of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in 1980, and he had served as electronics minister. With his technical background, Jiang hadn’t originally been destined for the top, but he’d made an unexpected ascent after Zhao Ziyang was sidelined following the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989.

67 岁的江泽民戴着一副巨大的矩形眼镜，头发梳理成同样方正且硬挺的造型。作为一名受过工程训练、职业生涯早期曾在苏联汽车厂实习过的工程师，他对技术很感兴趣。江泽民曾是 1980 年负责启动深圳经济特区的北京官员之一，并曾担任电子工业部部长。凭借其技术背景，江泽民最初并非注定要登上最高位，但在 1989 年天安门事件后赵紫阳靠边站，他实现了出人意料的晋升。

In the summer of 1994, Jiang was preoccupied with China’s efforts to become a founding member of the World Trade Organization, which was set to launch on January 1, 1995. Washington was obstructing Jiang’s WTO bid.[2] The Clinton administration had declared that there was nothing to be discussed until China cleaned up its rampant piracy of Western movies, music, and other intellectual property. It was true that China’s 1990s economic boom had been freewheeling, allowing many people to bootstrap their way into small fortunes overnight, but it had not been without legal and safety problems. Just that morning, Jiang had visited hospitals across the bay in Zhuhai to meet with survivors of a collapsed textile factory, the second such deadly accident in the area in two weeks.[3] China’s leaders had acknowledged that the nation needed to clean things up in order to gain acceptance on the world stage, and part of that meant evolving its own R&D.

1994 年夏天，江泽民正专注于中国争取成为世界贸易组织（WTO）创始成员国的努力，该组织定于 1995 年 1 月 1 日成立。华盛顿正在阻挠江泽民的入世申请。[2]克林顿政府宣称，在中国清理其对西方电影、音乐和其他知识产权的猖獗盗版行为之前，没什么好谈的。诚然，中国 20 世纪 90 年代的经济繁荣是自由放任的，允许许多人通过白手起家一夜致富，但也并非没有法律和安全问题。就在那天早上，江泽民还前往海湾对岸的珠海视察医院，慰问一家倒塌纺织厂的幸存者，那是该地区两周内发生的第二起此类致命事故。[3]中国领导人已经意识到，国家需要整顿秩序以获得国际社会的认可，而其中的一部分意味着发展自主研发。

So as Ren described Huawei’s R&D advances, Jiang listened with keen interest, calling him “Old Ren” in a show of fondness and even taking notes when Ren spoke about the company’s chips research. Ren waxed eloquent about the importance of the nation developing its own telephone switching technology. “A country without its own program-controlled switches is like one without an army,” Ren declared, delivering what would become one of his most famous sayings.[4] Jiang thought it well said and replied approvingly.[5] Ren added that because of the national security imperative, the software of such systems should be government-controlled: “Program-controlled switches are related to national security,” he said. “Its software must be held in the hands of the Chinese government.”[6]

因此，当任正非描述华为的研发进展时，江泽民听得津津有味，亲切地称他为“老任”，甚至在任正非谈到公司的芯片研究时做起了笔记。任正非口若悬河地谈论国家开发自主程控交换技术的重要性。“一个国家如果没有自己的程控交换机，就像没有军队一样，”任正非宣称，这句话后来成了他最著名的名言之一。[4]江泽民认为这话说得很好，并表示赞许。[5]任正非补充说，出于国家安全的紧迫性，此类系统的软件应由政府控制：“程控交换机关系到国家安全，”他说，“它的软件必须掌握在中国政府手中。”[6]

A local magazine reported that Jiang was also presented with Huawei’s company oath, which read:

当地一家杂志报道称，江泽民还看到了华为的公司誓词，内容如下：

Our feet stand on our forefathers’ dream of prosperity

我们脚踏着祖先繁荣的梦想

Bearing the hope of national rejuvenation

承载着民族复兴的希望

We are an honest and progressing force

我们是一支诚实进取的队伍

Aiming toward the advanced technology of the United States

瞄准美国先进技术

Following Japan’s great management

学习日本伟大管理

According to the glorious tradition of the Chinese nation

继承中华民族光荣传统

Building our team at a high level with high quality

高水平、高质量地建设我们的队伍

To better serve the motherland and the people.

更好地为祖国和人民服务。

According to the magazine, Jiang quipped that they should add a line to the oath: We must learn the meticulous hard-working spirit of the German people.[7]

据该杂志报道，江泽民开玩笑说，他们应该在誓词中加上一句：我们要学习德国人严谨刻苦的精神。[7]

Two days after the meeting, Ren penned an optimistic report to his staff.[8] General Secretary Jiang had talked “many times” about telecommunications policy during their meeting, he wrote. Top leaders understood their complaints: that it was an unfair playing field because foreign switchmakers were getting tax exemptions domestic vendors could not access, and that foreign switchmakers had enormous financing support from their own governments in ways Chinese startups did not. “The country will soon be canceling the practice of foreign switchmakers using commercial loans to get exemptions from customs duties and value-added tax,” Ren wrote. “The domestic industry will be protected, so that domestic and foreign industry are on a level playing field.”[9]

会面两天后，任正非给员工写了一份乐观的报告。[8]他写道，江总书记在会面期间“多次”谈到电信政策。最高领导层理解他们的抱怨：竞争环境不公平，因为外国交换机厂商享有国内厂商无法获得的税收减免，而且外国厂商从其政府获得了中国初创企业所没有的巨大融资支持。任正非写道：“国家很快将取消外国交换机厂商利用商业贷款免征关税和增值税的做法。”“国内产业将受到保护，使国内外产业处于平等的竞争地位。”[9]

Following Jiang’s visit, their obstacles began to melt away. In November 1994, the Shenzhen-headquartered China Merchants Bank announced a new financial product: “domestic buyer’s credit,” an equivalent to the kind of loan that foreign switchmakers were touting to Chinese telecom operators to get them to buy overseas wares. The first company in the nation able to offer domestic buyer’s credit to its customers was Huawei.[10]

在江泽民视察之后，他们的障碍开始消融。1994 年 11 月，总部位于深圳的招商银行宣布了一项新的金融产品：“国内买方信贷”，这相当于外国交换机厂商为了诱使中国电信运营商购买海外设备而推销的那种贷款。全国第一家能够向客户提供国内买方信贷的公司就是华为。[10]

—

On April 3, 1995, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications approved Huawei’s C&C08 switch for mass production.[11] Telecom specialists from across China had participated in the review, along with officials from the electric power ministry, the Guangzhou military staff, and the Ministry of Public Security’s cybersecurity bureau. The experts had pointed out problems, like the colors of components being inconsistent, the design inelegant, and some of the labels incorrect. Still, Huawei’s C&C08 passed the review. The company could commence selling it to telecom bureaus across the nation. Some of Huawei’s overseas rivals weren’t impressed either. One Western executive who peeked under the hood of a C&C08 thought it looked suspiciously like AT&T’s No. 5 switch.[12]

1995 年 4 月 3 日，邮电部批准华为 C&C08 交换机投入量产。[11] 来自中国各地的电信专家，以及电力部、广州军区和公安部计算机安全监察局的官员参加了评审。专家们指出了一些问题，比如零部件颜色不一致、设计不够美观、部分标签错误等。尽管如此，华为的 C&C08 还是通过了评审。公司可以开始向全国各地的电信局销售该产品。华为的一些海外对手对此并不以为然。一位曾拆解过 C&C08 的西方高管认为，它的内部构造看起来非常像 AT&T 的 5 号交换机。[12]

Now it turned out there was a new use for Mobeco, the joint venture Huawei had set up to finance its development of the C&C08. Mobeco’s investors—the municipal telecom bureaus—were also in charge of picking the switches for their cities’ central telephone exchanges. Huawei said they would achieve “common prosperity” through the venture and touted the prospect of an IPO. Huawei’s then vice-chairwoman, Sun Yafang, described it like this: “We created a community of shared interests with the telecom operators and the government departments overseeing them.”[13] In the modern day, such an arrangement might be considered a conflict of interest. But in China’s early capitalist era, few rules existed around things of this sort, and even fewer were being enforced. By the end of 1994, Huawei was Guangdong Province’s top-selling private tech company.[14]

事实证明，华为为了筹集 C&C08 研发资金而成立的合资公司“莫贝克”（Mobeco）有了新用途。莫贝克的投资者——各市电信局——同时也负责为其城市电话交换中心挑选交换机。华为表示，他们将通过该合资企业实现“共同富裕”，并吹捧了 IPO 的前景。华为时任副董事长孙亚芳曾这样描述：“我们与电信运营商以及监管它们的政府部门建立了一个利益共同体。”[13] 在现代，这种安排可能被视为利益冲突。但在中国早期的资本主义时代，针对此类事务的规则很少，被执行的就更少了。到 1994 年底，华为已成为广东省销售额最高的民营科技公司。[14]

Mobeco had started out with seventeen provincial and municipal telecom bureaus whose employees were shareholders, including in the capital, Beijing, and in cities across the country, among them Chengdu, Nanning, and Taiyuan. This list would grow quickly, with other municipalities keen to join the profit-sharing deal. Huawei talked up Mobeco as having the support of senior officials, including Guangdong Province’s boss, Xie Fei, who hoped it could quickly become competitive against foreign companies.[15]

莫贝克最初由 17 家省市电信局组成，其员工均为股东，其中包括首都北京以及成都、南宁、太原等全国各地的城市。随着其他城市渴望加入这一分红协议，名单迅速增加。华为宣称莫贝克得到了高级官员的支持，其中包括广东省委书记谢非，他希望莫贝克能迅速具备与外国公司竞争的实力。[15]

Mobeco was tasked with manufacturing Huawei switches, including the C&C08. Its articles of association set the initial production target at 740,000 lines, with an aim to expand capacity to three million annually. In the articles, Huawei also pledged a technology transfer to its state-owned partners: it said that after three years, it would exclusively transfer its program-controlled switching technology to Mobeco, with an option to transfer other technology as well.[16]

莫贝克负责生产包括 C&C08 在内的华为交换机。其章程将初始生产目标定为 74 万线，目标是年产能扩大到 300 万线。在章程中，华为还承诺向其国有合作伙伴转让技术：华为表示，三年后将向莫贝克独家转让其程控交换技术，并可选择转让其他技术。[16]

In a December 1994 meeting with Zhang Jinqiang, vice-minister of the Ministry of Electronics Industry, Ren also offered to share technology with the national government and give it an ownership stake in a project.[17] He gave Zhang a written proposal outlining a collaboration between Huawei and the government. While Huawei has not explained what, exactly, this proposed collaboration meant, the way Ren described it made it sound a lot like the one with Mobeco. “Our stance is very simple,” Ren said. “One, we are willing to share everything for joint production. Two, in thinking from the perspective of the national interest, Huawei can give up its controlling interest. If Huawei’s switches are used, Huawei can hold the controlling share and manage it in the short-term, and after setting up the system, gradually open it up.” Ren also said Huawei was willing to “open up” its software to the nation. Zhang said he would bring the proposal back to Beijing for discussion. It’s unclear if the proposition ever went forward.

在 1994 年 12 月与电子工业部副部长张今强会面时，任正非还提议与中央政府分享技术，并让政府在某个项目中持有股份。[17] 他向张今强提交了一份书面建议书，概述了华为与政府之间的合作。虽然华为并未解释这一拟议合作的具体含义，但任正非的描述听起来与莫贝克的模式非常相似。“我们的立场很简单，”任正非说，“第一，我们愿意分享一切进行联合生产。第二，从国家利益的角度考虑，华为可以放弃控股权。如果使用华为的交换机，华为可以持有控股权并进行短期管理，在系统建立后，逐步开放。”任正非还表示，华为愿意向国家“开放”其软件。张今强表示，他将把该提议带回北京讨论。目前尚不清楚该提议是否付诸实施。

In any case, the success of Mobeco prompted Huawei to expand the model, and it set up a network of joint ventures with local governments across the country. Forty-nine-year-old Li Yuzhuo, who had been Mobeco’s chairman, was put in charge of this effort, reporting to Sun. Li understood the importance of government relations: he’d previously worked at the Stone Group, and his boss there had had to flee the country for sympathizing with the student protesters at Tiananmen. Li described the joint ventures as a way to acquire “blood relations” with the telecom authorities so that Huawei would be on a more even footing with state-owned rivals like Great Dragon and Datang.[18] “After setting up the JVs, it all became easy,” Li wrote in a memoir. He recalled an official at their joint venture with Sichuan Province’s government saying, “Now that we are partners, we’re all one family,” then pledging to rip out forty thousand lines of foreign switches and replace them with Huawei ones. “Without needing to open my mouth, twenty-seven million yuan was sent to our account.”[19]

无论如何，莫贝克的成功促使华为推广这一模式，并在全国范围内与地方政府建立了一系列合资企业。曾任莫贝克董事长的 49 岁的李玉琢负责这项工作，向孙亚芳汇报。李玉琢深知政府关系的重要性：他曾在四通集团工作，他的老板曾因同情天安门广场的抗议学生而不得不逃亡海外。李玉琢将这些合资企业描述为与电信主管部门建立“血缘关系”的一种方式，从而使华为能与巨龙、大唐等国有对手处于更平等的竞争地位。[18] “合资公司办起来后，一切都变得容易了，”李玉琢在回忆录中写道。他回想起在与四川省政府成立的合资公司里，一位官员说：“既然我们是合作伙伴了，大家就是一家人，”随后承诺拆除 4 万线外国交换机，代之以华为的产品。“不用我开口，2700 万元就汇到了我们的账户上。”[19]

The local officials were pleased with the culture of efficiency that Huawei brought to the joint ventures, whipping their slowpoke factory workers into shape. They were also happy with the profit sharing, as Huawei’s sales skyrocketed. In 1992, Huawei’s sales were at 100 million yuan. This jumped to 410 million in 1993 (after Mobeco was founded), 800 million in 1994, and 1.5 billion in 1995.[20] And it kept on going up.

地方官员对华为带入合资企业的效率文化感到满意，这种文化让那些慢吞吞的工厂工人变得干劲十足。随着华为销售额的飙升，他们对利润分成也感到欣喜。1992 年，华为的销售额为 1 亿元人民币。1993 年（莫贝克成立后）跃升至 4.1 亿元，1994 年达到 8 亿元，1995 年达到 15 亿元。[20] 并且这一增长势头仍在继续。

—

After retiring from Duyun No. 1 Middle School, Ren Moxun and his wife, Cheng Yuanzhao, lived for a while with their son Ren Zhengfei in Shenzhen. The elderly couple were frugal. They scoured the markets late in the day for discounted produce.[21] They filled up water bottles when going out to avoid having to purchase overpriced drinks. They were reluctant to turn on the air conditioner, even on sweltering days.[22]

从都匀一中退休后，任摩逊和妻子程远昭曾随儿子任正非在深圳住过一段时间。这对老夫妇生活非常节俭。他们会在傍晚时分去市场搜寻打折的蔬菜。[21] 出门时他们会装满水瓶，以免购买价格过高的饮料。即使在酷热的日子里，他们也舍不得开空调。[22]

After a period, they moved to the subtropical city of Kunming, where one of their daughters lived.[23] While the precise timeline is unclear, Ren Zhengfei had remarried at some point and was building a new family in Shenzhen. This second marriage may have taken place around 1994, according to a speech Ren gave in January 2009, in which he praised his second wife, Yao Ling, for “fifteen years of silent devotion to the family.”[24] Yao Ling was a petite and graceful young woman, much younger than Ren, with almond-shaped eyes and a winsome smile. Some news reports referred to her as Ren’s former secretary,[25] though this has not been confirmed by the company. Ren had called Meng Jun “very tough”; he called Yao Ling “gentle and capable.”[26] Ren claimed that the two got along, mentioning once that his first wife had arranged the marriage certificate for his second marriage.[27]

过了一段时间，他们搬到了亚热带城市昆明，他的一个女儿住在那里。[23] 虽然确切的时间线尚不明确，但任正非在某个时间点已经再婚，并在深圳组建了新的家庭。根据任正非在 2009 年 1 月的一次演讲，这段第二次婚姻可能发生在 1994 年前后，他在演讲中赞扬了他的第二任妻子姚凌“十五年来对家庭默默无闻的奉献”。[24] 姚凌是一位娇小优雅的年轻女性，比任正非年轻得多，有着杏仁般的眼睛和迷人的微笑。一些新闻报道称她是任正非的前秘书，[25] 尽管这一说法尚未得到公司的证实。任正非曾评价孟军“非常刚烈”；他称姚凌“温柔能干”。[26] 任正非声称两人相处融洽，曾提到他的第一任妻子还为他的第二次婚姻办理了结婚证。[27]

In Kunming, Ren Moxun busied himself with penning a book on how to teach Mandarin to ethnic minority students who didn’t grow up speaking the language.[28] The rules of Chinese grammar were instinctive to anyone born into them, but they were complicated to explain. Ren Moxun counted up sixteen rules for how to use the particle de (的), which connects an adjective or descriptive phrase to a noun in some situations but not others. You didn’t need de to connect the noun to the adjective in duli yundong (independence movement) or in hutu sixiang (muddled ideology), Ren Moxun observed, but in other cases, it was necessary. For instance—and here Ren Moxun rattled off a few phrases that came to mind:

在昆明，任摩逊忙于撰写一本关于如何向非母语环境长大的少数民族学生教授普通话的书。[28] 汉语语法规则对任何生于其中的人来说都是本能，但解释起来却很复杂。任摩逊总结了十六条关于助词“的”的使用规则，在某些情况下，“的”将形容词或描述性短语连接到名词上，而在其他情况下则不需要。任摩逊观察到，在“独立运动”（duli yundong）或“糊涂思想”（hutu sixiang）中，不需要“的”来连接名词和形容词，但在其他情况下则是必要的。例如——任摩逊随口说出了几个脑海中浮现的短语：

“Nengchi de shanlihong” (the hawthorns that are edible).

“能吃的山里红”（the hawthorns that are edible）。

“Da riben guizi de gushi” (a story of battling the Japanese devils).

“打日本鬼子的故事”（a story of battling the Japanese devils）。

“Guoqu de rizi” (the days of the past).

“过去的日子”（the days of the past）。

“Zhengzhi guashi de ren” (a person who puts political considerations first).

“政治挂帅的人”（a person who puts political considerations first）。

Ren Moxun passed away in June 1995, at age eighty-five, in Kunming.[29] He had fallen ill after consuming a drink from a street vendor.[30]

1995 年 6 月，任摩逊在昆明逝世，享年八十五岁。[29] 他在饮用了街头小贩的饮料后病倒了。[30]

Years later, Ren Zhengfei would ask someone to help him procure a copy of his parents’ dang’an, their official dossiers.[31] The party kept one for each person, tracking their employment, political history, social activities, appraisals by colleagues, and other information. He said his friend was moved to tears after reading his parents’ confessions to the party. “All their lives, they followed the revolution,” Ren wrote.

几年后，任正非请人帮他调取父母的“档案”。[31] 党为每个人都建立了一份档案，记录他们的就业情况、政治历史、社会活动、同事评价及其他信息。他说，他的朋友在读完他父母向党提交的交代材料后感动落泪。“他们一生都跟随革命，”任正非写道。

—

Huawei was playing host to a growing stream of visitors out of Beijing. Officials were keen to support a rising star in the tech realm.

华为接待了越来越多来自北京的访客。官员们热衷于支持科技领域这颗冉冉升起的新星。

When Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji, the famed economic reformer, came to visit in 1996, he gave Huawei’s staff a thumbs-up[32] and encouraged them to go abroad. “You young people are great!” he said. “As long as China’s program-controlled switches make it overseas, there will definitely be buyer’s credit provided.” He told them that domestic switchmakers would also continue to enjoy support in the home market against foreign rivals. Shenzhen’s party secretary, Li Youwei, was thrilled when he heard that Zhu was continuing to praise Huawei after returning to Beijing. “As far as we know, he has not expressed such an opinion about any other company,” he exclaimed.[33]

1996 年，著名的经济改革家、副总理朱镕基前来视察时，他向华为员工竖起了大拇指[32] 并鼓励他们走出国门。“你们年轻人干得好！”他说，“只要中国的程控交换机能打到海外去，就一定会提供买方信贷。”他告诉他们，国内交换机制造商在本土市场对抗外国竞争对手时也将继续享有支持。深圳省委书记李有为听说朱镕基回到北京后继续赞扬华为，感到非常激动。“据我们所知，他还没有对其他任何一家公司表达过这样的看法，”他感叹道。[33]

The visitors also included Wang Qishan,[34] chairman of the China Construction Bank, and a local official named Zhang Gaoli,[35] both of whom would one day enter the government’s top ranks under Xi Jinping. Zhang encouraged Huawei’s engineers to set their sights higher. “You must not be satisfied with the status quo,” he told them.

访客中还包括中国建设银行行长王岐山[34] 和一位名叫张高丽[35] 的地方官员，两人日后都在习近平任内进入了政府最高层。张高丽鼓励华为的工程师们将目光投向更高远的地方。“你们绝不能满足于现状，”他告诉他们。

Many of the officials were particularly interested in Huawei’s chip design center, founded in 1991. Chips were the brains inside all computing devices—from consumer gadgets to military systems to telephone switches—and the industry was dominated by US companies. Chips R&D was particularly expensive due to the microscopic precision required for circuits. In 1996, Huawei was one of eight companies selected by Beijing for a $1 billion national semiconductor development program.[36] Speaking with Premier Li Peng that year, Ren had said Huawei was interested in setting up a “state-owned, privately operated” chipmaking venture.[37] He called chipmaking a “national activity.” “Developed nations use some silicon wafers and exchange them for a large amount of our peanuts,” Ren once remarked. “We have long felt this is an unequal exchange.”[38]

许多官员对华为成立于 1991 年的芯片设计中心特别感兴趣。芯片是所有计算设备——从消费电子产品到军事系统再到电话交换机——的大脑，而该行业一直由美国公司主导。由于电路所需的微观精度，芯片研发成本极其高昂。1996 年，华为成为北京选定的参与 10 亿美元国家半导体发展计划的八家公司之一。[36] 同年，在与李鹏总理交谈时，任正非表示华为有兴趣建立一个“国办民营”的芯片制造企业。[37] 他称芯片制造为“国家行为”。“发达国家用一些硅片换走了我们大量的花生，”任正非曾评论道，“我们长期以来一直觉得这是一种不平等的交换。”[38]

Since Ren’s meeting with Jiang in 1994, much more government support had been pledged. At the end of 1994, Zhang told Ren that in the next five-year economic plan, half of telecom operators’ switch purchases would be reserved for purely domestic companies like Huawei.[39] “The way I look at it,” Zhang said, “it’s not that important what type of ownership structure a company has. The important thing is if it’s Chinese. So we at the Electronics Ministry want to support a business like yours.” China would have 84 million telephone lines’ worth of switches in operation by 1995, and officials planned to more than double that to 174 million lines’ worth by 2000.

自 1994 年任正非与江泽民会面以来，政府承诺了更多的支持。1994 年底，张宏伟告诉任正非，在下一个五年计划中，电信运营商一半的交换机采购将预留给像华为这样的纯本土公司。[39] “在我看来，”张说，“一家公司是什么样的所有制结构并不那么重要。重要的是它是不是中国的。所以我们电子部想要支持像你们这样的企业。”到 1995 年，中国将拥有 8400 万线容量的交换机在运行，官员们计划到 2000 年将这一数字翻一番以上，达到 1.74 亿线。

Beijing came through with sales for Huawei and its crosstown rival, ZTE. In June 1996, China’s official Xinhua News Agency reported that the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications had held a nationwide switch-ordering fair in which Huawei and ZTE emerged with 3.14 million lines’ worth of switch orders, 62 percent of the total. “The transactions represented the country’s total demand for the first half of the year,” Xinhua said. The Xinhua report also noted that Huawei and ZTE were set to receive state aid in a program sponsored by the State Economic and Trade Commission.

北京方面兑现了对华为及其同城对手中兴通讯的销售支持。1996 年 6 月，中国官方的新华社报道称，邮电部举办了一场全国性的交换机订货会，华为和中兴共获得了 314 万线的交换机订单，占总量的 62%。“这些交易代表了全国上半年的总需求，”新华社称。新华社的报道还指出，华为和中兴将获得国家经贸委赞助的一项计划的国家资助。

Financing was also coming through. The People’s Bank of China offered Huawei loans, with the bank’s president, Dai Xianglong, declaring that it was forming an “unbreakable bond” with Huawei.[40] He said the bank would encourage its customers to use Huawei products.

资金支持也陆续到位。中国人民银行向华为提供贷款，行长戴相龙宣布该行正与华为结成“不解之缘”。[40] 他表示，银行将鼓励其客户使用华为的产品。

In 1995, Shenzhen, inspired by Silicon Valley, launched its first venture-capital firm to invest in startups. Ren was invited to speak at the launch. “Without the government’s attention and support, it’s impossible to achieve rapid high-tech development,” Ren told the crowd. “And the more intense the competition, the more state intervention is required. This is what is required by the high-tech industry, and what is required for national security.”[41]

1995 年，受硅谷启发，深圳成立了第一家风险投资公司以投资初创企业。任正非受邀在成立仪式上发言。“没有政府的关注和支持，就不可能实现高科技的快速发展，”任正非对人群说。“而且竞争越激烈，就越需要国家干预。这是高科技产业的要求，也是国家安全的要求。”[41]

Chinese officials had also begun promoting Huawei’s switches abroad. Vice-Premier Li Lanqing was extolling Huawei’s switches to foreign governments and inviting Huawei executives to accompany him on diplomatic trips. On a 1995 trip to eastern Europe, Vice-Premier Li brought along Huawei C&C08 switches as diplomatic gifts.

中国官员也开始在海外推广华为的交换机。副总理李岚清向外国政府盛赞华为的交换机，并邀请华为高管随同他进行外交访问。在 1995 年的一次东欧之行中，李岚清副总理带上了华为 C&C08 交换机作为外交国礼。

The growing interest from Beijing raised the specter that Huawei could be nationalized. Becoming a sluggish state-owned enterprise was something Ren was anxious to avoid. Others also warned him against it. “You must never become state-owned,” one official told him. “If that happens, you guys will die.”[42] After Vice-Premier Zhu’s visit, when his aides followed up to offer more loans, Ren politely declined.[43]

北京方面日益增长的兴趣引发了华为可能被国有化的担忧。成为一家死气沉沉的国有企业是任正非极力想避免的事情。其他人也曾就此向他发出警告。“你们千万不能变成国有的，”一位官员告诉他。“如果那样的话，你们就死定了。”[42] 在朱副总理访问后，当他的助手跟进提供更多贷款时，任正非婉言谢绝了。[43]

—

As government officials came to visit Huawei, they were also interested in how the technology could be used for surveillance. Visiting in March 1996, Premier Li Peng—a hard-liner nicknamed “the Butcher of Beijing” overseas for his role in the brutal Tiananmen Square suppression of 1989—asked Ren about a technology he’d seen in movies where investigators could log the phone numbers of criminals making phone calls.[44] He said that the Ministry of Public Security wanted this capability.

随着政府官员来访华为，他们也对这项技术如何用于监控产生了兴趣。1996 年 3 月，李鹏总理——因在 1989 年天安门广场镇压中所扮演的角色而在海外被称为“北京屠夫”的强硬派——向任正非询问他在电影中看到的一种技术，即调查人员可以记录罪犯拨打电话的号码。[44] 他表示公安部需要这种能力。

“Do you have this technology?” the premier asked.

“你们有这项技术吗？”总理问。

“As soon as it rings, we know,” Ren said. “In less than a second.”

“只要电话一响，我们就知道了，”任正非说。“不到一秒钟。”

Li asked if Huawei was selling the technology yet, and Ren said that the company had the capability but hadn’t rolled it out.

李鹏询问华为是否已经开始销售这项技术，任正非表示公司具备这种能力，但尚未推向市场。

“I’m especially interested in the issue of call tracing,” the premier said, “because national security is very important.”

“我特别关注追踪通话的问题，”总理说，“因为国家安全非常重要。”

It’s unclear what, if anything, came of Premier Li’s inquiries into call tracing at Huawei. But the incident reflected that Huawei had been subject to security demands from Chinese authorities at the highest levels as early as the 1990s. This would be unsurprising, given the governmental utility of monitoring telephone calls. Wiretapping is something that every nation’s government does to a greater or lesser extent. And in a few years’ time, as phones became hooked up to the internet, Huawei’s networks would become even more valuable. A lot more than phone calls would be flowing through.

目前尚不清楚李总理对华为通话追踪技术的询问是否产生了具体结果。但这一事件反映出，早在 20 世纪 90 年代，华为就已受到中国最高层安全需求的关注。考虑到监控电话对政府的效用，这并不令人意外。监听是每个国家政府都会在不同程度上做的事情。几年后，随着电话接入互联网，华为的网络将变得更具价值。流经其中的将远不止是电话通话。

7

7

Pack of Wolves

狼群

Huawei’s Sales Machine: 1990s

华为的销售机器：20 世纪 90 年代

On January 28, 1996, Ren Zhengfei held Huawei’s first “mass-resignation ceremony.” Each head of a regional sales office was told to prepare two reports: a work summary and a written resignation. “I will only sign one of the reports,” Ren said.[1]

1996 年 1 月 28 日，任正非举行了华为首次“集体辞职仪式”。各办事处主任被要求准备两份报告：一份工作总结和一份书面辞职信。任正非说：“我只会签署其中一份报告。”[1]

“Dear Chairman,” the resignation letter said,[2] “I have fought for the company’s sales development and sacrificed my youth. But in the few years that I’ve worked on the sales front lines, my technical and business ability may not have kept up…. If through the process of examination and selection, the company identifies a more suitable person for sales work, I will sincerely resign from my current position.”

辞职信中写道：[2]“尊敬的总裁，我为公司的销售发展而奋斗，牺牲了青春。但在销售一线工作的这几年里，我的技术和业务能力可能没有跟上……如果通过考核和选拔，公司发现了更适合从事销售工作的人选，我将诚恳地辞去现任职务。”

Huawei had started out in rural markets, and many of its early sales managers were provincial in their experience and network of contacts. As Ren sought to go national and international, he decided to make the entire sales staff resign and reapply for their jobs. “The mountain goat must outrun the lion to not be eaten,” he had told them ahead of the event. “All departments and sections must optimize and eat the lazy goats, the goats that do not learn or progress, and the goats with no sense of responsibility.”[3]

华为起步于农村市场，许多早期的销售经理在经验和人脉网络上都带有地方局限性。随着任正非寻求走向全国和国际，他决定让全体销售人员辞职并重新竞聘上岗。他在活动前告诉他们：“山羊必须跑得比狮子快才不会被吃掉。所有部门和科室必须优化并吃掉那些懒惰的羊、不学习不进步的羊，以及没有责任感的羊。”[3]

Now Ren took the podium. “Being an executive at Huawei should be understood as a responsibility, a choice to sacrifice personal happiness,” he said.[4]

随后任正非走上讲台。他说：“在华为担任高管应该被理解为一种责任，一种牺牲个人幸福的选择。”[4]

The resigning sales managers were allowed to speak in turn, some choking back tears.

辞职的销售经理们依次发言，有些人泣不成声。

“As a Huawei person, I’m willing to be a paving stone,” one said.[5]

其中一人说：“作为华为人，我愿意做一颗铺路石。”[5]

“If I can’t keep up with the pace of the company’s development, I’m willing to let new people, and higher-level people, take over my job,” another offered.

另一人表示：“如果我跟不上公司发展的步伐，我愿意让新人、更高水平的人接替我的工作。”

“My youth and ability are limited, and Huawei’s future is long,” a third said. “I can’t hold back the company because of me.”

第三人说：“我的青春和能力是有限的，而华为的前途是长远的。我不能因为我而拖了公司的后腿。”

In the end, Ren accepted the resignation of six of the twenty-six sales branch chiefs and turned over some 30 percent of the sales staff. Huawei executives would often cite the mass resignation as an example of who they were as “Huawei people.”[6] They could go up or down according to the needs of the company. In whatever position they were assigned, they would humbly strive to improve themselves. They believed in the company’s mission. They were willing to sacrifice.

最终，任正非接受了 26 名办事处主任中 6 人的辞职，并更替了约 30%的销售人员。华为高管经常引用这次集体辞职作为他们身为“华为人”的典范。[6] 他们可以根据公司的需要能上能下。无论被分配到什么岗位，他们都会谦虚地努力提升自己。他们信仰公司的使命。他们愿意牺牲。

Purges were a fixture in the Chinese Communist Party, seen as a way to test the mettle of cadres. At Huawei, too, Ren told his followers that demotions built character and that the demoted would only be stronger when they worked their way up again. “The bird that isn’t burned to death in the fire is a phoenix,” he often told them. Ren reminded them that paramount leader Deng Xiaoping himself had been purged thrice in his career, springing back each time. “Even Deng Xiaoping could go down and up three times. Why can’t you go down and up three times?”[7]

清洗是中国共产党的常态，被视为检验干部胆识的一种方式。在华为，任正非也告诉他的追随者，降职能磨练性格，被降职的人只有在重新奋斗上去时才会变得更强大。他常对他们说：“烧不死的鸟是凤凰。”任正非提醒他们，最高领导人邓小平本人在职业生涯中就曾三落三起，每次都能重新振作。“连邓小平都能三下三上，你们为什么不能三下三上？”[7]

—

Ren had grown up in the Mao years, when there was no such thing as private-sector sales. Now he presented sales to his young followers in rousing terms, almost as a mystical vocation. “Sales work is special, complex, and noble,” he told them. “You need the intelligence of a scientist, the insight of a philosopher, the eloquence of an orator, the ambition of a social reformer, and the optimism and persistent spirit of a religious man.”[8] He said that the sales profession was a battlefield, even if there wasn’t gunpowder or smoke. It was winner takes all, no mercy for losers. “Haven’t you been dying to have a go?” he asked. “Haven’t you been seeking all along your self-fulfillment? Then stand up bravely. This great era calls for unique heroes.”

任正非在毛泽东时代长大，那时还没有私营部门销售这回事。现在，他用慷慨激昂的辞藻向年轻的追随者描绘销售工作，几乎将其视为一种神秘的天职。他告诉他们：“销售工作是特殊的、复杂的、高尚的。你需要科学家的头脑、哲学家般的洞察力、演说家的口才、社会改革家的抱负，以及宗教徒般的乐观和执着精神。”[8] 他说销售职业是一个战场，即使没有硝烟。那是胜者通吃，对败者毫不留情。他问道：“你们难道不想去尝试一下吗？你们难道不是一直在寻求自我实现吗？那就勇敢地站起来。这个伟大的时代呼唤独特的英雄。”

Many of them were eager for this opportunity to travel, find adventure, look smart in a suit. The reality wasn’t quite as glamorous. Nearly all their sales were in rural areas and small towns at first. They were following the strategy that Mao had used to win the Chinese Civil War of “encircling the cities with the countryside.”[9] They’d won over villages and towns in the beginning, building their strength to take on the big cities. “There was no secretary, no cell phone, no driver or private car,” one of Huawei’s early salespeople wrote in an essay.[10] They traveled alone by bus or train, hauling product information, contracts, some basic maintenance tools, and changes of clothes. Another sales rep recalled that they were required to stay in the field for a year before they could take a trip home to Shenzhen: “You could only return to headquarters if you were accompanying a very important customer.”[11]

他们中的许多人都渴望这个机会去旅行、寻找冒险、穿着西装显得精明干练。现实并不那么光鲜。起初，他们几乎所有的销售都在农村地区和小城镇。他们遵循的是毛泽东在赢得中国内战时使用的“农村包围城市”战略。[9] 他们最初赢得了村庄和城镇，积蓄力量后再进攻大城市。一位华为早期销售人员在文章中写道：“没有秘书，没有手机，没有司机或私家车。”[10] 他们独自乘坐大巴或火车旅行，携带产品资料、合同、一些基本的维护工具和换洗衣物。另一位销售代表回忆说，他们被要求在现场待满一年才能回深圳探亲一次：“除非你陪同非常重要的客户，否则你不能回总部。”[11]

Ren now exhorted his sales team to develop a “wolf culture.” “Wolves are really powerful,” Ren told his staff. “They have a keen sense of smell, they are very aggressive, and they don’t attack alone but in packs. As soon as one falls, another steps into the breach. They don’t fear sacrifice.”[12]

任正非现在告诫他的销售团队要培养“狼性文化”。任正非告诉员工：“狼非常强大。它们嗅觉敏锐，极具攻击性，而且它们不单独行动，而是成群结队。一旦一个倒下，另一个就会顶上去。它们不畏牺牲。”[12]

To win orders, they made bold promises. In a memoir, one former Huawei salesman wrote that his manager had instructed him to tell customers a switch would be ready soon when they both knew it would be months. “Do you think it’s better for the customer to doubt the company or to doubt the ability of a single engineer?” his boss had reasoned.[13] Huawei would build a reputation for courting its customers relentlessly, loitering at hotels or airports to catch traveling officials, even waiting outside their homes. In 1995, China officially switched from a six-day workweek to a five-day one,[14] but Huawei’s staff continued to work around the clock.

为了赢得订单，他们做出大胆的承诺。在回忆录中，一位前华为销售员写道，他的经理指示他告诉客户某款交换机很快就能准备好，而他们双方都知道这需要几个月的时间。他的老板辩解道：“你认为让客户怀疑公司好，还是怀疑单个工程师的能力好？”[13] 华为因不懈地讨好客户而建立起名声，他们在酒店或机场徘徊以拦截出差的官员，甚至在他们家门外等候。1995 年，中国正式从六天工作制改为五天工作制，[14] 但华为的员工继续全天候工作。

Despite the interest that Huawei had received from government officials, it was only one among many contenders, and not even the most favored one. In 1995, officials had set up a state-owned switchmaking champion called China Great Dragon Telecommunication in an effort to combat the foreign switchmakers. Great Dragon was built around the military engineer Wu Jiangxing’s breakthrough 04 switch and had been formed by merging eight smaller telecom companies. The government was pouring some $2.2 billion a year into the venture.[15] Also in 1995, the Xi’an Datang Telephone Co.—a venture set up by a state-run research institute and several Chinese graduates from US universities[16]—began mass production of its new switch, the SP30. And across town in Shenzhen, the Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Company—which would later be known as ZTE—had developed its ZXJ10 switch.[17] People called them the Big Four of China’s domestic switchmaking, and they made quick work of eating into the foreign vendors’ market share. Within a few years, the price of telephone switches in China had dropped from $300 per line to $70 per line. With so many contenders, and such thin margins, companies were always flaming out. In early 1996, a dozen of Great Dragon’s 04 switches abruptly failed due to a software problem.[18] The company never recovered.

尽管华为受到了政府官员的关注，但它只是众多竞争者之一，甚至不是最受青睐的一个。1995 年，为了对抗外国交换机厂商，官员们扶持成立了一家名为中国巨龙通信的国有交换机领军企业。巨龙通信是围绕军事工程师邬江兴取得突破的 04 机建立的，由八家小型电信公司合并而成。政府每年向该合资企业投入约 22 亿美元。[15] 同样在 1995 年，西安大唐电话公司——一家由国有研究所和几名美国大学毕业的中国留学生[16]创办的企业——开始量产其新型交换机 SP30。而在同城的深圳，中兴通讯设备公司（即后来的中兴通讯）也开发出了 ZXJ10 交换机。[17] 人们称它们为中国国产交换机领域的“巨大中华”，它们迅速蚕食了外国供应商的市场份额。短短几年内，中国电话交换机的价格从每线 300 美元降至每线 70 美元。由于竞争者众多且利润微薄，不断有公司倒闭。1996 年初，由于软件问题，巨龙通信的十几台 04 交换机突然发生故障。[18] 该公司从此一蹶不振。

At the start of 1997, Huawei cracked into the Beijing market.[19] The nation’s capital purchased twenty-four thousand lines’ worth of Huawei’s C&C08 switches, following other big cities like Tianjin and Guangzhou. “It is time to equip China’s telecom trunks with domestic products,” a Beijing official affirmed. Huawei’s annual sales were now approaching half a billion dollars.[20] Huawei had started out as an underdog compared with its state-owned rivals. Now it was emerging as the frontrunner, so much so that the state-owned companies were crying foul. “They sell cheaply to get market share,” an executive at Datang complained.[21] Great Dragon’s Wu Jiangxing griped to Shenzhen’s Science and Technology Bureau that the local government shouldn’t just support privately owned companies.[22]

1997 年初，华为打入了北京市场。[19] 继天津、广州等大城市之后，首都北京采购了价值 2.4 万线的华为 C&C08 交换机。“是时候用国产产品装备中国的电信干线了，”一位北京官员肯定地表示。华为的年销售额此时已接近 5 亿美元。[20] 与国有对手相比，华为起步时处于劣势。而现在，它正脱颖而出成为领跑者，以至于国有公司纷纷抱怨不公。“他们通过低价销售来获取市场份额，”大唐的一位高管抱怨道。[21] 巨龙通信的邬江兴向深圳市科技局发牢骚，认为地方政府不应只支持私营企业。[22]

Huawei’s growing success was attracting broader public attention, but the company remained something of a cipher. Beginning in 1993, it had begun sending an in-house newspaper, Huawei People, to telecom officials and other stakeholders, but it remained press-shy to the general public. Huawei executives accepted interviews rarely; Ren, never. When he was selected to be one of eight entrepreneurs featured in a local magazine spread, the other seven had professional portraits, with soft lighting and heroic poses. For Ren, the magazine’s editors only managed to scrounge up some awkward snapshots. In one, he stands at the back of a meeting room with a mottled tie and a five-o’clock shadow, peeking out from behind the shoulder of the Shenzhen mayor, Li Zibin. “It seems,” the editors wrote, “that Ren Zhengfei is never in the center of a photograph.”[23]

华为日益增长的成功吸引了更广泛的公众关注，但这家公司在某种程度上仍像一个谜。从 1993 年开始，它开始向电信官员和其他利益相关者发送内部报纸 《华为人》，但对普通大众仍保持着回避媒体的态度。华为高管极少接受采访；任正非则从未接受过。当他被选为当地杂志专题报道的八位企业家之一时 ，其他七人都拍了专业的肖像照，光线柔和，姿势英武。而对于任正非，杂志编辑只设法搜集到了一些尴尬的快照。在其中一张照片中，他站在会议室后方，系着一条花领带，带着胡茬，从深圳市长李子彬的肩膀后探出头来。“看来，”编辑们写道，“任正非永远不在照片的中心。”[23]

—

Sales during China’s unbridled 1990s capitalist boom involved all sorts of risks. Business was heavily based on guanxi, or personal connections. And building guanxi with prospective clients involved heavy rounds of drinking and lavish gifts. “At the beginning of opening up, there weren’t strong regulations. Corruption was all over the place,” Ren once said. “It was so difficult for Huawei to build its own clean team in this environment.”[24]

在中国 20 世纪 90 年代放任自流的资本主义繁荣时期，销售活动涉及各种风险。生意在很大程度上基于“关系”。而与潜在客户建立关系则涉及多轮豪饮和厚礼。“在改革开放初期，监管并不严格。腐败无处不在，”任正非曾说，“在这样的环境下，华为要建立自己的廉洁团队是非常困难的。”[24]

Polite protocol for a business dinner involved breaking out the baijiu, a clear sorghum spirit that has an eye-watering 120-proof kick, and pouring out round after round of shots over a rotating parade of exquisite dishes. The protocol also involved getting drunker than your clients to show your respect for them. One early Huawei executive wrote about having to excuse himself for a vomit break while entertaining customers—not an uncommon occurrence. Others developed stomach or liver ailments. This seemed to happen particularly often in the far northeast, which had a reputation for heavy drinking. “The key staffer for this account is currently suffering hepatitis but refuses to come back to Shenzhen for medical treatment and insists on fighting on the front line through the ice and snow,” Ren said in 1995 about a Huawei salesperson based in Yichun, close to the northeastern border with Russia.[25] At one point, Huawei’s headquarters sent a shipment of propolis, a bee-made resin known for its healing properties, to northeast staffers whose stomachs were ruined by drink.[26]

商务晚宴上的礼节包括开启白酒——一种透明的高粱酒，酒精度高达 60 度，辛辣刺鼻——并在轮番上桌的精美菜肴间一轮接一轮地干杯。礼节还包括要比客户喝得更醉，以示对他们的尊重。一位早期的华为高管曾写道，他在招待客户时不得不借故离席去呕吐——这并非罕见现象。其他人则患上了胃病或肝病。这种情况在以豪饮著称的东北地区似乎尤为频繁。“负责该大客户的关键员工目前患有肝炎，但他拒绝回深圳治疗，坚持在冰天雪地的第一线战斗，”任正非在 1995 年谈到一名驻扎在靠近中俄边境的伊春的华为销售人员[25]时说道。有一次，华为总部向胃部因饮酒受损的东北员工寄送了一批蜂胶，这是一种具有愈合功效的蜜蜂树脂。[26]

Then there was the problem of bribery. Officials in China expected it, whether it was cash stuffed in red envelopes or other gifts. Over the years, a number of Huawei sales managers would be named in domestic bribery cases where telecom officials were found guilty of accepting cash, gift cards, or other enticements. Huawei described these as isolated incidents of employees disregarding the company’s ethics guidelines. But luxurious gifts to officials were par for the course. An executive of the Canadian vendor Nortel recollected how his boss tasked him with delivering fifty bottles of Johnnie Walker Scotch whisky to Chinese government officials. “Ericsson had a (golf) coach they would offer up to their customers. He would fly in from Australia,” an industry consultant recalled of the Swedish vendor.[27] Ericsson would later admit to the US Justice Department that it had splashed out tens of millions of dollars to cover gifts and perks, including Caribbean cruises, for Chinese customers.[28]

接着是贿赂问题。中国的官员对此有所期待，无论是塞在红封包里的现金还是其他礼物。多年来，多名华为销售经理在涉及电信官员收受现金、礼品卡或其他诱惑的国内贿赂案中被点名。华为将这些描述为员工无视公司道德准则的孤立事件。但向官员赠送豪华礼物是行业常态。加拿大供应商北电网络的一位高管回忆起他的老板如何交给他一项任务，将 50 瓶尊尼获加苏格兰威士忌送给中国政府官员。一位行业顾问在谈到瑞典供应商爱立信时回忆道：“爱立信有一位（高尔夫）教练专门为客户服务。他会从澳大利亚飞过来。”[27] 爱立信后来向美国司法部承认，它曾挥霍数千万美元用于支付中国客户的礼品和福利，包括加勒比海邮轮旅行。[28]

There was one curious report that emerged years later: In 2017, Li Jingxian, a former Chinese ambassador to Uzbekistan, published an essay in a local magazine. He wrote that on September 1, 1998, he’d met Ren for tea at Beijing’s Jinglun Hotel, and Ren had asked him for advice about breaking into the Russian market. At the end of the meeting, according to Li, Ren’s assistant handed him some pamphlets, and when he returned home and flipped through the pages, an envelope fell out. Inside, he said, were twenty US $100 bills. “I was so scared,” he wrote. “I hardly slept all night.” The next day, by his account, he turned the cash over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with a written note explaining the situation. A few days later, Huawei’s chief representative in Beijing, Catherine Chen, telephoned to say that the cash had been returned. Ren himself called too, apologizing profusely for the confusion and claiming that the money was a personal gift to the ambassador to help him furnish his new apartment. “This bit of money has been earned through my own labor, and is very much clean,” Li recalled Ren telling him. “It’s absolutely not from the company’s accounts.”[29]

多年后出现了一份离奇的报告：2017 年，中国前驻乌兹别克斯坦大使李景贤在当地一家杂志上发表了一篇文章。他写道，1998 年 9 月 1 日，他在北京京伦饭店与任正非一起喝茶，任正非向他咨询如何打入俄罗斯市场。据李景贤称，会面结束时，任正非的助手递给他几本小册子，当他回到家翻阅时，掉出了一个信封。他说，里面装有 20 张 100 美元的面钞。“我当时吓坏了，”他写道，“整晚几乎没合眼。”据他描述，第二天，他将现金上交给了外交部，并附上一份说明情况的书面材料。几天后，华为驻京首席代表陈黎芳致电表示现金已退回。任正非本人也打来电话，为造成的困扰深表歉意，并声称这笔钱是送给大使的个人礼物，用于购置新房家具。“这点钱是我自己劳动所得，非常干净，”李景贤回忆任正非对他说道，“绝对不是从公司账上出的。”[29]

In any case, Huawei had a reputation for generosity and hospitality within the industry. It paid for government officials and telecom executives to travel the world for conferences and training sessions. When they visited Huawei’s headquarters, they were greeted with lavish feasts. Ren told his sales managers to continue sending birthday cakes to retired telecom experts who had helped Huawei.

无论如何，华为在业内以慷慨大方和热情好客著称。它出资邀请政府官员和电信高管前往世界各地参加会议和培训。当他们访问华为总部时，会受到盛宴款待。任正非还告诉他的销售经理们，要继续给那些曾帮助过华为的退休电信专家寄送生日蛋糕。

After he left government office, Li Zibin, former mayor of Shenzhen, was visiting the US in 2007 when there was a knock on his hotel door. He opened it to find Ren standing there, inviting him to dinner. Li was stunned. He wrote in his memoir that Ren told him, “That’s just me, Ren Zhengfei. When you were in office for eleven years, our company didn’t invite you to dinner once. But Huawei’s people know to be grateful. You are our benefactor, and now that you are retired, I’m inviting you to dinner.”[30]

深圳市前市长李子彬在卸任政府职务后，于 2007 年访问美国，当时有人敲他的酒店房门。他打开门，发现任正非站在那里，邀请他共进晚餐。李子彬惊呆了。他在回忆录中写道，任正非告诉他：“这就是我，任正非。你在任十一年，我们公司没请你吃过一次饭。但华为人懂得感恩。你是我们的恩人，现在你退休了，我请你吃饭。”[30]

—

The company’s sales initiative had created a new crop of internal rising-star executives, whom Ren called Huawei’s “heroes” for enduring long hours and harsh conditions in the field. Two of the most outstanding salesmen were Ken Hu and Eric Xu. Hu had come out of the Huazhong Institute, like so many of Huawei’s other engineers, and joined the company in 1990. Early in his Huawei career, he was dispatched to the inland city of Changsha.[31] One of his customer’s switches was mysteriously malfunctioning each night. After camping in the switchroom overnight, Hu discovered it was because rats were gnawing on the cables.[32] Xu had gotten a doctorate in Nanjing before coming on board at Huawei in 1993. “I didn’t have any concept of sales or strategy,” he said. “The representative office would get a phone call or a fax, and I’d rush out with my materials and slide projector. I went to virtually all the provincial capitals.”[33]

公司的销售攻势造就了一批内部新星高管，任正非称他们为华为的“英雄”，因为他们能忍受长期加班和艰苦的现场环境。其中两位最杰出的销售员是胡厚崑和徐直军。胡厚崑和许多华为工程师一样，毕业于华中工学院，并于 1990 年加入公司。在华为职业生涯早期，他被派往内陆城市长沙。[31] 他的一位客户的交换机每晚都会莫名其妙地发生故障。在机房蹲守一夜后，胡厚崑发现是因为老鼠在啃咬电缆。[32] 徐直军在 1993 年加入华为前在南京获得了博士学位。“我当时对销售或战略没有任何概念，”他说，“办事处接到电话或传真，我就带着资料和幻灯机冲出去。我几乎跑遍了所有的省会城市。”[33]

Ren’s younger brother, Ren Shulu, or Steven Ren, had spent some time working in TV and film production and joined the company in 1992.[34] Twelve years younger, Steven Ren was assigned to run Huawei’s sales office in Lanzhou, a bustling city in the nation’s far west, before returning to headquarters. Ren’s sister Zheng Li would reportedly become a manager in Huawei’s finance department.[35] Ren’s other four siblings have remained out of the public eye; he has not mentioned what they went on to do professionally, and domestic press reports and biographies have omitted this particular as well.

任正非的弟弟任树录（英文名 Steven Ren）曾从事过影视制作工作，于 1992 年加入公司。[34] 比任正非小 12 岁的任树录在回到总部之前，被派往中国大西北的繁华城市兰州负责华为的销售办事处。据报道，任正非的妹妹郑黎后来成为了华为财务部门的一名经理。[35] 任正非的其他四个兄弟姐妹一直远离公众视线；他从未提及他们后来从事什么职业，国内的媒体报道和传记也忽略了这一细节。

The executive who rose the highest was Sun Yafang, who was elevated from marketing and sales president to Huawei’s vice-chairwoman in 1994. She was an intense woman of around forty, with a hawkish nose and a stately bearing. She had overseen Huawei’s “marriage” to the state through the joint ventures with provincial telecom bureaus and had led the mass resignation of the sales managers. People whispered that Madam Sun had worked for the Ministry of State Security, or the MSS, China’s powerful civilian intelligence agency, before joining the company. Perhaps that had something to do with her rapid rise through Huawei’s ranks, or perhaps not.

晋升最高的高管是孙亚芳，她在 1994 年从市场与销售总裁被提拔为华为副董事长。她是一位四十岁左右、性格刚强的女性，有着鹰钩鼻和庄重的仪态。她曾通过与各省电信局成立合资企业来监管华为与国家的“联姻”，并领导了销售经理的集体辞职。坊间传闻孙女士在加入公司之前曾在中国强大的民用情报机构——国家安全部（MSS）工作。也许这与她在华为职级的快速晋升有关，也许无关。

Sun’s parentage and childhood circumstances are unclear. Some Chinese media reports say Sun grew up in Guizhou Province, where Ren was born, but Huawei hasn’t confirmed this. What is known is that Sun went to university in Chengdu, the city where Ren’s first wife, Meng Jun, grew up and where their daughter Meng Wanzhou was born. In March 1978, when Sun matriculated at the Chengdu Radio Engineering Institute (which, like many technical schools at the time, was run by the military), she became one of the 760 students in the first freshman class in more than a decade.[36] During the Cultural Revolution, the college entrance exam had been suspended nationwide for twelve years. Competition was fierce that year, with a decade’s worth of students all competing for a spot. “She was very popular with her classmates,” Mao Yuming, a fellow student, recalled to a local newspaper. “She often organized class group activities. She was one of the leaders.”[37] In Sun’s freshman year, the school hosted its first American visitor since before the Cultural Revolution: the Georgia Institute of Technology’s president, J. M. Pettit.[38]

孙亚芳的出身和童年情况尚不明确。一些中国媒体报道称，孙亚芳在任正非的出生地贵州省长大，但华为尚未证实这一点。已知的是，孙亚芳在成都上的大学，那是任正非的第一任妻子孟军成长的地方，也是他们的女儿孟晚舟出生的地方。1978 年 3 月，当孙亚芳进入成都电讯工程学院（当时与许多技术学校一样由军队管理）时，她成为了十多年来首届 760 名大一新生中的一员。[36] 在文化大革命期间，高考在全国范围内中断了十二年。那一年的竞争异常激烈，十年的积压考生都在争夺一个名额。“她在同学中很受欢迎，”同学毛玉明向当地一家报纸回忆道，“她经常组织班级集体活动。她是领导者之一。”[37] 在孙亚芳的大一学年，学校接待了自文革前以来的第一位美国访客：佐治亚理工学院校长 J·M·佩蒂特。[38]

After university, Sun got a job in 1982 as a technician at the Xinxiang Liaoyuan Radio Factory,[39] also called Factory 760, in central Henan Province.[40] Set up by the military in the 1950s, the factory made radio tuners, tape recorders, and other equipment. It had also just begun an exciting pivot: making black-and-white TVs under the Melody brand amid a broad push for military suppliers to shift to consumer products.[41] Sun stayed at Factory 760 for only a year before becoming a teacher at the China Research Institute of Radio Wave Propagation in 1983 and then an engineer at the Beijing Research Institute of Information Technology in 1985.[42] Both of these are state-run institutes with low public profiles, and it’s unclear what she did there. Unclear, too, is whether her work at the MSS came after her stints at these institutes or took place concurrently.

大学毕业后，孙亚芳于 1982 年在河南新乡的辽源无线电厂（又称 760 厂）担任技术员。[39][40] 该厂由军方于 20 世纪 50 年代建立，生产调谐器、录音机等设备。当时在军工企业转向民用品的大潮下，该厂也刚开始一项令人兴奋的转型：生产“美乐”牌黑白电视机。[41] 孙在 760 厂仅待了一年，便在 1983 年成为中国电波传播研究所的一名教师，随后于 1985 年担任北京信息技术研究所的工程师。[42] 这两家都是行事低调的国有研究所，目前尚不清楚她在那里的具体工作。同样不清楚的是，她在国安部的工作是在这些研究所任职之后，还是与之同时进行的。

Sun’s rise at Huawei was swift. A September 1993 issue of Huawei’s internal magazine, Huawei People, mentions her being a sales manager who gave product demonstrations to visitors from around the country. “Our lightning-resistant chips are developed by our company and sent to the US for processing,” she told them.[43] By March 1994, Sun had been promoted to president of the marketing and sales department, where she ran training boot camps for new sales staff in which they each got eight minutes to pitch Huawei products.[44] At the end of 1994, she was listed as vice-chairwoman of the company.[45]

孙亚芳在华为的晋升十分迅速。1993 年 9 月出版的华为内部刊物《华为人》提到，她当时是一名销售经理，负责向来自全国各地的访客进行产品演示。“我们的防雷芯片是由公司自主研发，并送往美国加工的，”她告诉访客。[43] 到 1994 年 3 月，孙已升任市场部总裁，负责为新销售人员举办培训营，每人有八分钟时间推销华为产品。[44] 1994 年底，她被列为公司副董事长。[45]

Sun ran a tight ship, cracking down on excessive golfing among the managers.[46] “Huawei’s sales staffers all know that if Madam Sun sees you without a tie on a convention floor, your fate will be a miserable one,” a member of her team wrote about her. “Not to mention her fiery temper. The hurricane of her criticism will leave you with no possible hope to find an escape.”[47]

孙亚芳管理严厉，严厉打击管理层过度打高尔夫球的行为。[46] “华为的销售人员都知道，如果孙总在展厅看到你没打领带，你的下场会很惨，”她团队的一名成员这样写道，“更不用说她那火爆的脾气了。她批评的飓风会让你感到无处遁形，毫无生还希望。”[47]

Ren had proved willing to promote capable female executives, even as he sometimes expressed old-fashioned views on women in the workplace. “Many companies don’t like hiring female employees, because female employees are inefficient and can’t achieve the goals when they do things,” Ren said in a speech to Huawei’s secretaries around this time. “Female employees have a big shortcoming, which is they like to gossip and nag, which undermines unity. Originally, the purpose of hiring female employees was to add a lubricant to the management team. The main characteristic of male employees is their rigidity, and they are prone to producing sparks when they collide. With a layer of elastic sponge in between, there won’t be sparks.”[48]

任正非证明了自己愿意提拔有能力的女性高管，尽管他有时会对职场女性表达一些陈旧的看法。“很多公司不喜欢招聘女员工，因为女员工效率低，做事达不到目标，”任正非在这一时期对华为秘书的一次讲话中说道，“女员工有一个大缺点，就是喜欢八卦和唠叨，这会破坏团结。最初，招聘女员工的目的是为管理团队增加润滑剂。男员工的主要特点是刚性，碰撞时容易产生火花。中间加一层弹性海绵，就不会有火花了。”[48]

Sun described Huawei as a “male society” where the most talented male engineers garnered the most respect. “I’m no hero,” she once wrote. “But I’m a loyal inheritor of Ren Zhengfei’s management philosophy…. Some people would say I’m the most similar person spiritually to Ren Zhengfei.”[49]

孙亚芳将华为描述为一个“男性社会”，最有才华的男工程师最受尊敬。“我不是英雄，”她曾写道，“但我任正非管理思想的忠实继承者……有人会说，我是精神上与任正非最相似的人。”[49]

8

8

Farewell to the Paramount Leader

告别最高领袖

Deng Xiaoping’s Death and the Hong Kong Handover: 1997

邓小平逝世与香港回归：1997 年

Around 3:00 a.m. on the morning of February 20, 1997, Ren Zhengfei learned that ninety-two-year-old paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had died of pulmonary disease.[1] Deng had been the leader who revived scientific research, who brought back capitalism, who made it possible for a company like Huawei to exist. It was the middle of the night, but there was not a minute to spare. The death of a national leader was a moment of political peril: in the spring of 1989, the gathering of mourners after the death of General Secretary Hu Yaobang had turned into the Tiananmen democracy protests. With Deng gone, it was also unclear if his successors would maintain his path of economic reform. Huawei was a company that rose to the political moment. Ren picked up the phone.

1997 年 2 月 20 日凌晨 3 点左右，任正非获悉九十二岁的最高领袖邓小平因肺部疾病逝世。[1] 邓小平是振兴科学研究、恢复资本主义、并让华为这类公司得以存在的领导者。当时正值深夜，但时间一刻也不容浪费。国家领导人的逝世往往是政治上的危险时刻：1989 年春天，总书记胡耀邦逝世后的悼念集会演变成了天安门民主抗议活动。随着邓小平的离去，他的继任者是否会坚持他的经济改革道路也尚不明确。华为是一家紧跟政治形势的公司。任正非拿起电话。

By 8:15 a.m., Huawei’s fax machines were sending the emergency notice to all corners of the company, including thirty-some domestic branches; the US R&D subsidiary, Ran Boss; and the Hong Kong office.[2] Flowers were brought into the main office, fragrant boughs of pine and cypress. The finance department ordered black veils and white gauze to make crepe flowers. Mourning halls were set up in each of Huawei’s three offices in Shenzhen. Some Huawei staffers rushed out to a print shop to make large color posters bearing Deng’s image. Others arranged for more than a dozen TVs to be set up so that everyone could watch the memorial ceremony. The national flag was lowered to half-mast and would remain there for a week. Huawei’s vice-chairwoman, Sun Yafang, was traveling in Israel with China’s premier, Li Lanqing, and she rushed to the Chinese embassy to express her condolences.[3] At Ran Boss in the US, employees sent flower wreaths to the Chinese consulate in San Francisco.

到了上午 8 点 15 分，华为的传真机正在向公司的各个角落发送紧急通知，包括三十多个国内分支机构；美国研发子公司 Ran Boss；以及香港办事处。[2] 鲜花被送进总部大楼，还有芬芳的松柏枝。财务部订购了黑纱和白绸来制作花圈。华为在深圳的三个办公区都设立了灵堂。一些华为员工冲向印刷店，制作印有邓小平像的大型彩色海报。另一些人则安排安装了十几台电视机，以便大家观看追悼大会。国旗降半旗志哀，并将持续一周。华为副董事长孙亚芳当时正随同中国副总理李岚清在以色列访问，她赶往中国大使馆表达哀悼。[3] 在美国的 Ran Boss，员工们向中国驻旧金山领事馆送去了花圈。

Ren’s daughter Meng Wanzhou, now twenty-five, had been a secretary in Huawei’s marketing department for two years. As she got onto the shuttle that morning, it was misty with a chill wind.[4] Her solemn colleagues on the bus remained quiet. Perhaps if no one broached the matter, it wouldn’t be true.

任正非的女儿孟晚舟当时二十五岁，已在华为市场部担任了两年秘书。那天早上她登上通勤班车时，薄雾冥冥，寒风凛冽。[4] 车上神情庄重的同事们保持着沉默。也许只要没人提起这件事，它就不是真的。

Deng had requested a shockingly understated postmortem arrangement: for his corneas to be donated to an eye bank, for his body to be dissected for medical research, and for his ashes to be scattered into the sea.[5] It was a pointed divergence from Mao Zedong, whose embalmed body remained on permanent display in Tiananmen Square. Deng’s body would disappear, leaving no tombstone or memorial.

邓小平要求的身后事安排极其低调，令人震惊：捐献角膜给眼库，解剖遗体用于医学研究，并将骨灰撒入大海。[5] 这与毛泽东形成了鲜明的对比，后者的遗体经过防腐处理，永久陈列在天安门广场。邓小平的遗体将会消失，不留墓碑，不留纪念碑。

Despite official orders for low-key mourning, residents were gathering in the streets of Shenzhen, as they did across the nation. Beneath a large image of Deng near city hall, people piled wreaths and yellow chrysanthemums.[6] They hung strings of paper cranes from a railing. Deng had ordered the bloody crackdown on the student protesters in Tiananmen Square. There had been calls for him to step down near the end. But looking back, people felt that, on balance, Deng had been a great leader: he had ended the Mao-era witch hunts, reopened universities, legalized private enterprise, and given a generation a new lease on life. At Huawei, executives devoted the entire forty-fifth issue of Huawei People, the company’s main internal newspaper, to tributes to Deng. It was the only time ever that the newspaper was entirely dedicated to a single topic—and one with no direct relation to Huawei business, for that matter. “The four seas weep, the mountains and rivers have grown pale,” James Yan, Huawei’s US representative, wrote.[7] “His death is a great loss for all mankind,” Ren’s younger brother, Steven Ren, was quoted as saying.[8]

尽管官方命令低调悼念，但深圳市民仍像全国各地的人们一样聚集在街头。在市中心附近的一幅巨大的邓小平画像下，人们堆放着花圈和黄菊花。[6] 他们在栏杆上挂起一串串纸鹤。邓小平曾下令对天安门广场的抗议学生进行血腥镇压。在后期，曾有人要求他下台。但回首往事，人们觉得总的来说，邓小平是一位伟大的领袖：他结束了毛泽东时代的政治迫害，重开了大学，使私营企业合法化，并给了整整一代人新的生活契机。在华为，高管们将公司主要内部报纸《华为人》的整个第四十五期都用于悼念邓小平。这是该报唯一一次完全致力于单一主题——而且是一个与华为业务没有直接关系的主题。“四海呜咽，山河失色，”华为驻美代表严力勇写道。[7] “他的逝世是全人类的重大损失，”文中引用了任正非的弟弟任树录的话。[8]

Meng Wanzhou also penned a memorial essay.[9] She wrote that two months earlier, her father had instructed her to carefully watch the documentary about Deng Xiaoping running on state TV, reminding her that politics was the highest form of economic management. “In the past, Deng Xiaoping was so far away from me,” she wrote. “I’m just a twenty-five-year-old girl who has been living a peaceful life.” She called for Huawei’s employees to redouble their work efforts amid their grief. “Let us use tomorrow’s success to comfort our beloved Comrade Xiaoping.”

孟晚舟也撰写了一篇悼念文章。[9] 她写道，两个月前，父亲曾指示她仔细观看国家电视台播放的关于邓小平的纪录片，提醒她政治是经济管理的最高形式。“过去，邓小平对我来说是那么遥远，”她写道。“我只是一个一直过着平静生活的二十五岁女孩。”她号召华为员工化悲痛为力量，加倍努力工作。“让我们用明天的成功，来慰藉我们敬爱的小平同志。”

Five days after Deng’s death, Huawei’s three thousand employees stood in silence for three minutes along with people across the country as Deng’s memorial service began in Beijing.[10] For many of them, Meng included, it felt tragic that Deng would be missing the return of Hong Kong, which he had worked so hard to achieve for years. By the joint declaration signed in 1984, the British would hand over control of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China on July 1, 1997. “With only a bit more than a hundred days remaining before Hong Kong’s return, he has left us,” Meng wrote. “This is not only a pity for him, but a pity for all the nation’s people.”[11]

邓小平逝世五天后，随着北京追悼大会的开始，华为的三千名员工与全国人民一起默哀三分钟。[10] 对包括孟晚舟在内的许多人来说，邓小平将错过他多年来努力争取的香港回归，这令人感到悲伤。根据 1984 年签署的联合声明，英国将于 1997 年 7 月 1 日将香港的控制权移交给中华人民共和国。“距离香港回归仅剩一百多天，他却离开了我们，”孟晚舟写道。“这不仅是他个人的遗憾，也是全民族的遗憾。”[11]

—

Shenzhen was separated from Hong Kong by only the narrow river. Its wealthier sister city was never far from Shenzheners’ minds. Ren told his early engineers that the day would come when their salaries were higher than those of Hong Kongers, a giddy prospect that they only half believed.[12] If Shenzhen was China’s door to the world, then Hong Kong was the beginning of the rest of the world.

深圳与香港仅一河之隔。深圳人从未忘记这座更富裕的姐妹城市。任正非曾告诉他早期的工程师们，总有一天他们的工资会比香港人还高，这是一个让他们半信半疑的令人兴奋的前景。[12] 如果说深圳是中国通往世界的门户，那么香港就是通往世界其他地方的起点。

Huawei had done business with Hong Kong since its earliest days. It had been a contractor for the Hong Kong switchmaker Hung Nien, for which it assembled switches that were sold into the mainland market.[13] When it started designing its own switches, it relied on international suppliers through its Hong Kong offices. Huawei opened its Hong Kong branch office in September 1995, throwing a party at the Regent Hong Kong with more than 120 guests, including representatives from Texas Instruments, Siemens, and Panasonic.[14]

华为从创立之初就与香港有业务往来。它曾是香港交换机制造商鸿年公司的承包商，为其组装销往内地市场的交换机。[13] 当它开始设计自己的交换机时，通过其香港办事处依赖国际供应商。华为于 1995 年 9 月成立了香港分公司，在香港丽晶酒店举行了招待会，邀请了 120 多位嘉宾，包括德州仪器、西门子和松下的代表。[14]

Hong Kong’s telephone operators had generally purchased foreign switches up until this point, viewing mainland switchmakers with suspicion. “I felt a sense of shabbiness,” one Huawei manager reported after a trip to the British colony.[15] He urged his colleagues to improve their attention to detail and dress sharper to match their Hong Kong peers. But as the handover approached, Beijing was pushing for closer ties with Hong Kong. Shenzhen officials were tasked with trying to find technological points of cooperation.

在此之前，香港的电信运营商通常购买国外交换机，对中国大陆的交换机制造商持怀疑态度。“我感到一种寒酸感，”一位华为经理在访问这个英国殖民地后报告称。[15] 他敦促同事们提高对细节的关注，并穿着得更体面，以匹配香港同行的形象。但随着回归临近，北京方面正推动与香港建立更紧密的联系。深圳官员被赋予了寻找技术合作点的任务。

It was amid this current of political warming that Huawei made its breakthrough with Hutchison Telecom, Hong Kong’s second-largest telephone operator, owned by the city’s richest man, Li Ka-shing. Li had been born in the mainland, but he had moved to Hong Kong as a child, building a real-estate empire after getting his start making plastic flowers.[16] Li had been wary of doing business with the mainland, according to Simon Murray, Li’s right-hand man from 1984 to 1993.[17] “What he said to me was, ‘Simon, if we have a partner in China and we have a row, it will be us against the Chinese, and it will be very bad for us.’ ” But as the handover drew closer, Li was convinced that forging some mainland business ties would be favorable. When the Hutchison team visited Huawei’s headquarters in Shenzhen,[18] Ren’s team convinced them that Huawei could supply a network expansion much faster than rivals, and at only half the cost.[19] In June 1996, Huawei sealed a deal with Hutchison Telecom to supply twenty-five thousand lines’ worth of C&C08 switches.[20] Huawei scrambled to deliver, shipping the switches just four months later in October and completing installation in December. Asked why Hutchison picked Huawei as a vendor, Murray said: “Why not? We had a very nice relationship with China. When I was there, we bought a port in Shanghai. Everybody in Hong Kong was doing business with China.”

正是在这种政治回暖的潮流中，华为在和记电讯（Hutchison Telecom）取得了突破。和记电讯是香港第二大电信运营商，由香港首富李嘉诚所有。李嘉诚出生于大陆，但孩提时代就移居香港，在靠制造塑胶花起家后，建立了一个房地产帝国。[16] 据 1984 年至 1993 年担任李嘉诚得力助手的马世民（Simon Murray）称，李嘉诚此前一直对与大陆做生意持谨慎态度。[17] “他对我说道：‘马世民，如果我们在中国有一个合作伙伴并发生了争执，那就是我们对抗中国人，这对我们来说会非常糟糕。’”但随着回归临近，李嘉诚确信建立一些大陆业务联系将是有利的。当和记团队访问华为深圳总部时，[18] 任正非的团队说服了他们，华为提供网络扩容的速度比竞争对手快得多，且成本仅为一半。[19] 1996 年 6 月，华为与和记电讯签署协议，供应两万五千线容量的 C&C08 交换机。[20] 华为全力以赴交付，仅在四个月后的 10 月就发运了交换机，并在 12 月完成了安装。当被问及为何和记选择华为作为供应商时，马世民说：“为什么不呢？我们与中国的关系非常好。我在那里时，我们买下了上海的一个港口。香港的每个人都在和中国做生意。”

It was an important deal for Huawei: their first sales foothold outside the mainland. “This is an important event in Huawei’s history,” a Huawei manager wrote about the Hutchison project. “It symbolizes that we have taken our first solid step into overseas markets! With tears in our eyes, and dripping sweat, we almost broke our wineglasses from toasting!”[21]

这对华为来说是一笔重要的交易：这是他们在大陆以外的第一个销售据点。“这是华为历史上的一件大事，”一位华为经理在谈到和记项目时写道。“它象征着我们迈出了走向海外市场的坚实第一步！我们眼里含着泪水，流着汗水，干杯时几乎撞碎了酒杯！”[21]

—

Huawei was also expanding its horizons beyond switches. As the handover neared, Huawei launched a new product: a video-camera system that could be used for both conference calls and closed-circuit surveillance. China’s government had begun adopting these systems in 1992 for virtual meetings, but only foreign companies made them. Officials were keen to find domestic alternatives. “Video conferencing is very suitable for China’s centralized management system,” said Qiu Zhenbang, director of the emergency communications department of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, in a 1997 speech. “It is particularly convenient for party and government leaders.”[22] In 1996, Huawei engineer Chen Qing had gone to San Jose to visit the industry leader in videoconferencing, Compression Labs, and scope out the situation. “Since they knew Huawei was also making a videoconferencing system, the entire meeting was spent in a hostile and unfriendly atmosphere,” Chen reported back.[23]

华为也在将视野扩展到交换机之外。随着回归临近，华为推出了一款新产品：一种既可用于电话会议又可用于闭路监控的视频摄像系统。中国政府从 1992 年开始采用这些系统进行虚拟会议，但当时只有外国公司生产。官员们渴望寻找国产替代品。“视频会议非常适合中国的集中管理体制，”邮电部应急通信处处长邱振邦在 1997 年的一次演讲中说。“对党政领导来说尤其方便。”[22] 1996 年，华为工程师陈青前往圣何塞拜访视频会议行业的领军企业 Compression Labs，以摸清情况。陈青汇报称：“由于他们知道华为也在研制视频会议系统，整个会议都在一种敌对和不友好的气氛中进行。”[23]

Huawei’s ViewPoint videoconferencing system, which began development in 1994, was deployed in Sichuan Province in early 1997, with the city of Nanchong adopting eight interconnecting sets for communication between its offices.[24] Other provinces followed. Huawei lauded it as the first time that a domestically developed videoconferencing system had been put to use in China and said it was interoperable with the American Compression Labs systems that the Sichuan government was already using. Huawei was also marketing the ViewPoint system for surveillance. It could be hooked up to as many as 960 video cameras at once, with the video feeds rotating in color on a big screen.[25] When an alarm was triggered by a feed, the big screen would switch to that display. The device was being manufactured by Mobeco, Huawei’s joint venture with the municipal telecom bureaus, which had branched out from switches to power supplies and other gadgets.

华为的 ViewPoint 视频会议系统于 1994 年开始研发，1997 年初在四川省部署，南充市采用了八套互联设备用于办公室间的通信。[24] 其他省份紧随其后。华为称赞这是国产视频会议系统首次在中国投入使用，并表示该系统可与四川政府已在使用的美国 Compression Labs 系统互操作。华为还向监控市场推广 ViewPoint 系统。它可同时连接多达 960 个摄像机，视频画面在大屏幕上以彩色轮巡显示。[25] 当某个画面触发警报时，大屏幕会自动切换到该显示。该设备由莫贝克（Mobeco）制造，这是华为与各地电信局成立的合资企业，其业务已从交换机扩展到电源和其他设备。

This video system piqued the interest of China’s military. There were obvious security advantages over foreign-made gear. In November 1996, Liu Huaqing, vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, stopped in at Huawei during a visit to People’s Liberation Army troops stationed in Shenzhen to prepare for the Hong Kong handover.[26] Ren showed Liu and other military officials some of Huawei’s products and answered their questions. Liu encouraged Huawei to “continue prioritizing national interests” as it built its company, according to an account in Huawei People. Huawei’s ViewPoint video system was installed near the Guangzhou Military Region, a couple hours’ drive northwest of Shenzhen, and also to the south at the Hong Kong Garrison.[27]

这套视频系统引起了中国军方的兴趣。与外国制造的设备相比，它具有明显的安全优势。1996 年 11 月，中央军委副主席刘华清在视察驻深部队为香港回归做准备期间，顺道访问了华为。[26] 任正非向刘华清和其他军方官员展示了华为的部分产品并回答了提问。据《华为人》记载，刘华清鼓励华为在建设公司时“继续把国家利益放在首位”。华为的 ViewPoint 视频系统被安装在距离深圳西北几小时车程的广州军区，以及南边的驻港部队。[27]

Ren had claimed consistently to his staff that their humble work in switches was tied to larger purposes, even to national reunification. “To resolve Hong Kong’s return, and Taiwan’s unification, a large amount of foreign exchange is necessary,” Ren said in an internal speech in 1995. “China is a poor country. What can it use to attract people?…There’s only the market. And they don’t want the potato or onion market, only the high-tech market, especially the telecom market.”[28]

任正非一直向员工声称，他们在交换机领域所做的卑微工作与更宏大的目标息息相关，甚至关系到国家统一。“为了解决香港回归和台湾统一，需要大量的外汇，”任正非在 1995 年的一次内部讲话中说。“中国是一个穷国。它能拿什么来吸引人？……只有市场。而且他们不想要土豆或洋葱市场，只要高科技市场，特别是电信市场。”[28]

With the big day approaching, Ren gave a speech to Huawei employees. “In a few days, Hong Kong will return to the motherland,” he said. “The smoke of the Opium War has dissipated, but the ghosts of the Opium War still linger. The century of humiliation has taught us a truth, which is that weak countries will never be in ‘the right.’ When wolves want to eat sheep, they will always find a way to be in the right.”[29]

随着重大日子的临近，任正非向华为员工发表了演讲。“再过几天，香港就要回归祖国了，”他说。“鸦片战争的硝烟已经散去，但鸦片战争的幽灵依然徘徊。百年的屈辱教会了我们一个真理，那就是弱国永远不会有‘理’。狼要吃羊的时候，总能找到理由证明自己是有理的。”[29]

—

A few minutes before midnight on June 30, 1997, three British military guards of honor marched stiffly up to a flagpole under the bright lights in Hong Kong’s new convention center.[30] They drew down the Union Jack for the last time. At the stroke of midnight, three Chinese military guards replaced it with a crimson flag emblazoned with five yellow stars. China’s leader, Jiang Zemin, stood watch, as did Prince Charles, British prime minister Tony Blair, and former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who had negotiated the handover with Deng over many years.

1997 年 6 月 30 日午夜前几分钟，在香港新会议中心明亮的灯光下，三名英国军事仪仗兵迈着僵硬的步伐走向旗杆。[30] 他们最后一次降下了米字旗。午夜钟声敲响时，三名中国军人换上了印有五颗黄星的深红色国旗。中国领导人江泽民在场注视，查尔斯王子、英国首相托尼·布莱尔以及曾与邓小平就回归事宜进行了多年谈判的前英国首相玛格丽特·撒切尔也都在场。

Hong Kong was the last major colony of the British Empire, which, at its peak, covered a quarter of the land on earth. India had won its independence in 1947, Sudan in 1956, and most other British colonies in quick succession thereafter. “It wasn’t just the end, as it were, of the British Empire,” Hong Kong’s last British governor, Chris Patten, would later say of the handover. “It was the end of empire.”[31] Among the departing British, there was trepidation that Beijing would not keep its promise to allow Hong Kong freedom of speech and other rights not allowed in the mainland. Across China, there was jubilation that the era of colonial rule was finally over.

香港是大英帝国的最后一个主要殖民地，大英帝国在鼎盛时期曾覆盖地球四分之一的土地。印度于 1947 年获得独立，苏丹于 1956 年独立，此后大多数其他英国殖民地也相继独立。“这不仅仅是，可以说，大英帝国的终结，”香港最后一任总督彭定康后来在谈到交接时说，“这是帝国的终结。”[31] 在离去的英国人中，存在着一种忧虑，担心北京不会履行承诺，允许香港拥有言论自由和内地所不具备的其他权利。而在整个中国，人们都在为殖民统治时代终于结束而欢欣鼓舞。

Some eight thousand journalists had descended on Hong Kong.[32] China’s state-run broadcaster, CCTV, had forty cameras rolling and two helicopters shooting aerial footage. Among the sea of cameras were some of Huawei’s.

约有八千名记者云集香港。[32] 中国国家电视台中央电视台（CCTV）动用了 40 台摄像机进行拍摄，并有两架直升机拍摄航拍画面。在摄像机的海洋中，也有华为的身影。

“During the Hong Kong handover, it played a key role,” Huawei People reported of the company’s ViewPoint system. “It transmitted a large amount of command information, and at the first instance sent through precious images like the handover from the British troops to the Hong Kong Garrison, and the Hong Kong Garrison raising the national flag.”[33]

“在香港回归期间，它发挥了关键作用，”《华为人》在报道该公司的 ViewPoint 系统时称，“它传输了大量的指挥信息，并在第一时间传回了英军向驻港部队交接、驻港部队升起国旗等珍贵画面。”[33]

—

Ahead of the handover, Meng had given birth to her first child, a boy.[34] Little is known about her first husband, whom she appears to have avoided discussing publicly. But her mother, Meng Jun, had been on hand, feeding her soup and changing the boy’s diapers. Many years before, Meng Jun had sent her children Meng Wanzhou and Ren Ping to be reared by their grandparents while she pursued a career. Now she took on the role of doting grandmother to the small boy, freeing up Meng Wanzhou to focus on her career.

在回归前夕，孟晚舟生下了她的第一个孩子，是个男孩。[34] 关于她的第一任丈夫知之甚少，她似乎一直避免在公开场合谈论他。但她的母亲孟军当时在场，给她喂汤，给男孩换尿布。许多年前，孟军为了追求事业，曾把孩子孟晚舟和任平送去给祖父母抚养。现在，她承担起溺爱小外孙的祖母角色，让孟晚舟能够全身心地投入到事业中。

Meng Wanzhou had begun her journey at Huawei as a secretary, handling tasks like printing documents and answering phones.[35] She was flustered by all the buttons on the phone switchboard. Her family aspired for her to climb the ranks, and following her post-childbirth recovery, she spent six months working at Huawei’s Hong Kong office before returning to school.[36]

孟晚舟在华为的职业生涯是从秘书起步的，处理打印文件和接听电话等任务。[35] 电话交换机上的所有按钮曾让她感到手忙脚乱。她的家人渴望她能晋升，在产后康复后，她在华为香港办事处工作了六个月，然后重返校园。[36]

Meng Wanzhou’s college history remains hazy. Some domestic news reports called her a high school dropout. Years later, at her first press appearance, Meng would say that the reports were wrong,[37] that she had indeed attended university and graduated in 1992, a curious account given that Shenzhen University would list her as matriculating in 1990, putting her time at the university at only two years. Meng’s official bios at Huawei have never given specific details about her undergraduate studies or even noted if she obtained a bachelor’s degree.

孟晚舟的大学历史仍然模糊不清。一些国内新闻报道称她是高中辍学。多年后，在她的第一次媒体亮相中，孟晚舟表示这些报道是错误的，[37] 她确实上过大学并于 1992 年毕业，考虑到深圳大学将她的入学时间列为 1990 年，这意味着她在大学的时间只有两年，这是一个奇怪的说法。华为官方提供的孟晚舟简历从未给出过她本科学习的具体细节，甚至没有注明她是否获得了学士学位。

What is known for certain, however, is that in 1997, Meng went back to school to get a master’s degree in accounting while her mother looked after her son. She did her degree at the Huazhong Institute in Wuhan, the alma mater of Guo Ping and many of Ren’s other early engineers. “To let me better study and work, she silently took up all the responsibility of caring for the child,” Meng Wanzhou wrote of her mother. She may have pursued the degree under her father’s surname: In late 1997, two papers on financial management penned by a Ren Wanzhou were published in Chinese academic journals. One paper, about novel fundraising methods for state-owned enterprises, gave Ren Wanzhou’s affiliation as the Huazhong Institute, while the other paper, on the MRP II and ISO 9000 business-management systems, gave her affiliation as Shenzhen Huawei Company. With the accounting degree in hand, she would be able to rise through the ranks at Huawei. She was soon busy juggling work and motherhood. “Each day when I return from work, my precious boy is standing in the doorway, and when he sweetly says, ‘Mama,’ my heart is about to shatter,” she wrote. “The day’s weariness evaporates.”[38]

然而，可以确定的是，1997 年，在母亲照顾儿子的同时，孟晚舟回到学校攻读会计硕士学位。她在武汉的华中理工大学（现华中科技大学）完成了学位，那里也是郭平及任正非许多早期工程师的母校。“为了让我更好地学习和工作，她默默承担了照顾孩子的所有责任，”孟晚舟在谈到母亲时写道。她可能是以父亲的姓氏攻读学位的：1997 年下半年，两篇由“任晚舟”撰写的关于财务管理的论文发表在中国学术期刊上。一篇关于国有企业新型融资方式的论文，署名单位为华中理工大学；而另一篇关于 MRP II 和 ISO 9000 企业管理系统的论文，署名单位为深圳华为公司。拿到会计学位后，她就能在华为内部晋升。很快，她就开始忙于兼顾工作和母亲的角色。“每天下班回家，我心爱的宝贝就站在门口，当他甜甜地叫一声‘妈妈’时，我的心都要碎了，”她写道，“一天的疲惫都烟消云散了。”[38]

Huawei had survived its first decade. Ren’s team had built one of China’s first advanced digital telephone switches, relieving the nation from its dependence on foreign technology. He’d built a deep team of talent, with Sun Yafang, the female sales chief with an intelligence background; Li Yinan, the “young prodigy”; Zheng Baoyong, or “A-Bao,” whom he viewed with brotherly affection; and Guo Ping, one of his earliest engineers, all helping him steer the ship as Huawei vice presidents. Several of his family members were now at Huawei as well, including his younger brother, Steven Ren, who was in sales, and his daughter Meng Wanzhou, in the finance department.

华为挺过了它的第一个十年。任正非的团队研制出了中国首批先进的数字电话交换机，使国家摆脱了对外国技术的依赖。他建立了一支深厚的人才队伍，包括具有情报背景的女性销售主管孙亚芳；“天才少年”李一男；被他视为兄弟般亲近的郑宝用（阿宝）；以及他最早的工程师之一郭平，他们都以华为副总裁的身份协助他掌舵。他的几位家人现在也在华为工作，包括从事销售工作的弟弟任树录，以及在财务部工作的女儿孟晚舟。

Ren was setting his sights higher. He wanted Huawei to become not just a Chinese business but an international business and a leader in its field. He also wanted to take back control: he had asked a deputy to start negotiating to buy out Huawei’s five original investors.[39] To govern this growing corporate empire, Ren had recruited scholars to draft his own constitution, taking inspiration from the British constitutional monarchy. The age of kings and queens had waned. Now Huawei was fast becoming a dominion upon which the sun never set.

任正非正把目光投向更高远的地方。他希望华为不仅成为一家中国企业，而且成为一家国际化企业和行业领导者。他还想收回控制权：他已要求一名副手开始谈判，回购华为最初的五位投资者的股份。[39] 为了管理这个不断扩张的商业帝国，任正非聘请学者起草了自己的“宪法”，灵感源自英国的君主立宪制。国王和王后的时代已经衰落。现在，华为正迅速成为一个日不落的领地。

When Meng was young, her father would tell her stories about the old war heroes from Mao’s army: Dong Cunrui, who went on a suicide bombing mission to destroy a Nationalist bunker; Liu Hulan, a fourteen-year-old female spy beheaded by the Nationalists after they failed to get her to betray her allies; Wang Erxiao, a thirteen-year-old cowherd killed by Japanese troops’ bayonets after he was found to have helped Red troops escape; and Yang Jingyu, who alone held off Japanese soldiers for five days, despite having nothing to eat but tree bark and cotton.[40] Meng listened in thrall, half wishing that she, too, could become a war hero. “How could I understand at such a young age,” she wrote, “what exactly is a hero?”

孟晚舟年幼时，父亲常给她讲毛泽东军队里的老英雄故事：董存瑞，他在自杀式炸弹袭击中炸毁了国民党的碉堡；刘胡兰，这位十四岁的女情报员在拒绝背叛盟友后被国民党斩首；王二小，这位十三岁的放牛娃因被发现帮助红军撤退而被日军用刺刀杀害；还有杨靖宇，他在只靠树皮和棉絮充饥的情况下，独自抵御日军长达五天。[40] 孟晚舟听得如痴如醉，甚至有些希望自己也能成为一名战争英雄。她写道：“在那样的年纪，我怎么能理解，究竟什么是英雄？”

Part II

第二部分

As we are a large, globalized company, major events happening in any corner of the world may have something to do with us.[1]

作为一个大型全球化公司，世界任何角落发生的重大事件都可能与我们有关。[1]

—Huawei’s Management Optimization newspaper, March 31, 2011

——华为《管理优化》报，2011 年 3 月 31 日

9

9

Iron Army

铁军

Huawei Abroad: 1996–1999

华为出海：1996–1999

On December 17, 1998, at twenty minutes after midnight, the eerie wail of air-raid sirens pierced the dark sky over Baghdad.[1] The horizon exploded with bursts of light as Iraqi antiaircraft guns sprayed fire. American B-52H planes were bombing the Iraqi capital.

1998 年 12 月 17 日凌晨零点二十分，凄厉的防空警报声划破了巴格达黑暗的天空。[1] 随着伊拉克高射炮喷射火舌，地平线上火光四溅。美国 B-52H 轰炸机正在轰炸这座伊拉克首都。

At the Chinese embassy earlier in the evening, the mood was light.[2] No one seriously expected the Americans to attack. Still, just in case, embassy staff had distributed bulletproof vests and helmets. Now, with air-raid sirens screaming, everyone rushed to the basement. According to a Huawei staffer’s account, the embassy turned off the lights to avoid drawing fire. Some wondered if it would be safer to declare themselves friendly bystanders by blazing the lights and flying China’s red-and-yellow flag.

当天傍晚早些时候，中国大使馆内的气氛还很轻松。[2] 没有人真的预料到美国人会发动进攻。尽管如此，为了以防万一，使馆工作人员还是分发了防弹背心和头盔。现在，随着防空警报声尖叫，所有人冲向地下室。根据一名华为员工的叙述，使馆熄灭了灯火以避免引来炮火。有人在想，如果大开灯火并升起中国的红黄旗帜，以此表明自己是友好的旁观者，是否会更安全。

In the morning, the embassy’s staff surveyed the damage. Some two hundred US Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles had been fired into what the Americans called “sensitive targets,” sites suspected of being associated with the development of weapons of mass destruction.[3] The Chinese embassy was unscathed. A stray shell had exploded beyond its perimeter, and a piece of Iraqi shrapnel had landed on the empty garage. As they evacuated from the city by car, a Huawei employee saw a group of Iraqi residents standing in the street, looking up at the sky. “I suddenly thought of the scenes from China during the Opium War, when foreigners used their foreign guns and cannons to confront Chinese people armed with traditional weapons like knives,” he later wrote. “How terrifying it is to be a weak and small country. And as a citizen of such a weak nation, what kind of humiliation will they endure?”[4]

清晨，使馆工作人员查看了受损情况。大约两百枚美国海军战斧巡航导弹射向了美国人所谓的“敏感目标”，即怀疑与研发大规模杀伤性武器有关的地点。[3] 中国大使馆安然无恙。一颗流弹在围墙外爆炸，一块伊拉克的弹片落在了空荡荡的车库上。在乘车撤离城市时，一名华为员工看到一群伊拉克居民站在街头仰望天空。“我突然想到了鸦片战争时期的中国场景，当时外国人用他们的洋枪洋炮对抗拿着刀剑等传统武器的中国人，”他后来写道。“作为一个弱小国家是多么可怕。而作为这样一个弱小国家的公民，他们将忍受怎样的屈辱？”[4]

Iraq was tricky territory for a company like Huawei. The country had been under United Nations sanctions since the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which meant that sales of telecommunications equipment into the country were largely blocked, with any exceptions under the humanitarian Oil-for-Food Programme requiring a UN waiver. Huawei was operating there but trying to keep a low-profile presence. A few years later, when asked by a Western journalist about the company’s Iraq office, a Huawei executive said he was uncertain if it existed.[5] When Huawei had brought a prospective Iraqi customer to visit its headquarters in Shenzhen, it had taken pains to go under the radar. “At that time, it was difficult to send formal invitation letters to them through normal channels,” one Huawei employee working in Iraq recalled, saying that a colleague had used their connections to help them secure a visa to China.[6]

对于像华为这样的公司来说，伊拉克是一个棘手的领域。自 1990 年伊拉克入侵科威特以来，该国一直处于联合国的制裁之下，这意味着向该国销售电信设备基本上被封锁，任何在人道主义“石油换食品计划”下的例外情况都需要获得联合国的豁免。华为在那里开展业务，但试图保持低调。几年后，当一名西方记者问及该公司的伊拉克办事处时，一位华为高管表示他不确定该办事处是否存在。[5] 当华为邀请一位潜在的伊拉克客户访问其深圳总部时，曾费尽心思避开关注。“当时，很难通过正常渠道向他们发送正式邀请函，”一名在伊拉克工作的华为员工回忆说，并表示一位同事利用关系帮助他们获得了来华签证。[6]

It was easy to see why many of Huawei’s engineers would feel sympathy for the sanctioned and downtrodden nations of the world. The parallels to China’s own recent past were only too clear. Because the Beijing government had turned its guns and tanks on students at Tiananmen Square in 1989, all of China’s people had been punished for years with economic sanctions, including those who had supported the student protesters. Now, in Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s reign meant that under UN dictum, no Iraqi resident could use a cell phone.

不难理解为什么华为的许多工程师会对世界上受制裁和受压迫的国家产生同情。这与中国自身近期的过去有着显而易见的相似之处。由于北京政府在 1989 年动用枪支和坦克对付天安门广场的学生，所有中国人民多年来都受到了经济制裁的惩罚，包括那些支持抗议学生的人。现在，在伊拉克，萨达姆·侯赛因的统治意味着根据联合国的指令，任何伊拉克居民都不能使用手机。

As Ren Zhengfei and his team looked out at the global telecommunications landscape, they saw a market dominated by the West.[7] America’s Lucent Technologies—a direct descendant of Alexander Graham Bell’s Bell Telephone Company—was number one in the world, with Sweden’s Ericsson, France’s Alcatel, and Canada’s Nortel rounding out the heavyweights. There were plenty of smaller contenders too, all jostling for space: Britain’s Marconi, Germany’s Siemens, Japan’s Fujitsu, Finland’s Nokia, and Motorola and Cisco in the US.

当任正非和他的团队审视全球电信版图时，他们看到的是一个由西方主导的市场。[7] 美国的朗讯科技（亚历山大·格拉汉姆·贝尔的贝尔电话公司的直接后裔）排名世界第一，瑞典的爱立信、法国的阿尔卡特和加拿大的北电网络紧随其后，构成了重量级阵营。此外还有许多规模较小的竞争者也在争夺空间：英国的马可尼、德国的西门子、日本的富士通、芬兰的诺基亚，以及美国的摩托罗拉和思科。

To thread its way into this competitive market, Huawei began working for “rogue regimes.” These controversial contracts would serve as the engine for the company’s early global rise. But they would also put Huawei in Washington’s crosshairs. For one thing, the National Security Agency, the signals-intelligence agency of the US, had relied on interception of radio communications to monitor countries like Iraq. As Huawei laid down fiber-optic cables to modernize the phone networks, the National Security Agency (NSA) found itself shut out from conversations it would have liked to hear.[8]

为了在这个竞争激烈的市场中杀出一条血路，华为开始为“流氓政权”工作。这些充满争议的合同将成为公司早期全球崛起的引擎。但它们也将华为置于华盛顿的准星之下。一方面，美国信号情报机构国家安全局（NSA）一直依赖拦截无线电通信来监控伊拉克等国家。随着华为铺设光缆实现电话网络现代化，国家安全局发现自己被排除在那些它想听到的对话之外。[8]

—

Huawei’s journey into the international market began with the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996. As tensions between the US and China ramped up, Beijing sought out closer ties with Russia, leading to Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin announcing a strategic partnership in April 1996.[9] Timed to the historic pact, China’s National Science and Technology Commission arranged for Ren to go to Moscow to attend an international convention.[10] It would be Huawei’s first major international event.

华为进军国际市场的旅程始于 1995-1996 年的第三次台湾海峡危机。随着美中紧张局势升级，北京寻求与俄罗斯建立更紧密的联系，促使鲍里斯·叶利钦和江泽民在 1996 年 4 月宣布建立战略协作伙伴关系。[9] 配合这一历史性协议，中国国家科学技术委员会安排任正非前往莫斯科参加一个国际会议。[10] 这将是华为第一次重大的国际活动。

Ren understood that political winds had blown the door open for Huawei. “I believe it’s not solely because our technical products are so exceptional, to the extent that the Russian government values us so much,” Ren wrote. “It’s more likely that we are benefiting from the influence of both General Secretary Jiang and President Yeltsin, as well as from the mutual desire of China and Russia to improve relations.”[11] A Chinese diplomat who helped organize the trip wrote that Ren had “grasped the business opportunity hidden in this change in international relations.”[12] Russia’s state-owned TASS news agency reported that China’s government had made a “special disbursement” to Huawei to open an office in Moscow, and that the office would also cover former Soviet countries like Ukraine and Belarus.[13]

任正非明白，政治风向为华为打开了大门。“我相信，这不仅仅是因为我们的技术产品如此卓越，以至于俄罗斯政府如此看重我们，”任正非写道。“更有可能的是，我们受益于江总书记和叶利钦总统的影响力，以及中俄双方改善关系的共同愿望。”[11] 一位协助组织此次行程的中国外交官写道，任正非“抓住了隐藏在国际关系变化中的商机”。[12] 俄罗斯国家通讯社塔斯社报道称，中国政府向华为提供了“专项拨款”用于在莫斯科开设办事处，该办事处还将覆盖乌克兰和白俄罗斯等前苏联国家。[13]

Ren had grown up in the 1950s, when Soviet Russia was held up as a role model for China. Mao’s industrial projects had relied heavily on Soviet expertise.[14] Ren had studied the Russian language in school,[15] and he’d read Soviet novels like How the Steel Was Tempered, Nikolai Ostrovsky’s classic about a Bolshevik soldier.[16] “The Soviet Union’s today is our tomorrow,” the slogan went. He was now curious to see the heroic nation he’d heard so much about.

任正非成长于 20 世纪 50 年代，当时苏联被奉为中国的榜样。毛泽东时代的工业项目在很大程度上依赖于苏联的技术专家。[14] 任正非在学校学习过俄语，[15] 他还读过苏联小说，如尼古拉·奥斯特洛夫斯基关于布尔什维克战士的经典著作《钢铁是怎样炼成的》。[16] 当时的口号是“苏联的今天就是我们的明天”。他现在很好奇，想亲眼看看这个他早有耳闻的英雄国度。

But by the time Ren arrived at the Moscow airport, the Soviet Union was no more, having lost the Cold War and collapsed in 1991. Ren saw a Russia devastated by hyperinflation. It cost twenty thousand rubles just for Ren to rent a couple of carts to wheel his luggage out of the airport.[17] Ren felt that the United States was partly to blame: Washington had coaxed the leader of the new Russia, Boris Yeltsin, to apply “shock therapy” to the economy with a rapid shift to capitalism, he wrote, but Washington did not follow through with the financial aid it had dangled. “They always give you some bait to get you to change some policies, but when you’ve made changes according to their demands, they raise further demands,” Ren wrote. “You still cannot get ‘sincere’ help from the United States.”[18]

但当任正非抵达莫斯科机场时，苏联已不复存在，它在冷战中失败并于 1991 年解体。任正非看到的是一个被恶性通货膨胀摧毁的俄罗斯。任正非仅租用几辆手推车将行李推出机场。[17]任正非认为美国应负部分责任：他写道，华盛顿诱导新俄罗斯的领导人鲍里斯·叶利钦对经济实施“休克疗法”，迅速向资本主义转型，但华盛顿并没有兑现其抛出的财政援助诱饵。“他们总是给你一点诱饵，让你改变一些政策，但当你按照他们的要求做出改变后，他们又会提出进一步的要求，”任正非写道。“你仍然无法从美国获得‘真诚’的帮助。”[18]

For Huawei’s coming-out-to-the-world moment at the Moscow convention, Ren and his team had prepared stacks of marketing materials and hired Russian water ballet dancers to staff the company’s convention booth, which had China’s flag displayed proudly at the front, along with the words China Huawei.[19] The Chinese embassy had helped them with everything they needed, setting up meetings with Russian officials and organizing a reception and press conference at the luxurious Hotel Ukraina.[20] Ren had brought along his daughter Meng Wanzhou, who had joined Huawei a few years earlier and who tried to make herself useful on tasks like exchanging dollars for rubles.[21]

为了华为在莫斯科展会上的全球亮相，任正非和他的团队准备了大量的营销材料，并聘请了俄罗斯水上芭蕾舞者在公司展位工作，展位正面自豪地展示着中国国旗，以及中国华为字样。[19] 中国大使馆为他们提供了所需的一切帮助，安排了与俄罗斯官员的会面，并在豪华的乌克兰酒店组织了招待会和新闻发布会。[20] 任正非带着女儿孟晚舟同行，她几年前加入了华为，并努力在兑换卢布等事务上发挥作用。[21]

That visit resulted in Huawei’s first international company, a joint venture with Russia’s Ufa-based Beto company to produce Huawei’s C&C08 switch. The factory would be tied up for years by regulatory red tape, as Russian officials found one reason after another for delays.[22] At the end of the day, the Russians remained wary about installing Chinese switches in their networks. “We are still unsure how much we know about Russia and if we can really open up the market,” Ren wrote to staff.[23]

那次访问促成了华为的第一家国际公司，即与俄罗斯乌法市的贝托（Beto）公司合资生产华为的 C&C08 交换机。由于俄罗斯官员不断找借口拖延，工厂多年来一直受困于监管方面的繁文缛节。[22] 归根结底，俄罗斯人对在他们的网络中安装中国交换机仍持谨慎态度。“我们仍然不确定对俄罗斯了解多少，以及是否真的能打开市场，”任正非在给员工的信中写道。[23]

Huawei would continue to court Russia, China’s neighbor to the north. Neither side really trusted the other, but Beijing and Moscow understood their fates to be intertwined. “The people of China and Russia will become wealthy,” Ren wrote. “To be wealthy is not the birthright of the West alone.”[24] Later, when a man named Vladimir Putin was elected president, Ren sent him a congratulatory message through a friend.[25]

华为将继续争取俄罗斯这个中国北方的邻国。虽然双方并不真正信任对方，但北京和莫斯科明白他们的命运是交织在一起的。“中俄两国人民都会富裕起来，”任正非写道。“富裕并非西方独有的天赋权利。”[24] 后来，当一位名叫弗拉基米尔·普京的人当选总统时，任正非通过一位朋友向他发去了贺信。[25]

—

In January 1998, Ren’s second wife, Yao Ling, gave birth to their daughter, Yao Siwei, or Annabel Yao, in the subtropical city of Kunming.[26] The city had become a new family hub for the Ren family: one of Ren’s sisters lived there, and his parents had moved there after retirement. In the year of Annabel Yao’s birth, Ren was fifty-three. His elder children, Meng Wanzhou and Ren Ping, were twenty-six and twenty-three. Ren had no intention of retiring anytime soon, but speculation already swirled over the prospect of a family succession. Former Chinese ambassador to Uzbekistan Li Jingxian reported asking Ren that summer, when they were on a flight to Beijing, if Meng Wanzhou might succeed him at Huawei.[27] He wrote that Ren brushed off the idea, citing his daughter’s young age and remarking that she wasn’t made of the right material for the job. As for Ren Ping, his father made him an intern at Huawei at a young age, but he appears to have had little interest in telephone switches. According to an account by a former Huawei executive, Ren Ping studied at China’s University of Science and Technology in Hefei, then went to the UK for an MBA.[28]

1998 年 1 月，任正非的第二任妻子姚凌在亚热带城市昆明生下了他们的女儿姚思为（又名姚安娜）。[26] 这座城市已成为任家的新中心：任正非的一个妹妹住在那里，他的父母退休后也搬到了那里。姚安娜出生那年，任正非五十三岁。他的长子长女孟晚舟和任平分别是二十六岁和二十三岁。任正非当时并无退休打算，但关于家族接班的猜测已经甚嚣尘上。中国前驻乌兹别克斯坦大使李景贤记录道，那年夏天在飞往北京的航班上，他曾询问任正非，孟晚舟是否会接替他在华为的位置。[27] 他写道，任正非对这个想法不屑一顾，理由是女儿年纪尚轻，并评论说她不是那块料。至于任平，他的父亲在他很小的时候就让他到华为实习，但他似乎对电话交换机没什么兴趣。根据一位华为前高管的叙述，任平曾就读于合肥的中国科学技术大学，随后前往英国攻读 MBA。[28]

Yao Ling moved to the UK with Annabel Yao and enrolled her in school there.[29] Annabel Yao described herself as a shy girl. “Each morning outside the nursery school, I would cry,” she recalled in a documentary. “I would say, ‘I don’t want to go to school, I want to go home, I want to stay with Mama.’ ”[30] To build the shy girl’s confidence, her mother enrolled her in a ballet class. Annabel Yao loved it. Soon she was being cast in starring roles.

姚凌带着姚安娜移居英国，并安排她在那里上学。[29] 姚安娜形容自己是个害羞的女孩。“每天早晨在幼儿园门口，我都会哭，”她在一部纪录片中回忆道。“我会说，‘我不想上学，我想回家，我想和妈妈待在一起。’”[30] 为了建立这个害羞女孩的自信，她的母亲给她报了芭蕾舞班。姚安娜非常喜欢。很快，她就开始担任主角。

While Annabel Yao would speak English fluently, having been exposed to it at a young age, the foreign language was a struggle for the rest of the family. Colleagues reported seeing Ren reciting English to himself at the office,[31] and they spotted Meng Wanzhou reviewing English vocabulary during breaks in meetings.[32] Across Huawei, contests and other activities were launched to try to accelerate English learning among employees. At the India office, executives instituted a small fine of a few cents for any engineers caught speaking Chinese during work hours.[33]

虽然姚安娜因为从小接触英语而能说一口流利的英语，但外语对家族其他成员来说却是一大挑战。同事们反映看到任正非在办公室里背诵英语，[31] 他们还发现孟晚舟在会议间隙复习英语词汇。[32] 在整个华为，公司开展了竞赛和其他活动，试图加速员工的英语学习。在印度办事处，管理层规定，任何工程师在工作时间被发现说中文，都要被处以几美分的微薄罚款。[33]

Ren was spending much of his time overseas wooing prospective clients. The veteran industry consultant Duncan Clark recalled an unassuming-looking Ren wearing a name tag and manning the Huawei booth personally at the GSM World Congress in the French city of Cannes in around 1996. “The big boys like Alcatel and Motorola—some of them even had huge yachts off of the Croisette,” Clark recalled, referring to a scenic coastal strip of Cannes. “Siemens had a boat they would use to ferry their customers back and forth. And then there was little Huawei.” Clark said he introduced Ren to executives from Vodafone, the major European mobile operator, at the convention.[34]

任正非将大部分时间花在海外争取潜在客户上。资深行业顾问邓肯·克拉克（Duncan Clark）回忆说，大约在 1996 年法国戛纳举行的 GSM 世界大会上，貌不惊人的任正非佩戴着名牌，亲自在华为展位值守。“像阿尔卡特和摩托罗拉这样的大牌——其中一些甚至在克鲁瓦塞特大道外的海面上停着巨型游艇，”克拉克在提到戛纳风景优美的海岸带时回忆道。“西门子有一艘船，专门用来来回接送客户。而当时只有小小的华为。”克拉克说，他在大会上将任正非介绍给了欧洲主要移动运营商沃达丰（Vodafone）的高管。[34]

Ren often scheduled overseas work trips for Chinese holidays, considering it a way to squeeze out some extra time to work.[35] He felt apologetic for not spending more time with Annabel Yao, who had developed a fondness for stuffed pigs. The girl nicknamed Ren “Daddy Pig” and her mother “Mommy Pig.”[36] As Ren recalled, “She wanted me to play games and spend more time with her, but I didn’t. When I came back home from overseas, I was so tired that I would just lie on the bed.”[37] Ren’s constant travel took a toll on the marriage. His wife accused him of only caring about his company, not the family.[38]

任正非经常将海外出差安排在中国的节假日，认为这是挤出额外工作时间的一种方式。[35] 他对没能花更多时间陪伴姚安娜感到愧疚，当时小女儿正迷恋毛绒玩具猪。女孩给任正非起绰号叫“猪爸爸”，给母亲起名叫“猪妈妈”。[36] 正如任正非回忆的那样：“她希望我能陪她玩游戏，多陪陪她，但我没有。当我从海外回到家时，累得只想躺在床上。”[37] 任正非频繁的出差对婚姻造成了损害。他的妻子指责他只关心公司，不关心家庭。[38]

—

Chinese officials were urging companies like Huawei to go abroad in preparation for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization and providing preferential policies to support them. WTO membership would open the floodgates for foreign companies coming into China—and Chinese officials also wanted their own companies to have a running start overseas. “As China gets closer to entering the World Trade Organization, it is of great significance for the country to engage in investment and to actively participate in global market competition,” one official said.[39]

中国官员正敦促华为等公司走出国门，为中国加入世界贸易组织做准备，并提供优惠政策予以支持。加入世贸组织将为外国公司进入中国打开闸门——中国官员也希望本国公司在海外拥有领先优势。一位官员表示：“随着中国日益临近加入世界贸易组织，国家开展投资并积极参与全球市场竞争具有重大意义。”[39]

In most countries, Huawei’s executives encountered more than a little skepticism. Government officials all understood the importance of their telephone networks when it came to their economies and their national security. They weren’t going to lightly hand them over to an unknown and untested switchmaker from China. As Ren and his team gradually began to land orders, they would chalk it up to sheer persistence. One of Huawei’s internal newspapers recounted the company’s manager in Saudi Arabia landing a contract because he continued to seek meetings with the Saudi Telecommunication Company (STC) for two years, earning the respect of Saudi executives.[40] Like many of Huawei’s projects, the STC one was rocky at first, with Saudi officials phoning up Huawei to complain about network outages. Huawei stuck with it, and its services gradually improved.

在大多数国家，华为的高管们遇到了不少质疑。各国政府官员都明白电话网络对本国经济和国家安全的重要性。他们不会轻易将其交给一家来自中国的、默默无闻且未经考验的交换机制造商。随着任正非和他的团队逐渐开始获得订单，他们将其归功于纯粹的坚持。华为的一份内部报刊讲述了公司驻沙特阿拉伯经理赢得合同的故事，因为他坚持不懈地寻求与沙特电信公司（STC）会面长达两年，赢得了沙特高管的尊重。[40] 与华为的许多项目一样，STC 项目起初也充满坎坷，沙特官员经常打电话给华为投诉网络中断。华为坚持了下来，其服务也逐渐得到改善。

After Huawei made an overseas stint a requirement for promotion in 1998,[41] it became a rite of passage for Huawei executives to do hardship postings in distant corners of the earth. When they returned to headquarters, they would swap stories from the trenches. Some had dodged bullets in war zones. Others had caught malaria or typhoid fever in swamps and hills. Or they had hobbled on frostbitten feet over desolate tundras. Some projects in sanctioned nations were cloaked in secrecy and code names.

1998 年华为将海外工作经历定为晋升的必要条件后，[41] 在地球遥远的角落从事艰苦岗位成了华为高管的必经之路。当他们回到总部时，会交流在“战壕”里的故事。有人在战区躲过子弹；有人在沼泽和山丘中染上疟疾或伤寒；或者在荒凉的冻原上拖着冻伤的双脚蹒跚而行。一些在受制裁国家的项目则笼罩在秘密和代号之中。

One staffer posted to Burundi reported frequent power cuts, a T-shirt shortage due to the lack of a nearby market, and a close call with a hippopotamus.[42] Another recalled sticking it out through an Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, including offering to take a customer’s sick employee to the hospital.[43] When civil war broke out in Libya, Huawei’s staffers divided themselves into two teams so that they could keep the phones running on both sides.[44] “We must always remember,” Ren told his staff following a deadly earthquake, “when phone service is down, we must run toward the switchrooms as fast as we can.”[45]

一名被派往布隆迪的员工报告称，那里经常停电，由于附近没有市场导致 T 恤短缺，还曾与河马狭路相逢。[42] 另一人回忆起在塞拉利昂埃博拉疫情期间的坚守，包括主动提出送客户生病的员工去医院。[43] 当利比亚爆发内战时，华为员工分成两组，以便维持双方的电话通讯正常运行。[44] 在一次致命地震后，任正非告诉员工：“我们必须永远记住，当电话服务中断时，我们必须以最快的速度冲向机房。”[45]

Ren called his workers his “iron army.”[46] He called his managers “generals,” his engineers “soldiers,” his sales teams “guerillas,” and their salaries “rations.” He sent new employees through military-esque boot camps to build discipline and camaraderie. He said Huawei’s executives took their inspiration from the US military in choosing which staffers to promote: “Has this person been in combat? Has this person been in a live firefight? Has this person been wounded?”[47]

任正非称他的员工为“铁军”。[46] 他称经理为“将军”，工程师为“战士”，销售团队为“游击队”，而他们的工资则是“口粮”。他将新员工送入军事化的新兵训练营，以建立纪律和战友情谊。他说，华为高管在选择提拔哪些员工时借鉴了美军的灵感：“这个人参加过战斗吗？这个人经历过实战交火吗？这个人负过伤吗？”[47]

He rallied them with lines from a poem about soldiers’ bodies returned from the battlefield: “Bury the bones at the green mountain / The bodies return wrapped in horse-skin shrouds.”[48]

他用一首关于战士尸骨从战场归来的诗句来激励他们：“青山处处埋忠骨，何须马革裹尸还。”[48]

Eric Xu, the bespectacled PhD from Nanjing who had spent his early years at Huawei running from province to province with a slide projector, was now head of Huawei’s international marketing department.[49] Some of his fellow executives called him “Little Xu” to differentiate him from another teammate, the larger-framed William Xu, or “Big Xu,” who had been their early chips specialist. In 1999, Little Xu told the state-run China Daily that Huawei had representative offices in Moscow, Ukraine, Brazil, Columbia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Nigeria, as well as an R&D foothold in Silicon Valley. He said they had also landed sales in Bulgaria, Uzbekistan, and Kenya. Huawei’s Silicon Valley outpost—which was set up in 1993 under the cryptic name Ran Boss—had recently come out of stealth mode. In 1998, the unit reregistered as Huawei America Inc., with Huawei’s executive vice president, Zheng Baoyong, listed as the subsidiary’s president.

徐直军，这位戴着眼镜、来自南京的博士，早年在华为曾带着幻灯机奔波于各省之间，如今已是华为国际营销部的负责人。[49] 一些同事高管称他为“小徐”，以区别于另一位队友——体格较大的徐文伟，即“大徐”，后者是他们早期的芯片专家。1999 年，小徐告诉官方媒体《中国日报》，华为已在莫斯科、乌克兰、巴西、哥伦比亚、沙特阿拉伯、南非和尼日利亚设立了代表处，并在硅谷建立了研发据点。他说，他们还在保加利亚、乌兹别克斯坦和肯尼亚实现了销售。华为的硅谷前哨站——1993 年以神秘名称“Ran Boss”设立——最近已结束隐身模式。1998 年，该机构重新注册为华为美国公司（Huawei America Inc.），华为常务副总裁郑宝用被列为该子公司的总裁。

—

Huawei’s fiercest rival in China was now ZTE, also based in Shenzhen. Outsiders were often surprised by the intensity of the vitriol between the two. One executive who had worked for both would describe Huawei and ZTE as being “at virtual war with one another,” adding that “they love to sue each other and steal each other’s customers.”[50] Duncan Clark recalled that Huawei executives hated being associated with ZTE so much that “they would never even refer to them by name.” The two companies’ salespeople went to extreme lengths to outbid each other for contracts. One Western executive recalled ZTE staffers turning up on his doorstep when he was on the verge of signing a deal with Huawei. “You can’t do this—we’ll lose our jobs,” one of them said. For years, Huawei and ZTE would be locked in bitter court battles around the world, with each accusing the other of intellectual-property infringement.

华为在中国最激烈的对手是同样总部位于深圳的中兴通讯（ZTE）。外界经常对两家公司之间尖锐的敌意感到惊讶。一位曾在两家公司都工作过的高管形容华为和中兴处于“实质性的战争状态”，并补充说“他们热衷于互相起诉并抢夺对方的客户”。[50] 邓肯·克拉克（Duncan Clark）回忆说，华为高管非常讨厌被与中兴联系在一起，以至于“他们甚至从不直呼其名”。两家公司的销售人员为了在合同竞标中胜过对方而不遗余力。一位西方高管回忆起当他即将与华为签署协议时，中兴的员工出现在他的家门口。“你不能这么做——我们会丢掉工作的，”其中一人说道。多年来，华为和中兴在世界各地陷入了激烈的法律诉讼，互相指责对方侵犯知识产权。

ZTE’s founder, Hou Weigui, was born in 1941, three years before Ren. He had started his career at a state-run aerospace factory before being sent to Shenzhen to set up a chipmaking joint venture in the new Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. Like Ren at Huawei, Hou also had an early falling out with his original investors. He and much of his staff quit and started their own company, with China’s Ministry of Aerospace Industry trying for a while to shut down the runaway company.[51] But Hou’s ZTE prevailed. It was soon making a name for itself in telephone switches.

中兴通讯的创始人侯为贵出生于 1941 年，比任正非早三年。他的职业生涯始于一家国营航天工厂，随后被派往深圳，在新的深圳经济特区建立一家芯片制造合资企业。与华为的任正非一样，侯为贵早期也与最初的投资者发生了分歧。他带着大部分员工辞职并创办了自己的公司，中国航天工业部曾一度试图关停这家“出逃”的公司。[51] 但侯为贵的中兴通讯挺了过来，并很快在电话交换机领域声名鹊起。

The two men were very different. While Ren was short and compact, with a fiery temper, Hou was tall, gangly, and mild-mannered. “Always smiling, he appears at ease. Most ZTE employees talk of his amiability,” one state-media profile said about Hou.[52] Ren, on the other hand, was famous for his irascibility, with former colleagues recalling him angrily throwing reports on the ground in meetings, berating staffers until they cried, and once even chucking a binder at a subordinate’s head.[53] Unlike Huawei, ZTE was majority state-owned, and its company culture was more bureaucratic and risk-averse. The local media likened ZTE’s executives to oxen, Huawei’s to wolves. This was sometimes an advantage domestically: when retired party historian Li Rui visited both companies in May 1998, he noted in his diary that Huawei had twenty-two hundred engineers—twice ZTE’s head count—but that ZTE had less debt, making it a less risky enterprise.[54] But overseas, ZTE’s state ownership was a major impediment to gaining trust from foreign telecom operators, who felt that Huawei might be more independent as an employee-owned company. One potential customer recalled a ZTE sales executive, confronted yet again with distrust over ZTE’s state ownership, exclaiming in frustration that Huawei’s employee shareholder system was a “facade.”

两人性格迥异。任正非身材不高但结实，脾气火爆；侯为贵则身材高瘦，举止温和。一份官方媒体的简介这样描述侯为贵：“他总是面带微笑，显得泰然自若。大多数中兴员工都谈到他的亲和力。”[52] 相比之下，任正非以易怒著称，前同事回忆说，他曾在会议上愤怒地将报告摔在地上，斥责员工直到他们流泪，甚至有一次将文件夹砸向部下的头。[53] 与华为不同，中兴通讯是国有控股企业，其公司文化更具官僚气息且规避风险。当地媒体将中兴的高管比作牛，将华为的高管比作狼。在国内，这有时是一种优势：1998 年 5 月，退休的党史专家李锐访问这两家公司时，在日记中写道，华为拥有 2200 名工程师——是中兴的两倍——但中兴的债务较少，是一家风险较小的企业。[54] 但在海外，中兴的国有身份是赢得外国电信运营商信任的主要障碍，这些运营商认为，作为一家员工持股的公司，华为可能更具独立性。一位潜在客户回忆说，一名中兴销售主管在再次面对对其国有身份的不信任时，沮丧地宣称华为的员工持股制度只是“表象”。

Former Huawei executive Liu Ping claimed that ZTE and Huawei kept a very close eye on each other’s operations.[55] “As soon as a high-level Huawei meeting was over,” Liu wrote, “ZTE’s leadership would have the meeting notes. Of course, Huawei would also know immediately that ZTE had gotten Huawei’s meeting notes.” To try to stem the leaks, according to Liu, they went so far as to draw up a list of everyone at Huawei whose spouse worked at ZTE.

华为前高管刘平声称，中兴和华为密切注视着对方的一举一动。[55] “华为的高层会议一结束，”刘平写道，“中兴的领导层就会拿到会议记录。当然，华为也会立即知道中兴拿到了华为的会议记录。”据刘平称，为了试图阻止泄密，他们甚至列出了一份华为员工名单，其配偶均在中兴工作。

—

As midnight approached on May 7, 1999, a US B-2 bomber flew over Belgrade. People nearby heard a whoosh as five guided missiles smashed into the Chinese embassy, reducing it to a flaming shell.[56] The blasts shattered windows a block away, sending glass shards flying. From the embassy ruins, bloodied staffers stumbled out in shock. Three journalists for Chinese state-run media lay dead. Washington called it an accident, claiming that the CIA had identified the wrong coordinates for a military target as part of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in the Kosovo War. But many in China did not believe it was an accident.

1999 年 5 月 7 日午夜临近，一架美国 B-2 轰炸机飞越贝尔格莱德。附近的人们听到一阵呼啸声，五枚制导导弹击中了中国大使馆，将其炸成了一个燃烧的空壳。[56] 爆炸震碎了一个街区外的窗户，玻璃碎片四处飞溅。血流满面的工作人员惊魂未定地从使馆废墟中跌跌撞撞地走出来。三名中国官方媒体记者遇难。华盛顿称这是一起意外，声称中央情报局在北约轰炸南联盟的科索沃战争中，为一个军事目标识别了错误的坐标。但许多中国人并不相信这是一场意外。

After the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Huawei’s staff joined people across the nation in an outpouring of anger. “I hope the powers of global justice can defeat the crazy US and NATO,” one Huawei employee wrote. “Every Chinese person should remember this day when the US and NATO incurred this new blood debt.”[57] Huawei sent a message to the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, condemning the attack and offering two hundred thousand yuan to the relatives of those killed. The company offered to help orphaned children.[58] “Since 1949, the Chinese people have never lowered their heads,” Huawei declared.[59] The scene in Shenzhen was subdued compared with that in Beijing, where thousands of protesters filled the streets outside the US embassy, hurling rocks, flaming US flags, and even Molotov cocktails. But Shenzhen still made a strong showing, hosting a political protest concert for ten thousand people under the slogan “Today the Chinese People Say No.” Huawei employees joined a chorus of two thousand who sang patriotic songs at the event.[60] Such a large political gathering was a rarity in China, with authorities wary of allowing large protests since the 1989 tragedy in Tiananmen Square. This was an exception.

在中国驻贝尔格莱德大使馆遭轰炸后，华为员工与全国人民一道宣泄愤怒。“我希望全球正义的力量能够击败疯狂的美国和北约，”一名华为员工写道。“每个中国人都应该记住这一天，美国和北约欠下了这笔新的血债。”[57] 华为向中国驻南联盟大使馆发去慰问电，谴责袭击事件，并向遇难者家属捐款 20 万元人民币。公司还提出帮助孤儿。[58] “自 1949 年以来，中国人民从未低过头，”华为声明道。[59] 与北京相比，深圳的场面较为克制。在北京，成千上万的抗议者挤满了美国大使馆外的街道，投掷石块，焚烧美国国旗，甚至投掷莫洛托夫鸡尾酒。但深圳依然表现强劲，在“今天中国人民说不”的口号下，举办了一场万人政治抗议音乐会。华为员工加入了一个 2000 人的合唱团，在活动中演唱爱国歌曲。[60] 如此大规模的政治集会在中国十分罕见，因为自 1989 年天安门广场悲剧以来，当局一直对允许大规模抗议活动持谨慎态度。这次是一个例外。

China’s vice president, Hu Jintao, came on television to denounce the NATO bombing as a heinous act and praise the patriotic protesters while urging restraint.[61] At Huawei, executives held an internal meeting to discuss Hu’s speech. “The United States’ huge military budget is mainly funded by excessive high-tech profits,” one employee declared.[62] Madam Chen Zhufang, the company’s august party secretary, said that the US looked down on today’s China but feared tomorrow’s China. She said that by working hard at their jobs, they could help their nation: “Every bit of improvement of our products, and every bit of our development in the international market, is helpful for enhancing our nation’s comprehensive national strength.”[63]

中国副主席胡锦涛发表电视讲话，谴责北约的轰炸是令人发指的行径，赞扬了抗议者的爱国热情，同时也敦促保持克制。[61] 在华为，高管们召开内部会议讨论胡锦涛的讲话。“美国庞大的军费开支主要由高科技的超额利润支撑，”一名员工宣称。[62] 公司德高望重的党委书记陈珠芳女士表示，美国看不起今天的中国，但害怕明天的中国。她说，通过努力工作，他们可以报效国家：“我们产品的每一点进步，我们在国际市场的每一点发展，都有助于增强我们国家的综合国力。”[63]

Ren told staff that the bombing reflected how “the American empire’s desire for the downfall of our nation always lingers.” He continued: “This is not only for our generation to remember, but also for the next two or three generations to understand, until our nation’s economic strength reaches international equilibrium.”[64]

任正非告诉员工，轰炸反映了“美帝国主义亡我之心不死”。他继续说道：“这不仅要让我们这一代人记住，也要让后两三代人明白，直到我们国家的经济实力达到国际平衡。”[64]

The incident would continue to loom large in the Chinese people’s psyche. Just the previous year, at the Chinese embassy in Baghdad, they had thought they would be safe from American bombs as long as they marked themselves as Chinese bystanders. In a few years’ time, Huawei would find itself squarely in the crosshairs.

这一事件将继续在中国人的心理中占据重要地位。就在前一年，在中国驻巴格达大使馆，他们曾认为只要标明自己是中国旁观者，就能免受美国炸弹的袭击。几年后，华为发现自己正处于风口浪尖。

10

10

Huawei’s Basic Law

华为基本法

Management Reforms: 1996–1999

管理变革：1996–1999

In August 1996, Huawei’s vice-chairwoman, Sun Yafang, sat down to a meeting with Shenzhen’s party secretary, Li Youwei, and several young business professors from Beijing.[1] They were there to discuss the thorny question of how a company should be owned. Not so long ago, this would have been a politically treacherous topic. People had been thrown into labor camps for expressing the wrong opinions on capitalism. Now Li encouraged everyone to speak their minds. He reassured them that they would not be punished. He quipped that some Marxist theory was “completely inapplicable” to modern China, drawing appreciative laughter from the room.

1996 年 8 月，华为副董事长孙亚芳与深圳市委书记厉有为以及几位来自北京的年轻商学院教授共聚一堂。[1] 他们聚在一起是为了讨论一个棘手的问题：公司应该如何确立所有权。在不久前，这还是一个政治上极其危险的话题。曾有人因表达了关于资本主义的错误观点而被关进劳改营。现在，厉有为鼓励大家畅所欲言。他向他们保证不会受到惩罚。他开玩笑说，某些马克思主义理论对现代中国“完全不适用”，引来全场会心的笑声。

“I will listen to you today,” Li said. “Today is just a discussion. There is no need to worry. We can talk casually.”

“我今天就是来听你们说的，”厉有为说。“今天只是讨论。没必要担心。我们可以随便聊。”

One of the Beijing professors, who had been advising Huawei, began speaking.

一位一直为华为提供咨询的北京教授开始发言。

“It is still difficult to determine what kind of company Huawei is,” the professor said. “At present, there is no new theoretical guidance in the academic world.”

“目前还很难界定华为究竟是一家什么样的公司，”这位教授说。“目前学术界还没有新的理论指导。”

Huawei had been on the cutting edge of China’s economic reforms since its start. It was founded in 1987, months after Shenzhen legalized private tech startups under a pilot program. When Beijing had issued regulations for “collectively owned enterprises” in 1991, promising state support for these “red-cap” companies that operated under the socialist principle of workers owning the means of production, Huawei had decided to try it. Then, in 1994, China opened the option of setting up Western-style “limited liability companies” under the nation’s new Company Law. Huawei’s leadership was intrigued. But a lot remained unclear about if and how Huawei could make the shift, including how it could adapt its red-cap ownership structure of dispersed shareholdings by employees to meet the LLC requirements, which limited the number of shareholders to fifty. It was also unclear to what extent such a company should imitate a Western-style LLC, and to what extent it should hew to the tenets of Communism.

华为自创立以来一直处于中国经济改革的前沿。它成立于 1987 年，就在深圳通过试点计划将私人科技创业合法化几个月后。1991 年北京发布“集体所有制企业”条例，承诺对这些在工人拥有生产资料的社会主义原则下运作的“红帽子”公司给予国家支持时，华为决定尝试一下。随后在 1994 年，中国根据新颁布的《公司法》开放了设立西方式“有限责任公司”的选择。华为领导层对此很感兴趣。但关于华为是否以及如何进行转型，仍有许多不明朗之处，包括如何调整其由员工分散持股的红帽子所有权结构，以满足有限责任公司股东人数不得超过五十人的要求。同样不明确的是，这样一家公司应该在多大程度上模仿西方式的有限责任公司，又在多大程度上应该恪守共产主义的信条。

Ren Zhengfei had decided to seize his own fate instead of just waiting for instructions. He hired the team of professors to help him draft a unified theory for the successful operation of a modern Chinese company, which would cover not only day-to-day management strategy but also how the company should relate to the party, the state, and the world. The professors called it “the Huawei Basic Law.”[2] The name echoed that of Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Hong Kong Basic Law, a landmark document that carved out rights like freedom of speech within the city’s limits, beyond what was enjoyed in other parts of China. It was an indication, perhaps, of Ren’s ambitions: he was going to try to build something radically different, something separate from China even while a part of it.

任正非决定掌握自己的命运，而不是坐等指示。他聘请了教授团队帮助他起草一套关于现代中国公司成功运作的统一理论，该理论不仅涵盖日常管理战略，还包括公司应如何处理与党、国家以及世界的关系。教授们称之为“华为基本法”。[2] 这个名字呼应了香港的小宪法《香港基本法》，那是一份具有里程碑意义的文件，在城市范围内划定了言论自由等权利，超出了中国其他地区的享有程度。这或许暗示了任正非的雄心：他试图建立一些截然不同的东西，一些既是中国的一部分，又独立于中国之外的东西。

Huang Weiwei, one of the professors involved in formulating the Huawei Basic Law, wrote that they were dismayed that China had failed to produce even a single world-class company over the past century.[3] “We have tried all the world’s cutting-edge management theories and methods. America’s Taylor method, Germany’s lean production, Japan’s just-in-time production…we’ve tried them all. And how have our crops grown as a result? Thin and short.”

参与制定《华为基本法》的教授之一黄卫伟写道，令他们感到沮丧的是，中国在过去一个世纪里竟然没能产生一家世界级的公司。[3] “我们尝试了世界上所有尖端的管理理论和方法。美国的泰勒法、德国的精益生产、日本的准时制生产……我们都试过了。结果我们的庄稼长得怎么样？又瘦又矮。”

Huang had high hopes that Ren would accomplish what no one before him had done: “What the Huawei Basic Law was actually going to do was raise common problems faced by Chinese companies in management, and provide an answer.”[4]

黄卫伟对任正非寄予厚望，希望他能完成前人未竟的事业：“《华为基本法》实际上要做的是提出中国公司在管理中面临的共同问题，并给出答案。”[4]

—

Ren had been meeting with other leading Chinese tech entrepreneurs to see how they structured their companies. Li Yuzhuo, head of Huawei’s joint ventures during the 1990s, recalled in his memoir that he arranged meetings for Ren, at Ren’s request, with Duan Yongji, the CEO of the Stone Group—China’s star tech company in the 1980s—and Lenovo’s founder, Liu Chuanzhi. In both meetings, Li wrote, Ren discussed the issue of employee shareholding with his counterparts.[5]

任正非一直在与其他领先的中国科技企业家会面，了解他们的公司架构。20 世纪 90 年代担任华为合资企业负责人的李玉琢在回忆录中提到，他应任正非的要求，安排任与四通集团（80 年代中国明星科技公司）CEO 段永基以及联想创始人柳传志会面。李写道，在这两次会面中，任正非都与对方探讨了员工持股的问题。[5]

But Ren was also anxious to seek advice beyond China’s shores. The week before Christmas in 1997, he traveled to the United States with several colleagues to visit the International Business Machines Corporation.[6] IBM had long been a role model for China’s private tech industry, with the Stone Group declaring ambitions to become “China’s IBM” in the 1980s. Now, just ahead of Ren’s arrival in the United States, IBM had achieved an even higher status: its supercomputer Deep Blue had recently beat a reigning world chess champion, Garry Kasparov, at the game, a landmark for artificial intelligence. IBM was offering pricy consulting packages to teach other companies its management moxie.

但任正非也急于寻求海外的建议。1997 年圣诞节前一周，他与几位同事前往美国访问国际商业机器公司（IBM）。[6] IBM 长期以来一直是中国私营科技行业的榜样，四通集团在 80 年代就曾宣布要成为“中国的 IBM”。现在，就在任正非抵达美国之前，IBM 获得了更高的地位：其超级计算机“深蓝”最近在比赛中击败了当时的世界国际象棋冠军加里·卡斯帕罗夫，这是人工智能的一个里程碑。IBM 当时正提供昂贵的咨询方案，向其他公司传授其管理秘诀。

Ren was anxious to learn the secrets behind how to build a company that could last a century. There were no such examples in China, with everyone having started again from scratch after the Cultural Revolution. Silicon Valley entrepreneurs often grew through failure, launching one startup after another until they finally succeeded. But Ren was already fifty-three. His health was faltering. He knew he had only one shot to get it right. There were so many moving parts to master to turn a startup into a sturdy multinational. You needed to be able to develop new products on schedule and within budget, and the products had to work reliably. You needed supply chains that could deliver. You needed to manage far more people than you could ever learn the names of. You needed to pay taxes and follow the laws in countries around the world. You needed succession planning so that the company could survive beyond you. You needed guardrails so that a mistake by a single executive couldn’t take down the entire company.

任正非渴望学习如何建立一家百年企业的秘诀。在中国没有这样的先例，因为每个人在文化大革命后都是白手起家。硅谷的企业家通常在失败中成长，一个接一个地创办公司，直到最终成功。但任正非已经五十三岁了。他的健康状况正在下滑。他知道自己只有一次成功的机会。要将一家初创公司转变为稳健的跨国企业，有太多环节需要掌握。你需要能够按进度和预算开发新产品，且产品必须运行可靠。你需要能够交付的供应链。你需要管理远超你能记住名字的人数。你需要缴纳税款并遵守世界各国的法律。你需要接班人计划，以便公司在你离开后仍能生存。你需要护栏，以免单个高管的错误导致整个公司垮掉。

Ren was in poor health on the IBM visit, but he listened to the presentations with keen interest. The IBM representatives discussed how they screened investments, developed their product pipelines, kept projects on schedule, and organized their teams. The Huawei team furiously scribbled notes. Ren came out convinced that IBM’s guidance could help Huawei save many years of trial and error in building a successful multinational company. IBM had developed this management know-how over a century. “Only by seriously learning from these large companies can we avoid taking a longer road,” Ren told his staff. “IBM came to these conclusions by paying billions of dollars in direct costs.”[7]

任正非在访问 IBM 期间身体状况不佳，但他以极大的兴趣听取了演示。IBM 的代表讨论了他们如何筛选投资、开发产品管线、保持项目进度以及组织团队。华为团队疯狂地记着笔记。任正非在结束访问时深信，IBM 的指导可以帮助华为在建立成功的跨国公司过程中，减少多年的摸索和失误。IBM 花了一个世纪才开发出这些管理诀窍。“只有认真向这些大公司学习，我们才能少走弯路，”任正非告诉他的员工。“IBM 是通过支付数十亿美元的直接成本才得出这些结论的。”[7]

IBM’s consultants started arriving at Huawei’s headquarters in August 1998. They would remain in residence for a decade. Gary Garner, one of the early IBM consultants, recalled that his first impression of Huawei was that it was a vibrant but undisciplined company where things were sometimes just scrawled on sticky notes instead of being filed properly. “President Ren had a whole bunch of bright young PhDs,” he said, “but it was disorganized. It wasn’t ready to go to the international market.”[8]

IBM 的顾问于 1998 年 8 月开始抵达华为总部。他们将在那里驻扎十年。早期 IBM 顾问之一加里·加纳（Gary Garner）回忆道，他对华为的第一印象是，这是一家充满活力但缺乏纪律的公司，有些事情只是随手写在便签纸上，而不是妥善归档。“任总裁拥有一大批聪明的年轻博士，”他说，“但组织混乱。它还没有准备好进入国际市场。”[8]

Guo Ping was in charge of the project, in which IBM would help Huawei map out a professional R&D workflow and global supply chain. This advice didn’t come cheap. Ren later claimed the company paid $680 per IBM consultant per hour,[9] nearly the average monthly salary at Huawei, though some former IBM consultants said they didn’t recall it being quite that high. Some of Huawei’s managers protested the new systems, which they found burdensome. Ren insisted they follow the IBM way. If the shoes didn’t fit, Ren told them, they had to “cut their feet to fit the shoes.”[10]

郭平负责该项目，IBM 将帮助华为规划专业的研发流程和全球供应链。这些建议并不便宜。任正非后来声称，公司为每位 IBM 顾问每小时支付 680 美元，[9] 这几乎相当于当时华为员工的平均月薪，尽管一些前 IBM 顾问表示，他们不记得费用有那么高。华为的一些经理抗议新系统，认为其过于繁琐。任正非坚持要求他们遵循 IBM 的方式。任正非告诉他们，如果鞋子不合脚，就必须“削足适履”。[10]

IBM’s output was fifty-five times Huawei’s that first year, 1998. Ren set a goal of shrinking the difference to thirty-five to forty times greater by 1999. “We are making big strides forward,” he told his staff. “We’re narrowing the gap.”[11]

1998 年，即合作的第一年，IBM 的产值是华为的 55 倍。任正非设定了一个目标，到 1999 年将这一差距缩小到 35 至 40 倍。“我们正在大步前进，”他告诉员工。“我们正在缩小差距。”[11]

—

As Huawei grappled with how to build a modern Chinese company, one of the biggest things that made it different from a Western company was the role of the party. In the Mao era, the Chinese Communist Party had governed all areas of life and work in the nation. The party was now ceding many decisions to private businesses, but it still expected to have a role.

在华为努力思考如何建立一家现代中国公司时，它与西方公司最大的不同点之一就是党的角色。在毛泽东时代，中国共产党管理着国家生活和工作的方方面面。现在，党正将许多决策权让渡给私营企业，但仍期望发挥作用。

The party’s constitution had long required farms, people’s communes, cooperatives, factories, and other work units to set up an internal party branch if they had at least three employees who were party members. In 1992, in recognition of the changing economy, the wording of this requirement was tweaked to specify that “companies” must also comply.[12]

长期以来，党章要求农场、人民公社、合作社、工厂和其他工作单位，只要有三名以上党员，就必须建立基层党组织。1992 年，为了认可经济的变化，这一要求的措辞进行了微调，明确规定“公司”也必须遵守。[12]

The head of a company’s party apparatus was called the party secretary, and this official was expected to keep the company in step with national priorities, as well as to provide ethical oversight of the staff.[13]

公司党组织的负责人被称为党务书记，这位官员被期望使公司与国家优先事项保持一致，并对员工进行道德监督。[13]

Huawei set up its internal party branch in May 1996, demarcating a formal role for the party within the company.[14] Ren himself was party secretary at first, with the company’s main internal newspaper, Huawei People, reporting him in that role in September 1997.[15] Having the CEO double as the party secretary was common within smaller companies, ensuring that the two leadership roles would be in accord. Within Huawei, as in broader society, party members were an influential minority: the September 1997 article noted that a sixth of the company’s R&D ranks, or 240 staffers, were party members.[16] Ren called on them to provide ideological leadership for the entire staff.[17] “In high-tech enterprises, more and more scientific and technological achievements must rely on collective efforts,” the article said. “Therefore, how to correctly view the relationship between individuals and organizations has become a problem that every employee in the research system must face. In response to these circumstances, it was decided to establish a party branch in the research system to give full play to the exemplary role of party members and promote the formation of a good corporate culture.”

华为于 1996 年 5 月成立了基层党支部，划定了党在公司内部的正式角色。[14] 任正非本人最初担任党支部书记，公司内部主要报纸《华为人》在 1997 年 9 月的报道中确认了他的这一身份。[15] 由首席执行官兼任党支部书记在较小的公司中很常见，这确保了两个领导角色能够保持一致。在华为内部，正如在更广泛的社会中一样，党员是具有影响力的少数群体：1997 年 9 月的文章指出，公司研发队伍的六分之一（即 240 名员工）是党员。[16] 任正非号召他们为全体员工提供思想领导。[17] “在高科技企业中，越来越多的科技成果必须依靠集体努力，”文章写道。“因此，如何正确看待个人与组织的关系，已成为研发体系每一位员工必须面对的问题。针对这些情况，决定在研发体系建立党支部，以充分发挥党员的模范带头作用，促进良好企业文化的形成。”

Not long after, Huawei upgraded its party branch to a party committee, and Madam Chen Zhufang—the former Huazhong Institute of Technology administrator who had met Ren back when he was a manager at South Sea Oil—was appointed party secretary. It was still unclear how big of a role a party committee was supposed to be playing inside a private enterprise. Chen told the scholar Tian Tao that she asked around at other companies for advice, including at the American company Motorola, which had set up a party committee in its China outpost. “I thought a long time about how a party committee should work in a private company,” she said.[18]

不久后，华为将党支部升格为党委，陈珠芳女士——那位在任正非还在南海石油担任经理时就与他相识的前华中理工大学管理人员——被任命为党委书记。当时尚不清楚党委在私营企业内部应该扮演多大的角色。陈珠芳告诉学者田涛，她曾向其他公司咨询建议，包括在其中国分支机构设立了党委的美国公司摩托罗拉。“我思考了很久，党委在私营公司应该如何工作，”她说。[18]

According to a bio published by Hubei provincial authorities, Chen was born in 1935, making her around nine years Ren’s senior.[19] She’d grown up in a poor family in small-town Guangxi. “If I could avoid being hungry or cold my whole life, I would be fully satisfied,” she recalled thinking as a girl. “This was my dream throughout my childhood.”[20] As an engineering student at the Huazhong Institute, she had begun to show political chops: in 1958, she was selected to represent the university at a national convention for socialist youth.[21] After graduating from the Electrical Machinery Department in 1960,[22] she stayed on at the university to work on laser research and eventually rose through the management ranks to become party secretary of the Huazhong Institute’s School of Economic Management. Chen spoke some English: in 1989, she had done an exchange stint in human-resources management at the University of Toronto.[23]

根据湖北省官方发布的传记，陈珠芳出生于 1935 年，比任正非大九岁左右。[19] 她在广西小镇的一个贫困家庭长大。“如果我这辈子能不挨饿、不受冻，我就心满意足了，”她回忆起少女时代的想法时说。“这是我整个童年的梦想。”[20] 作为华中理工大学的一名工程系学生，她开始展现出政治才干：1958 年，她被选为学校代表参加全国社会主义青年大会。[21] 1960 年从电机系毕业后，[22] 她留校从事激光研究，并最终晋升至管理层，担任华中理工大学经济管理学院的党委书记。陈珠芳会说一些英语：1989 年，她曾在多伦多大学进行过人力资源管理方面的交流。[23]

Ren had persuaded her to join Huawei in 1995, when she retired from her first career in academia at around the age of sixty.[24] Her academic network was valuable to Huawei’s recruiting efforts, and Ren named her Huawei’s first human-resources manager. She also served briefly as editor in chief of Huawei People before becoming party secretary, the role she would retain for a decade.

任正非在 1995 年说服她加入华为，当时她大约六十岁，刚从学术界的第一段职业生涯中退休。[24] 她的学术网络对华为的招聘工作非常有价值，任正非任命她为华为首任人力资源部部长。在担任党委书记之前，她还曾短暂担任过《华为人》的总编辑，而党委书记这一职务她此后担任了十年之久。

With her halo of snowy hair, Chen served as something like a stern grandmother at Huawei. In a nation that was officially atheistic, the party took on the church’s role of ethical guidance. Chen often lectured the young engineers on morality. She told them that they would suffer from karma if they stole intellectual property from the company or otherwise abused their positions. “This is justice, this is the law of the cosmos,” she wrote to employees. “If you rely on unfair means to seek illegal gains, you will eventually vomit back up what you ate—indeed, more than you ate.”[25] She reminded them of their broader patriotic mission. “You are shouldering the dream of becoming a strong nation that the Chinese people have carried for nearly a hundred years,” she said.[26]

陈珠芳留着一头雪白的短发，在华为扮演着类似严厉祖母的角色。在一个官方奉行无神论的国家，党组织承担了教会提供道德指引的职能。陈珠芳经常向年轻工程师们讲授道德课。她告诉他们，如果窃取公司知识产权或以其他方式滥用职权，会遭到报应。“这是正义，这是宇宙的法则，”她写信给员工说，“如果你依靠不正当手段谋取非法利益，你最终会把吃进去的吐出来——而且吐得比吃进去的还要多。”[25] 她还提醒他们肩负着更广泛的爱国使命。“你们肩负着中国人民近百年来强国梦的梦想，”她说。[26]

Chen played an important role in molding Huawei’s company culture and infusing it with the Chinese Communist Party’s themes of patriotism, struggle for the greater cause, and self-sacrifice. In 1996, she had helped organize the famous mass resignation of Huawei’s sales team, where managers declared they were willing to give up their own jobs for the company’s success.[27] Within Huawei, she also ran regular “democratic life meetings,” a type of party meeting at which attendees criticized themselves and one another.[28]

陈珠芳在塑造华为企业文化，并为其注入中国共产党的爱国主义、为崇高事业奋斗和自我牺牲等主题方面发挥了重要作用。1996 年，她协助组织了著名的华为市场部集体辞职行动，当时的管理人员宣布他们愿意为了公司的成功而放弃自己的职位。[27] 在华为内部，她还定期主持“民主生活会”，这是一种参会者进行自我批评和相互批评的党内会议。[28]

Just how much power a party secretary should be wielding within a private company was a murky question mark. In Chen’s case, her older age appeared to ease the potential of a power struggle with Ren. She had already retired once before she joined Huawei, and she seemed to be past some of the concerns of the younger staffers. Recalling how some Huawei executives fought against one another, she remarked to Tian, “At the time, the kids were fighting. It was pretty amusing.” However, Chen also mentioned that she sometimes dealt with issues without consulting Ren, reflecting a certain confidence and autonomy in her role. Chen said that after once telling Ren about the suicide of a Huawei employee and seeing his terrified reaction, she resolved not to relate this sort of thing again unless necessary. “You really couldn’t tell him,” she said.[29]

一名党委书记在私营企业中究竟应该行使多大权力，是一个模糊的问号。就陈珠芳而言，她较大的年龄似乎缓解了与任正非发生权力斗争的可能性。她在加入华为前已经退休过一次，似乎已经超脱了年轻员工的一些顾虑。在回忆华为高管们如何互相争斗时，她对田涛评论道：“当时孩子们在吵架，挺有意思的。”然而，陈珠芳也提到，她有时会在不咨询任正非的情况下处理问题，这反映了她在角色中的某种自信和自主权。陈珠芳说，有一次她告诉任正非一名华为员工自杀的消息，看到他惊恐的反应后，她决定除非必要，否则不再向他提及此类事情。“你真的不能告诉他，”她说。[29]

—

In March 1998, after two years of drafting and redrafting, Huawei adopted its 103-article Basic Law.[30] The six professors had done their best to determine what kind of company Huawei was—and what kind of company Huawei was not.

1998 年 3 月，经过两年的反复起草，华为通过了共 103 条的《华为基本法》。[30] 六位教授尽了最大努力来确定华为是一家什么样的公司——以及华为不是什么样的公司。

The kind of company that Huawei was not was a Western-style, publicly listed company. The Basic Law declared that Huawei did not make its decisions based on the short-term maximization of shareholder value: “Profit maximization is by no means our only pursuit.”

华为不是的那种公司，是西方风格的上市公司。《基本法》宣布，华为不根据股东价值的短期最大化来做出决策：“利润最大化绝不是我们的唯一追求。”

The purpose of Huawei was not to serve its shareholders but to achieve its goal, which was “to become a leading world-class enterprise” in telecom gear. Achieving this target would require focus and sacrifice. It meant that Huawei would plow much of its earnings back into strategic investments, seeking to maximize growth instead of profit. During economic downturns, employees would be expected to take an “automatic pay cut.” Staffers could not expect a windfall from an IPO.

华为的目的不是为股东服务，而是实现其目标，即在电信设备领域“成为世界一流的领先企业”。实现这一目标需要专注和牺牲。这意味着华为会将大部分收益重新投入到战略投资中，寻求增长最大化而非利润最大化。在经济低迷时期，员工将被要求“自动降薪”。员工不能指望通过 IPO 获得暴利。

Ren was particularly wary about the temptation of a public stock-market listing. China was in the middle of a stock-market boom, with executives and casual investors alike starry-eyed at the prospect of instantaneous riches. But after a successful IPO, there was often a talent exodus, as employees cashed out their stock and retired early. The company was then stuck on the treadmill of keeping up its profit margin each quarter, giving executives a shortsighted and reactive mentality. “After going public, if the employees get rich overnight, will they still work?” rotating Huawei CEO Eric Xu remarked. “And if the employees don’t work anymore, then why are we going public?”[31] The Basic Law declared that an IPO was not necessary for Huawei: “Our internal mechanism can be kept dynamic without relying on the stimulation from external market pressure.”

任正非对公开上市的诱惑尤为警惕。当时中国正处于股市热潮中，高管和散户投资者都对一夜暴富的前景充满憧憬。但在成功的 IPO 之后，往往会出现人才流失，因为员工会兑现股票并提前退休。公司随后会陷入每个季度维持利润率的跑步机上，使高管产生短视和被动的心理。“上市后，如果员工一夜暴富，他们还会工作吗？”华为轮值 CEO 徐直军评论道，“如果员工不再工作了，那我们为什么要上市呢？”[31] 《基本法》宣布，IPO 对华为并非必要：“我们的内部机制可以保持活力，而不必依赖外部市场压力的刺激。”

The Basic Law also laid out other guidelines to prevent Huawei’s management from losing focus. One was that the company would stick to its knitting of telecom gear and would not mindlessly diversify into other sectors, even if they looked alluring. A baseline of 10 percent of sales each year had to be plowed back into R&D. Huawei would narrowly pick its targets for intensive R&D, with an aim of matching or even surpassing its global rivals in strategic areas. “Once we decide to do a thing, we will go all out,” the Basic Law said.

《基本法》还制定了其他准则，以防止华为的管理层失去焦点。其中之一是公司将专注于电信设备的主业，不会盲目多元化进入其他领域，即使这些领域看起来很诱人。每年销售额的 10%作为底线必须重新投入研发。华为将狭义地选择重点研发目标，旨在战略领域追赶甚至超越全球竞争对手。“我们一旦决定做一件事，就会全力以赴，”《基本法》写道。

The document also warned against future successors straying from Huawei’s mission: “We should make rules to prevent the third, fourth and future generations of successors from being corrupt, self-centered and indolent.”

该文件还警告未来的继任者不要偏离华为的使命：“我们要制定规则，防止第三代、第四代及未来的继任者腐败、自我中心和懈怠。”

—

Huawei changed its registration in 1997 to a limited liability company, shedding the anachronistic “collectively owned enterprise” label and adopting an internationally recognized structure.[32] This change was not without complications.

1997 年，华为将注册性质变更为有限责任公司，摆脱了过时的“集体所有制企业”标签，采用了国际公认的结构。[32] 这一变化并非没有复杂之处。

For one thing, China’s Company Law limited an LLC to fifty shareholders.[33] Huawei already had far more, due to Ren issuing shares to employees over the years as a central part of their compensation. According to one former executive, only 3 percent was held by Huawei’s leadership and less than 1 percent held by Ren himself.[34] The Shenzhen government recognized this hurdle, and in September 1997, it suggested a workaround for local companies: collectively registering all their employee shareholders under a “trade union,” which would serve as a single shareholder in the eyes of the law.[35] Huawei adopted this solution, an arrangement that would continue to the present day, causing much confusion and drawing accusations about the opacity of Huawei’s ownership structure. On paper, Huawei would have just two shareholders: Ren himself, with around 1 percent of shares, and a trade union for the rest. Huawei executives would later say the ownership structure was a historical oddity that new companies in China weren’t even allowed to use anymore. “Of course, according to the current law, it is illegal, but the special approval of the special district at the time was legal,” Xu said in 2012.[36] He noted that there were about a thousand companies in the country with such special approval. The fact that Huawei was allowed to keep this structure perhaps reflects an acknowledgement by government officials that even if what the company was doing was unorthodox, it was working.

一方面，中国的《公司法》限制有限责任公司的股东人数不得超过五十人。[33] 由于任正非多年来一直将向员工发行股票作为薪酬的核心部分，华为的股东人数早已远超这一限制。据一位前高管称，华为领导层仅持有 3%的股份，任正非本人持股不足 1%。[34] 深圳市政府意识到了这一障碍，并在 1997 年 9 月为当地企业建议了一个变通方案：将所有持股员工集体注册在一个“工会”下，在法律层面将其视为单一股东。[35] 华为采纳了这一方案，这种安排一直持续至今，引发了诸多困惑，并招致了对其所有权结构不透明的指责。在账面上，华为只有两个股东：持股约 1%的任正非本人，以及持有其余股份的工会。华为高管后来表示，这种所有权结构是一个历史遗留的奇特现象，中国的新公司甚至已不再被允许使用。徐直军在 2012 年表示：“当然，根据现行法律，这是不合法的，但当时特区的特殊批准是合法的。”[36] 他指出，全国大约有一千家公司拥有此类特殊批准。华为被允许保留这一结构，或许反映了政府官员的一种认可：即便该公司的做法不合常规，但它确实行之有效。

Huawei was seeking to buy out its five original investors as part of its efforts to reformat its shareholding structure, and it was running into problems. Professor Huang Weiwei, one of the professors who helped Huawei craft its Basic Law, wrote that under China’s Company Law of 1994, profits converted into capital belonged to the original investors unless those investors agreed to let new ones be brought on board. “But Mr. Ren didn’t think this way,” Huang wrote. “He said other companies give too much consideration to entrepreneurs’ profits, but Huawei gives more consideration to the interests of all those who have strived with us together…. If we insist on all the capital belonging to the original investors, we deny the workers ownership of the surplus value they created.”[37] Ren had brought on many more investors through the shares he had issued to employees, and he’d promised them the profits as part of their compensation. Two of the investors sued—Chen Jinyang, the travel service manager, and Shen Dingxing, the inventor of the BH-01 switch, which Huawei had imitated.[38] By 1999, Huawei had succeeded in settling the lawsuits filed by the two early investors, paying them 70 to 300 percent of their original investments.

华为在重新调整股权结构的努力中，正寻求买断其最初五位投资者的股份，但这遇到了问题。协助华为起草《基本法》的教授之一黄卫伟写道，根据 1994 年中国的《公司法》，利润转增资本应归原投资者所有，除非这些投资者同意让新投资者加入。“但任先生不这么想，”黄写道，“他说其他公司过多考虑创业者的利润，但华为更多考虑所有与我们共同奋斗的人的利益……如果我们坚持所有资本都归原投资者所有，我们就否定了劳动者对其创造的剩余价值的所有权。”[37] 任正非通过向员工发行股票引入了更多的投资者，并承诺将利润作为他们薪酬的一部分。其中两位投资者提起了诉讼——一位是旅游服务经理陈金阳，另一位是华为曾模仿的 BH-01 交换机的发明者沈定兴。[38] 到 1999 年，华为成功解决了这两位早期投资者提起的诉讼，向他们支付了原始投资额的 70%到 300%不等的补偿。

[picture]

Huawei’s chairwoman, Sun Yafang (center left), gives a tour of Huawei’s Latin America headquarters in Mexico City to China’s vice-premier, Liu Yandong (center right), in 2016.

2016 年，华为董事长孙亚芳（左中）向中国副总理刘延东（右中）介绍位于墨西哥城的华为拉美总部。

—

Huawei made one more notable change to its management structure during this period. In 1999, Vice-Chairwoman Sun Yafang was promoted to Huawei’s chairwoman.[39] It is unclear who had been Huawei’s chairperson before her—if it had still been the company’s founding chairman, Mei Zhongxing, or if someone else had since taken up the position. Sun would be very visible during her nineteen years as Huawei chairwoman, taking on many of the company’s meetings with foreign dignitaries and gaining the nickname of “Huawei’s Secretary of State” from the domestic press. She kept a jet-setting schedule, meeting with world leaders ranging from United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to Prime Minister Theresa May.[40] She spoke with a hint of a British accent and had a fondness for maroon fingernail polish and brightly patterned scarves.

在此期间，华为对其管理结构进行了又一次显著调整。1999 年，副董事长孙亚芳被提升为华为董事长。[39] 目前尚不清楚在她之前谁是华为的董事长——是公司的创始董事长梅忠兴，还是后来有其他人接任了这一职位。孙亚芳在担任华为董事长的十九年里表现得非常活跃，承担了公司与外国政要的许多会面，并被国内媒体冠以“华为国务卿”的称号。她的行程繁忙，足迹遍布全球，会见的领导人从联合国秘书长科菲·安南到英国首相特蕾莎·梅。[40] 她说话带着一丝英国口音，偏爱栗色的指甲油和花纹鲜艳的丝巾。

In September 1999, the year of her promotion, Sun had attended Harvard Business School’s two-month Advanced Management Program for mid-career executives. As the program’s “first class of the Internet,” the roughly 170 students each got a PalmPilot and an email address.[41] They lived in groups of eight, attending lectures six days a week and meeting in small groups in the evenings to discuss case studies. “Yafang being on the program felt like it was part of China opening up to the world,” said Graham Lovelace, a classmate in the program. Sun was affected by a lecture by the leadership scholar John Kotter. He told them that being a leader meant taking on personal risk to bring about change. He ended the lecture with a clip of Bobby Kennedy’s improvised speech on civil rights in April 1968, delivered hours after the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and two months before he himself was assassinated. “It was communication from soul to soul,” Sun wrote of Kotter’s lecture. “I couldn’t help the tears falling from my eyes.”[42]

1999 年 9 月，也就是她升职的那一年，孙亚芳参加了哈佛商学院为期两个月的针对职业中期高管的高级管理项目。作为该项目的“互联网第一届”，约 170 名学生每人都领到了一个 PalmPilot 掌上电脑和一个电子邮件地址。[41] 他们每八人一组生活，每周上六天课，晚上进行小组讨论案例研究。“亚芳参加这个项目，感觉就像是中国向世界开放的一部分，”该项目的同学格雷厄姆·洛夫莱斯说。孙亚芳深受领导力学者约翰·科特一次讲座的影响。科特告诉他们，成为领导者意味着要承担个人风险以带来变革。讲座以鲍比·肯尼迪 1968 年 4 月关于民权的即兴演讲片段结束，那次演讲发表在马丁·路德·金遇刺数小时后，也是他本人遇刺前两个月。“那是灵魂与灵魂之间的交流，”孙亚芳在谈到科特的讲座时写道，“我忍不住泪流满面。”[42]

While Sun had a reputation as an able and tough manager at Huawei during her time leading the sales department, it was still a bit of a mystery what had separated her from the pack, catapulting her to the top of Huawei’s pecking order. As the chairwoman of Huawei’s board of directors, Sun steered the company’s strategic direction and approved the selection, appraisal, and compensation of Ren as CEO, as well as the appointment and compensation of other senior managers.[43] She had all these powers on paper, at least. It was unclear how, exactly, power was shared between her and Ren in practice. Some in the industry believed that her background working for China’s state security agency, the Ministry of State Security, was a source of her power, though this was the sort of thing that was difficult to prove or disprove. “As chairwoman at Huawei, Sun Yafang is representing certain government departments, that’s my feeling,” said Wan Runnan, founder of the early Chinese tech company Stone Group.[44]

虽然孙亚芳在领导销售部门期间以精干和强硬的管理风格著称，但究竟是什么让她脱颖而出，跃升至华为权力金字塔的顶端，在某种程度上仍是一个谜。作为华为董事会董事长，孙亚芳掌管公司的战略方向，并负责审批任正非作为 CEO 的选拔、考核和薪酬，以及其他高管的任命和薪酬。[43] 至少在纸面上，她拥有所有这些权力。在实践中，她与任正非之间究竟如何分配权力尚不明确。业内一些人认为，她曾在中国国家安全机构——国家安全部工作的背景是其权力的来源，尽管这类事情很难被证实或证伪。“作为华为的董事长，孙亚芳代表着某些政府部门，这是我的感觉，”早期中国科技公司四通集团的创始人万润南表示。[44]

The haziness in her history continued to be a source of intrigue. What Sun herself would write in a 2017 magazine essay was this: “I was born in 1957, graduated from the University of Electronic Science and Technology, served as a communication warrior, wore the army’s green uniform, and later entered the Ministry of State Security to work in communications. In 1992, five years after Huawei was founded, I joined Huawei.” Curiously, this account diverged from her official Huawei bio: Huawei’s annual reports gave her birth year as 1955 and said she joined the company in 1989.[45] Such discrepancies were noted by the US director of national intelligence’s Open Source Center in an unclassified report.[46]

她履历中的模糊不清一直是人们好奇的源头。孙亚芳本人在 2017 年的一篇杂志文章中是这样写的：“我出生于 1957 年，毕业于电子科技大学，曾是一名通信兵，穿过军装，后来进入国家安全部从事通信工作。1992 年，即华为成立五年后，我加入了华为。”奇怪的是，这段叙述与华为官方简历有所出入：华为的年报显示她的出生年份为 1955 年，并称她于 1989 年加入公司。[45] 美国国家情报总监办公室下属的开源中心在一份非机密报告中注意到了这些差异。[46]

James Lewis, a US Commerce Department officer during the 1990s, said that he once asked a Huawei representative about Sun’s history in the MSS.[47]

20 世纪 90 年代担任美国商务部官员的詹姆斯·刘易斯（James Lewis）表示，他曾询问过一名华为代表关于孙亚芳在国安部的工作经历。[47]

“How did you know that?” the Huawei representative reportedly asked him.

据报道，那名华为代表反问他：“你是怎么知道的？”

“It’s on your website,” Lewis replied.

“你们的网站上写着呢，”刘易斯回答道。

Within a week, Lewis said, the MSS mention had disappeared.

刘易斯说，不到一周时间，关于国安部的表述就消失了。

11

11

Winter

寒冬

Dot-Com Bubble Burst: 1999–2001

互联网泡沫破裂：1999–2001

In the spring of 1999, the first mysterious letter surfaced.[1] It accused Huawei’s stratospheric growth of being based on “debt” and “fraud,” claiming that the company’s vaunted stock for employees was just a number on paper. “No one is clear as to how much the stocks held by employees are actually worth? No one knows when employees can actually exchange the stocks in their hands for cash?” A second letter, around a year later, purported to “expose” Huawei’s “illegal and fraudulent acts.” It included allegations that Huawei Electric—Huawei’s joint-venture company originally named Mobeco—was a pay-for-play tie-up with telecom operators.

1999 年春天，第一封神秘的信件浮出水面。[1] 信中指责华为的惊人增长是建立在“债务”和“欺诈”之上的，声称该公司引以为傲的员工持股只是纸面上的数字。“没有人清楚员工持有的股票到底值多少钱？没有人知道员工什么时候才能真正把手里的股票兑换成现金？”大约一年后，第二封信声称要“揭露”华为的“违法欺诈行为”。其中包括指控华为电气——华为最初名为莫贝克的合资公司——是与电信运营商之间的权钱交易纽带。

It wasn’t clear where the letters came from. One former Huawei executive alleged it was a smear campaign by Huawei’s archrival, ZTE.[2] In any case, it spooked Huawei’s customers. The second letter had come out just as the dot-com bubble was bursting, sending the entire industry into panic. Huawei’s orders dried up. Worse, Beijing decided to investigate.

目前尚不清楚这些信件来自何处。一位前华为高管指称这是华为死对头中兴通讯（ZTE）发起的抹黑行动。[2] 无论如何，这惊吓到了华为的客户。第二封信发出时正值互联网泡沫破裂，导致整个行业陷入恐慌。华为的订单枯竭了。更糟糕的是，北京决定展开调查。

Ren Zhengfei appealed for help from local officials, saying that Huawei could not survive the pall of the rumors. Shenzhen’s mayor, Li Zibin, went to Beijing and sought an audience with Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo. He told the vice-premier that if the rumors were true, Ren should be detained. But if he was innocent, the central government should publicly clear Huawei’s name.[3]

任正非向当地官员寻求帮助，称华为无法在谣言的阴影下生存。深圳市市长李子彬前往北京，寻求副总理吴邦国的接见。他告诉副总理，如果传言属实，任正非应该被拘留；但如果他是清白的，中央政府应该公开为华为正名。[3]

Ren was terrified when he heard that some twenty staffers from the National Audit Office were coming to audit Huawei. Hao Chunmin, director of Shenzhen’s Science and Technology Bureau, found Chairwoman Sun on his doorstep, pleading for help. Ren also phoned from South Africa in tears, saying that even if Huawei’s name was eventually cleared, it could not afford such upheavals. “Director Hao, I love my country, but my country doesn’t love me!”[4]

当任正非听说国家审计署约二十名工作人员要来审计华为时，他感到非常恐惧。深圳市科技局局长郝春民发现孙亚芳董事长站在他家门口，恳求帮助。任正非也从南非打来电话，哭着说即使华为最终被证明清白，也承受不起这样的动荡。“郝局长，我爱我的国家，但我的国家不爱我！”[4]

—

The audit would be only the first of a series of setbacks that Ren called Huawei’s Winter. Trial followed tribulation for the next three years. Ren would later recall a period of six months when he often had nightmares and wept.[5]

这次审计只是任正非称之为“华为的冬天”的一系列挫折的开始。在接下来的三年里，磨难接踵而至。任正非后来回忆起那段长达六个月的时期，他经常做噩梦并哭泣。[5]

The dot-com bubble burst in March 2000. The sky-high expectations for startups like Pets.com had come crashing back to Earth, erasing some $1.7 trillion in global wealth and laying low those who had built the internet’s pipes. Huawei and its rivals all wondered if they could survive. More than two dozen companies in the global telecom industry would file for bankruptcy. Huawei and its competitors all slashed their prices as they struggled to stay afloat.

2000 年 3 月，互联网泡沫破裂。像 Pets.com 这样的初创公司曾被寄予厚望，如今却跌回现实，全球财富蒸发了约 1.7 万亿美元，那些构建互联网管道的企业也陷入低谷。华为及其竞争对手都在怀疑自己能否生存下去。全球电信行业有二十多家公司申请破产。华为及其竞争对手为了维持生存，都大幅削减了价格。

Amid the global tech winter, Huawei was feeling the pressure of skyrocketing expectations from Beijing. After Huawei’s success in building an indigenous landline telephone system, China’s leaders were pushing it to figure out how to build domestic mobile networks. In 1996, Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo had personally requested that Huawei take a stab at mobile,[6] saying the sector was dominated by foreign firms. Wu penned a calligraphy inscription for Huawei as encouragement.[7] Mastering the complicated radio technologies for cell towers would require enormous R&D expenditures, and it was far from a sure bet that Huawei could compete against America’s Motorola, Finland’s Nokia, Sweden’s Ericsson, and Japan’s Fujitsu. At the same time, it was being encouraged to go global in anticipation of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. Companies often collapsed at this juncture—as they tried to scale up from doing one thing successfully to juggling many things. Ren found his finances stretched to the breaking point.

在全球科技寒冬中，华为感受到了来自北京日益增长的期望压力。在华为成功建立自主程控交换机系统后，中国领导人正推动其研究如何建设国内移动网络。1996 年，副总理吴邦国曾亲自要求华为尝试进军移动领域，[6] 称该领域被外国公司垄断。吴邦国还为华为题词以示鼓励。[7] 掌握基站复杂的无线电技术需要巨额的研发支出，而华为能否与美国的摩托罗拉、芬兰的诺基亚、瑞典的爱立信和日本的富士通竞争，还远未可知。与此同时，在预见到中国将加入世界贸易组织的情况下，华为也被鼓励走向全球。企业往往在这个关头崩溃——因为它们试图从成功做好一件事扩展到同时兼顾多件事。任正非发现他的财务状况已紧张到了极点。

Huawei would one day become the global king of mobile, number one in both consumer sales of smartphones and technical sales of cell tower gear. Yet its early days of mobile were anything but smooth. One problem was the lack of clarity in China’s national mobile blueprint. In Beijing, there was bureaucratic gridlock over which mobile standard to base the country’s networks on: Should they use the US’s CDMA, opt for Europe’s GSM, or try to strike out and develop a new standard altogether? The question was a little akin to asking whether you wanted to develop an app for iOS, develop an app for Android, or go down the entirely uncertain path of building your own app store. As Beijing officials debated the matter, companies like Huawei tried to hedge their bets by devoting some R&D funds to each of the technology standards, spreading their resources thin.

华为终有一天会成为全球移动通信之王，在智能手机的消费者销售和基站设备的的技术销售方面均排名第一。然而，其移动业务的早期阶段绝非一帆风顺。一个问题是中国国家移动蓝图缺乏清晰度。在北京，关于国家网络应基于哪种移动标准存在官僚主义僵局：是应该使用美国的 CDMA，选择欧洲的 GSM，还是尝试另辟蹊径开发一套全新的标准？这个问题有点类似于问你是想为 iOS 开发应用，为 Android 开发应用，还是走上一条完全不确定的道路去建立自己的应用商店。当北京官员辩论此事时，像华为这样的公司试图通过向每种技术标准都投入一些研发资金来对冲风险，从而分散了资源。

To add another wrinkle, it was unclear if China, once it picked CDMA or GSM, would go with the older 2G generation—traditional voice and text—or next-generation 3G, which was already being rolled out in countries like Japan and which allowed users to surf the web on a phone. Since Huawei’s early days, Ren had been disinterested in lagging technology. He aspired to reach the cutting edge. Now he chose to focus Huawei’s R&D efforts on 3G, in hopes of catching up with established rivals in the 3G generation. “Some people said this was a crazy idea,” one Huawei executive later recalled in an essay. “After all, 99 percent of the market was 2G.”[8] Some of his deputies warned him: “If you make the wrong choice, Huawei will collapse.”[9]

更复杂的是，目前尚不清楚中国一旦选择了 CDMA 或 GSM，是会采用较旧的 2G 一代（传统的语音和短信），还是采用已经在日本等国推出的下一代 3G（允许用户在手机上浏览网页）。从华为早期开始，任正非就对落后技术不感兴趣。他渴望达到最前沿。现在，他选择将华为的研发重点放在 3G 上，希望在 3G 时代赶上老牌对手。“有人说这是一个疯狂的想法，”一位华为高管后来在文章中回忆道，“毕竟，99%的市场都是 2G。”[8] 他的一些副手警告他：“如果你选错了，华为就会垮掉。”[9]

Across town, Huawei’s archrival, ZTE, had taken the opposite approach. ZTE’s founder, Hou Weigui, had picked a slow-and-steady strategy, reasoning that 2G was good enough for many consumers in China, which was still a developing nation. ZTE put its R&D resources into 2G and, indeed, into an even lower-end technology, the Personal Handyphone, a rudimentary type of cell phone with a limited range and a price tag to match.

在同城的另一端，华为的死对头中兴通讯采取了截然相反的做法。中兴通讯的创始人侯为贵选择了稳扎稳打的策略，认为 2G 对于中国这个仍是发展中国家的许多消费者来说已经足够好了。中兴通讯将研发资源投入到 2G，甚至投入到一种更低端的技术——小灵通（Personal Handyphone），这是一种覆盖范围有限、价格也相应低廉的原始手机。

Unfortunately for Ren, China’s 3G rollout proved to be a massive boondoggle, with the networks not up and running until 2009, more than a decade after the first trial 3G network was launched in Japan. “It turned out that we had made the wrong choice,” Ren later admitted.[10] ZTE surged ahead in sales as China built out 2G networks year after year, with 3G nowhere in sight. ZTE’s cheap and cheerful Personal Handyphones were such a smash success that Huawei was forced to reverse course a few years later and launch its own Personal Handyphones. Within Huawei, some executives wondered if Ren had lost his touch. A wave of early employees left.

对任正非来说不幸的是，中国的 3G 部署被证明是一个巨大的劳民伤财之举，直到 2009 年网络才投入运行，这比日本推出首个 3G 试验网晚了十多年。“事实证明，我们做出了错误的选择，”任正非后来承认道。[10] 随着中国年复一年地扩建 2G 网络，而 3G 却迟迟不见踪影，中兴通讯的销售额大幅飙升。中兴通讯廉价且好用的“小灵通”（Personal Handyphones）获得了巨大的成功，以至于华为在几年后被迫掉头，推出了自己的小灵通。在华为内部，一些高管开始怀疑任正非是否已经失去了敏锐的洞察力。一批早期员工相继离职。

The defection that stung the most for Ren was probably the departure of his “young prodigy,” Li Yinan. Li had been promoted from a junior engineer to a senior executive at Huawei in record speed, and many felt that Ren had been grooming him as a potential successor. But Ren’s succession plan was unclear, and to an ambitious young executive, it must have felt like there were greater opportunities beyond Huawei’s gates. Soon after leaving Huawei, Li launched a rival company, Harbour Networks, that sold a line of routers and switches under the eye-catching brand PowerHammer. Unlike Huawei, with its clouded ownership structure, Harbour Networks raised international venture capital like a Western-style startup.[11] Li’s team was soon aggressively poaching Huawei’s engineers and customers. For the next few years, Ren would be preoccupied with defeating his former disciple.

最令任正非感到刺痛的背叛，或许是他的“天才少年”李一男的离去。李一男在华为从一名初级工程师晋升为高级管理人员的速度创下了纪录，许多人认为任正非一直将其作为潜在接班人来培养。但任正非的接班计划并不明确，对于一位雄心勃勃的年轻高管来说，华为大门之外似乎有更大的机遇。离开华为后不久，李一男创办了一家竞争对手公司——港湾网络（Harbour Networks），销售一系列品牌名为“力量之锤”（PowerHammer）、引人注目的路由器和交换机产品。与所有权结构模糊的华为不同，港湾网络像西方初创企业一样募集了国际风险投资。[11] 李一男的团队很快开始大肆挖掘华为的工程师和客户。在接下来的几年里，任正非将全神贯注于击败他的这位前弟子。

During this period, Ren also lost his other close deputy, Zheng Baoyong, whom he had affectionately nicknamed “A-Bao,” to illness. Zheng was diagnosed with a brain tumor that required emergency surgery.[12] Working at Huawei was not conducive to good health, given the grueling work hours, the psychological stress of the company’s ferocious internal competition, and the outsize role of alcohol and cigarettes in China’s business culture. The scholars Tian Tao and Wu Chunbo reported that two-thirds of Huawei’s senior management suffered from stress-related diseases, including anxiety, hypertension, diabetes, and depression.[13] Ren himself was suffering from poor health. He had been diagnosed with diabetes and was once hospitalized on a trip to the US.[14] He had also plunged into a dark depression around the time of the audit. He later told a fellow industry executive that he had contemplated suicide more than once around the turn of the century, calling Chairwoman Sun each time for support.[15]

在此期间，任正非还因病失去了另一位亲密副手郑宝用，他曾亲昵地称其为“阿宝”。郑宝用被诊断出患有脑瘤，需要进行紧急手术。[12] 在华为工作并不利于身体健康，因为这里有繁重的工作时间、公司内部残酷竞争带来的心理压力，以及烟酒在中国商业文化中占据的巨大地位。学者田涛和吴春波报告称，华为三分之二的高层管理人员患有与压力相关的疾病，包括焦虑、高血压、糖尿病和抑郁症。[13] 任正非本人的健康状况也很糟糕。他被诊断出患有糖尿病，并曾在一次赴美旅行中住院。[14] 在审计期间，他也陷入了严重的抑郁。他后来告诉一位同行高管，在世纪之交前后，他曾不止一次产生过自杀念头，[15] 每次都打电话给孙亚芳董事长寻求支持。

Ren gave a speech to his staff titled “Huawei’s Winter.” He warned that they were too complacent, that they had to be prepared for any potential crisis.

任正非向员工发表了一篇题为《华为的冬天》的演讲。他警告说，他们太自满了，必须为任何潜在的危机做好准备。

“Those who didn’t predict it, who didn’t prepare, will freeze to death,” he said. “At that time, whoever has a warm coat will live.”[16]

“那些没有预见、没有准备的人，将会被冻死，”他说。“到那时，谁有厚棉袄，谁就能活下来。”[16]

—

Huawei was cleared in the audit, giving Ren and his team a second lease on life. Now, at least, Ren knew he was not going to jail. Following the near-death experience, Huawei quietly sold off Mobeco, the subsidiary it had used to build a web of financial ties to telecom officials across the country. After giving Mobeco a new name, Avansys Power, Huawei unloaded it to Emerson Electric in the United States for $750 million.[17] “Avansys is an outstanding company with strong sales dynamics,” Emerson CEO David N. Farr said in the announcement. Naturally, the press release didn’t mention anything about an audit, allegations of pay for play, or a complicated tangle of financial connections.

华为在审计中过关，这让任正非和他的团队获得了新生。现在，任正非至少知道自己不会入狱了。在经历了这次死里逃生后，华为悄悄卖掉了莫贝克（Mobeco），这家子公司曾被用来与全国各地的电信官员建立复杂的财务联系网。在给莫贝克改名为“安圣电气”（Avansys Power）后，华为将其以 7.5 亿美元的价格卖给了美国的艾默生电气（Emerson Electric）。[17] “安圣是一家拥有强劲销售势头的优秀公司，”艾默生首席执行官大卫·法尔（David N. Farr）在公告中表示。自然地，新闻稿中没有提到任何关于审计、权钱交易指控或错综复杂的财务关联。

There was another hopeful note: after China had negotiated for thirteen years to gain entry into the World Trade Organization, it looked like the country might finally be accepted. Once Beijing made a range of concessions, President Bill Clinton announced his support for China’s WTO entry, making clear his hope that the liberalization of China’s economy would lead to democratic reforms in the nation’s political system. “Everything I have learned about human nature in over a half century of living now convinces me that we have a far greater chance of having a positive influence on China’s actions if we welcome China into the world community instead of shutting it out,” Clinton said in a March 2000 speech. “As Justice Earl Warren once said, liberty is the most contagious force in the world. In the new century, liberty will spread by cell phone and cable modem.”[18]

还有一个令人充满希望的迹象：在中国为加入世界贸易组织进行了十三年的谈判后，这个国家似乎终于要被接纳了。在北京做出了一系列让步后，比尔·克林顿总统宣布支持中国加入世贸组织，并明确表示他希望中国经济的自由化能带动其政治体制的民主改革。“在我半个多世纪的人生中，关于人性所学到的一切都让我确信，如果我们欢迎中国加入国际社会而不是将其拒之门外，我们将有更大的机会对中国的行为产生积极影响，”克林顿在 2000 年 3 月的一次演讲中说。“正如大法官厄尔·沃伦曾说过的，自由是世界上最具传染性的力量。在新世纪，自由将通过手机和电缆调制解调器传播。”[18]

The Clinton administration touted China’s agreement to open up its telecommunications market for the first time as a key concession that made the deal palatable to Washington. “In opening China’s telecommunications market, including to Internet and satellite services, the agreement will over time expose the Chinese people to information, ideas and debate from around the world,” the administration announced. “As China’s people become more mobile, prosperous, and aware of alternative ways of life, they will seek greater say in the decisions that affect their lives.”[19]

克林顿政府吹捧中国首次同意开放电信市场是一项关键让步，这使得该协议对华盛顿来说变得可以接受。“在开放包括互联网和卫星服务在内的中国电信市场方面，该协议将随着时间的推移让中国人民接触到来自世界各地的信息、思想和辩论，”政府宣布。“随着中国人民变得更加流动、富裕，并意识到替代性的生活方式，他们将寻求在影响其生活的决策中拥有更大的发言权。”[19]

With the world primed for greater integration with China, Huawei began opening offices around the world. One of Ren’s star sales executives, Ken Hu, was sent to Latin America to establish a presence there. Declaring ambitions to grow, the company opened a ten-person office in Mexico in August 2000.[20] In the first year of the aughts, Huawei also set up an outpost in Kista, Sweden, the hometown of its established Swedish rival, Ericsson.[21] In January 2001, Huawei set up an office in Plano, Texas, called Futurewei Technologies, a stone’s throw from the strip dubbed “Telecom Corridor,” where telecom giants like AT&T and Lucent were based.

随着世界准备好与中国进一步融合，华为开始在世界各地设立办事处。任正非的一位明星销售高管胡厚崑（Ken Hu）被派往拉美建立业务。2000 年 8 月，该公司宣布了扩张雄心，在墨西哥开设了一个十人的办事处。[20] 在 21 世纪的头一年，华为还在瑞典希斯塔（Kista）设立了据点，那里是其老牌瑞典对手爱立信的故乡。[21] 2001 年 1 月，华为在德克萨斯州普莱诺（Plano）设立了一个名为 Futurewei Technologies 的办公室，距离被称为“电信走廊”的地带仅一步之遥，那里是 AT&T 和朗讯等电信巨头的所在地。

The growing visibility in the Western world had both rewards and risks. At the Hong Kong–based magazine Far Eastern Economic Review, editors had heard about an up-and-coming telecom gear supplier called Huawei. A thirty-four-year-old Canadian reporter named Bruce Gilley was assigned to write a profile. Huawei allowed Gilley to visit and interview executives. “They didn’t have their shields up. They were very open,” Gilley recalled. “They thought of themselves as this great private-sector success story.”[22]

在西方世界日益增长的知名度既带来了回报，也带来了风险。在总部位于香港的《远东经济评论》杂志，编辑们听说了一家名为华为的新兴电信设备供应商。一位名叫布鲁斯·吉利（Bruce Gilley）的 34 岁加拿大记者被指派撰写一篇人物专访。华为允许吉利进行参观并采访高管。“他们没有设防，非常开放，”吉利回忆道，“他们认为自己是一个伟大的私营部门成功故事。”[22]

But Gilley’s profile—one of the first in-depth articles in English on the company and an influential one in Western policymaking circles—ended up focusing on Huawei’s military and government links. Gilley opened the piece with a description of his visit to Huawei’s headquarters, during which he saw several room-sized switching systems waiting to be shipped—with shipping labels that said they were headed for the People’s Liberation Army.[23] “I will never forget standing there with these three big shrink-wrapped systems in front of me,” he said.

但吉利的专访——这是最早关于该公司的英文深度文章之一，在西方决策圈极具影响力——最终却聚焦于华为与军方及政府的联系。吉利在文章开头描述了他参观华为总部的情景，期间他看到几个房间大小的交换系统正等待发货，发货标签上写着它们的目的地是中国人民解放军。[23] “我永远不会忘记站在那里的情景，面前是这三套巨大的、用收缩包装纸包裹着的系统，”他说。

Gilley’s profile of Huawei would have curious staying power for an article in a regional magazine, continuing to be cited decades later in prominent Western government reports. Many of its details appear to be accurate, but one throwaway line would be contested and would generate controversy for years. In reviewing Ren’s background, the piece gives his military title as “a former director of the Information Engineering Academy of the PLA’s General Staff Department,” which conducts telecoms research for China’s military. US politicians seized on this title as proof of Ren’s work in military telecommunications. Huawei would vigorously dispute that Ren had ever held that title, with one spokesman calling it “the most regularly trotted-out turd” about the company.[24] In retrospect, it looks likely to be a simple mix-up. Wu Jiangxing, inventor of the military’s 04 switch and founder of Huawei rival Great Dragon, had held that exact title during his military years, and it is a standard part of his bio. Ren’s time in the military is largely accounted for, and had he worked at the Information Engineering Academy, it’s unclear why that tidbit would have been secret for him when it wasn’t for Wu. “It may well be wrong,” Gilley said when asked about the controversial title for Ren. “I don’t think a lot hangs on that. We know he came out of the military. And we know his company was backed by the military. And then we know it was rapidly identified as the national champion.”[25]

吉利对华为的专访对于一篇地区性杂志的文章来说，具有一种奇特的持久生命力，在几十年后仍不断被西方政府的重要报告所引用。文中的许多细节似乎是准确的，但其中一句随笔提及的话却引发了争议，并持续争论多年。在回顾任正非的背景时，该文称他的军职为“原解放军总参谋部信息工程学院院长”，该学院负责为中国军方进行电信研究。美国政客抓住这一头衔，将其作为任正非从事军事电信工作的证据。华为对此坚决否认，称任正非从未担任过该职务，一位发言人称其为关于该公司“最常被翻出来的陈年谣言”。[24] 回想起来，这很可能只是一个简单的混淆。军用 04 机交换机的发明者、华为竞争对手巨龙公司的创始人邬江兴，在服役期间确实担任过该职务，这是他简历中的标准组成部分。任正非的军旅生涯基本都有据可查，如果他曾在信息工程学院工作过，不明白为什么这段往事对他来说是秘密，而对邬江兴却不是。“这很可能是错的，”当被问及任正非那个备受争议的头衔时，吉利说道，“我认为这并不影响大局。我们知道他出身军旅，我们知道他的公司得到了军方的支持，我们也知道它很快就被确认为国家冠军企业。”[25]

Even more than Gilley’s profile, a report by Forbes caused consternation within Huawei in 2000. The magazine’s second annual list of China’s richest people placed fifty-six-year-old Ren at number three. According to Forbes, he was the third-richest man in all of China, behind only eighty-four-year-old Rong Yiren, the CITIC conglomerate’s founder, and fifty-two-year-old Liu Yongxing, founder of animal-feed company East Hope Group.

相比吉利的专访，《福布斯》的一份报告在 2000 年给华为内部造成了更大的震动。该杂志发布的第二届中国富豪榜将 56 岁的任正非排在第三位。根据《福布斯》的说法，他是全中国第三富有的人，仅次于 84 岁的中信集团创始人荣毅仁，以及 52 岁的东方希望集团创始人刘永行。

Ren had not wanted to appear on the list. The Financial Times reported that Huawei had offered the list’s author, Rupert Hoogewerf, a factory tour if Ren could be omitted.[26] Hoogewerf had estimated Ren’s fortune at $500 million, based on his 5 percent stake in Huawei, using an estimated value of $10 billion for the company. Since Huawei wasn’t publicly traded, it was hard to know how close or far this estimate was from the truth. Ren dismissed the list, telling staff that the foreign media had fabricated it out of ulterior motives.[27] He reminded them that he’d driven a humble Peugeot until quite recently, when he was persuaded to upgrade for safety considerations. He told them that he’d only just finished paying back the money he owed the company.

任正非并不想上榜。《金融时报》报道称，华为曾向榜单作者胡润（Rupert Hoogewerf）提出，如果能把任正非从名单中剔除，可以让他参观工厂。[26] 胡润根据任正非持有的 5%华为股份，并以公司 100 亿美元的估值为基础，估算出任正非的财富为 5 亿美元。由于华为不是上市公司，很难知晓这个估值与事实相差多远。任正非对这份榜单不屑一顾，他告诉员工，这是外国媒体出于别有用心的动机而捏造的。[27] 他提醒员工，直到不久前他还在开一辆简陋的标致车，后来是在别人的劝说下，出于安全考虑才升级了座驾。他告诉他们，他才刚刚还清欠公司的钱。

To be ostentatiously wealthy could be politically dangerous in China, and indeed, many of the executives on the rich list ended up being investigated for corruption in ensuing years. “My mother was constantly worried about the political implications of being called rich so publicly by Forbes,” Ren later said. “She asked me where the money came from. Given the environment at the time, she was haunted by these fears.”[28]

在中国，表现得极其富有可能是政治上的危险信号，事实上，富豪榜上的许多高管在随后的几年里都因腐败问题受到了调查。“我母亲一直担心被富豪如此公开地称为《福布斯》所带来的政治影响，”任正非后来回忆道，“她问我钱是从哪里来的。考虑到当时的环境，她一直被这些恐惧所困扰。”[28]

—

Ren was one among a small group of executives invited to accompany Vice President Hu Jintao on a state visit to Iran in January 2001.[29] The two governments had agreed to deepen their ties, and now Hu told his Iranian counterpart that China wished to see more trade in the fields of transportation, energy, and telecommunications.[30]

2001 年 1 月，任正非是受邀陪同副主席胡锦涛对伊朗进行国事访问的一小群高管之一。[29] 两国政府同意深化关系，胡锦涛告诉伊朗同行，中国希望在交通、能源和电信领域看到更多的贸易往来。[30]

Hu was already rumored to be China’s next president, and it was valuable face time with the future leader. There was also little reason to believe that business in Iran would put Chinese companies in danger at the time: the United States had eased trade sanctions against Iran after the 1997 election of reformist president Mohammad Khatami. Bidding for a project in Iran in 2000, Huawei had competed against Finland’s Nokia, Sweden’s Ericsson, Italy’s Italtel, and Germany’s Siemens.[31] The greatest concern of a Huawei manager working on the bid had been his wife’s fury that he was missing Chinese New Year for work.[32] But after the United States tightened sanctions on Iran—first under the George W. Bush administration, then further under Barack Obama’s presidency—Huawei’s relationships in Iran became dangerous. They would be the reason why Meng Wanzhou was detained in Vancouver.

当时已有传闻称胡锦涛将成为中国下一任国家主席，这对于与未来领导人面对面接触来说是非常宝贵的机会。当时也没有理由认为在伊朗开展业务会使中国公司陷入危险：在 1997 年改革派总统穆罕默德·哈塔米当选后，美国已经放宽了对伊朗的贸易制裁。在 2000 年竞标伊朗的一个项目时，华为的竞争对手包括芬兰的诺基亚、瑞典的爱立信、意大利的 Italtel 和德国的西门子。[31] 当时负责竞标的一位华为经理最大的担忧是，他因为工作错过了春节，这让他的妻子感到愤怒。[32] 但在美国收紧对伊制裁后——先是在乔治·W·布什政府时期，随后在巴拉克·奥巴马任期内进一步收紧——华为在伊朗的业务往来变得危险起来。这些往来最终成为了孟晚舟在温哥华被拘留的原因。

On the trip, Ren was allotted a few minutes to give Hu a presentation on Huawei. Ren was thrilled that Hu seemed to know what Huawei was. But later on during the trip, Ren received a phone call.[33] He was told that back in China, his seventy-seven-year-old mother had been struck by a car that morning after going to a market in Kunming. His sister had gone in search of her when she didn’t return for lunch. Chairwoman Sun had already flown to her side.[34] Ren’s daughter Meng Wanzhou had rushed there too.[35] When Ren arrived, he found his mother in worse shape than he had imagined. “Her heartbeat and breathing were being sustained by medication and machines,” he wrote. “They didn’t tell me over the telephone because they were afraid I might have a mishap on my trip back.” She passed away soon after.

在这次行程中，任正非获得了几分钟时间向胡锦涛介绍华为。令任正非欣喜的是，胡锦涛似乎知道华为。但在行程后期的某天，任正非接到一个电话。[33] 他被告知，那天早晨在昆明，他七十七岁的老母亲在去菜市场的路上被车撞了。由于她中午没回家，他的妹妹便出去寻找。孙亚芳董事长已经飞往她身边。[34] 任正非的女儿孟晚舟也赶到了那里。[35] 当任正非赶到时，他发现母亲的情况比他想象的还要糟糕。“她的心跳和呼吸全靠药物和机器维持，”他写道。“他们没有在电话里告诉我，是怕我在回程途中出事。”不久后她便去世了。

The death of Ren’s mother prompted him to pen a long essay about his family titled “My Father and Mother.” The piece offers the most that Ren has ever said about his family history, outlining his parents’ early life, his own childhood, and the family’s experiences through the Great Chinese Famine and the Cultural Revolution. Ren expressed regret that while immersed in the work of building Huawei, he had neglected to spend more time with his parents. His essay would be influential in the industry, with Liu Chuanzhi, founder of PC-making giant Lenovo, moved to write about his own early life.[36] Liu wrote that in 1966, his own father had refused to falsely accuse former comrades under coercion and, as a result, was expelled from the party. “The atmosphere then was tense, frightening,” Liu recalled. “This is seared into my memory. My father taught me by example how to be a man. He taught me what integrity is!” Liu suggested that the successes of Huawei and Lenovo owed something to these early lessons: “Like Ren Zhengfei, we can lead by example and prioritize the interests of the company over personal gain. Going back to our roots, the earlier generations laid the foundation for how we should act.”

母亲的去世促使任正非写下了一篇关于家庭的长文，题为《我的父亲母亲》。这篇文章是任正非对家族史讲述最多的一次，概述了父母的早年生活、他自己的童年，以及全家人在三年困难时期和文革中的经历。任正非表达了遗憾，由于沉浸在创建华为的工作中，他忽略了多花时间陪伴父母。他的文章在业界产生了影响，个人电脑巨头联想的创始人柳传志也深受感动，写下了关于自己早年生活的文章。[36] 柳传志写道，1966 年，他自己的父亲在威逼之下拒绝诬陷昔日的战友，结果被开除出党。“当时的空气是紧张的、恐怖的，”柳传志回忆道。“这深深地烙在我的记忆里。我父亲用行动教会了我如何做人。他教会了我什么是正直！”柳传志认为，华为和联想的成功在一定程度上归功于这些早年的教诲：“像任正非一样，我们可以以身作则，将公司的利益置于个人利益之上。追根溯源，是老一辈为我们的行为准则奠定了基础。”

—

Ren did not have long to grieve and contemplate. Weeks later, Huawei found itself in a shocking predicament. On February 16, 2001, under the orders of President George W. Bush, the United States and Britain launched a joint air strike on five targets outside the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.[37] When the dust cleared, the Pentagon announced that the target was a network of fiber-optic cables that Huawei was installing for Iraq’s military.

任正非没有太长时间去悲伤和沉思。几周后，华为发现自己陷入了一个令人震惊的困境。2001 年 2 月 16 日，在乔治·W·布什总统的命令下，美国和英国对伊拉克首都巴格达郊外的五个目标发动了联合空袭。[37] 硝烟散去后，五角大楼宣布，袭击目标是华为正在为伊拉克军方安装的光纤电缆网络。

The Pentagon gave few details publicly at the time, except to say that the fiber-optic cables were a threat and helped Iraq target allied jets. Behind closed doors, US officials acknowledged they were also trying to smoke out Iraqi troops by cutting off landline connections, which would force them to use radio communications that the NSA could intercept. “If the Iraqi air-defense communications were shifted to fiber, then interception of communication would be impossible and there would be increased risk to patrols,” Charles Duelfer, former special adviser to the director of central intelligence, later wrote. “The attacks forced the Iraqis to use radio links or none at all.”[38] An earlier classified CIA memo about the technology had noted that “fiber is immune to unauthorized intercept by conventional means,” calling this “a unique feature not available from other modes of communications.”[39] Matthew M. Aid, a former NSA analyst turned independent military historian, wrote that the NSA had persuaded US military officials to carry out the air strike.[40]

五角大楼当时公开提供的细节很少，只是说光纤电缆构成了威胁，并帮助伊拉克瞄准盟军战机。在闭门会议中，美国官员承认，他们还试图通过切断陆路通信连接来逼出伊拉克军队，这将迫使他们使用美国国家安全局（NSA）可以拦截的无线电通信。“如果伊拉克的防空通信转为光纤，那么拦截通信将变得不可能，巡逻的风险也会增加，”前中央情报局局长特别顾问查尔斯·杜尔费尔后来写道。“这些攻击迫使伊拉克人使用无线电链路，或者干脆无法通信。”[38] 早期一份关于该技术的中央情报局机密备忘录指出，“光纤不受常规手段的非法拦截”，并称这是“其他通信模式所不具备的独特特征”。[39] 前美国国家安全局分析师、现独立军事史学家马修·M·艾德写道，是美国国家安全局说服了美国军方官员实施这次空袭。[40]

The controversy put Huawei in the diplomatic limelight at the highest levels in a way that Ren and his team were wholly unprepared for. Huawei denied having made any sales in Iraq that violated sanctions, but this did little to quell the controversy. US Secretary of State Colin Powell confronted China’s ambassador to the United States, Yang Jiechi, directly.[41] The Washington Post reported that in 1999, Chinese diplomats had twice applied to a UN sanctions committee to obtain permission for Huawei to supply Baghdad with telecom equipment, reflecting that the Chinese government was aware of, and supported, Huawei’s operations in Iraq.[42] The Post also reported that the Huawei contracts might have proceeded clandestinely after Britain and the US placed “holds” on Huawei’s application with the UN sanctions committee. Pressed for comment, a spokeswoman for China’s mission to the UN told The Post that if a company was found in violation of UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq, the Chinese government would investigate and prosecute. One former Huawei executive wrote that he’d only seen Ren scared out of his wits twice: “Once was when the central government’s inspection group arrived, and the other was when Huawei exported equipment to Iraq and was facing US sanctions.”[43]

这场争议将华为推向了最高级别的外交风口浪尖，这是任正非及其团队完全没有准备好应对的 。华为否认在伊拉克进行过任何违反制裁的销售，但这并未能平息争议。美国国务卿科林·鲍威尔直接质询了中国驻美大使杨洁篪。[41] 《华盛顿邮报》 报道称，1999 年，中国外交官曾两次向联合国制裁委员会申请许可，允许华为向巴格达供应电信设备，这反映出中国政府知晓并支持华为在伊拉克的业务。[42] 《邮报》 还报道称，在英国和美国对华为向联合国制裁委员会提交的申请投下“暂缓键”后，华为的合同可能仍在秘密进行。在被要求置评时，中国常驻联合国代表团的一位发言人告诉 《邮报》，如果发现有公司违反联合国安理会关于伊拉克的决议，中国政府将进行调查并起诉。一位华为前高管写道，他只见过任正非被吓坏过两次：“一次是中央调查组到来时，另一次是华为向伊拉克出口设备面临美国制裁时。”[43]

Huawei ended up escaping more or less with a warning. Powell told reporters that China had ordered companies working on fiber-optic cable projects in Iraq to “cease and desist.”[44] But the incident sparked broader scrutiny of Huawei in Washington, including calls for restriction of US technology sales to the company. At a Senate committee hearing on weapons of mass destruction in November 2001, Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, criticized the Commerce Department for granting Huawei licenses to purchase advanced US components to build its products.[45] He said that Huawei had been allowed to purchase half a million dollars’ worth of telecom gear from US tech giant Qualcomm, as well as high-performance computers from Digital Equipment Corporation, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Sun Microsystems. He added that Motorola had an export license application pending with the Commerce Department that, if approved, would help it build high-speed switching and routing equipment. Milhollin argued that this US technology had helped build Huawei “out of virtually nothing.”

华为最终基本是以警告了事。鲍威尔告诉记者，中国已命令在伊拉克从事光纤电缆项目的公司“停止并终止”此类活动。[44] 但这一事件引发了华盛顿对华为更广泛的审查，包括要求限制美国向该公司出售技术的呼声。在 2001 年 11 月的一次参议院大规模杀伤性武器委员会听证会上，威斯康星核军控项目主任加里·米尔霍林批评商务部向华为发放许可证，允许其购买先进的美国组件来制造产品。[45] 他表示，华为获准从美国科技巨头高通公司购买价值 50 万美元的电信设备，以及从迪吉多、IBM、惠普和太阳微系统公司购买高性能计算机。他补充说，摩托罗拉有一项出口许可申请正待商务部审批，如果获批，将帮助华为制造高速交换和路由设备。米尔霍林辩称，正是这些美国技术帮助华为“从几乎一无所有”中建立起来。

One former Huawei executive called the Iraq incident a pivotal moment in the company’s history, even though few realized it at the time. Huawei had come onto the US radar screen as a potential national security threat, and it would never be able to fall off. “The Iraq incident was very important,” he said. “The US strategy toward Huawei shifted. At that point, Huawei knew that something would happen eventually…though perhaps no one could have predicted that thing would turn out to be Trump.”[46]

一位前华为高管称伊拉克事件是公司历史上的一个转折点，尽管当时很少有人意识到这一点。华为已经进入了美国的雷达监测范围，被视为潜在的国家安全威胁，并且再也无法从中脱身。“伊拉克事件非常重要，”他说，“美国对华为的策略发生了转变。在那一刻，华为知道迟早会发生些什么……尽管或许没有人能预料到，那件事最终会演变成特朗普。”[46]

—

Days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Huawei again found itself under public scrutiny. The Western press was reporting that the company had a contract to install a twelve-thousand-line digital telephone exchange in Kabul, putting it—and China—on the wrong side of the war on terror. Beijing in Quandary over Trade Links with Taliban, one headline blared. For the second time that year, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was forced to publicly defend Huawei. “The reports seriously deviated from the facts,” a ministry spokesperson told reporters. “The accusations are groundless.”[47]

在 9/11 恐怖袭击发生几天后，华为再次发现自己处于公众审查之下。西方媒体报道称，该公司签订了一份在喀布尔安装 1.2 万门数字电话交换机的合同，这使其——以及中国——站在了反恐战争的对立面。《北京在与塔利班的贸易联系中陷入困境》，一个头条新闻赫然写道。那一年，中国外交部被迫第二次公开为华为辩护。“有关报道严重失实，”外交部发言人告诉记者，“这些指责是毫无根据的。”[47]

The spat over Huawei’s telephone lines for the Taliban came as Washington was broadly rethinking its China strategy as it focused on the war on terror.[48] The Bush administration decided to shelve the issue of containing Communism in order to concentrate on counterterrorism cooperation. China shared a border with Afghanistan and had close ties with Pakistan. Its suppliers, like Huawei, operated across the region. “People began to start thinking about how to work with China on the Afghanistan issue,” Evan Feigenbaum, a State Department official at the time, recalled in an oral history. “This was something that really redefined the lines of debate. Instead of having a classic Cold War–like balance-of-power debate about how to deal with China as a challenge to American power, the orientation in foreign policy shifted.”[49] A month after 9/11, Bush met with Jiang Zemin in Shanghai and sought China’s help with intelligence sharing and cracking down on military technology proliferation. “China is a great power,” Bush said. “And America wants a constructive relationship with China. We welcome a China that is a full member of [the] world community…. We welcome and support China’s accession into the World Trade Organization.”[50]

就在华盛顿因专注于反恐战争而全面重新思考其对华战略之际，关于华为为塔利班提供电话线的争端爆发了。[48] 布什政府决定搁置遏制共产主义的问题，以便集中精力进行反恐合作。中国与阿富汗接壤，并与巴基斯坦有着密切联系。其供应商（如华为）在整个地区都有业务。“人们开始思考如何就阿富汗问题与中国合作，”当时的一位国务院官员埃文·费根鲍姆在口述历史中回忆道，“这确实重新定义了辩论的界限。外交政策的取向发生了转变，不再是关于如何应对中国对美国权力的挑战这种经典的冷战式权力平衡辩论。”[49] 9/11 事件一个月后，布什在上海会见了江泽民，寻求中国在情报共享和打击军事技术扩散方面的帮助。“中国是一个大国，”布什说，“美国希望与中国建立建设性的关系。我们欢迎中国成为国际社会的正式成员……我们欢迎并支持中国加入世界贸易组织。”[50]

In December 2001, China was finally allowed into the WTO. While officials on both sides hailed it as a historic moment of China joining the international community, business executives in China and foreign countries alike were nervous about whether they could survive the flood of global competition. “After we enter the WTO, the number of unemployed people in our nation will rise, and it’s unclear if things will still be politically stable,” Ren remarked.[51]

2001 年 12 月，中国终于获准加入世贸组织（WTO）。虽然双方官员都将其赞誉为中国加入国际社会的历史性时刻，但中国和外国的企业高管都在担心自己能否在全球竞争的洪流中生存下来。“加入世贸组织后，我国的失业人数将会上升，政治局势是否依然稳定尚不明确，”任正非评论道。[51]

Huawei’s entry into the US market had created waves. Rumors were flying that the US networking giant Cisco was going to sue Huawei over its routers being too similar. A human-resources manager at Huawei’s US division, Futurewei, asked an engineering colleague about the rumors.

华为进入美国市场引起了轩然大波。有传言称，美国网络巨头思科公司将起诉华为，理由是华为的路由器与其产品过于相似。华为美国分公司（Futurewei）的一位人力资源经理向一位工程同事询问了这些传闻。

“Don’t worry,” his colleague replied. “We are fixing the problems so we won’t have to worry about that.”[52]

“别担心，”他的同事回答道，“我们正在解决这些问题，所以我们不必为此担心。”[52]

12

12

Sudden and Acute

突发与尖锐

Iraq, SARS, and Cisco: 2003–2004

伊拉克、非典与思科：2003–2004

As the year 2003 began, the global telecom industry was excited by a tantalizing business opportunity: rumor had it that the US was going to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. “Wireless vendors around the world are clamoring for a piece of this lucrative pie,” one industry publication said.[1] Another reported that vendors were “salivating” at the prospect.[2]

2003 年伊始，全球电信业被一个诱人的商业机会所鼓舞：传闻美国将入侵伊拉克并推翻萨达姆·侯赛因政权。“世界各地的无线设备供应商都在叫嚣着要分得这块肥肉的一羹，”一家行业刊物写道。[1] 另一家媒体报道称，供应商们对这一前景“垂涎三尺”。[2]

The UN sanctions had prevented Iraq from modernizing: the nation still did not have a mobile phone network, and its landline networks, built by France’s Alcatel in the 1980s,[3] were in dismal shape. But now the ouster of Hussein and the installation of a US-friendly regime pointed toward the lifting of sanctions—and a telephone network construction boom—on the horizon.

联合国的制裁曾阻碍了伊拉克的现代化：该国仍没有移动电话网络，其由法国阿尔卡特公司在 20 世纪 80 年代建造的固定电话网络[3] 也处于凄惨的状态。但现在，侯赛因的下台和亲美政权的建立预示着制裁的解除——以及地平线上即将出现的电话网络建设热潮。

After the Pentagon had bombed Huawei-built installations in Iraq in 2001 and accused it of violating sanctions, Huawei had pulled back.[4] But with whispers of a US invasion circulating, Huawei quietly began sending employees back into Iraq. “At the start, we didn’t have a clear mission in Iraq,” recalled an employee who was sent in that January. “The task that the company’s leadership gave us was to rebuild the cities after the war.”[5]

在五角大楼于 2001 年轰炸了华为在伊拉克建造的设施并指责其违反制裁后，华为曾有所收敛。[4] 但随着美国入侵的传闻四起，华为开始悄悄地将员工派回伊拉克。“刚开始的时候，我们在伊拉克并没有明确的任务，”一位在那年 1 月被派往当地的员工回忆道。“公司领导交给我们的任务是战后重建城市。”[5]

In March 2003, President George W. Bush gave Hussein an ultimatum to leave the country or face an imminent influx of US troops. In hopes of sealing a contract, Huawei launched an urgent operation to whisk some employees from the Iraqi telecom operator Asiacell to Shenzhen, where they could attend a training session.[6] The company scrambled to sort out visas for the Iraqi engineers.

2003 年 3 月，乔治·W·布什总统向侯赛因发出最后通牒，要求其离开该国，否则将面临美军迫在眉睫的进攻。为了敲定合同，华为发起了一项紧急行动，将伊拉克电信运营商 Asiacell 的一些员工接到深圳参加培训。[6] 公司仓促地为这些伊拉克工程师办理了签证。

“The war was about to break out,” a Huawei manager overseeing Middle East sales later wrote. “If the customer’s engineers are not pulled out to the company for training at this time, then they will not be able to come out after the war breaks out, and even contact with the outside world will be interrupted.”[7]

“战争即将爆发，”一位负责中东销售的华为经理后来写道。“如果此时不把客户的工程师接到公司培训，战争爆发后他们就出不来了，甚至连与外界的联系都会中断。”[7]

—

Meanwhile, the first pandemic of the twenty-first century had begun in southern China, with rumors that people were mysteriously struggling to breathe not too far from Shenzhen. Given little official information from the government, people were hoarding cold medicine as they tried to figure out how to protect themselves. The new disease was eventually called severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS. “This is the first time in our lives we have faced such a challenge,” Huawei wrote to customers, acknowledging that the rapid spread of the disease had caused “psychological panic.”[8]

与此同时，21 世纪的第一场大流行病在中国南方爆发，有传闻称在离深圳不远的地方，人们正神秘地陷入呼吸困难。由于政府提供的官方信息很少，人们在试图弄清楚如何自我保护的同时，纷纷囤积感冒药。这种新疾病最终被称为严重急性呼吸系统综合征，即 SARS（非典）。“这是我们生命中第一次面临这样的挑战，”华为在给客户的信中写道，承认疾病的迅速蔓延已引起“心理恐慌”。[8]

As with other global disasters, Huawei’s executives saw SARS as an opportunity to prove to customers that they had the bravery and chops to deliver on their contracts. As some of Huawei’s foreign rivals paused business, Huawei ordered installations to continue in the field, with engineers arriving ten to fifteen days early so that they could self-isolate before meeting clients.[9] This was in line with Beijing’s efforts to project calm: in a show of normalcy, the nation’s leader, Hu Jintao, took a detour from his visit with local epidemiologists about containing the outbreak to drop by Huawei, with state media photos showing him chatting with Ren Zhengfei and his team, no face masks in sight.[10]

与应对其他全球性灾难一样，华为高管将非典视为一个向客户证明他们有勇气和能力履行合同的机会。当华为的一些外国竞争对手暂停业务时，华为命令现场安装继续进行，工程师提前 10 到 15 天到达，以便在会见客户前进行自我隔离。[9] 这与北京方面展现镇定的努力相一致：为了显示一切正常，国家领导人胡锦涛在就控制疫情访问当地流行病学家期间，顺道视察了华为。官方媒体的照片显示，他正与任正非及其团队交谈，现场无人佩戴口罩。[10]

Huawei was also unwilling to let a pandemic foil its big plans for 3G. Network operators around the world had begun planning their 3G mobile networks, and Huawei was desperate to get its foot in the door after investing heavily in R&D for the technology. It was pushing especially hard in Hong Kong, where the company felt it had a shot at winning over Sunday Communications, the smallest mobile player in the city. “We pretty much pushed SARS to the back of our minds and forgot about it,” a Huawei staffer working on the Sunday account later wrote. “We met almost every day, ate together, talked. Except for necessary precautions, no one mentioned SARS.”[11]

华为也不愿让一场流行病挫败其宏大的 3G 计划。全球的网络运营商已开始规划其 3G 移动网络，在对该技术投入巨额研发资金后，华为迫切希望分得一杯羹。它在香港的推进尤为卖力，公司觉得在那里有机会争取到 Sunday 通讯——该市规模最小的移动运营商。“我们几乎把非典抛到了脑后，忘掉了它，”一位负责 Sunday 账户的华为员工后来写道。“我们几乎每天见面，一起吃饭，交谈。除了必要的预防措施，没人提到非典。”[11]

The Iraqi engineers arrived in Shenzhen with SARS raging. Huawei staffers took them to halal restaurants around town and brought them to the company for the training course.

伊拉克工程师抵达深圳时，非典正肆虐。华为员工带他们去城里的清真餐厅，并带他们到公司参加培训课程。

—

In February 2003, on the eve of the Lunar New Year, Ren learned that US rival Cisco was suing Huawei. He couldn’t quite believe it at first. “He was saying, ‘No, I’ve had very friendly discussions with them. I can’t believe they would actually sue us,’ ” recalled one person involved in the deliberations at Huawei.[12]

2003 年 2 月，农历新年前夕，任正非得知美国竞争对手思科正在起诉华为。起初他简直不敢相信。“他说，‘不，我和他们进行过非常友好的讨论。我不相信他们真的会起诉我们，’”一位参与华为内部商议的人员回忆道。[12]

Cisco’s general counsel, Mark Chandler, had traveled to Shenzhen a couple months earlier to personally deliver the warning, saying Cisco had “determined definitively” that Huawei had copied Cisco’s routers.[13] And now Cisco had followed through.

思科的总法律顾问马克·钱德勒在几个月前曾前往深圳亲自递交警告，称思科已“明确判定”华为抄袭了思科的路由器。[13] 而现在，思科付诸了行动。

Founded in 1984 by Stanford University computer scientists, Cisco Systems was the builder of the internet’s pipes and the world’s most valuable company, with a market capitalization of more than half a trillion dollars. Cisco’s CEO, John Chambers, was the industry’s blond-haired, blue-eyed golden boy. The press fawned over him as “King of the Internet,” “world’s greatest CEO,” and “best boss in America.” There was even speculation that he would run for president. But then came the dot-com bust. In 2001, Chambers reported Cisco’s first loss in its seventeen-year history. When Huawei came bursting into the US market with routers that were suspiciously similar to Cisco’s, Chambers was in no mood to let it slide.

思科系统公司于 1984 年由斯坦福大学的计算机科学家创立，是互联网管道的建造者，也是全球市值最高的公司，市值超过 5000 亿美元。思科首席执行官约翰·钱伯斯是该行业金发碧眼的宠儿。媒体对他阿谀奉承，称其为“互联网之王”、“全球最伟大的 CEO”和“美国最佳老板”。甚至有人猜测他会竞选总统。但随后互联网泡沫破裂。2001 年，钱伯斯报告了思科 17 年历史上的首次亏损。当华为带着与思科路由器惊人相似的产品闯入美国市场时，钱伯斯完全没有心情听之任之。

Ren told his trusted deputy, Guo Ping, who was now Huawei’s executive vice president, to get to the US as quickly as he could. Ren invoked the fable of ancient Chinese military general Han Xin, who had accepted the humiliation of crawling between another man’s legs to prevent a deadly fight.[14] They could take some blows to their pride as long as the company survived.

任正非告诉他信任的副手、现任华为执行副总裁的郭平，让他尽快赶往美国。任正非引用了中国古代名将韩信的典故，韩信曾忍受胯下之辱以避免致命的争斗。[14] 只要公司能生存下去，他们可以承受一些自尊心上的打击。

Guo met with a series of expensive lawyers, each time asking, “If we lose, how much will we have to pay?”[15] Cisco’s message made it back to Guo through one of Huawei’s consultants: “You guys will be facing astronomical fines. Huawei will go bankrupt.”[16]

郭平会见了一系列收费昂贵的律师，每次都会问：“如果我们输了，得赔多少钱？”[15] 思科的信息通过华为的一位顾问传回了郭平耳中：“你们将面临天文数字般的罚款。华为会破产。”[16]

—

The case looked rough for Huawei. Cisco’s lawsuit alleged that certain bugs from Cisco’s source code were repeated in the software for Huawei’s Quidway line of routers, a telltale sign of copying. It said that Huawei had infringed on at least five Cisco patents and had copied sections of its user manuals verbatim. The lawsuit also revealed that Cisco had hired a sting operator, a California consultant named Scott McElroy, to surreptitiously gather evidence against Huawei, including by chatting up Huawei staffers at a trade show and purchasing a Huawei router to turn over to Cisco for forensic analysis.[17] In an early win, the court granted Cisco a temporary restraining order that required Huawei to preserve evidence.

这起案件对华为来说形势严峻。思科的诉状指控，思科源代码中的某些漏洞在华为 Quidway 系列路由器的软件中重复出现，这是抄袭的典型迹象。诉状称，华为侵犯了思科至少五项专利，并逐字抄袭了其用户手册的部分内容。诉讼还披露，思科雇佣了一名“钓鱼执法”人员——一位名叫斯科特·麦克罗伊（Scott McElroy）的加州顾问，潜伏搜集针对华为的证据，手段包括在贸易展上搭讪华为员工，以及购买一台华为路由器交给思科进行取证分析。[17] 在早期的胜利中，法院授予了思科一项临时限制令，要求华为保全证据。

Cisco had also taken political care by making a trip to Beijing ahead of filing the lawsuit. It was the number-one router vendor in China, and it didn’t want to lose that position by stirring up a nationalistic backlash. Its executives impressed upon Chinese officials that Cisco’s gripe was with a single company, not with the government or the nation. Cisco CEO John Chambers, who had grown up duck hunting in West Virginia, instructed his team to carefully weigh the pros and cons of a lawsuit ahead of time, likening the exercise to studying a duck’s habits before a hunt.[18] “We looked at everything, from the family background of CEO Ren Zhengfei to China’s handling of unrelated but similar cases,” Chambers later wrote. He concluded that Cisco could come out ahead by suing, so long as it took pains not to embarrass the Chinese government or the company.

思科在提起诉讼前还前往北京进行了政治斡旋。它是中国排名第一的路由器供应商，不希望因激起民族主义情绪的反弹而失去这一地位。其高管向中国官员强调，思科的不满针对的是单一公司，而非政府或国家。思科首席执行官约翰·钱伯斯（John Chambers）在西弗吉尼亚州长大，有着猎鸭的经历，他指示团队提前仔细权衡诉讼的利弊，将此举比作狩猎前研究鸭子的习性。[18] “我们研究了一切，从首席执行官任正非的家庭背景到中国对不相关但类似案件的处理方式，”钱伯斯后来写道。他得出结论，只要费心不让中国政府或该公司难堪，思科就能通过起诉占据上风。

Within Huawei, the mood was tense. When some Huawei employees circulated a satirical piece that mentioned the Cisco lawsuit in a mocking way, the 225 staffers who forwarded the email had their pay docked. “Anyone who participates in circulating chain emails unrelated to work will have their pay cut!” management warned.[19]

华为内部气氛紧张。当一些华为员工传阅一篇以嘲讽口吻提及思科诉讼的讽刺文章时，转发该邮件的 225 名员工被扣了工资。“任何参与传阅与工作无关的连锁邮件的人都将被减薪！”管理层警告道。[19]

Huawei was frantically seeking to shore up its intellectual-property standing, striking IP-sharing agreements with Nokia and Siemens. It even considered the drastic move of selling itself to Motorola. Ren met with Motorola’s COO, Mike Zafirovski, on a beach in Hainan, where the two sketched out a $7.5 billion deal. “Ren and the management, they were very excited,” one person with knowledge of the talks recalled. The deal never firmed up, and it was unclear if it even could have passed regulatory approval, with both companies being military suppliers in their home nations. But word of the talks trickled back to Chambers at Cisco.[20] Perhaps that was the point.

华为正疯狂寻求巩固其知识产权地位，与诺基亚和西门子达成了知识产权共享协议。它甚至考虑过将自己卖给摩托罗拉这一激进举动。任正非在海南的海滩上会见了摩托罗拉首席运营官迈克·扎菲罗夫斯基（Mike Zafirovski），两人草拟了一项价值 75 亿美元的交易。“任正非和管理层，他们非常兴奋，”一位了解谈判情况的人士回忆道。这笔交易从未敲定，而且鉴于两家公司在各自国家都是军事供应商，是否能通过监管审批尚不明确。但有关谈判的消息传到了思科钱伯斯的耳中。[20] 或许这正是用意所在。

Huawei’s savior turned out to be 3Com, a Cisco rival. Founded in 1979 by the inventor of Ethernet, Robert Metcalfe, 3Com was an industry forefather. It was now struggling to keep up. Its CEO, Bruce Claflin, a bespectacled IBM veteran with salt-and-pepper hair, admitted to a personal rivalry with Cisco’s Chambers. “My wife said she loved me, but that John Chambers knew a lot more than I did,” Claflin told The New York Times. “Then it was personal.”[21]

华为的救星结果是思科的竞争对手 3Com。3Com 由以太网发明者罗伯特·梅特卡夫（Robert Metcalfe）于 1979 年创立，是行业的鼻祖。当时它正苦于跟不上步伐。其首席执行官布鲁斯·克拉夫林（Bruce Claflin）是一位戴着眼镜、头发花白的 IBM 老将，他承认与思科的钱伯斯存在个人竞争。“我妻子说她爱我，但约翰·钱伯斯比我懂得多得多，”克拉夫林告诉《纽约时报》，“于是这成了私人恩怨。”[21]

An alliance between 3Com and Huawei was attractive to both sides. Huawei would get the immediate legal protection of 3Com’s deep patent portfolio; 3Com would get Huawei’s lower production costs and its connections to the vast China market. Soon after the two announced their joint venture, called H3C, 3Com’s lawyers filed a motion to intervene in the Cisco case, calling 3Com an interested party.[22] Cisco’s lawyers tried to argue that 3Com had no interest in the case, since its prospective joint venture with Huawei was still awaiting regulatory approval. Counsel for 3Com fired back,[23] contending that 3Com had been so “eager to consummate [its] business relationship” with Huawei that the two companies had struck a separate side deal by which Huawei had already begun manufacturing some products for the 3Com brand. Claflin told the court: “3Com and the JV are committed to not releasing any products into the marketplace that they believe infringe the intellectual-property rights of third parties, including Cisco.”

3Com 与华为的联盟对双方都有吸引力。华为将立即获得 3Com 深厚专利库的法律保护；3Com 则将获得华为较低的生产成本及其与庞大中国市场的联系。在两家公司宣布成立名为 H3C 的合资企业后不久，3Com 的律师就提出动议介入思科案，称 3Com 是利益相关方。[22] 思科的律师试图辩称 3Com 与此案无关，因为其与华为拟议的合资企业仍在等待监管审批。3Com 的律师反唇相讥，[23] 辩称 3Com 由于非常“渴望完成与华为的业务关系”，两家公司已达成了一项单独的附带协议，据此华为已经开始为 3Com 品牌制造部分产品。克拉夫林告诉法庭：“3Com 和合资公司致力于不向市场投放任何他们认为侵犯第三方（包括思科）知识产权的产品。”

Shielded by 3Com’s patent umbrella for any current and future products, Huawei saw its legal problem shrink to the much smaller one of whether it had previously infringed on Cisco patents. It was now harder for Cisco to argue that the court needed to block Huawei from pursuing any new sales into the US market.

有了 3Com 专利伞对现有和未来产品的保护，华为的法律问题缩小到了一个更小的范围：即它此前是否侵犯了思科的专利。思科现在更难辩称法院需要阻止华为在美国市场寻求任何新的销售。

As for the question of how sections of Cisco’s code got into Huawei products, some would find Huawei’s explanation extraordinarily implausible, though it was difficult to prove one way or another what had really transpired. Huawei told the court that in 1999, a third party who was not employed by Cisco had given a Huawei employee a disk containing source code for a router protocol, and that employee had given it to a colleague, who’d then proceeded to use it without doing much checking into its provenance.[24] Huawei called it a one-off act by a rogue employee that violated company policy. “The conduct that Cisco seeks to enjoin was stopped and will not resume,” Huawei’s lawyers wrote to the court.

至于思科的部分代码是如何进入华为产品的问题，有些人会觉得华为的解释极其不可信，尽管很难证明当时到底发生了什么。华为告诉法庭，1999 年，一名非思科雇员的第三方给了华为员工一张包含路由器协议源代码的光盘，该员工将其交给了一位同事，后者随后在没有对其来源进行过多检查的情况下便开始使用。[24] 华为称这是违反公司政策的个别员工的孤立行为。“思科寻求禁止的行为已经停止，且不会再犯，”华为律师在呈交给法庭的文件中写道。

—

After Saddam Hussein was overthrown in April 2003, the global telecom industry went into a frenzy. Iraq would be able to build a mobile phone network for the first time—a project worth up to $900 million. Iraq was on the agenda of Huawei’s top management, and Huawei was far from alone.[25] It was on everyone’s agenda.

2003 年 4 月萨达姆·侯赛因被推翻后，全球电信业陷入疯狂。伊拉克将能够首次建设移动电话网络——这是一个价值高达9 亿美元的项目。伊拉克被列入了华为高层的议程，而华为绝非孤例。[25] 它在每个人的议程上。

The World Health Organization declared SARS contained in July 2003, and soon after, a tender conference was held in Amman, Jordan, to pick the telecom operators who would get the licenses to set up Iraq’s mobile networks. A Huawei engineer stationed in Iraq traveled to Amman for the tender, passing a bombed-out landscape along the way. “If not for war and tyranny, what a rich and happy land this nation would be,” the engineer wrote.[26] Huawei’s customer Asiacell emerged as one of the three winners.[27]

世界卫生组织于 2003 年 7 月宣布非典疫情得到控制，不久后，一场招标会议在约旦安曼举行，旨在选出获得伊拉克移动网络建设牌照的电信运营商。一名驻扎在伊拉克的华为工程师前往安曼参加招标，沿途经过了满目疮痍的战后废墟。这位工程师写道：“如果没有战争和暴政，这个国家该是多么富饶幸福的土地啊。”[26] 华为的客户 Asiacell 最终成为三家中标者之一。[27]

By December 2003, streams of Huawei engineers in sturdy SUVs were making the seventeen-hour drive from Amman to Sulaymaniyah, in northern Iraq, to work on Asiacell’s 2G wireless network. Meeting some friendly US soldiers patrolling in Hummers, one managed to get an incongruous snapshot as a souvenir: a smiling Chinese man in a black suit and tie, hands clasped, standing amid a bunch of American troops toting machine guns.[28]

到 2003 年 12 月，成群结队的华为工程师驾驶着坚固的越野车，从安曼出发，历经 17 小时车程前往伊拉克北部的苏莱曼尼亚，负责 Asiacell 的 2G 无线网络建设。在遇到一些驾驶悍马巡逻的友好美军士兵时，其中一人成功拍下了一张极不协调的快照作为纪念：一名身穿黑色西装、系着领带、双手合十的中国男子，微笑着站在一群手持机枪的美国大兵中间。[28]

With the SARS threat contained, mobile operators around the world were proceeding with selecting vendors for next-generation 3G networks. The tireless efforts of Huawei’s sales teams during the pandemic paid off. Hong Kong’s Sunday Communications and the United Arab Emirates’ Etisalat both announced Huawei as their pick for 3G.

随着非典威胁得到控制，全球移动运营商开始着手为下一代 3G 网络选择供应商。华为销售团队在疫情期间的不懈努力得到了回报。香港的星期日电讯（Sunday Communications）和阿联酋电信（Etisalat）均宣布选择华为作为其 3G 供应商。

Huawei even landed its first small US mobile operator during this period. Ironically, it got its foot in the door thanks to an effort by the FBI to expand the agency’s wiretapping capabilities. The 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, or CALEA, had required telecom operators to have a technical side door through which the FBI or other US authorities could wiretap phone calls. But with more and more communications taking place via the internet, US regulators were pushing for an update to CALEA. The FCC ordered operators to retrofit their equipment so that web traffic could also be tapped.[29]

华为甚至在这一时期拿下了其首个美国小型移动运营商客户。讽刺的是，它之所以能敲开这扇大门，得益于联邦调查局（FBI）扩大其窃听能力的努力。1994 年的《执法通信协助法》（CALEA）曾要求电信运营商预留技术后门，以便 FBI 或其他美国当局窃听电话。但随着越来越多的通信通过互联网进行，美国监管机构开始推动更新 CALEA 法案。联邦通信委员会（FCC）命令运营商对其设备进行改造，以便网络流量也能被监听。[29]

For small mobile operators, the cost of buying the new gear on sudden notice was prohibitive. Huawei offered a generous financing package in which an operator could pay the cost over time. Based on this financing option, ClearTalk, which served some twenty thousand residents around El Centro, California, and Yuma, Arizona, chose Huawei. Eric Steinmann, ClearTalk’s owner, recalled the US supplier Lucent quoting around $30 million for the CALEA upgrade and two other new technical requirements by the FCC, “which, for a small company, was more than we had spent building out all our networks, and certainly nothing we had…. So that’s why we had to go with Huawei.”[30]

对于小型移动运营商来说，在接到突如其来的通知后购买新设备的成本是高昂到无法承受的。华为提供了一套慷慨的融资方案，允许运营商分期支付费用。基于这一融资选择，为加利福尼亚州埃尔森特罗和亚利桑那州尤马周边约两万名居民提供服务的 ClearTalk 公司选择了华为。ClearTalk 的所有者埃里克·斯坦曼（Eric Steinmann）回忆说，美国供应商朗讯（Lucent）对 CALEA 升级以及 FCC 的其他两项新技术要求的报价约为 3000 万美元，“对于一家小公司来说，这比我们建设所有网络的总花费还要多，而且我们肯定拿不出这笔钱……所以这就是为什么我们不得不选择华为。”[30]

Cisco dropped its lawsuit against Huawei in July 2004. The two sides did not announce financial terms, except to say that each company had to pay its own legal fees. Each side put its own spin on the outcome. Cisco’s Mark Chandler declared it a “victory for the protection of intellectual property rights.” Huawei said the company was very satisfied with the result.[31]

思科于 2004 年 7 月撤销了对华为的诉讼。双方未公布财务条款，仅表示各自承担法律费用。双方都对结果给出了自己的解读。思科的马克·钱德勒（Mark Chandler）称其为“知识产权保护的胜利”。华为则表示公司对这一结果非常满意。[31]

Huawei would continue to be trailed by intellectual-property lawsuits in the ensuing years. While Huawei largely disputed the claims, Ren has acknowledged that the Chinese market was wild and lawless in its infancy.

在接下来的几年里，华为继续受到知识产权诉讼的困扰。虽然华为在很大程度上对这些指控予以反驳，但任正非也承认，中国市场在起步阶段是狂野且缺乏法治的。

“Everyone knows about this thing, Facebook,” he once quipped. “If it had arisen in China, it might have been copied many times. Not only would the original inventor have been cast aside, but the early copycats would have been as well.”[32]

“大家都知道 Facebook 这个东西，”他曾打趣道，“如果它诞生在中国，可能会被复制很多次。不仅最初的发明者会被抛弃，早期的抄袭者也会被淘汰。”[32]

13

13

The Roads to Empire

帝国之路

Global Expansion: 2004–2008

全球扩张：2004–2008

During Ren Zhengfei’s childhood, traveling outside the country was almost unheard of. Now Huawei employees were seeing the world in style, for work and for amusement. One popular destination was Australia: Ren appealed personally to the Australian consul general in Guangzhou in 2005 for help with visas that would enable Huawei employees to go on holiday in Australia.[1] Those who went on work trips to the United States arrived with shopping lists of designer bags, brand-name sneakers, and other desirable gifts for friends and family back in Shenzhen. On their return, employees sometimes picked up a few tins of imported baby formula in Hong Kong, prized by colleagues with infants who preferred the foreign brands.[2] Ren even amassed a collection of oil paintings, which Huawei staffers helped him tote home from abroad.[3]

在任正非的童年时代，出国旅行几乎是闻所未闻的事情。而现在，华为的员工们无论是因为工作还是娱乐，都在体面地看世界。澳大利亚是一个热门目的地：2005 年，任正非亲自向澳大利亚驻广州总领事求助，希望在签证方面获得帮助，以便华为员工能去澳大利亚度假。[1] 那些去美国出差的人，回来时都带着购物清单，上面写满了名牌包、名牌运动鞋以及其他送给深圳亲友的心仪礼物。回程时，员工有时会在香港买几罐进口奶粉，这深受那些青睐外国品牌的有娃同事们的欢迎。[2] 任正非甚至还收藏了一批油画，由华为员工帮他从国外搬运回国。[3]

Huawei was becoming a frequent host to foreign dignitaries and international executives, with the company often offering to cover travel expenses for visitors. And it now boasted a gleaming new campus that was so large it had its own highway exit.[4] Gone were the hot and humid old offices, where staffers had ducked beneath nets to try to escape the mosquitoes. The new employee dorms had air-conditioning and televisions. Across 350 acres, there were tree-lined boulevards, soccer fields (four in all), tennis courts, and swimming pools.[5] For visitors, there was an upscale hotel operated by Huawei and a palatial white hall, filled with product demos, that some waggish staffers had nicknamed “Saddam’s Palace.”[6] Chefs cooked food from around the world with attention to detail: both northern- and southern-style Indian dishes were served so that Indian software engineers from either part of the country could feel at home. There were hostesses trained in the art of traditional tea ceremonies.[7] The statuesque receptionists and waiters had been screened for height, weight, and posture, their hands and arms checked for scars.[8]

华为正成为外国政要和国际高管的频繁东道主，公司经常主动承担访客的差旅费用。如今，华为拥有一个闪亮的新园区，规模大到拥有专属的高速公路出口。[4] 过去那种闷热潮湿、员工必须躲在蚊帐下躲避蚊虫的老办公室已成为历史。新的员工宿舍配备了空调和电视。在 350 英亩的土地上，分布着林荫大道、足球场（共四个）、网球场和游泳池。[5] 对于访客，这里有华为经营的高档酒店，以及一座展示产品演示的宏伟白色大厅，一些爱开玩笑的员工将其戏称为“萨达姆的宫殿”。[6] 厨师们精心烹饪来自世界各地的美食：同时供应南北风格的印度菜，让来自印度不同地区的软件工程师都能找到家的感觉。还有受过传统茶艺训练的礼仪小姐。[7] 身材高挑的接待员和侍者都经过了身高、体重和姿态的筛选，他们的手部和手臂还要检查是否有伤疤。[8]

Some employees thought all the pomp was wasteful. Ren told them it was just good business. “When customers come to see it, they’ll say this company looks beautiful, it doesn’t look like it will collapse, let’s give them the contract!” he said. “You must understand this point. We serve the customer. So if the customer likes the look of it, we’ll build it for them.”[9]

一些员工认为这些排场是浪费。任正非告诉他们，这正是高明的生意经。“客户来看了，会说这家公司看起来很漂亮，不像要倒闭的样子，把合同给他们吧！”他说，“你们必须明白这一点。我们为客户服务。所以如果客户喜欢这种样子，我们就为他们建造。”[9]

In the early days, Ren had told his engineers they would get so rich that they’d have to air out their cash on balconies so it didn’t get moldy.[10] They’d all laughed. But Huawei’s employees were indeed getting wealthy. Foreign employees too. Huawei’s representative in India, Lu Ke, got the nickname “Mr. Double,” due to his willingness to double Indian engineers’ salaries to get them to join Huawei.[11] Robert Read, who was working at Huawei’s office in Sweden, recalled his boss sending him out on recruiting missions whenever Ericsson was doing layoffs. “He’d give me a big stack of money and send me down to the train station,” he said. “And he’d say, ‘Be friendly with them; buy them drinks. Buy the whole place drinks.’ ”[12]

在早期，任正非曾告诉他的工程师们，他们会变得非常富有，以至于不得不把现金拿到阳台上晾晒，以免发霉。[10] 当时大家都笑了。但华为的员工确实正变得富有。外籍员工也是如此。华为驻印度代表卢克得到了“双倍先生”的绰号，因为他愿意给印度工程师开出双倍薪水，以吸引他们加入华为。[11] 在华为瑞典办事处工作的罗伯特·里德（Robert Read）回忆说，每当爱立信裁员时，他的老板就会派他去执行招聘任务。“他会给我一大叠钱，把我送到火车站，”他说，“他会说，‘对他们友好点；请他们喝酒。请全场的人喝酒。’”[12]

Ren thought of Huawei’s staff as more than just dumb money. He pushed them to cultivate themselves. He felt that the Huawei man should be a Renaissance man, learned in history, literature, philosophy, and global cultures. He set the example himself, penning wide-ranging essays to staff that recounted his own personal experiences, interspersed with musings on historic battles, poetry, and geopolitics. His engineers scrambled to follow suit, to prove themselves sophisticated and philosophical men and women, not just cogs in a router-making machine.

任正非认为华为的员工不仅仅是赚钱的机器。他敦促他们自我修养。他觉得华为人应该是“通才”，精通历史、文学、哲学和全球文化。他以身作则，给员工写了大量散文，讲述自己的个人经历，其中穿插着对历史战役、诗歌和地缘政治的思考。他的工程师们争相效仿，以证明自己是具有文化底蕴和哲学思考的男女，而不仅仅是制造路由器机器上的齿轮。

The cash was flooding in faster than ever before, and much of it was from Beijing. In 2005, the China Development Bank, a Beijing-controlled policy bank, allocated a whopping $10 billion to fund Huawei’s overseas expansion.[13] This was a staggering sum—twice Huawei’s 2004 revenue. It meant that telecom operators around the globe could buy Huawei equipment with little cash down, paying back the loans bit by bit. It was clear encouragement from Beijing to go forth as quickly as possible. In quick succession, Huawei announced deals in South Africa, Jordan, Argentina, Thailand, and a string of other countries.

现金正以前所未有的速度涌入，其中大部分来自北京。2005 年，由北京控制的政策性银行——国家开发银行拨出了高达 100 亿美元的资金，用于支持华为的海外扩张。[13] 这是一个惊人的数字，是华为 2004 年收入的两倍。这意味着全球的电信运营商只需支付很少的现金就能购买华为设备，然后逐笔偿还贷款。这是来自北京的明确鼓励，要求其尽快走向世界。接连不断地，华为宣布在南非、约旦、阿根廷、泰国和一系列其他国家达成交易。

Hu Jintao had succeeded Jiang Zemin as the nation’s leader, and he showed up personally for Huawei’s deal-signing ceremonies in countries ranging from Nigeria to the Philippines to Germany. Some of these projects were being negotiated at the diplomatic level. During a visit to Huawei’s headquarters in August 2005, Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyano said: “Chinese president Hu Jintao and I have reached agreement on expanding the scope of our cooperation, in particular in the areas of information, telecommunications, and national defense.”[14]

胡锦涛接替江泽民成为国家领导人，他亲自出席了华为在尼日利亚、菲律宾、德国等国的签约仪式。其中一些项目是在外交层面进行谈判的。2005 年 8 月访问华为总部期间，印度尼西亚总统苏西洛·班邦·尤多约诺表示：“中国国家主席胡锦涛和我已就扩大合作范围达成协议，特别是在信息、电信和国防领域。”[14]

As Huawei went global, Ren and his team considered changing the company’s name to something catchier to foreign ears. Ren wasn’t fully satisfied with the name Huawei, which he thought had too soft a sound, even if it had the nice meaning of “China is great.” They decided it was too late to change Huawei’s name, but they did revamp the logo. Up until then, it had been a red sunburst with fifteen thin rays. Now, in May 2006, the company streamlined it into eight wider red petals reminiscent of a chrysanthemum.[15] The domestic press nicknamed Huawei “the Chrysanthemum Factory.”

随着华为走向全球，任正非和他的团队曾考虑将公司名称改为更朗朗上口的外国名字。任正非对“华为”这个名字并不完全满意，他认为这个名字发音太软，尽管它有着“中华有为”的美好含义。他们最终决定更改名称为时已晚，但确实重新设计了标志。在此之前，标志是一个带有 15 根细光芒的红色旭日。现在，在 2006 年 5 月，公司将其简化为八片较宽的红色花瓣，让人联想到菊花。[15] 国内媒体因此给华为起了一个绰号叫“菊厂”。

Ren appeared in the ranks of Time’s “100 Most Influential People of 2005.” Ren was “a former soldier who fashions himself after Chairman Mao,” Time said. “Like China’s former leader, Ren Zhengfei is known for spouting folk witticisms, purging associates and challenging U.S. power.”[16]

任正非出现在了《时代》周刊“2005 年百大最具影响力人物”名单中。《时代》周刊评价说，任正非是“一位以毛泽东为榜样的前军人”。“就像中国的前领导人一样，任正非以发表民间警句、清洗合伙人和挑战美国实力而闻名。”[16]

—

In London, there was hushed discussion among officials. British Telecom, or BT, Britain’s biggest phone and internet company, had flagged to British authorities that Huawei was vying for a spot in BT’s £10 billion network upgrade from dial-up internet to speedy broadband. Ren and his team were hoping this would be their breakthrough into the West. Officials at the UK’s National Security Information Exchange considered banning Huawei from the bid but ultimately allowed it to proceed.[17] They were wary of the possibility of a lawsuit if they barred a single vendor. And there was certainly the risk of political retaliation from China.

在伦敦，官员们正在进行低声讨论。英国最大的电话和互联网公司英国电信（BT）向英国当局发出预警，称华为正竞标参与 BT 耗资 100 亿英镑的网络升级项目，旨在将拨号上网升级为高速宽带。任正非和他的团队希望这能成为他们打入西方市场的突破口。英国国家安全信息交换所（National Security Information Exchange）的官员曾考虑禁止华为投标，但最终允许其继续进行。[17] 他们担心如果禁止单一供应商可能会引发诉讼。而且，确实存在来自中国政治报复的风险。

Huawei sent more than a hundred employees to the UK to work on its bid.[18] The company had been wooing BT’s CTO, Matt Bross, for months, and while Bross had responded positively, it was hard to know if Huawei really had a shot. Huawei’s staffers had never worked with a major Western operator, and they scrambled to meet BT’s strict supplier requirements and to answer all the technical questions in the bidding process. “We were sleeping on the floor for a couple hours and then continuing with the work,” one Huawei employee recalled. “We went for seven days nonstop.”

华为向英国派驻了一百多名员工负责竞标工作。[18] 公司数月来一直在拉拢 BT 的首席技术官马特·布罗斯（Matt Bross），虽然布罗斯反应积极，但很难确定华为是否真的有机会。华为的员工从未与西方大型运营商合作过，他们拼命工作以满足 BT 严格的供应商要求，并回答招标过程中的所有技术问题。“我们就在地板上睡几个小时，然后继续工作，”一名华为员工回忆道，“我们连续七天没合眼。”

BT’s decision to pick Huawei in April 2005 broke open the dam into the West. With BT’s seal of approval, Huawei quickly landed contracts with the UK’s Vodafone, France’s Orange SA, and Spain’s Telefónica. These deals plugged Huawei into not just individual countries but entire continents. Vodafone ran mobile networks across Europe and the developing world. Orange SA spanned France and Francophone Africa. Telefónica dominated Spanish-speaking nations. If these operators’ footprints had echoes of the European empires of old, it wasn’t entirely a coincidence. Building out telephone networks across their empires had been a priority for European governments as a way to connect to and manage their territories. This telephone infrastructure had gradually come into the ownership of privatized companies. Ken Zita, former strategic adviser on telecommunications to the US Pacific Command, said that a lot about geopolitics could be explained by the layout of telecommunications networks. “If you understand how information flows in a system, then you can understand how the whole thing works,” he said.[19]

2005 年 4 月，BT 决定选择华为，这彻底冲开了进入西方市场的大闸。有了 BT 的认可，华为迅速拿下了英国沃达丰（Vodafone）、法国电信（Orange SA）和西班牙电信（Telefónica）的合同。这些交易不仅让华为进入了单个国家，还触及了整个大洲。沃达丰的移动网络遍布欧洲和发展中国家；法国电信横跨法国和法语非洲地区；西班牙电信则主导着西语国家。如果说这些运营商的版图带有旧时欧洲帝国的影子，这并非完全巧合。在整个帝国范围内建设电话网络曾是欧洲各国政府的优先事项，以此作为连接和管理其领土的手段。这些电话基础设施后来逐渐转入私有化公司手中。曾任美国太平洋司令部电信战略顾问的肯·齐塔（Ken Zita）表示，地缘政治的许多方面都可以通过电信网络的布局来解释。“如果你了解信息在一个系统中是如何流动的，你就能理解整个系统是如何运作的，”他说。[19]

Huawei’s entry into Europe with Vodafone began humbly: it started out supplying 3G “dongles”—USB sticks that could project a Wi-Fi hotspot when plugged into a laptop—then advanced to making Vodafone-brand cell phones.[20] Pretty soon, Huawei was supplying the whole kit and caboodle: routers, servers, fiber-optic networks, mobile base stations. Telecom operators around the world couldn’t get enough of Huawei’s gear or, especially, its bargain prices.

华为通过沃达丰进入欧洲市场的起步非常低调：最初只是供应 3G “上网卡”——这种插入笔记本电脑后能发射 Wi-Fi 热点的 USB 棒——随后发展到制造沃达丰品牌的手机。[20] 很快，华为就开始供应全套设备：路由器、服务器、光纤网络、移动基站。世界各地的电信运营商对华为的设备趋之若鹜，尤其是其低廉的价格。

It was the beginning of the end for several of Huawei’s Western rivals. After losing the BT contract, Britain’s Marconi and Canada’s Nortel considered the possibility of a Huawei takeover or merger, with Ren’s trusted deputy, Guo Ping, having discussions with both.[21] Nortel’s CEO, Bill Owens, said he tried for several months to get the Canadian and US governments to agree to a merger between Huawei and Nortel, which he said would have been “a wonderful thing for the relationship of China, Canada, and the United States.”[22] (Nortel’s significant US operations meant that Washington regulators would involve themselves in any deal.) “I thought that Mr. Ren Zhengfei was going to be willing to share all the source code of Huawei with the National Security Agency,” Owens said. “I had talked to the National Security Council about this.” It quickly became clear, however, that any such deal would be viewed as a security risk by Western regulators.

这是华为的几个西方竞争对手走向终结的开始。在失去 BT 的合同后，英国的马可尼（Marconi）和加拿大的北电网络（Nortel）都考虑过被华为收购或与其合并的可能性，任正非信任的副手郭平曾与双方进行过讨论。[21] 北电首席执行官比尔·欧文斯（Bill Owens）表示，他曾花了几个月时间试图让加拿大和美国政府同意华为与北电合并，他认为这“对中国、加拿大和美国的关系将是一件美事”。[22]（由于北电在美国有大量业务，这意味着华盛顿的监管机构会介入任何交易。）“我认为任正非先生会愿意与美国国家安全局分享华为的所有源代码，”欧文斯说，“我曾就此与国家安全委员会进行过交谈。”然而，很快情况就变得明朗，任何此类交易都会被西方监管机构视为安全风险。

—

As Beijing opened the financing taps for Huawei’s overseas expansion, the company’s challenge was now keeping up with orders. It was grievously delayed on some of its contracts and struggled to pacify irate customers. “At the time, people would joke that ‘even if you are able to find a project manager on the moon, they still won’t be able to deliver a Huawei project,’ ” Guo Ping recalled.[23]

随着北京为华为的海外扩张开启融资闸门，公司现在的挑战变成了如何跟上订单进度。华为在一些合同上严重延期，并费力地安抚愤怒的客户。“当时人们开玩笑说，‘就算你能从月球上找来项目经理，他们也无法交付华为的项目，’”郭平回忆道。[23]

In Kenya in 2004, Huawei held a grand signing ceremony with mobile operator Safaricom, and the Chinese Communist Party elder Wu Bangguo even flew over for the occasion.[24] Three years later, Safaricom was still waiting on the billing system. Safaricom’s CEO, Michael Joseph, was beside himself. “I had lots and lots of meetings, quite upset meetings,” he recalled.[25]

2004 年在肯尼亚，华为与移动运营商 Safaricom 举行了盛大的签约仪式，中国共产党元老吴邦国甚至亲临现场。[24] 三年后，Safaricom 仍在等待计费系统上线。Safaricom 的首席执行官迈克尔·约瑟夫（Michael Joseph）气急败坏。“我开了无数次会，非常不愉快的会议，”他回忆道。[25]

Finally, Joseph flew to Hong Kong. “I want to cancel this contract,” he remembered telling Huawei executives. “And if you don’t give me my money back, I’m going to sue you in London.”

最终，约瑟夫飞往香港。“我要取消这份合同，”他记得自己当时对华为高管说，“如果你不把钱退给我，我就在伦敦起诉你们。”

Huawei agreed to refund the money, and the problem seemed resolved. But when Joseph returned home, Kenya’s information and communication minister summoned him. According to a WikiLeaks-leaked cable from the US embassy in Nairobi, Joseph was told that canceling the Huawei contract had put all Chinese foreign assistance to Kenya at risk. Other ministers also telephoned Joseph to ask him to reconsider. The minister of immigration insinuated that as a foreigner, he might have work-permit problems if he went through with the cancellation.[26]

华为同意退款，问题似乎得到了解决。但当约瑟夫回到家时，肯尼亚信息与通信部长召见了他。根据维基解密泄露的一份来自美国驻内罗毕大使馆的电报，约瑟夫被告知，取消华为合同已使中国对肯尼亚的所有对外援助面临风险。其他部长也给约瑟夫打电话，要求他重新考虑。移民局长甚至暗示，作为一名外国人，如果他坚持取消合同，他的工作许可可能会出问题。[26]

Asked about the incident years later, Joseph acknowledged it had taken place, but he came to Huawei’s defense. He said that the company had succeeded in winning back Safaricom and had gone on to become a key partner. Huawei had provided the engineering resources that Safaricom needed to build a mobile payment system called M-PESA (pesa is Swahili for “money”), which became a smash success, with people signing up for Safaricom service just to use it. This was not something Safaricom could have done without Huawei’s help. In any case, Safaricom had few options beyond making up with Huawei. Only a handful of companies in the world still made cell tower systems, and at budget price points, it was either Huawei or ZTE.

多年后被问及此事时，约瑟夫承认确实发生过，但他为华为辩护。他说，该公司成功赢回了萨法利通信（Safaricom），并随后成为了关键合作伙伴。华为提供了萨法利通信建立名为 M-PESA（pesa 在斯瓦希里语中意为“钱”）的移动支付系统所需的工程资源，该系统取得了巨大的成功，人们为了使用它而纷纷注册萨法利通信的服务。如果没有华为的帮助，萨法利通信是无法做到这一点的。无论如何，除了与华为和解，萨法利通信几乎没有其他选择。全球只有少数几家公司仍在制造基站系统，而在预算价格点上，要么选择华为，要么选择中兴。

[picture]

A Safaricom shop in Siaya County, Kenya, advertises M-PESA, the mobile payment service developed by Huawei in 2016.

肯尼亚西亚亚郡的一家萨法利通信商店正在为 M-PESA 做广告，这是华为在 2016 年开发的移动支付服务。

When Joseph stepped down as Safaricom’s CEO in 2011, Huawei threw him a lavish party in Shenzhen, true to its tradition of remembering old friends. “They knew I liked classical music, and they brought in a classical orchestra,” Joseph recalled. “They brought in an opera singer. They gave me a bottle of wine that was made in the year that I was born.”

当约瑟夫于 2011 年卸任萨法利通信首席执行官时，华为在深圳为他举办了一场奢华的派对，这符合其不忘老朋友的传统。“他们知道我喜欢古典音乐，于是请来了一支古典管弦乐队，”约瑟夫回忆道，“他们请来了一位歌剧演唱家。他们还送了我一瓶在我出生那年酿造的红酒。”

—

On a Sunday morning in January 2006, North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Il, emerged from his hotel in Shenzhen, stepped into a car, and rode by motorcade to Huawei Technologies.[27] He stayed for only twenty minutes. But the visit opened the door to a contract for Huawei to construct North Korea’s first 3G mobile phone network, Koryolink.[28]

2006 年 1 月的一个周日早晨，朝鲜领导人金正日走出他在深圳下榻的酒店，坐进一辆轿车，在车队的护送下前往华为技术有限公司。[27] 他仅停留了二十分钟。但这次访问为华为赢得建设朝鲜首个 3G 移动通信网络 Koryolink 的合同打开了大门。[28]

Huawei’s experience in Iraq had perhaps left the company’s executives with the lesson that they could successfully work in countries sanctioned by the United States so long as they proceeded carefully. While Huawei had suffered a setback in 2001, when the Pentagon blew up its fiber-optic network in Iraq and the company had faced the prospect of penalties for violating UN sanctions, it had made it through. Indeed, Huawei had been rewarded in the end for going where others shied away. When the sanctions were lifted in 2003, Huawei was positioned to quickly win a place in Iraq’s new mobile network.

华为在伊拉克的经历或许给公司高管们留下了一个教训：只要谨慎行事，他们就可以在受美国制裁的国家成功开展业务。虽然华为在 2001 年遭受了挫折——当时五角大楼炸毁了其在伊拉克的地面光纤网络，且公司面临因违反联合国制裁而受到处罚的可能——但它挺了过来。事实上，华为最终因为敢于去别人畏缩不前的地方而获得了回报。当 2003 年制裁解除时，华为已占据有利位置，迅速在伊拉克的新移动网络中赢得了一席之地。

Now, in North Korea, which was under US technology sanctions, Huawei approached the project carefully, using the code name “A9” in internal records. Huawei sold its antennae and other gear to an intermediary Chinese company, Panda International, which shipped the equipment by rail across China’s far-northeast border, as later reported by The Washington Post.[29] (Asked by The Post, Huawei said it had “no business presence” in North Korea.) Due to his own childhood experience of famine, Ren sympathized with the nation’s plight. “I can truly understand the difficulties faced by the North Korean people in recent years,” he once remarked.[30]

现在，在受美国技术制裁的朝鲜，华为谨慎地推进项目，在内部记录中使用代号“A9”。据《华盛顿邮报》后来报道，华为将其天线和其他设备卖给了一家中间商中国公司——熊猫国际，后者通过铁路将设备运过中国东北边境。[29]（在接受《邮报》采访时，华为表示其在朝鲜“没有业务存在”。）由于自己童年时期的饥荒经历，任正非对该国的困境表示同情。“我确实能理解朝鲜人民近年来面临的困难，”他曾评论道。[30]

Huawei was also staying in the Afghanistan market, even though the US war against the Taliban made the business prospects unclear. “We were just spending money,” one Afghanistan-based Huawei engineer recalled. “After one year, I didn’t see any returns.” He said that management told him it was okay. They were taking the long view. “This is how they grow from country to country,” he said. “They are long-term thinkers.” The engineer recalled that he received a daily “war allowance” stipend of one hundred dollars.[31] Workers often had to hunker down at the company’s secure villa in Kabul, where they lived and worked. “There were bombs, and during a blast, we used to get the message ‘Okay, today we just stay home.’ ” Another Huawei staffer stationed in Afghanistan wrote that a local colleague was once held hostage but fortunately released unharmed.[32] Huawei sent over a chef from Chongqing to ease homesickness, and Ren went to visit the Afghanistan office to shore up morale. “I promise that as long as I can fly, I’ll come to visit you in hardship zones,” Ren said. “If I fear death myself, how can I ask you to fight heroically?”[33]

华为也留在了阿富汗市场，尽管美国针对塔利班的战争让业务前景变得不明朗。“我们当时只是在花钱，”一位驻阿富汗的华为工程师回忆道，“一年后，我没看到任何回报。”他说管理层告诉他没关系，他们看重的是长远。“这就是他们如何在一个又一个国家成长起来的，”他说，“他们是长期主义者。”这位工程师回忆说，他每天能领取 100 美元的“战争津贴”。[31] 员工们经常不得不躲在公司位于喀布尔的安全别墅里，他们在那里生活和工作。“那里有炸弹，爆炸发生时，我们通常会收到消息说‘好吧，今天就待在家里’。”另一位驻阿富汗的华为员工写道，一名当地同事曾被扣为人质，但幸运的是安全获释。[32] 华为从重庆派去了一名厨师以缓解员工的思乡之情，任正非也前往阿富汗办事处视察以提振士气。“我承诺，只要我还能飞，我就会去艰苦地区看望你们，”任正非说，“如果我自己都怕死，我怎么能要求你们英勇奋斗呢？”[33]

Huawei’s business in Iran also carried on, though the political environment had grown increasingly fraught. In the late 1990s, the US had eased sanctions on Iran under the reformist president Mohammad Khatami, but the revelation that the country had covertly built nuclear facilities in 2002 sparked an international crisis. After being elected president in 2005, hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad pushed the nuclear program more forcefully, with Iran announcing in 2006 that it had succeeded in enriching uranium for the first time.[34] President George W. Bush’s administration instituted new sanctions against individuals connected with Iran’s nuclear industry, though other trade was allowed to continue. Iran was a frequent pit stop for Huawei employees in the region, partly because they had at some point discovered that it was a convenient route for renewing their visas for the United Arab Emirates. Huawei employees who were posted to the UAE often worked on tourist visas, but they had to leave the country each month to renew them.[35] The quickest round trip out of Dubai was the short flight across the Persian Gulf to Iran and back again, an arrangement that the employees were largely okay with until a plane on the route crashed, killing forty-three of the forty-six people on board. In a complaint to Huawei’s leadership, they wrote that only by luck had none of them been aboard the doomed flight. “Perhaps it is for convenience, or considerations from the cost perspective, but tourist visas are used for work in many countries, bringing great inconvenience to employees,” their grievance read.

华为在伊朗的业务也在继续，尽管政治环境已变得日益紧张。20 世纪 90 年代末，在改革派总统穆罕默德·哈塔米执政期间，美国放宽了对伊朗的制裁，但 2002 年该国秘密建造核设施的消息引发了国际危机。强硬派马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德在 2005 年当选总统后，更强力地推进核计划，伊朗在 2006 年宣布首次成功浓缩铀。[34] 乔治·W·布什总统政府对与伊朗核工业有关的个人实施了新制裁，但其他贸易被允许继续。伊朗是该地区华为员工经常停留的一站，部分原因是他们在某个时候发现，那是续签阿拉伯联合酋长国签证的便捷路线。被派往阿联酋的华为员工通常持旅游签证工作，但他们必须每月离境一次以续签。[35] 从迪拜出发最快的往返行程是飞越波斯湾到达伊朗再返回，员工们对这种安排基本没意见，直到该航线上的一架飞机坠毁，造成机上 46 人中的 43 人遇难。在给华为领导层的一份投诉中，他们写道，仅仅是运气好才没有人在那架失事的飞机上。“也许是为了方便，或者是出于成本考虑，但在许多国家，旅游签证被用于工作，给员工带来了极大的不便，”他们的诉求书中写道。

During this period, Huawei was also selling products to Iran Electronics Industries, an Iranian military contractor owned by the Ministry of Defense. As with the North Korea project, it was making sales through an intermediary. In the October 2006 issue of Management Optimization, one of Huawei’s internal newspapers, an article berating staffers for sloppily pasting shipping labels included, by way of illustration, a photo of a box being shipped from the China National Technical Import and Export Corp., a state-owned Chinese company, to “Iran Electronic Industries.”[36] The shipping label gave no indication that the package had any relation to Huawei, but the author of the article, a Huawei employee working on the company’s Middle East supply chains, wrote that their business partner had complained about the label peeling off the box due to not being glued on securely enough. “It was really embarrassing to be a Huawei employee in that moment!” the employee wrote. Weeks later, this very same Iranian company was sanctioned by the US State Department, which accused it of being involved in the development of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.[37]

在此期间，华为还向伊朗电子工业公司（Iran Electronics Industries）销售产品，这是一家隶属于伊朗国防部的军事承包商。与朝鲜项目一样，华为也是通过中间商进行销售。在 2006 年 10 月刊的华为内部报纸《管理优化》中，一篇责备员工粘贴出货标签过于马虎的文章，附上了一张作为例证的照片，照片显示一个箱子正从中国国有企业“中国技术进出口总公司”发往“伊朗电子工业公司”。[36] 出货标签上没有任何迹象表明该包裹与华为有关，但文章作者（一名负责华为中东供应链的员工）写道，他们的业务伙伴抱怨标签从箱子上脱落，因为胶水粘得不够牢固。该员工写道：“那一刻，作为一名华为员工真的很尴尬！”几周后，这家伊朗公司就受到了美国国务院的制裁，美方指控其参与了导弹和大规模杀伤性武器的研发。[37]

—

In 2007, Huawei leveled up into the big leagues when it launched two exotic offerings: submarine cables and managed services. These product areas might have been obscure to the general consumer, but they reflected that Huawei had arrived at an elite level in the networking world.

2007 年，华为推出了两项极具特色的业务：海底电缆和管理服务，由此晋升至行业顶尖行列。这些产品领域对普通消费者来说可能比较陌生，但它们反映出华为已进入网络世界的精英阶层。

Submarine cables, the pipes that carry some 99 percent of the world’s internet traffic, form the backbone of the global telecommunication network. While people tend to imagine data being beamed to their devices by satellite from the other side of the earth, it almost always travels under the sea. The industry is viewed by governments as a critical one, since a severed cable can temporarily knock an entire country off-line. For obvious reasons, the sector has also been of high interest to intelligence agencies.[38] In a famous case, Operation Ivy Bells, the US Navy, CIA, and NSA put a tap on a Soviet subsea cable in the early 1970s, with divers swapping in a new set of tapes each month for a decade until the operation was compromised.[39] Since then, these networks have been built with more secure fiber-optic cables, which transport the information through beams of light. In 2001, The Wall Street Journal reported that the NSA was keenly interested in developing technologies to tap subsea fiber-optic cables, calling such operations “technologically daunting, physically dangerous and potentially illegal.”[40] The Journal added that missions to intercept signals were among the most highly classified US government operations, and leaking information about them was a federal crime punishable by imprisonment.

海底电缆是承载全球约 99%互联网流量的管道，构成了全球电信网络的骨干。虽然人们倾向于想象数据是通过卫星从地球另一端发射到设备上的，但实际上数据几乎总是通过海底传输。各国政府将该行业视为关键领域，因为一根电缆被切断就可能导致整个国家暂时断网。出于显而易见的原因，该领域也一直受到情报机构的高度关注。[38] 在著名的“常春藤铃”（Operation Ivy Bells）行动中，美国海军、中央情报局（CIA）和国家安全局（NSA）于 20 世纪 70 年代初期在苏联的一条海底电缆上安装了窃听装置，潜水员在长达十年的时间里每月更换一套新的录音带，直到该行动暴露。[39] 自那时起，这些网络开始使用安全性更高的光缆构建，通过光束传输信息。2001 年，《华尔街日报》报道称，美国国家安全局对开发窃听海底光缆的技术表现出浓厚兴趣，并称此类行动“在技术上令人望而生畏，在物理上充满危险，且可能涉嫌违法”。[40] 该报还补充说，拦截信号的任务属于美国政府最高机密行动，泄露相关信息是联邦犯罪，可判处监禁。

The cloak-and-dagger stuff aside, building the cables was big business. With global internet traffic growing exponentially, the world was in a subsea cable building spree. Traditional networking vendors like Cisco and Nokia were involved. Newer companies like Google, Microsoft, and Facebook were also jumping in. Huawei made its entry through a joint-venture company set up in 2007 with the UK’s Global Marine Systems.[41] Guo Ping, who was now Huawei’s chief strategic officer, was named the chairman of the new submarine cable venture,[42] called Huawei Submarine Networks. The joint-venture company was soon bidding for projects like an undersea fiber-optic cable to connect Kenya and the United Arab Emirates. Huawei lost that project, which was awarded to Alcatel-Lucent—the French networking giant that had absorbed the strongest US player, Lucent, a year earlier amid a wave of industry consolidation. But Huawei kept bidding, and pretty soon it began winning submarine cable projects.

撇开这些特工戏码不谈，建造电缆是一门大生意。随着全球互联网流量呈指数级增长，世界正处于海底电缆建设热潮中。思科和诺基亚等传统网络供应商参与其中。谷歌、微软和脸书等新兴公司也纷纷加入。华为通过 2007 年与英国全球海事系统公司（Global Marine Systems）成立的合资公司进入了这一领域。[41] 当时担任华为首席战略官的郭平被任命为这家名为“华为海洋网络”的新海底电缆合资公司的董事长。[42] 这家合资公司很快就开始竞标连接肯尼亚和阿拉伯联合酋长国的海底光缆等项目。华为输掉了那个项目，该项目被阿尔卡特朗讯（Alcatel-Lucent）夺得——这家法国网络巨头在一年前的行业整合浪潮中吞并了美国最强的竞争对手朗讯。但华为继续竞标，很快就开始赢得海底电缆项目。

In 2007, Huawei also began selling managed services, a comprehensive service offering pioneered by Western companies like Ericsson. If a customer opted for managed services, Huawei helped run its networks for a fee.[43] This bland-sounding part of Huawei’s business was often entirely overlooked by outside observers. But in terms of the company’s geopolitical importance, it was one of the most critical. It put Huawei’s engineers at the controls of customers’ networks. In ensuing years, many of the controversies that would arise over Huawei’s participation in government surveillance would involve contracts whereby Huawei was providing managed services for the customer. The scope of such deals was outlined in corporate press releases. For example, Huawei announced in 2008 that Saudi Arabia’s Mobily was contracting it to administer Mobily’s “network operations, back office, field operations, network optimization and spare parts management.” Huawei would also maintain equipment from third-party companies in Mobily’s network. “This managed services agreement will enable Mobily to reduce operations costs,” a press release said.[44]

2007 年，华为还开始销售管理服务，这是一种由爱立信等西方公司开创的综合服务方案。如果客户选择了管理服务，华为将收取费用协助其运行网络。[43] 华为业务中这个听起来平淡无奇的部分往往被外界观察者完全忽视。但就该公司的地缘政治重要性而言，它是最关键的部分之一。它让华为的工程师掌握了客户网络的控制权。在随后的几年里，许多关于华为参与政府监控的争议都涉及华为为客户提供管理服务的合同。此类交易的范围在公司新闻稿中有所概述。例如，华为在 2008 年宣布，沙特阿拉伯的 Mobily 公司正签约委托其管理 Mobily 的“网络运营、后台部门、外场作业、网络优化和备件管理”。华为还将维护 Mobily 网络中来自第三方公司的设备。一份新闻稿称：“这项管理服务协议将使 Mobily 能够降低运营成本。”[44]

With Huawei increasingly integrated into global networks, it was being watched closely by spy agencies. Several industry executives recalled Western intelligence officers reaching out with questions. In July 2007, FBI agents interviewed Ren at a New York hotel. Not much is known about the circumstances, except that Ren told them Huawei had not dealt directly with any Iranian company, having only sold some equipment to a third party, “possibly in Egypt.” When Ren and his deputies applied for visas to travel to the US for business trips, they were frustrated to find that they were limited to single-entry visas.[45] The State Department had flagged all Huawei employees as a technology-transfer risk, prohibiting them from multiple-entry visas under the Visas Mantis program.

随着华为日益融入全球网络，它也受到了间谍机构的密切监视。几位行业高管回忆说，西方情报官员曾找他们询问情况。2007 年 7 月，联邦调查局（FBI）探员在纽约的一家酒店面谈了任正非。除了任正非告诉他们华为没有直接与任何伊朗公司打交道，只是向第三方（“可能在埃及”）出售了一些设备外，外界对当时的情况知之甚少。当任正非及其副手申请赴美商务考察的签证时，他们沮丧地发现自己被限制在单次入境签证。[45] 美国国务院已将所有华为员工标记为技术转移风险人员，根据“螳螂签证”（Visas Mantis）计划禁止向他们发放多次入境签证。

Charles Clancy, who was a research leader with the National Security Agency, recalled visiting Asiacell’s headquarters in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, in 2009 or 2010 and seeing a lot of Huawei engineers posted there to support a managed services contract. “The Huawei engineers and the Asiacell engineers were playing soccer,” he said. “They were the ones that were really running a lot of the infrastructure.”[46] Clancy later told a Senate committee that Huawei’s managed services gave the company’s employees broad access to overseas networks without any hacks having to take place. “A back door is not needed if you already have a key to the front door,” he explained to the committee.[47]

曾任美国国家安全局研究负责人的查尔斯·克兰西（Charles Clancy）回忆起 2009 年或 2010 年访问伊拉克 Asiacell 公司位于苏莱曼尼亚的总部时，看到那里驻扎着大量华为工程师，负责支持一项管理服务合同。“华为的工程师和 Asiacell 的工程师在一起踢足球，”他说。“他们才是真正运行大量基础设施的人。”[46] 克兰西后来告诉参议院委员会，华为的管理服务让该公司员工拥有广泛访问海外网络的权限，而无需进行任何黑客攻击。他向委员会解释道：“如果你已经有了正门的钥匙，就不需要后门了。”[47]

Western spy agencies were also meeting with domestic networking companies, not all of which were receptive to the visits. Michel Juneau-Katsuya, a former senior Canadian intelligence officer, recalled warning Nortel executives that their company was being targeted by China’s intelligence services. “We were disregarded,” he said. “Like, ‘What’s the problem?…Everything’s fine. We don’t need you guys. Go play James Bond somewhere else.’ ”[48]

西方间谍机构也在与国内网络公司接洽，但并非所有公司都对这些访问表示欢迎。前加拿大高级情报官员米歇尔·朱诺-卡苏亚（Michel Juneau-Katsuya）回忆说，他曾警告北电网络（Nortel）的高管，他们的公司正成为中国情报机构的目标。“我们被忽视了，”他说。“就像在说，‘有什么问题吗？……一切都很好。我们不需要你们。去别的地方玩詹姆斯·邦德的游戏吧。’”[48]

—

In September 2007, Huawei found itself at the center of a political maelstrom in Washington. News had broken that Huawei and Bain Capital—the Boston-based private equity company cofounded by former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney—had struck a deal to take over the US networking company 3Com. US politicians were up in arms, denouncing it as a threat to national security and calling for the Bush administration to block the deal.

2007 年 9 月，华为发现自己处于华盛顿一场政治旋涡的中心。有消息传出，华为与贝恩资本（Bain Capital）——由前马萨诸塞州州长米特·罗姆尼共同创立的波士顿私募股权公司——达成了一项收购美国网络公司 3Com 的交易。美国政客们义愤填膺，谴责此举威胁国家安全，并要求布什政府阻止该交易。

From a purely financial perspective, the transaction made sense. Bain knew that 3Com’s success depended on Huawei’s blessing. What few people on the outside understood was that practically the only thing keeping 3Com afloat in those days was sales from its China unit, H3C, which Huawei had helped set up as a joint venture in 2003. In line with the agreement between Huawei and 3Com, Huawei had sold its H3C shares back to 3Com in 2006, promising not to compete head-to-head with H3C for eighteen months. But they all knew that after the eighteen months were up, Huawei could crush H3C if Ren felt inclined. Bain had made Huawei a peace offering of a 16.5 percent stake in the $2.2 billion deal.

从纯粹的财务角度来看，这笔交易是合理的。贝恩知道 3Com 的成功取决于华为的认可。外界很少有人明白，当时维持 3Com 运转的几乎唯一支柱就是其中国子公司 H3C（华三）的销售额，而 H3C 是华为在 2003 年协助建立的合资企业。根据华为与 3Com 达成的协议，华为已于 2006 年将其持有的 H3C 股份卖回给 3Com，并承诺在 18 个月内不与 H3C 开展直接竞争。但大家都知道，18 个月期限一过，如果任正非愿意，华为可以轻易击垮 H3C。在这笔价值 22 亿美元的交易中，贝恩向华为提供了 16.5% 的股份作为和解条件。

In Washington, folks did not see things that way. US politicians pointed out that 3Com was a Pentagon contractor. Congressman Peter Hoekstra of Michigan warned that China might be able to learn what systems the US government had put in place to block hackers. Thaddeus McCotter, chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee, called it a “stealth assault on America’s national security.” Huawei’s executives were taken aback by the vitriol. Asked by a Financial Times reporter if the deal would endanger US national security, Huawei’s chief marketing officer, Eric Xu—a serious, bespectacled PhD known within the company for his plainspokenness—exclaimed: “That would be bullshit.”[49]

在华盛顿，人们并不这么看。美国政客指出 3Com 是五角大楼的承包商。密歇根州国会议员彼得·霍克斯特拉（Peter Hoekstra）警告说，中国可能会借此了解美国政府为阻止黑客而设置的系统。众议院共和党政策委员会主席撒迪厄斯·麦科特尔（Thaddeus McCotter）称之为对“美国国家安全的隐秘攻击”。华为的高管们对这种刻薄的言论感到吃惊。当被《金融时报》记者问及该交易是否会危及美国国家安全时，华为首席营销官徐直军——一位在公司内部以直言不讳著称、神情严肃且戴着眼镜的博士——惊呼道：“那简直是胡说八道。”[49]

The fate of the deal came down to a cloistered US regulatory panel called the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS. People called it “Sif-ee-us,” the pronunciation giving it an ancient Grecian ring of authority and intrigue. The Treasury secretary usually chaired the twelve-agency committee, but Secretary Henry Paulson had recused himself due to a potential conflict: he was a former chairman of Goldman Sachs, which had advised 3Com on the deal with Bain and Huawei.[50] Paulson passed review of the case to Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert M. Kimmitt.

这笔交易的命运最终落到了一个名为美国外资投资委员会（CFIUS）的封闭式监管小组手中。人们称之为“Sif-ee-us”，这个发音带有一种古希腊式的权威与阴谋色彩。财政部长通常担任这个由 12 个机构组成的委员会的主席，但亨利·保尔森（Henry Paulson）部长因潜在的利益冲突而回避了：他曾任高盛集团主席，而高盛曾就该交易为 3Com 提供咨询。[50] 保尔森将此案的审查权交给了财政部副部长罗伯特·M·金米特（Robert M. Kimmitt）。

CFIUS was powerful, and its workings were mysterious. The members made closed-door decisions on which foreign investments in US companies would be blocked for national security reasons. Due to their work touching on classified information, they did not feel able or obligated to explain their decisions. Such was their power that they often didn’t even have to reject a deal outright. They just had to intimate that it would not pass, and a deal would be stopped cold.

CFIUS 权力巨大，且运作神秘。成员们在闭门会议中决定哪些对美国公司的外国投资将因国家安全原因被阻止。由于他们的工作涉及机密信息，他们认为没有能力也没有义务解释其决定。他们的权力如此之大，以至于往往甚至不需要直接拒绝一笔交易。他们只需暗示该交易无法通过，交易就会戛然而止。

A first exchange with CFIUS was often a small, private meeting with a few lawyers. But when Huawei representatives turned up to begin the review process, they found themselves in a packed hall with senior Pentagon officials in uniform. “It means they’ve already decided you’re done,” said one person with knowledge of the meeting. “They just want to see how much information they can get out of you before they tell you to go screw yourself.”

与 CFIUS 的首次交流通常是与几名律师进行的小型私人会议。但当华为代表出现并开始审查程序时，他们发现自己置身于一个挤满了身着制服的五角大楼高级官员的大厅里。“这意味着他们已经决定让你出局了，”一位了解会议情况的人士说。“他们只是想看看在叫你滚蛋之前，能从你身上榨取多少信息。”

Huawei, 3Com, and Bain persisted for a few months in trying to find a risk-mitigation plan that could appease CFIUS. But by February 2008, they knew the deal was dead.

华为、3Com 和贝恩在接下来的几个月里坚持尝试寻找能够平息 CFIUS 疑虑的风险缓解方案。但到 2008 年 2 月，他们知道这笔交易已经彻底告吹。

14

14

Separation of Powers

三权分立

Management Evolution: 2006–2008

管理演变：2006–2008

In 2007, Huawei’s management told staff of a change: the company’s Communist Party committee now had veto power over executive appointments.[1] The move was controversial. Some employees had chosen to work at a private company like Huawei precisely because they liked having some distance between themselves and the state apparatus. There were worries, too, that closer involvement of the party in Huawei’s operations would be detrimental to the company’s international expansion. Foreign governments were wary of the party’s role in Chinese companies: by having a say in promotion decisions, a party committee could theoretically assist in embedding intelligence agents across a company’s operations.

2007 年，华为管理层向员工通报了一项变革：公司党委现在对高管任命拥有否决权。[1] 这一举措引发了争议。一些员工之所以选择在华为这样的私营企业工作，恰恰是因为他们喜欢与国家机器保持一定的距离。还有人担心，党组织更深入地参与华为的运营会不利于公司的国际扩张。外国政府对党在中国企业中的角色保持警惕：通过在晋升决策中拥有发言权，党委理论上可以协助在公司的各项业务中安插情报人员。

There was enough discomfiture among the rank and file that Huawei’s management felt the need to defend the new policy in a two-page explainer that December. It said that executives had considered the move carefully, with discussions beginning in 2005. Huawei had drafted the new rule in autumn 2006, with senior management and party officials holding several days of meetings in March 2007 to debate the details of implementation. “The entire period of discussion and decision-making for this system took more than a year and a half,” the company told employees.

普通员工中的不安情绪如此之大，以至于华为管理层觉得有必要在当年 12 月的一份两页说明书中为新政策辩护。书中称，高管们对这一举措进行了慎重考虑，讨论始于 2005 年。华为在 2006 年秋季起草了新规，高管层和党组织负责人于 2007 年 3 月举行了为期数天的会议，讨论实施细节。公司告诉员工：“这套制度的整个讨论和决策过程历时一年半以上。”

Huawei’s leadership said that this new “separation of powers” was meant to stem nepotism and corruption, and that it was inspired by the checks and balances among the three branches of the US government. Executives could no longer unilaterally make the decision to promote a subordinate. They had to seek a green light from the human-resources department and party committee. The party committee could veto planned promotions or even “impeach” unfit executives after the fact.

华为领导层表示，这种新的“三权分立”旨在遏制裙带关系和腐败，其灵感源自美国政府三权分立的制衡机制。高管不再能单方面决定提拔下属。他们必须获得人力资源部门和党委的许可。党委可以否决拟议的晋升，甚至可以在事后“弹劾”不称职的高管。

It was unclear who had suggested this idea of giving the party committee a say in Huawei’s executive appointments—whether it had originated from Ren Zhengfei’s team or been imposed upon Huawei by external party authorities. In any event, the move aligned with a push from Beijing in the mid-2000s to give the party a larger role in private enterprise, with China’s leader, Hu Jintao, calling for it personally.

目前尚不清楚是谁提出了让党委在华为高管任命中有发言权的建议——是源于任正非的团队，还是由外部党组织权力机构强加给华为的。无论如何，这一举措符合北京在 2000 年代中期推动党在私营企业中发挥更大作用的趋势，中国领导人胡锦涛曾亲自对此提出要求。

As the party committee prepared to take on a greater role within Huawei, Ren told committee members that he hoped they would use the power well. “This ‘veto power’ and ‘impeachment power’ are very powerful,” he said.[2]

随着党委准备在华为内部承担更大的角色，任正非对委员会成员说，他希望他们能用好这项权力。“这项‘否决权’和‘弹劾权’是非常强大的，”他说。[2]

—

The party’s push to institute heavier oversight of Huawei came during a period of domestic outcry against the company. Huawei had fetishized long work hours as part of its culture, with engineers keeping mats at their desks so that they could nap on the floor while pulling all-nighters. Reflective of the self-flagellating culture, Huawei titled a volume of essays about its R&D Purgatory, alluding to a Karl Marx quote about the struggles of scientific research.[3] When an employee complained about excessive overtime at a town hall, Chairwoman Sun Yafang dismissed it, saying that extended work hours were unavoidable. “The resource we most lack is time,” she said. “It’s impossible for us to sleep more if we are to catch up.”[4]

党组织推动对华为实施更严格监管之际，国内正掀起一场针对该公司的舆论声讨。华为将长时间加班奉为企业文化的一部分，工程师们在办公桌旁备有床垫，以便在通宵达旦工作时能睡在地板上。为了体现这种自我磨砺的文化，华为将其研发论文集命名为《炼狱》，暗指马克思关于科学研究艰辛的一段名言。[3] 当一名员工在员工大会上抱怨加班过度时，董事长孙亚芳对此不予理会，称延长工作时间是不可避免的。“我们最缺乏的资源就是时间，”她说。“如果我们想要赶超，就不可能多睡觉。”[4]

But then, in 2006, Huawei employees began dying. And as much as Ren tried, he could not make it stop. The local press cast the deaths at Huawei as emblematic of the unspoken human costs behind the nation’s economic boom. The nation’s GDP was at 11.1 percent, a twelve-year high. Many had attained wealth beyond their wildest dreams. But the skies were smog-choked, historic neighborhoods had been flattened to make room for skyscrapers, and factory bosses pushed their workers beyond the boundaries of safety and humaneness.

但随后，在 2006 年，华为员工开始出现死亡。尽管任正非做出了努力，但他无法阻止这一切。地方媒体将华为的死亡事件视为国家经济繁荣背后不言而喻的人力成本缩影。当时国家的 GDP 增长率为 11.1%，创下 12 年来的新高。许多人获得了超出想象的财富。但天空被雾霾笼罩，历史街区被夷为平地以腾出空间建造摩天大楼，工厂老板们将工人推向了安全和人道的极限之外。

The first was a twenty-five-year-old engineer named Hu Xinyu, who had an open face and dimples.[5] In March 2006, Hu started a high-priority project at Huawei, his girlfriend told the local press. She claimed that over the next month, he returned home only four times, spending the other nights at the office, stealing brief naps atop a mattress on the floor. In late April, Hu went to the hospital and was diagnosed with a severe brain infection. He fell into a coma and never woke up. As Huawei struggled to quell a nationwide backlash, a spokesperson told reporters that Hu Xinyu had died from an illness, not overwork.

第一位是二十五岁的工程师胡新宇，他面容清秀，带着酒窝。[5] 胡新宇的女友告诉地方媒体，2006 年 3 月，他在华为开始负责一个高优先级项目。她声称，在接下来的一个月里，他只回过四次家，其他晚上都在办公室度过，在地板上的床垫上小睡片刻。4 月下旬，胡新宇前往医院，被诊断出严重的脑部感染。他陷入昏迷，再也没有醒来。在华为努力平息全国性的抵制浪潮时，一名发言人告诉记者，胡新宇死于疾病，而非过劳。

The string of “unnatural” deaths at Huawei continued for two years. One Huawei employee jumped to his death at an R&D center. Another leaped over the railing of a third-floor cafeteria. A third hanged himself. It was hard to say afterward if work pressures played a role in their demise. The local press counted no fewer than six deaths. A posthumously discovered blog post from one of the engineers hinted at the heavy financial pressures he had felt.

华为内部的一系列“非正常”死亡持续了两年。一名华为员工在研发中心跳楼身亡。另一名员工从三楼食堂的栏杆跳下。第三名员工自缢身亡。事后很难说工作压力是否在他们的死亡中起到了作用。地方媒体统计的死亡人数不少于六人。一名工程师死后被发现的博客文章暗示了他所感受到的沉重财务压力。

With tears in my eyes, I have left my wife and seven-month-old daughter…. I have no alternative but to come back to Shenzhen…. I’ve returned to this city I’ve come to love and hate.

我含泪告别了妻子和七个月大的女儿……我别无选择，只能回到深圳……我回到了这个让我又爱又恨的城市。

In June 2007, Ren published an open letter in Management Optimization, one of Huawei’s internal newspapers, appealing to the party secretary, Madam Chen Zhufang, for help. He wrote that he was at his wit’s end about stopping the deaths among his employees. “Huawei continues to have employees committing suicide and self-harm,” Ren said. “And the number of employees suffering from depression and anxiety is increasing, which is very worrying. Is there any way to help employees face life positively, openly, and uprightly? I’ve thought about it again and again, and I can’t solve it.”[6] In the letter, Ren revealed that he himself had suffered from clinical depression in the past, but he claimed to have made a full recovery with medical treatment. He suggested that employees spend more time relaxing outside of work, drinking tea together or strolling through a park. “As long as these activities do not involve discussing politics, violating the law, or violating ethics, we will not interfere.”

2007 年 6 月，任正非在华为内部报刊之一的《管理优化》上发表了一封公开信，向党委书记陈珠芳女士寻求帮助。他写道，对于如何阻止员工死亡，他已束手无策。“华为不断有员工自杀和自残，”任正非说，“而且患有抑郁症和焦虑症的员工人数正在增加，这非常令人担忧。有什么办法能帮助员工积极、开放、正直地面对生活吗？我反复思考，却无法解决。”[6] 在信中，任正非透露自己过去也曾患有临床抑郁症，但他声称经过医疗已经完全康复。他建议员工在工作之余多花时间放松，一起喝茶或在公园散步。“只要这些活动不涉及谈论政治、违法或违反道德，我们就不予干涉。”

But some external critics thought it was clear that Ren himself had created this crisis through Huawei’s pressure-cooker work culture. Huawei had long cultivated a Wall Street–esque ethos that saw employees pitted against one another, the winners showered with riches and the losers weeded out. “Humanistic concern for individual employees is not part of this corporate culture,” one Shanghai sociologist, Zhang Youde, told a domestic magazine. “Huawei not only treats its employees as a means to maximize its profits, but it also encourages a dark side of human nature, namely that everyone is competing with everyone else.”[7]

但一些外界批评人士认为，显然是任正非本人通过华为的高压锅式工作文化制造了这场危机。华为长期以来培养了一种类似于华尔街的价值观，即员工之间相互竞争，胜者获得丰厚财富，败者被淘汰出局。“对个体员工的人文关怀并不是这种企业文化的一部分，”上海社会学家张友德告诉一家国内杂志，“华为不仅将员工视为实现利润最大化的手段，还鼓励人性中阴暗的一面，即每个人都在与其他人竞争。”[7]

Even as Huawei was in the thick of the suicides scandal, another labor controversy erupted. China had just adopted its landmark Labor Contract Law, which would provide some protections for workers who had put in a decade of work at the same company. Huawei had long had a reputation for laying off older engineers to keep its salary costs lower with a younger staff. Now, in late 2007, Huawei rushed to get ahead of the new law. With Ren taking the lead himself, some sixty-five hundred Huawei employees resigned and rejoined the company, wiping out their seniority.[8] Huawei called the resignations voluntary,[9] and it gave the resignees buyout compensation, but the local press reported that employees felt forced to go along with the move. The local government launched an investigation, and though it later announced that the mass resignations were not illegal,[10] the incident was yet another blemish on Huawei’s domestic reputation.

就在华为深陷自杀丑闻之际，另一场劳动争议爆发了。中国当时刚刚通过了具有里程碑意义的《劳动合同法》，该法将为在同一家公司工作满十年的劳动者提供一定的保护。华为长期以来一直有裁减老工程师以通过年轻员工降低薪酬成本的名声。现在，在 2007 年底，华为抢在新法实施前采取了行动。在任正非本人的带领下，约六千五百名华为员工辞职并重新入职公司，从而抹去了他们的工龄。[8] 华为称这些辞职是自愿的，[9] 并向辞职者支付了买断补偿，但据国内媒体报道，员工感到是被迫配合这一举动的。地方政府展开了调查，尽管后来宣布大规模辞职并不违法，[10] 但这一事件再次损害了华为在国内的声誉。

China was changing, and Huawei would have to keep up. In the past, the company had repeatedly pressured its staff into mass resignations, most famously the 1996 culling of its sales team, an effort led by Madam Sun Yafang. But now the new generation of workers had legal protections, and they increasingly knew their rights. “Workers born in the 1980s are different than those of us born in the 1960s and ’70s in their values and way of thinking,” Ren’s younger brother, Steven Ren, once remarked. “They have a stronger sense of independence, and they have a strong sense of self.”[11]

中国正在发生变化，华为必须跟上步伐。过去，公司曾多次向员工施压要求集体辞职，最著名的是 1996 年由孙亚芳女士领导的销售团队大裁员。但现在，新一代劳动者拥有法律保护，而且他们越来越了解自己的权利。“80 后工人在价值观和思维方式上与我们这些 60 后和70 后不同，”任正非的弟弟任树录曾评论道，“他们有更强的独立意识，有很强的自我意识。”[11]

Huawei stopped boasting that it had a “wolf culture.” Ren ordered overtime hours to be cut. The company stopped telling visitors that employees worked so hard they slept on mats on the ground overnight; instead, it explained that the engineers’ mats were there for taking daytime naps, thanks to considerate management.

华为不再吹嘘自己拥有“狼性文化”。任正非下令削减加班时间。公司不再告诉访客员工们工作非常努力以至于晚上睡在地上的垫子上；相反，它解释说，由于管理层的体贴，工程师们的垫子是用来午睡的。

—

For a few years, Ren, who turned sixty-three in 2007, had been delegating more management tasks to a group of eight executives he called Huawei’s “executive management team,” or EMT. This EMT included Chairwoman Sun Yafang, William Xu, Ji Ping, Fei Min, Hong Tianfeng, the early engineer Guo Ping, and the early salesmen Eric Xu and Ken Hu.[12]

几年来，在 2007 年满六十三岁的任正非一直将更多的管理任务授权给一个由八名高管组成的团队，他称之为华为的“执行管理团队”（EMT）。这个 EMT 成员包括董事长孙亚芳、徐文伟、纪平、费敏、洪天峰、早期的工程师郭平，以及早期的销售人员徐直军和胡厚崑。[12]

Ren quipped internally that he had become number two in the company and that Chairwoman Sun was now the one aging quickly from all the stress. “When I was number one, there were a lot of annoyances, and you get older faster as number one,” Ren said at a staff meeting in 2004. “I’m radiant and vigorous now as second-in-command, because I don’t have as much pressure or inner pain.”[13]

任正非在内部调侃说，他已经变成了公司的二把手，而孙董事长现在是那个因为压力而迅速变老的人。“当我是一把手的时候，有很多烦恼，当一把手老得快，”任正非在 2004 年的一次员工会议上说，“我现在作为二把手容光焕发、精力充沛，因为我没有那么大的压力或内心的痛苦。”[13]

His daughter Meng Wanzhou was also stepping into a larger role. In November 2006, the Mauritian press reported that a new Huawei finance office had opened in the Indian Ocean’s island nation, and it was headed by “a woman, Meng Wanzhou, 34.”[14] She had been tasked with opening the center, which would take advantage of Mauritius’s favorable tax environment to handle Huawei’s finances across sub-Saharan Africa. Due to the low level of public disclosures required for companies in Mauritius, Meng’s team would also channel business operations that Huawei wanted to keep out of the public eye through the island nation.

他的女儿孟晚舟也开始承担更重要的角色。2006 年 11 月，毛里求斯媒体报道称，一家新的华为财务办公室在这个印度洋岛国开业，负责人是“一名 34 岁的女性，孟晚舟”。[14] 她被委派负责建立该中心，该中心将利用毛里求斯优惠的税收环境来处理华为在撒哈拉以南非洲地区的财务。由于毛里求斯对公司的公开披露要求较低，孟晚舟的团队还会通过这个岛国处理华为希望避开公众视线的业务运营。

It had taken Meng a while to learn the ropes of finance. By her own admission, when she’d first joined the department, she’d struggled to balance the ledgers, and her work had needed to be checked by others. “Thanks to the tolerance and guidance of others, I was able to pick up my lost financial knowledge, bit by bit,” she later wrote. Huawei’s finance department was also disorganized and chaotic, with Meng recalling that she and her departmental colleagues were often beset by criticism from Huawei’s other departments, the company’s customers, and her father. It sometimes took Huawei employees five months to get reimbursements.[15] “We were like a headless chicken, running around aimlessly,” Meng wrote.[16]

孟晚舟花了一段时间才掌握财务工作的窍门。据她自己承认，刚加入该部门时，她很难平衡账目，她的工作需要别人检查。“感谢他人的宽容和指导，我才能够一点一滴地捡回丢失的财务知识，”她后来写道。华为的财务部门当时也组织混乱，孟晚舟回忆说，她和部门同事经常遭到华为其他部门、公司客户以及她父亲的批评。有时华为员工需要五个月才能拿到报销款。[15] “我们就像无头苍蝇一样，到处乱撞，”孟晚舟写道。[16]

In 2007, Ren put Meng in charge of an IBM consulting project meant to overhaul Huawei’s finance operations. Conversing with the IBM consultants was a challenge for Meng due to her rudimentary English, but she kept at it. Her project wasn’t widely popular within the company either, as some salespeople felt that the strict new rules made their work more difficult. “In the early days of promoting internal controls, finance was viewed as being in opposition to the business side of our operations,” Meng wrote.

2007 年，任正非让孟晚舟负责一项 IBM 咨询项目，旨在彻底改革华为的财务运营。由于英语基础薄弱，孟晚舟与 IBM 顾问的交流充满挑战，但她坚持了下来。她的项目在公司内部也并非广受欢迎，因为一些销售人员认为严格的新规增加了工作难度。“在推行内控的早期，财务被视为与业务部门处于对立面，”孟晚舟写道。

In Hong Kong in February 2007, Meng remarried, tying the knot with Huawei’s former Mexico representative, Liu Xiaozong, also known as Carlos.[17] Meng had three sons from previous marriages; it was Liu’s first marriage. Liu, three years younger, was a tall southerner who sometimes styled his hair in a wavy pompadour. Like Meng, he was born in the Sichuan provincial capital of Chengdu, giving them some common childhood experiences.[18] Liu had joined Huawei in 1996 after graduating from college, and by the early 2000s, he’d worked his way up to head of sales for Liaoning Province. As part of Ren’s first big international push, Liu was sent abroad to Mexico. While he didn’t make major headlines during his posting there, he was noted once by the Mexican press as representing Huawei at a 2005 meeting of senior telecommunications officials from Mexico and China.[19]

2007 年 2 月，孟晚舟在香港再婚，与华为前墨西哥代表刘晓棕（又名 Carlos）结为连理。[17] 孟晚舟在之前的婚姻中育有三个儿子；这是刘晓棕的初婚。刘晓棕比孟晚舟小三岁，是个身材高大的南方人，有时会梳着波浪式的蓬蓬头。和孟晚舟一样，他也出生在四川省会成都，这让他们拥有一些共同的童年经历。[18] 刘晓棕于 1996 年大学毕业后加入华为，到 21 世纪初，他已晋升为辽宁省销售负责人。作为任正非首次大规模国际扩张的一部分，刘晓棕被派往墨西哥。虽然他在任职期间没有引起重大关注，但墨西哥媒体曾提到他代表华为参加了 2005 年墨西哥与中国高级电信官员的会议。[19]

Huawei had a rule against couples working for the company, an effort to prevent nepotism and conflict. The rule was only sometimes enforced. But as Liu’s relationship with Meng became serious, he left Huawei for an MBA program, with local media attributing the decision to his desire to earn his own professional achievements outside Ren’s shadow. After their marriage, Meng changed the name on her passport to Wanzhou Meng Liu in the Hong Kong custom of adding her husband’s surname to her own. But when this created complications, since her passport no longer matched other IDs, she ended up changing it back.[20]

华为有一项禁止夫妻在公司共同工作的规定，旨在防止任人唯亲和利益冲突。这项规定只是偶尔被执行。但随着刘晓棕与孟晚舟的关系变得认真，他离开华为去攻读 MBA，当地媒体将这一决定归因于他希望在任正非的阴影之外取得自己的职业成就。婚后，孟晚舟按照香港在自己姓氏前冠以夫姓的习俗，将护照上的姓名改为“刘孟晚舟”。但由于这导致护照与其他身份证件不符，造成了诸多不便，她最终又改了回来。[20]

Meng and her husband bought a house in Vancouver, where they would start spending their summers. It was a sturdy two-story house on a sunny corner lot, a block from a neighborhood park with baseball diamonds. The two soon had a daughter, adding to Meng’s three sons from previous marriages. Liu’s parents stayed with them sometimes, helping to look after the children. The pink and blue hydrangeas bloomed riotously each year.

孟晚舟和丈夫在温哥华买了一套房子，他们开始在那里度过夏天。那是一栋坚固的两层住宅，位于一个阳光充足的转角地块，距离一个带有棒球场的社区公园仅一个街区。两人很快有了一个女儿，加上孟晚舟前段婚姻的三个儿子，家庭成员进一步增加。刘晓棕的父母有时会和他们住在一起，帮忙照看孩子。院子里的粉色和蓝色绣球花每年都开得异常灿烂。

Around the time Meng set up the Huawei unit in Mauritius, another company, Canicula Holdings Limited, was also registered in the island nation. From the outside, it wasn’t possible to tell that Canicula was controlled by Huawei. In 2007, Canicula purchased a Hong Kong–incorporated company called Skycom Tech Co. Ltd. from a Huawei subsidiary. Few people knew it at the time, but Skycom was a shell company that Huawei had been using to obscure its business in Iran.

在孟晚舟于毛里求斯设立华为机构的同时，另一家名为星通技术有限公司（Canicula Holdings Limited）的公司也在这个岛国注册。从外部看，无法得知星通是由华为控制的。2007 年，星通从华为的一家子公司手中收购了一家名为 Skycom Tech Co. Ltd. 的香港注册公司。当时很少有人知道，Skycom 其实是华为用来掩盖其在伊朗业务的壳公司。

In early 2008, Meng, who was now president of the financial management department at Huawei, registered as a director of Skycom.[21] It’s unclear why she created a paper trail linking herself to Huawei’s dealings in Iran. It very well might have been the worst mistake of her life. Cathy Meng, she signed on the Hong Kong disclosure form, the English letters slanting optimistically upward.

2008 年初，时任华为财务管理部总裁的孟晚舟注册成为 Skycom 的董事。[21] 目前尚不清楚她为何会留下将自己与华为在伊朗业务联系起来的书面记录。这很可能是她一生中最严重的错误。她在香港的披露表格上签署了Cathy Meng，英文字母乐观地向上倾斜。

—

After Huawei set up its party committee in 1996, its number of party members grew apace with the company. In 2000, Huawei had eighteen hundred party members. In 2007, this number was up to twelve thousand out of more than sixty-one thousand employees.[22] As was common in Chinese companies, there was sometimes grumbling among Huawei employees about how the patriotic and moralistic activities organized by the party committee were a waste of time. Madam Chen Zhufang, the party secretary, once remarked that some executives seemed to be just going through the motions in their self-criticisms.

自 1996 年华为成立党委后，其党员人数随公司发展同步增长。2000 年，华为有 1800 名党员。到 2007 年，在 6.1 万多名员工中，党员人数已达到 1.2 万人。[22] 正如中国公司的普遍现象，华为员工有时也会抱怨党委组织的爱国主义和道德活动是浪费时间。党委书记陈珠芳女士曾评论说，一些高管在进行自我批评时似乎只是在走过场。

One of the roles of the party committee within Huawei was ethical oversight. Employees were encouraged to report misbehaving managers for investigation. “Certain managers are even engaging in corruption, participating in gambling and visiting unhealthy establishments,” the committee said in an alert to staff. During a crackdown on gambling, it warned that party members found in violation would be punished by both the company and the party.[23] The committee fielded internal complaints of all sorts, including an anonymous letter from an employee alleging that the company’s overseas offices were grossly inflating their earnings by booking projects as revenue before they were installed.[24] In the internal publication Management Optimization, party officials chided employees for infractions ranging from falsifying receipts at hotels, to being disrespectful to the Special Economic Zone’s border checkpoint officers, to leaving their desks a few minutes early for lunch.

华为党委的职责之一是道德监督。公司鼓励员工举报行为不端的经理以进行调查。党委在给员工的一份警示中称：“某些管理人员甚至参与腐败、参与赌博和出入不健康场所。”在一次打击赌博的行动中，党委警告称，被发现违规的党员将受到公司和党的双重处罚。[23] 党委处理各种内部投诉，包括一封员工匿名信，指控公司海外办事处通过在项目安装前就将其计入收入，从而严重夸大业绩。[24] 在内部刊物《管理优化》中，党组织官员斥责员工的违规行为，从伪造酒店发票、对经济特区边境检查站官员不尊重，到午餐时间提前几分钟离开座位。

Party organization leaders signed pledges to provide moral leadership to colleagues and steer clear of graft. “If large-scale corruption and party member corruption occurs in the area that I oversee, then I agree to take on joint liability for my poor supervision,” read one pledge that Huawei party members signed.[25]

党组织领导人签署了誓言，承诺为同事提供道德领导并远离贪腐。华为党员签署的一份誓言中写道：“如果在我管辖的范围内发生大规模腐败或党员腐败，我同意为监管不力承担连带责任。”[25]

There was sustained interest from outsiders in the role of Huawei’s Communist Party committee. At a 2005 meeting, when an Australian diplomat asked Ren about the party secretary’s role, he replied that the party secretary helped align business with national goals. “Business works best when private business and state coordinate,” a person at the meeting recalled Ren saying.[26]

外界对华为党委的角色一直保持着持续的关注。在 2005 年的一次会议上，当一名澳大利亚外交官询问任正非党委书记的角色时，他回答说，党委书记协助将业务与国家目标保持一致。据一位与会者回忆，任正非当时说：“当私营业务与国家协调一致时，业务运作效果最好。”[26]

The party committee also oversaw internal “democratic life meetings,” at which executives criticized themselves and received criticism from staff.[27] Many of the complaints were common enough for a company town hall in any nation: employees griped that managers were too distant, that the bosses only emerged for chats when something went wrong, that lower-level staff were reluctant to volunteer for tasks because they knew they would be punished if there was a mishap.[28] Ren cautioned staffers against criticizing one another too harshly at the meetings. “I believe people fear pain,” he said. “If it’s too painful, that’s not too good either.”[29]

党委还负责监督内部的“民主生活会”，在会上，高管们进行自我批评并接受员工的批评。[27] 许多抱怨在任何国家的公司全员大会上都很常见：员工抱怨经理太疏远，老板只有在出问题时才会露面谈话，基层员工不愿主动承担任务，因为他们知道一旦发生意外就会受到惩罚。[28] 任正非告诫员工在会上不要过于严厉地批评彼此。他说：“我相信人们都怕痛。如果太痛苦了，那也不太好。”[29]

The self-criticism sessions for senior executives were occasionally recounted internally in Management Optimization. In one session, Steven Ren, who was overseeing construction projects as head of Huawei’s Capital Construction Management Department, confessed before the party committee that he was not a good listener, that he was too quick to lose his temper, and that he let personal feelings interfere with his decisions. “My personality is relatively confident and stubborn,” he said. “So when an issue arises, my first instinct is to think I am right. In fact, for some things, there is no absolute right or wrong.”[30]

高管们的自我批评会议偶尔会在《管理优化》中进行内部复述。在一次会议上，时任华为基建管理部部长、负责建设项目的任树录在党委面前承认，他不善于倾听，脾气太急躁，并且让个人感情干扰了决策。他说：“我的性格比较自信和固执。所以当问题出现时，我的第一直觉是认为自己是对的。事实上，有些事情并没有绝对的对错。”[30]

In a December 2006 criticism session for global sales chief Ken Hu—a rising star at Huawei who was increasingly representing the company at overseas events—Party Secretary Chen Zhufang upbraided him for not being enthusiastic enough about party work, and for staying at arm’s length from the committee.[31]

在 2006 年 12 月为全球销售总裁胡厚崑——一位越来越多地代表公司参加海外活动的华为新星——举行的批评会议上，党委书记陈珠芳责备他对党务工作不够热心，并与党委保持距离。[31]

“To be honest, it’s quite hard to find you,” she said, according to an internally circulated account of the meeting.

根据一份内部流传的会议记录，她说：“说实话，挺难找到你的。”

“It’s true,” Hu acknowledged. “We’ve known each other for many years, but we haven’t talked a lot.”

“确实如此，”胡厚崑承认道，“我们认识很多年了，但交流并不多。”

Madam Chen expressed her hope that Hu would encourage the party committee to organize activities at Huawei’s overseas offices. She said that they’d taken three trips to Huawei’s overseas offices the previous year but hadn’t dared make any further visits after receiving feedback that they’d “interfered” with sales work.

陈女士表达了她的希望，即胡厚崑能鼓励党委在华为的海外办事处组织活动。她说，前一年他们曾三次前往华为海外办事处考察，但在收到“干扰”了销售工作的反馈后，就不敢再进行进一步访问了。

“If Mr. Hu doesn’t say the word, we don’t even dare to go,” she said.

她说：“如果胡总不发话，我们甚至都不敢去。”

Hu apparently obliged. Not long after, Chen visited Huawei staff in Latin America, where she encouraged them to learn to sing local songs as a way of better adapting to the culture around them.[32]

胡厚崑显然照办了。不久后，陈珠芳看望了华为在拉美的员工，鼓励他们学习唱当地歌曲，以此作为更好地融入周围文化的一种方式。[32]

—

Party Secretary Chen retired quietly in 2007 or 2008. Huawei’s internal publications began to refer to a new party secretary, Zhou Daiqi, as early as March 2008.[33]

党委书记陈珠芳在 2007 年或 2008 年悄然退休。华为的内部刊物早在 2008 年 3 月就开始提到新任党委书记周代琪。[33]

Zhou would keep a low profile, lower than that of Madam Chen. While she had been a prolific writer of moralistic and patriotic essays and speeches, Zhou rarely put pen to paper for public consumption. Perhaps during Huawei’s international era, it seemed prudent to downplay the role of the company’s party officials. Huawei’s annual reports would leave out Zhou’s party secretary title—the more powerful of his positions—referring to him only as a member of the company’s supervisory board, or as the chief ethics and compliance officer.[34]

周代琪保持着低调，比陈女士还要低调。陈女士曾撰写过大量的道德和爱国主义文章及演讲稿，而周代琪则很少动笔写供公众阅读的东西。或许在华为的国际化时代，淡化公司党务官员的角色显得更为审慎。华为的年报会隐去周代琪的党委书记头衔——这是他权力更大的职位——仅将他称为公司监事会成员或首席道德合规官。[34]

Three years younger than Ren,[35] Zhou had been a telephone switching researcher in Xi’an at the State Key Laboratory of Integrated Service Networks at Xidian University, a lab funded by the central government. He appeared to have kept this affiliation after joining Huawei in 1994 as an engineer, continuing to publish academic papers under both his Huawei and Xidian titles for years. One colleague recalled that in 1996, Zhou tapped a group of Xidian University researchers in their twenties to help Huawei work on a switching technology project funded by Beijing’s 863 high-tech research program.[36] At Huawei, he worked his way up through positions such as chief engineer and director of the hardware department. In 2002, some six years before his promotion to the powerful party secretary position, Zhou still seemed to be somewhat outside Ren’s inner circle. In Management Optimization, he was quoted as head of Huawei’s Xi’an Research Center and praised a recent Huawei training session for bringing his team closer to the company.[37]

周代琪比任正非小三岁，[35] 曾是西安电子科技大学综合业务网理论及关键技术国家重点实验室（一个由中央政府资助的实验室）的电话交换研究员。他在 1994 年作为工程师加入华为后，似乎仍保留了这一身份，多年来一直以华为和西电的双重头衔发表学术论文。一位同事回忆说，1996 年，周代琪抽调了一组二十多岁的西电研究人员，帮助华为开发由北京“863”高技术研究发展计划资助的交换技术项目。[36] 在华为，他历任总工程师、硬件部部长等职，逐步晋升。在2002 年，即他被提拔到权力巨大的党委书记职位约六年前，周代琪似乎仍处于任正非的核心圈子之外。在《管理优化》中，他以华为西安研究所所长的身份被引用，并赞扬了华为最近的一次培训课程，认为这拉近了他的团队与公司的距离。[37]

Huawei’s senior executives tended to be those whom Ren had trained from a young age, true believers who had spent nearly their entire careers at the company. In the case of Huawei’s party secretaries—first Madam Chen, then Zhou—they had reached senior levels at academic institutions before joining Huawei. This suggested, perhaps, that having high-level connections in China’s academic and official realms was valued for the position.

华为的高管往往是任正非从小培养起来的人，是几乎整个职业生涯都在公司度过的虔诚信徒。而就华为的党委书记而言——先是陈女士，后是周代琪——他们在加入华为之前都已在学术机构达到了高级别。这或许表明，在这一职位上，拥有中国学术界和官方的高层关系是受到重视的。

Huawei executives stipulated internally that party members would be treated differently in some respects, that they would have higher expectations of patriotism, and that they would be seen as suitable for leadership positions. “Our requirements for party members must be stricter, and in various types of work, we should encourage party members to take the lead,” Ren said in March 2005 while visiting Huawei finance staff in Europe. Ren claimed that the company kept personnel records on each party member employee to better “encourage and supervise” them, and he acknowledged that the interests of the nation must supersede all else: “Ahead of the individual and the organization, party members should first of all comply with the big picture and understand the big picture.”[38]

华为高管在内部规定，党员在某些方面将受到区别对待，对他们的爱国主义要求更高，并被视为适合担任领导职务。2005 年 3 月，任正非在视察华为驻欧洲财务人员时说：“我们对党员的要求必须更严，在各项工作中，要鼓励党员带头。”任正非声称，公司为每位党员员工建立人事档案，以便更好地“鼓励和监督”他们，他承认国家利益必须高于一切：“在个人和组织面前，党员首先要服从大局、理解大局。”[38]

15

15

The Torch

火炬

Beijing Olympics: 2008

北京奥运会：2008 年

Huawei’s engineers began work on Mount Everest in the latter part of 2007.[1] China would be hosting the Olympics in the summer, and authorities were planning an epic torch relay spanning the globe, with a dramatic ascent up the world’s highest mountain. Huawei had been hired to rig up cell service on Mount Everest so that the images could be beamed out to the world in real time.

华为的工程师于 2007 年后期开始在珠穆朗玛峰开展工作。[1] 中国将在夏季举办奥运会，官方计划进行一场跨越全球的史诗级火炬传递，其中包括一次登上世界最高峰的壮丽攀登。华为受聘在珠穆朗玛峰上架设移动通信服务，以便将影像实时传向世界。

By the time Huawei’s team reached base camp at Mount Everest, all five members had altitude sickness, with headaches and dizziness. They were more than seventeen thousand feet above sea level. With each breath, they were getting only half as much oxygen as what they were used to. The air was so thin that it was even difficult to cook their food, which had been hauled up by yaks. “Even though there was a pressure cooker, the rice always felt undercooked,” one engineer recalled. In the morning, they’d wake in their tents with ice crystals clinging to their hair. They swaddled the antennae and radios in waterproof packs and continued to climb from base camp. A bit past twenty-one thousand feet, they stopped and installed the highest base station in the world. It looked small and frail: a few white boxes lashed to a tripod, sparkling in the cold sunlight.

当华为团队到达珠穆朗玛峰大本营时，全部五名成员都患上了高原反应，伴有头痛和头晕。他们身处海拔一万七千多英尺的高度。每一次呼吸，他们获得的氧气只有习惯量的一半。空气如此稀薄，以至于煮熟由牦牛驮运上山的食物都变得困难。“即使有压力锅，米饭也总是感觉夹生，”一位工程师回忆道。早晨，他们在帐篷里醒来，头发上挂着冰晶。他们用防水包包裹住天线和无线电设备，继续从大本营向上攀登。在海拔两万一千多英尺稍高处，他们停下来安装了世界上最高的基站。它看起来既小又脆弱：几个固定在三脚架上的白色盒子，在寒冷的阳光下闪闪发光。

The year 2008 would be a landmark one for Huawei—and for China. With the Summer Olympics, a modern China would come out onto the world stage. Huawei would achieve new heights in R&D, reaching number one worldwide in the total number of patent applications filed, the first time a Chinese company had held the honor.[2] The company would also launch a popular cell tower technology called SingleRAN (RAN stands for “radio access network”), codeveloped with the major European operator Vodafone, which would help secure Vodafone as a longtime partner.

2008 年对华为和中国来说都是具有里程碑意义的一年。随着夏季奥运会的举办，一个现代化的中国将走上世界舞台。华为在研发方面将达到新高度，专利申请总数跃居全球第一，这是中国公司首次获得这一殊荣。[2] 该公司还推出了一种名为 SingleRAN（RAN 代表“无线接入网”）的流行基站技术，这是与欧洲主要运营商沃达丰（Vodafone）共同开发的，此举有助于确保沃达丰成为其长期合作伙伴。

China had been attempting to host the Games for well over a decade. Ren Zhengfei recalled the disappointment in 1993 when China lost its bid—to Australia by two votes—to host the 2000 Games.[3] After Beijing won its bid for 2008, officials were so proud that they started a countdown clock in Tiananmen Square as soon as the Athens 2004 Games had concluded.[4] As the date finally approached, people were excited. Under the direction of a low-profile but ambitious vice president named Xi Jinping, Beijing had undergone a complete transformation, with shiny, futuristic-looking buildings anchoring the skyline. Li Yinan—Ren’s “young prodigy” from Huawei’s early days—had since returned to the company and was spotted by a Chinese reporter on a flight to the US to attend a conference. “Look, I’m wearing a Beijing Olympics T-shirt,” Li told him. “I’m going to show off our Olympics in America.”[5]

中国争取举办奥运会已超过十年。任正非回忆起 1993 年中国以两票之差输给澳大利亚、失去 2000 年奥运会举办权时的失望。[3] 在北京赢得 2008 年申办权后，官员们深感自豪，以至于 2004 年雅典奥运会一结束，他们就在天安门广场启动了倒计时钟。[4] 随着日期临近，人们兴奋不已。在低调但雄心勃勃的副主席习近平的指导下，北京经历了彻底的蜕变，闪亮的、充满未来感的建筑构成了城市天际线的主体。李一男——任正非华为早期的“天才少年”——此时已回到公司，他在飞往美国参加会议的航班上被一名中国记者认出。“看，我穿着北京奥运会的 T 恤，”李告诉他，“我要去美国炫耀我们的奥运会。”[5]

—

As the Olympics drew closer, China was now the world’s largest internet market. With 253 million people online, it had surged past the United States in number of users.[6] For Beijing authorities, tightening control over this explosion of internet use was a high priority. A major international event like the Olympics meant soaring phone and internet demand. It also meant security risks ranging from cyberattacks to political protests to the potential for stampedes and terrorist plots. Chinese authorities called their project to shore up the police’s cyber capabilities “Golden Shield.” Overseas, it took on the nickname “the Great Firewall.”

随着奥运会的临近，中国已成为全球最大的互联网市场。凭借 2.53 亿上网人数，其用户数量已激增并超过了美国。[6] 对于北京当局来说，加强对这种爆炸式互联网增长的控制是重中之重。像奥运会这样的重大国际赛事意味着电话和互联网需求的飙升。它也意味着从网络攻击到政治抗议，再到潜在的踩踏事件和恐怖阴谋等安全风险。中国当局将其加强警方网络能力的项目称为“金盾工程”。在海外，它得到了“防火长城”的绰号。

Much of the Great Firewall had come from the US company Cisco, which was a leading supplier for a technology called “deep-packet inspection,” or DPI. DPI allowed authorities to peek into packets of internet data in transit. If the data was deemed objectionable, the system could stop a website from loading or an email from arriving in the receiver’s inbox. With the Olympics approaching, Huawei had developed its own version and had struck a deal to sell it to the capital’s network operator, Beijing Netcom. “For the ’08 Olympics, Beijing Netcom will adopt this solution to inspect abnormal traffic,” a Huawei cyber expert wrote in a technical journal. “This is primarily aimed at defending against network attacks during the Olympic Games.”[7]

防火长城的大部分技术来自美国思科公司，该公司是“深度数据包检测”（DPI）技术的领先供应商。DPI 允许当局窥视传输中的互联网数据包。如果数据被认为是有问题的，系统可以阻止网站加载或阻止电子邮件到达接收者的收件箱。随着奥运会的临近，华为开发了自己的版本，并达成协议将其出售给首都的网络运营商北京网通。“为了 08 年奥运会，北京网通将采用这一方案来检测异常流量，”一位华为网络安全专家在技术期刊中写道。“这主要旨在防御奥运会期间的网络攻击。”[7]

Huawei’s overview of the product highlighted its capability to sniff out viruses and cyberattacks with names like Smurf, Fraggle, and Ping of Death. There was more in the fine print: the product could also monitor VoIP traffic (internet phone calls over services like Skype) and P2P file-sharing networks (which many young people used for downloading foreign TV shows, circumventing Beijing’s censors), as well as analyze user behavior. Chinese authorities in the city of Shenyang had successfully used Huawei’s DPI system to hunt down illegal VoIP calls and disrupt them with high-decibel noise.[8]

华为对该产品的概述强调了其识别病毒和网络攻击的能力，这些攻击有着 Smurf、Fraggle 和“死亡之萍”（Ping of Death）等名称。细则中还有更多内容：该产品还可以监控 VoIP 流量（通过 Skype 等服务进行的互联网电话）和 P2P 文件共享网络（许多年轻人利用这些网络下载外国电视节目，规避北京的审查），并分析用户行为。沈阳市的中国当局已成功使用华为的 DPI 系统追踪非法 VoIP 通话，并用高分贝噪音干扰它们。[8]

China was also ramping up physical security. Huawei was helping set up a citywide surveillance-camera system in Beijing that state media said would help prevent accidents and public security incidents. At the Beijing city government’s command center, a big screen let authorities see the traffic on every street connecting to the Games venues. The city would have some three hundred thousand surveillance cameras by the time the Games began. A telecom expert who visited China that year recalled getting a peek at one of the video display rooms for surveillance cameras and finding them surprisingly advanced. “They had an AI on all those screens,” he said. “Any movement, any anomalies on all those cameras, would get flagged automatically with alarms.”[9] A domestic technology journal observed that the Olympics had accelerated China’s adoption of new surveillance-camera features like facial recognition and thermal imaging. “The shared feature of these technologies is that they are rarely used in ordinary security systems,” the journal reported. “But driven by the security needs of the Olympics, these technologies will be popularized rapidly.”[10]

中国也在加强物理安保。华为正协助在北京建立一套全市范围的监控摄像头系统，官方媒体称这将有助于预防事故和公共安全事件。在北京政府的指挥中心，大屏幕让当局可以看到连接奥运场馆的每条街道的交通情况。到奥运会开幕时，这座城市将拥有约三十万个监控摄像头。那年访问中国的一位电信专家回忆说，他曾窥见过一个监控摄像头视频显示室，发现它们先进得令人惊讶。“他们在所有屏幕上都应用了人工智能，”他说，“这些摄像头上的任何动作、任何异常，都会自动触发警报。”[9] 一家国内技术期刊观察到，奥运会加速了中国对人脸识别和热成像等新型监控摄像头功能的采用。该期刊报道称：“这些技术的共同特点是，它们很少用于普通的安保系统。但在奥运安保需求的驱动下，这些技术将迅速普及。”[10]

The surveillance-camera boom was good news for Huawei’s chip unit, HiSilicon, which had become a major supplier of chips for both Huawei’s own surveillance cameras and those of other companies. Founded in 1991 as Huawei’s in-house chip design center, HiSilicon was formalized as a subsidiary in 2004. In 2006, it launched its first surveillance camera chip, which it used in Huawei’s own systems and also sold to other camera makers.[11] HiSilicon ranked number one in China in revenue among integrated-circuit design companies for 2008, with $452.47 million in sales, according to the China Semiconductor Industry Association.[12] This was more than twice the sales of the number-two company, China Huada Integrated Circuit Design. By 2009, HiSilicon would capture 40 percent of the surveillance-camera chip market, with more than two million units in shipments to mainland China, Taiwan, and South Korea.

监控摄像头的热潮对华为的芯片部门海思（HiSilicon）来说是个好消息，海思已成为华为自有监控摄像头以及其他公司摄像头的主要芯片供应商。海思成立于 1991 年，最初是华为内部的芯片设计中心，2004 年正式成为子公司。2006 年，它推出了首款监控摄像头芯片，不仅用于华为自有的系统，还销往其他摄像头制造商。[11] 根据中国半导体行业协会的数据，2008 年海思在集成电路设计公司中收入排名中国第一，销售额达 4.5247 亿美元。[12] 这一数字是排名第二的中国华大集成电路设计公司销售额的两倍多。到 2009 年，海思将占据监控摄像头芯片市场 40%的份额，向中国大陆、台湾和韩国的出货量超过 200 万颗。

“Before HiSilicon entered security, the entire semiconductor industry had not developed chips specifically for security,” HiSilicon executive Ai Wei told China Public Security magazine. “It can be said that HiSilicon is the first semiconductor company with a close interest in security.”[13]

“在海思进入安防领域之前，整个半导体行业还没有专门为安防开发芯片，”海思高管艾伟告诉《中国公共安全》杂志。“可以说，海思是第一家对安防表现出浓厚兴趣的半导体公司。”[13]

—

Chinese officials were tense in May 2008 when the torch arrived in Tibet. Despite Beijing’s years of tightening security, the run-up to the Olympics had been marred by the breakout of deadly protests in Tibet. The first riot had left 22 dead according to the official count, or more than 140 dead according to human-rights groups. The wave of clashes that followed brought the worst unrest that the region had seen in decades. Chinese officials blamed supporters of the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, for fanning separatism to undermine the nation. Overseas, many were sympathetic to the Tibetans, who had endured oppressive assimilation by the party for decades. As the Olympic torch wended its way from country to country, anti-China protesters showed up in droves to yell “Free Tibet!” and “Shame on China!”

2008 年 5 月火炬抵达西藏时，中国官员情绪紧张。尽管北京多年来不断加强安保，但奥运会的筹备工作仍因西藏爆发致命抗议活动而蒙上阴影。根据官方统计，第一场骚乱造成 22 人死亡，而人权组织称死亡人数超过 140 人。随后爆发的一系列冲突带来了该地区数十年来最严重的动荡。中国官员指责流亡的西藏精神领袖达赖喇嘛的支持者煽动分裂以破坏国家。在海外，许多人同情西藏人，他们几十年来一直忍受着党推行的压迫性同化政策。随着奥运火炬在各国传递，反华抗议者成群结队地出现，高喊“西藏自由！”和“中国可耻！”

Huawei had been rolling out phone service across Tibet for years, including in rugged rural areas only accessible by foot.[14] Indeed, Beijing viewed the rollout of these utilities as an important part of assimilation efforts to connect Tibetans to the rest of the nation. Ren had previously criticized the United States for attempts to intervene in Tibet. “America wears the human-rights hat to attack China with all its might, using the Taiwan issue, the Tibet issue,” Ren said.[15] Another time, he denounced President Clinton’s decision to meet with the Dalai Lama as “an instigation to subvert China.”[16]

华为多年来一直在西藏各地推广电话服务，包括只能徒步到达的崎岖农村地区。[14] 事实上，北京将这些公用设施的推广视为同化努力的重要组成部分，旨在将西藏人与国家其他地区联系起来。任正非此前曾批评美国试图干预西藏。任正非说：“美国戴着人权帽子，利用台湾问题、西藏问题全力攻击中国。”[15] 另一次，他谴责克林顿总统会见达赖喇嘛的决定是“煽动颠覆中国”。[16]

Early in the morning on May 8, 2008, a team of Tibetan mountaineers in thick red parkas lit a red torch and began their frigid climb.[17] The climbers were carrying mobile phones outfitted to easily shoot and upload photos.

2008 年 5 月 8 日清晨，一队身穿厚重红色派克大衣的西藏登山者点燃了红色火炬，开始了寒冷的攀登。[17] 登山者携带了配备有易于拍摄和上传照片功能的手机。

The Chinese side of Mount Everest had been closed off to climbers. China had secured Nepal’s cooperation for the other half, with Nepali soldiers warning that any anti-China protesters might be shot.[18] At base camp, Huawei’s engineers were ready to make sure that the ascent went off without a hitch.

珠穆朗玛峰的中国一侧已对登山者封闭。中国确保了尼泊尔在另一侧的配合，尼泊尔士兵警告称，任何反华抗议者都可能被枪杀。[18] 在大本营，华为的工程师们严阵以待，确保登顶过程万无一失。

At 9:23 a.m., the first photo went live on the website of the official state news agency, Xinhua.

上午 9 点 23 分，第一张照片在官方通讯社新华社的网站上发布。

A Huawei engineer excitedly texted colleagues back home: “The sacred Mount Everest fire has successfully reached the summit and been set aflame. It was all Huawei’s equipment that broadcast and safeguarded it.”[19]

一名华为工程师兴奋地给国内的同事发短信：“神圣的珠峰圣火已成功登顶并点燃。全程都是华为的设备在进行转播和保障。”[19]

—

On the morning of the Olympics’ opening ceremony, Huawei engineers arrived early at Beijing Netcom’s office for their sixteen-hour shift. They reviewed their checklists.[20]

在奥运会开幕式当天早上，华为工程师早早来到北京网通办公室，开始他们长达 16 小时的轮班。他们检查了核对清单。[20]

The streets were quiet. Most Beijing businesses were closed for the day, the roads blocked to all but official Games traffic. In an effort to avoid smoggy skies, factories surrounding the capital had been ordered to suspend production. For two months beforehand, cars were only allowed to drive on alternating days, with restrictions based on whether the last digit of a license plate was odd or even. Prominent political dissidents were under house arrest to eliminate the risk of disruption.[21] Near the main stadium, two surface-to-air missile launchers sat at the ready.

街道上很安静。北京的大多数商店当天都停业了，道路除奥运官方车辆外全部封锁。为了避免雾霾天气，首都周边的工厂被勒令停产。在此前的两个月里，汽车只能按单双号限行。著名的政治异见人士被软禁，以消除干扰风险。[21] 在主体育场附近，两台地对空导弹发射器严阵以待。

There had been talk of elevated online surveillance for the Games, though it could not be proved to just what extent authorities were monitoring the traffic, or if Huawei’s staff were involved. A US senator warned that Beijing hotels had been required to install monitoring systems so that all of the guests’ emails and web activity would be viewable by local authorities.[22] A Huawei employee separately recalled, without elaborating, that all international roaming on mobile phones had to pass through a special switching office in Beijing during the Olympics.[23]

曾有传言称奥运期间网络监控有所升级，尽管无法证实当局在多大程度上监控流量，或者华为员工是否参与其中。一位美国参议员警告称，北京的酒店被要求安装监控系统，以便地方当局查看所有客人的电子邮件和网络活动。[22] 一名华为员工另外回忆道（未作详细说明），奥运期间手机上的所有国际漫游都必须经过北京的一个特殊交换局。[23]

That wasn’t something visitors could see, though. What Olympics spectators could see when they arrived in Beijing was gleaming futuristic buildings, a sea of flowers, and cheerful English-speaking university student volunteers at every turn.[24] Huawei had helped China Mobile roll out an automated hotline to help visitors with any questions about hotels or transportation. Huawei’s internal hospitality arm, Smartcom, prepared a lavish dinner party for VIP customers visiting to watch the Games.[25]

不过，这些并不是游客能看到的。奥运观众抵达北京时看到的是流光溢彩的未来主义建筑、花海，以及随处可见的笑容满面、操着流利英语的大学生志愿者。[24] 华为协助中国移动推出了自动化热线，帮助游客解决有关酒店或交通的任何问题。华为内部的接待部门慧通（Smartcom）为前来观看比赛的 VIP 客户准备了奢华的晚宴。[25]

Now, four hours before the opening ceremony, rockets containing silver iodide began to fire into the air. They seeded rain in the clouds to Beijing’s south to ensure that the skies stayed dry over the stadium to the north. The city had left nothing to chance.

此时，距离开幕式还有四个小时，装有碘化银的火箭开始射向空中。它们在北京南部的云层中人工增雨，以确保北边体育场上空保持干燥。这座城市没有留下任何偶然。

Just after 8:00 p.m. on August 8, 2008—eight was an auspicious number—2,008 drummers began pounding in unison on rows of bronze drums. Fireworks shaped like twenty-nine enormous footprints exploded overhead, walking across the city’s sky, an incredible feat of pyrotechnics. To ensure that each footprint was launched at the right choreographic moment, a telephone system had been set up, with the help of Huawei gear, to connect the twenty-nine sites so that each fireworks team knew when to launch.[26] Just to make sure it was perfect, the state TV broadcaster played a digitally rendered version of the firework footprints instead of a live feed. The meticulous Olympics preparations of the low-key Vice President Xi Jinping had paid off, and would help pave his rise to become the nation’s most powerful leader in a generation.

2008 年 8 月 8 日晚 8 点刚过——“八”是一个吉祥的数字——2008 名鼓手开始同步击打成排的青铜鼓。29 个巨大脚印形状的烟花在头顶绽放，穿过城市的上空，这是一场令人惊叹的烟火壮举。为了确保每一个脚印都能在精确的编排时刻发射，在华为设备的帮助下，一套电话系统被建立起来，将 29 个地点连接在一起，以便每个烟花团队都知道何时发射。[26] 为了确保万无一失，国家电视台播放了烟花脚印的数字渲染版本，而非现场直播。低调的副主席习近平为奥运会所做的精心准备得到了回报，这将有助于为他崛起成为该国一代以来最强大的领导人铺平道路。

Later, some Huawei engineers wistfully remarked that they had missed seeing the historic opening ceremony despite being right there in Beijing. They hadn’t been allowed to turn on the TVs at their desks, lest it distract them from their important job of guarding the networks.

后来，一些华为工程师惆怅地提到，尽管人就在北京，他们却错过了观看那场历史性的开幕式。他们不被允许打开办公桌上的电视机，以免分散他们在守护网络这一重要工作上的注意力。

16

16

The Western Front

西线战场

Washington and London: 2009–2010

华盛顿与伦敦：2010–2011 年

In November 2010, Dan Hesse got a phone call.[1] Hesse was the CEO of Sprint Nextel, the third-largest wireless provider in the US behind Verizon and AT&T. The man on the line was Gary Locke, the US commerce secretary. Locke told Hesse that he and his colleagues knew Sprint was considering a bid from Huawei to expand its 4G network upgrade. He said they had concerns.

2010 年 11 月，丹·赫塞（Dan Hesse）接到了一通电话。[1] 赫塞当时是 Sprint Nextel 的首席执行官，该公司是美国仅次于 Verizon 和 AT&T 的第三大无线运营商。电话那头是美国商务部长骆家辉（Gary Locke）。骆家辉告诉赫塞，他和他的同事们了解到 Sprint 正在考虑由华为竞标其 4G 网络升级扩容项目。他说，他们对此表示担忧。

“It wasn’t heavy-handed in any way—he actually made it clear this was Sprint’s decision,” Hesse recalled. “He wasn’t telling me as a member of the government not to choose Huawei equipment. But they wanted to make sure I knew that they had security concerns with Huawei equipment going into our network.”

“这绝非高压手段——他实际上明确表示这是 Sprint 的决定，”赫塞回忆道。“他并没有以政府成员的身份告诉我不准选择华为设备。但他们想确保我知道，他们对进入我们网络的华为设备存在安全方面的顾虑。”

China had only just rolled out 3G, but many nations, like the US, were moving on to 4G. The arrival of a new generation of mobile technology meant that telecom operators around the world were doing a once-in-a-decade overhaul of their networks. Contracts were open. Operators were entertaining offers.

当时中国才刚刚推出 3G，但包括美国在内的许多国家已经开始向 4G 迈进。新一代移动技术的到来，意味着全球电信运营商都在对网络进行十年一遇的彻底翻修。合同是开放的，运营商们正在考虑各种报价。

Huawei was bidding vigorously for 4G projects around the world—including for the Sprint expansion in the US. The news raised alarms in Washington. “If Huawei builds the components for our cell towers in the U.S. 4G network, then every cell tower is a potential listening post for Beijing,” Edward Timperlake, former director of technology assessment for the Pentagon, was quoted as saying in The Washington Times.[2] Sprint’s previous 3G supplier, the Canadian networking giant Nortel, had gone bankrupt in 2009, driven out of business in part by its inability to match Huawei’s low prices.

华为当时正积极竞标全球各地的 4G 项目——包括美国的 Sprint 扩容项目。这一消息在华盛顿引发了警报。“如果华为为美国 4G 网络建造基站组件，那么每个基站都可能成为北京的潜在监听站，”五角大楼前技术评估主任爱德华·廷伯莱克（Edward Timperlake）在《华盛顿时报》[2]中被引用道。Sprint 之前的 3G 供应商是加拿大网络巨头北电网络（Nortel），该公司已于 2009 年破产，部分原因就是无法应对华为的低价竞争。

There were also murmurs over who was now representing Huawei: Admiral Bill Owens, the former Nortel CEO. Before he landed at Nortel, Owens had been the vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the number-two officer in the US military.[3]

坊间对于现在谁在代表华为也颇有微词：比尔·欧文斯（Bill Owens）海军上将，前北电首席执行官。在入职北电之前，欧文斯曾担任参谋长联席会议副主席，是美国军方的二号人物。[3]

Now Secretary Locke told Hesse that if Sprint picked Huawei, there was a possibility that some US government agencies might no longer use Sprint due to network security concerns.

此时，骆家辉部长告诉赫塞，如果 Sprint 选择了华为，出于网络安全考虑，一些美国政府机构可能将不再使用 Sprint 的服务。

“It was a friendly call,” Hesse said. “It wasn’t threatening in any way. But he wanted to make sure that I knew.”

“这是一通友好的电话，”赫塞说。“没有任何威胁的意味。但他想确保我知道这一点。”

—

In August 2010, as talk of Huawei’s Sprint bid circulated, eight Republican lawmakers sent an urgent letter to top officials in the Obama administration.[4] “Sprint Nextel supplies important equipment to the U.S. military and law enforcement agencies,” they wrote. “We are concerned that Huawei’s position as a supplier of Sprint Nextel could create substantial risk for U.S. companies and possibly undermine U.S. national security.”

2010 年 8 月，随着华为竞标 Sprint 的传闻流传开来，八名共和党议员向奥巴马政府的高级官员发出了一封紧急信函。[4] “Sprint Nextel 为美国军方和执法机构提供重要设备，”他们写道。“我们担心华为作为 Sprint Nextel 供应商的地位可能会给美国公司带来巨大风险，并可能破坏美国的国家安全。”

This was followed by a letter from four lawmakers to the FCC requesting that the agency take measures to block Huawei from conducting business in the US. “The sensitivity of information transmitted in communications systems, as well as the potential for foreign espionage, requires that the U.S. government take decisive action,” the letter said.

随后，四名议员致信联邦通信委员会（FCC），要求该机构采取措施阻止华为在美国开展业务。信中称：“通信系统中传输信息的敏感性，以及外国间谍活动的潜在可能，要求美国政府采取果断行动。”

Huawei had been allowed to pick up some small contracts in the US, such as with ClearTalk in December 2004 to supply small patches of California and Arizona. But there was a lot more concern in Washington about Huawei being plugged into a major network. Would China’s government potentially be able to listen in to calls through Huawei’s equipment? Could the gear be hacked to disrupt the network? There was also considerable intrigue about why Owens was now on Team Huawei.

华为此前曾获准在美国承接一些小型合同，例如 2004 年 12 月与 ClearTalk 签约，为加利福尼亚州和亚利桑那州的小部分地区提供服务。但华盛顿对于华为接入主要网络存在更多的担忧。中国政府是否有可能通过华为设备进行监听？这些设备是否会被黑客攻击以破坏网络？此外，关于欧文斯为何加入华为团队也存在诸多猜测。

Intellectual-property infringement allegations also continued to dog Huawei. Fujitsu had written a stern letter to Ren Zhengfei in 2004, decrying that a Huawei employee had been caught at an industry conference removing the casing of a Fujitsu optical networking device and examining the circuit boards inside.[5] Fujitsu called this unlawful and said that it had turned the matter over to the FBI. In July 2010, Motorola sued Huawei, alleging that in the early aughts, the company had sought out proprietary details about Motorola’s mobile base stations, with Ren himself allegedly involved in the meetings. Huawei called the lawsuit groundless, and it was quietly settled without the terms being disclosed.

侵犯知识产权的指控也继续困扰着华为。富士通（Fujitsu）曾在 2004 年给任正非写过一封措辞严厉的信，谴责一名华为员工在一次行业会议上被当场抓获，当时他正在拆卸富士通光网络设备的机壳并检查内部电路板。[5] 富士通称此举违法，并表示已将此事移交给 FBI。2010 年 7 月，摩托罗拉（Motorola）起诉华为，指控该公司在 2000 年代初期曾试图获取有关摩托罗拉移动基站的专有细节，据称任正非本人也参与了相关会议。华为称该诉讼毫无根据，随后该案在未披露条款的情况下悄然和解。

When he was CEO of Nortel, Owens had explored the idea of a Nortel-Huawei merger, meeting with Ren and Guo Ping, but ultimately abandoned it due to the likely hurdles of getting such a deal past Western regulators. But he had come away from the experience with a deep respect for Ren’s management and vision. “As a military man I have known many clever and truly outstanding strategists,” he’d later write. “I have rarely come across an individual more strategically oriented than Ren.”[6]

欧文斯在担任北电首席执行官期间，曾探讨过北电与华为合并的想法，并与任正非和郭平会面，但最终由于此类交易难以通过西方监管机构的审查而放弃。但他从这段经历中对任正非的管理和远见产生了深深的敬意。“作为一名军人，我认识许多聪明且真正杰出的战略家，”他后来写道。“我很少遇到比任正非更具战略导向的人。”[6]

After spending years in senior military leadership, Owens should have had no illusions about the potential for telecommunications equipment to be tapped and infiltrated by governments. But there were different schools of thought on just how sensitive the information traversing consumer networks was. In any event, government secrets and military data were kept not on public networks but on specialized systems with heightened security. And Owens often said that he felt the gravest risk facing the United States in his lifetime was a war with China. Each country getting a certain degree of visibility into the other’s workings could help prevent a paranoid downward spiral into war. To this end, Owens had started something called the Sanya Initiative in 2008, an annual dialogue between retired American and Chinese generals and admirals.

在担任多年军队高级领导职务后，欧文斯不应对电信设备可能被政府窃听和渗透的风险抱有幻想。但对于通过消费网络传输的信息究竟有多敏感，存在不同的观点。无论如何，政府机密和军事数据并不保存在公共网络上，而是保存在具有更高安全性的专用系统中。欧文斯经常说，他认为在他有生之年美国面临的最大风险是与中国发生战争。如果两国都能在一定程度上了解对方的运作情况，可能有助于防止因偏执而陷入战争的恶性循环。为此，欧文斯于 2008 年发起了一项名为“三亚倡议”（Sanya Initiative）的活动，这是美国和中国退役将领之间的年度对话。

Now Owens proposed to US officials that Huawei’s equipment could be safely integrated into Sprint’s network via a new US-based company called Amerilink that would oversee the security vetting of the gear, with the US government’s close involvement. The chairman of Amerilink was Owens. “Huawei would not be involved in any way in Amerilink,” Owens wrote. “Equipment and services would be delivered to Amerilink, tested, quality-controlled and delivered to Sprint. There would be no direct Huawei-to-Sprint interface.”[7] Owens said that Amerilink was offering to open its board and all deliberations to the National Security Agency, and that such a deal would save Sprint hundreds of millions of dollars, as well as give Washington a new level of insight into Huawei as a company.

欧文斯向美国官员提议，华为的设备可以通过一家名为 Amerilink 的新美国公司安全地整合到 Sprint 的网络中，该公司将在美国政府的密切参与下负责设备的安全性审查。Amerilink 的董事长正是欧文斯。“华为将不以任何方式参与 Amerilink，”欧文斯写道。“设备和服务将交付给 Amerilink，经过测试、质量控制后再交付给 Sprint。华为与 Sprint 之间不会有直接接触。”[7] 欧文斯表示，Amerilink 提议向国家安全局（NSA）开放其董事会和所有审议过程，并称此类交易将为 Sprint 节省数亿美元，同时让华盛顿对华为这家公司有更深层次的了解。

Huawei had other supporters too. Texas governor Rick Perry praised Ren in October 2010 for creating local jobs through Huawei’s expanded North American headquarters in Plano and said Ren’s straight-talking style reminded him of residents of the Lone Star State. “If you didn’t know any better, you’d say he grew up out in West Texas,” Perry said. “He wasn’t sugarcoatin’ it a lot.”[8] Matt Bross, the BT CTO who had helped select Huawei for that crucial first contract, was named Huawei’s global chief technology officer and one of two copresidents of Huawei USA.[9] At Amerilink, a former Sprint Nextel vice president, Kevin Packingham, had signed on as CEO. Amerilink’s board included Gordon England, former US deputy secretary of defense and homeland security; former House majority leader Richard Gephardt; and former World Bank president James Wolfensohn. “It is doable,” England told the Financial Times, in reference to Amerilink’s ability to ensure that Huawei’s technology was secure.[10]

华为也有其他支持者。2010 年 10 月，德克萨斯州州长里克·佩里赞扬任正非通过华为在普莱诺扩建的北美总部创造了当地就业机会，并表示任正非直言不讳的风格让他想起了“孤星之州”的居民。“如果你不了解情况，你会以为他是在西德克萨斯长大的，”佩里说。“他一点儿也不虚饰。”[8] 曾帮助华为赢得那份至关重要的首份合同的前英国电信（BT）首席技术官马特·布罗斯，被任命为华为全球首席技术官兼华为美国公司两位联席总裁之一。[9] 在 Amerilink，前 Sprint Nextel 副总裁凯文·帕金汉姆已签约担任首席执行官。Amerilink 的董事会成员包括：前美国国防部及国土安全部副部长戈登·英格兰；前众议院多数党领袖理查德·格普哈特；以及前世界银行行长詹姆斯·沃尔芬森。“这是可行的，”英格兰在谈到 Amerilink 确保华为技术安全的能力时告诉《金融时报》。[10]

Behind closed doors, Ren was skeptical about Huawei’s chances, and he told Owens that he thought the company’s bid would fail because of political opposition in Washington.[11]

在私下里，任正非对华为的机会持怀疑态度，他告诉欧文斯，他认为由于华盛顿的政治反对，公司的竞标将会失败。[11]

—

Across the Atlantic, British government officials were grappling with the same questions that Hesse faced at Sprint. Was having Huawei’s gear in the network a security risk? If so, could the risk be mitigated?

在大西洋彼岸，英国政府官员也在苦苦思索黑塞在 Sprint 面临的同样问题。在网络中使用华为设备是否存在安全风险？如果是，风险能否降低？

Huawei had already been in major UK networks for years, having won a spot in BT’s nationwide broadband upgrade in 2005, but London had been reconsidering its stance. “The British government said, ‘Look, we don’t want you to put any more Huawei equipment into UK networks,’ ” a Huawei executive recalled. “They said, ‘It’s not possible. It’s a security risk for the UK.’ ”[12] After intensive efforts by Huawei to find a solution, British officials were convinced that the risk could be mitigated. Huawei’s solution was something called “the Cell.”

华为进入英国主要网络已有多年，早在 2005 年就赢得了英国电信全国宽带升级的一个席位，但伦敦方面一直在重新审视其立场。“英国政府说，‘听着，我们不希望你们在英国网络中再投入任何华为设备，’”一位华为高管回忆道。“他们说，‘这不可能。这对英国来说是一个安全风险。’”[12] 在华为通过密集努力寻找解决方案后，英国官员确信风险是可以降低的。华为的解决方案被称为“细胞”（the Cell）。

The Cell was located in a nondescript office complex[13] on the outskirts of Banbury, a quiet English town known for its spiced currant cakes. The Huawei facility featured all manner of security precautions. “It had a door that was bombproof,” recalled one person who worked there and spoke on condition of anonymity. “There were no phones inside the secure area…. All the servers that contained the source code were in locked cages, and only one person had the key to the cages.”[14]

“细胞”位于班伯里郊区一个不起眼的办公大楼内[13]，班伯里是一个以香料醋栗蛋糕闻名的宁静英国小镇。华为的这一设施配备了各种安全预防措施。“它有一扇防弹门，”一位曾在那里工作并要求匿名的人士回忆道。“安全区域内没有电话……所有包含源代码的服务器都锁在笼子里，只有一个人有笼子的钥匙。”[14]

The official name, the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre, was a mouthful, as was the acronym, HCSEC, so people had taken to calling it “the Cell.” It was a center where UK officials could look under the hood of Huawei’s gear to see for themselves if it was safe, the first such center that Huawei had opened in the world. In November 2010, Ken Hu, the early star salesman who was now the company’s senior vice president and chairman of Huawei’s Global Network Security Committee, flew over for the launch.[15] Huawei’s executives were proud to have such a sophisticated facility in the UK. “They felt they were finally coming of age on the international scene, that they were being taken seriously as a supplier,” recalled Gary Garner, an IBM consultant working with Huawei.[16]

它的官方名称是“华为网络安全评估中心”，名字很绕口，缩写 HCSEC 也是如此，所以人们习惯称它为“细胞”。这是英国官员可以深入了解华为设备内部以亲自确认其是否安全的中心，也是华为在全球开设的首个此类中心。2010 年 11 月，早期的明星销售员、时任公司高级副总裁兼华为全球网络安全委员会主席的胡厚崑飞往英国参加启动仪式。[15] 华为的高管们为在英国拥有这样一个先进的设施感到自豪。“他们觉得自己在国际舞台上终于成熟了，被视为一个受到重视的供应商，”与华为合作的 IBM 顾问加里·加纳回忆道。[16]

The Cell wasn’t too far from Cheltenham, where Britain’s signals-intelligence agency, GCHQ, the British equivalent to the NSA, was based. This was convenient. What Huawei’s press release about the Cell didn’t mention, however, was just how deeply involved GCHQ was in the operation. “It was more like an arm of the British intelligence agencies, as opposed to being Huawei itself,” said Chris Powell, a former UK government cybersecurity researcher who began working at the Cell in 2016. “People would say, ‘Oh, you’re trusting Huawei to check its own code.’ And I just thought to myself, If only you knew.”[17]

“细胞”离切尔滕纳姆不远，那里是英国信号情报机构政府通信总部（GCHQ）的所在地，该机构相当于美国的国家安全局。这很方便。然而，华为关于“细胞”的新闻稿中没有提到的是，GCHQ 对该运作的参与程度有多深。“它更像是英国情报机构的一个分支，而不是华为本身，”2016 年开始在“细胞”工作的前英国政府网络安全研究员克里斯·鲍威尔说。“人们会说，‘哦，你们竟然信任华为检查自己的代码。’我心里就在想，要是你们知道真相就好了。”[17]

Huawei technically owned the Cell and supplied the funding, but GCHQ ran the show. Without clearance, Huawei executives couldn’t even access the center. The intelligence agency vetted prospective employees, requiring all staffers to have “Developed Vetting” security clearance, the level required for members of the British intelligence services.[18] It meant that they were cleared for frequent, uncontrolled access to classified information. GCHQ gave new staffers a security briefing and ensured that they signed the Official Secrets Act.

从技术上讲，华为拥有“细胞”并提供资金，但 GCHQ 才是掌控者。如果没有许可，华为高管甚至无法进入该中心。情报机构对潜在员工进行审查，要求所有员工都拥有“深度审查”（Developed Vetting）安全许可，这是英国情报机构成员所需的级别。[18] 这意味着他们被允许频繁、不受控地接触机密信息。GCHQ 会对新员工进行安全简报，并确保他们签署《官方机密法案》。

The first managing director of the Cell was Andrew Hopkins, a former deputy director for GCHQ and a forty-year veteran of British intelligence.[19] Other former GCHQ agents were the Cell’s researchers. Some in London argued that the Cell’s staff should be employed directly by GCHQ, not put on Huawei’s payroll. At any rate, according to Powell, there was no contest when it came to loyalties: “People were, like, infinitely more loyal to the British government than they were to Huawei.”

“细胞”的第一任总经理是安德鲁·霍普金斯，他是 GCHQ 的前副局长，也是一位拥有四十年经验的英国情报界老兵。[19] 其他前 GCHQ 特工则是“细胞”的研究员。伦敦方面有人认为，“细胞”的员工应该直接由 GCHQ 雇佣，而不是列入华为的工资单。无论如何，据鲍威尔称，在忠诚度方面毫无争议：“人们对英国政府的忠诚度，远高于对华为的忠诚度。”

The Cell was soon finding vulnerabilities and pushing Huawei to fix them. One team looked at each product, one by one, while another looked for weaknesses in the broader systems. The Cell’s researchers could find problems in the code, but they had little visibility into why these aberrations were there. “It’s very difficult to tell the difference between a back door and a mistake,” Powell said. “Every organization has bugs. And Huawei, at least at the beginning, had a significant amount of bugs—beyond anyone else.” One such issue, according to someone who spoke on condition of anonymity, was devices all being set to the same default password. This person said that UK authorities received the Cell’s reports before Huawei did.

“细胞”小组很快就发现了漏洞，并督促华为进行修复。一个团队逐一检查每款产品，而另一个团队则在更广泛的系统中寻找弱点。“细胞”小组的研究人员可以在代码中发现问题，但他们很难看清为什么会出现这些异常。鲍威尔说：“很难区分后门和失误。每个组织都有漏洞。而华为，至少在初期，其漏洞数量惊人——超过了其他任何人。”据一位要求匿名的人士透露，其中一个问题是所有设备的默认密码都被设为相同。此人表示，英国当局在华为收到报告之前就先拿到了“细胞”小组的报告。

There was more than a little dispute among UK officials about just how effective the Cell was at guaranteeing cybersecurity. But the existence of the center did a lot to reassure customers anyhow, and not only in the UK. “Since we set up this security center, I think it’s a great help for our business growing not only in the UK but also the European market and other countries,” Huawei’s chairwoman, Sun Yafang, said in a speech during a visit to Britain.[20] Vince Cable, UK secretary of state for business, innovation, and skills during this time, later recalled that the government largely felt that any risks from Huawei’s gear were containable. “There was some discussion, mainly from one or two conservative backbenchers who said that we were taking too many risks. But it wasn’t very loud,” he said.[21]

英国官员对于“细胞”小组在保障网络安全方面的有效性存在不小的争议。但无论如何，该中心的设立在很大程度上安抚了客户，且不仅限于英国。华为董事长孙亚芳在访问英国期间的一次演讲中表示：“自从我们建立了这个安全中心，我认为这对我们在英国以及欧洲市场和其他国家的业务增长都有很大帮助。”[20] 当时担任英国商业、创新与技能大臣的文斯·凯布尔后来回忆说，政府普遍认为华为设备带来的任何风险都是可控的。他说：“有一些讨论，主要来自一两名保守党后座议员，他们认为我们承担了太多风险。但这种声音并不响亮。”[21]

Huawei would continue to make extra efforts to win over the UK, seeing the market as its key foothold in the West. It would pour funds into hosting British politicians, seeking their favor. In late 2012, the British TV news program Dispatches, which airs on Channel 4, would report that Huawei had spent more than £90,000 ($144,000) over nearly two years on trips for British members of Parliament, according to the politicians’ public filings of financial interests.[22] That included a £12,000 trip to Hong Kong and Shanghai for MP Mark Hendrick and his wife in January 2011, a trip that Hendrick said he took “to consider the implications of Chinese technological investment in the UK.”[23]

华为继续加大力度争取英国的支持，将该市场视为其在西方的关键立足点。它投入资金招待英国政客，寻求他们的好感。2012 年末，英国第四频道播出的电视新闻节目《派遣》（Dispatches）报道称，根据政客公开的财务利益申报，华为在近两年内花费了超过 9 万英镑（14.4 万美元）资助英国国会议员出访。[22] 这包括 2011 年 1 月为国会议员马克·亨德里克及其妻子提供的价值 1.2 万英镑的香港和上海之行，亨德里克表示，他此行是“为了考察中国技术投资对英国的影响”。[23]

—

For decades, Ren had looked askance at the vulgarity of hawking gizmos and gadgets to lay consumers. He was a discreet tradesman selling specialized products to specialized buyers. Ren also suspected that this buzzy new thing called a smartphone was overhyped. “We believe that the internet has not changed the essence of things,” he told staff. “A car must be a car first, and tofu must be tofu.”[24]

几十年来，任正非一直对向普通消费者兜售小玩意的粗俗行为不屑一顾。他是一名谨慎的商人，向专业买家销售专业产品。任正非还怀疑这个被称为智能手机的热门新事物被过度炒作了。他告诉员工：“我们认为互联网并没有改变事物的本质。车必须首先是车，豆腐必须是豆腐。”[24]

But amid Huawei’s challenges in the West, Ren came around to the idea of a pivot into consumer electronics. Consumer gadgets could help Huawei soften its image overseas and gain acceptance in markets that were otherwise hard to crack. Smartphones were more innocuous than radio antennae, surveillance cameras, and submarine cables. Even as US officials were sounding the alarm over Huawei’s Sprint bid, Best Buy outlets across America began carrying Huawei-branded Android tablets.[25] Consumers around the world began to see ads for a new brand called Huawei.

但在华为面临西方挑战之际，任正非转变了观念，接受了向消费电子产品转型的想法。消费类产品可以帮助华为软化其海外形象，并在其他难以攻克的市场获得认可。智能手机比无线电天线、监控摄像头和海底电缆更显得无害。就在美国官员对华为竞标 Sprint 敲响警钟时，全美各地的百思买（Best Buy）门店开始销售华为品牌的安卓平板电脑。[25] 全球各地的消费者开始看到一个名为“华为”的新品牌的广告。

Due to years of bureaucratic delays, China was very late to the smartphone revolution. The country finally launched 3G networks in 2009, making it possible to use smartphones like iPhones domestically, a decade after the first 3G network was launched in Japan. But smartphones had been made in China since long before they could be used there. Indeed, the manufacturing center of Taiwan’s Foxconn, the world’s largest contract manufacturer of smartphones and the primary assembler of Apple’s iPhone, coincidentally sat just across the road from Huawei’s Shenzhen offices.

由于多年的官僚延误，中国在智能手机革命中起步很晚。该国终于在 2009 年推出了 3G 网络，使得在国内使用像 iPhone 这样的智能手机成为可能，这比日本推出首个 3G 网络晚了十年。但智能手机在中国制造的历史远早于它们在中国被使用的历史。事实上，台湾富士康（全球最大的智能手机代工厂，也是苹果 iPhone 的主要组装商）的制造中心，巧合地就坐落在华为深圳总部的马路对面。

It took a while for Huawei’s own executives to come around to the idea that Huawei was now a consumer brand and that they had to like its phones—or at least pretend to like them. When Ken Hu, Huawei’s deputy chairman, opened an account on Weibo, China’s answer to Twitter, netizens were amused to see that each of his posts carried the telltale auto-stamp showing that it had been posted from an iPhone.

华为的高管们花了一段时间才接受华为现在是一个消费品牌的事实，并意识到他们必须喜欢自家的手机——或者至少假装喜欢。当华为副董事长胡厚崑在微博（中国的 Twitter）上开通账号时，网民们惊讶地发现，他的每条博文都带着明显的自动标记，显示是从 iPhone 发布的。

—

In the end, Huawei wasn’t able to convince the doubters. Soon after Secretary Locke’s phone call to Hesse, Sprint rejected Huawei’s bid.

最终，华为没能说服质疑者。在骆家辉部长给赫塞打完电话后不久，Sprint 拒绝了华为的竞标。

Hesse maintains that he didn’t tell his team members about Locke’s call, as he wanted them to make their recommendations independently. Huawei was “very strong on price,” he said, but what it lacked was “reference accounts.”[26] The company did not have a track record of successfully building other large networks in the US, which Hesse said was the biggest thing they were looking for. “We would have been their first big account,” he said. “You’re taking a big risk. You’re kind of their first marquee customer in North America.”

赫塞坚持认为他没有告诉团队成员关于骆家辉的电话，因为他希望他们独立做出建议。他说，华为在“价格上非常有优势”，但缺乏的是“参考案例”。[26] 该公司在美国没有成功建设其他大型网络的记录，赫塞表示这是他们最看重的。他说：“我们本会成为他们的第一个大客户。这要承担很大的风险。你相当于他们在北美的第一个标杆客户。”

Hesse said that Huawei’s inclusion on the bidding shortlist probably helped Sprint get a better deal from the winning vendors: Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent, and Samsung. “It caused them to sharpen their pencils and be more aggressive on price than they would have been,” he said. “They knew they had to be competitive.”

赫塞表示，将华为列入竞标短名单可能有助于 Sprint 从最终中标的供应商（爱立信、阿尔卡特朗讯和三星）那里获得更好的条件。他说：“这促使他们更加认真地对待，在价格上比以往更具竞争力。他们知道自己必须保持竞争力。”

On the Huawei side, executives felt that it had simply been a political call. “We came face-to-face with the political reality of Washington, and the fact that it was an election year,” Owens told a journalist.[27]

在华为方面，高管们认为这纯粹是一个政治决定。欧文斯告诉一名记者：“我们直面了华盛顿的政治现实，以及当时正值大选年这一事实。”[27]

Hu texted Ren the news of the loss of the contract, reporting that Huawei’s US team was in tears.[28] Ren read it and laughed. It was a shame, he said, but there was also an upside. He no longer harbored any illusions.

胡厚崑给任正非发短信告知了失去合同的消息，报告称华为美国团队都流下了眼泪。[28] 任正非读后笑了。他说，这很遗憾，但也有好的一面。他不再抱有任何幻想。

“I can finally put down that mental burden,” Ren told his staff. “We no longer have to have so many worries, no longer have to compromise with them…. The result of America’s arrogance and bias is that we are pushing out our chests and competing directly.”[29]

任正非告诉员工：“我终于可以放下那个思想包袱了。我们不再需要有那么多顾虑，不再需要向他们妥协……美国傲慢和偏见的结果，就是我们要挺起胸膛直接竞争。”[29]

17

17

Revolution

革命

The Arab Spring: 2011

阿拉伯之春：2011 年

Ren Zhengfei was in Iraq in early 2011 when Huawei’s Middle East chief, Yi Xiang, who was traveling with him, got a phone call. The Chinese embassy in Bahrain was urging Huawei to pull out of the country.[1] A wave of unrest that people were calling the Arab Spring was intensifying. Bahrain, where Huawei’s Middle East headquarters were based, was no longer safe.[2] The Chinese embassy in Turkey was also appealing to Huawei and other Chinese companies for help with organizing an emergency evacuation of tens of thousands of Chinese nationals from Libya.[3] One of Ren’s contacts in Iraq, a prominent businessman, urged him to make haste in departing, telling him that Iraq’s roads were about to be sealed off. The window for safe passage out was closing.

2011 年初，任正非正在伊拉克视察，随行的华为中东地区部总裁易翔接到一个电话。中国驻巴林大使馆敦促华为撤离该国。[1] 一场被称为“阿拉伯之春”的动荡浪潮正在愈演愈烈。华为中东总部所在地巴林已不再安全。[2] 中国驻土耳其大使馆也向华为及其他中国公司寻求帮助，组织紧急撤离利比亚境内的数万名中国公民。[3] 任正非在伊拉克的一位商界名流联系人敦促他尽快离开，并告知伊拉克的道路即将被封锁。安全撤离的窗口期正在关闭。

The Middle East was the beating heart of Huawei’s global empire. This was, in part, due to Huawei’s struggles to make progress in the United States and other Western countries. Many of the governments in the Middle East had complicated relationships with Washington and were interested in forging closer ties with China. “In the Middle East, the decisions are not taken just because of some news in the West,” said one former Huawei manager in Saudi Arabia. Huawei’s first 3G network customer overseas was Etisalat in the United Arab Emirates. It now had some four thousand employees across the region.[4] Since 2007, Huawei had sold not only networking gear itself but also managed services, or outsourced tech support, to operators around the world. This meant that Huawei’s engineers were contractually obligated to be available if a network operator was experiencing problems. With the Arab Spring turning violent, Ren set off across the Middle East to steel his staff’s nerves.

中东曾是华为全球版图的核心地带。这在一定程度上是因为华为在美国及其他西方国家的进展举步维艰。许多中东国家政府与华盛顿的关系错综复杂，并有兴趣与中国建立更紧密的联系。“在中东，做决定并不仅仅是因为西方的某些新闻，”一位华为前沙特经理表示。华为在海外的首个 3G 网络客户是阿联酋电信（Etisalat）。如今，华为在该地区拥有约四千名员工。[4] 自 2007 年以来，华为不仅销售网络设备，还向全球运营商提供管理服务或外包技术支持。这意味着根据合同义务，如果网络运营商遇到问题，华为工程师必须随叫随到。随着阿拉伯之春演变为暴力冲突，任正非奔赴中东各地，为员工打气。

During his visits to Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Mali, Ren told Huawei employees that while he sympathized with family members’ concerns over their safety, they couldn’t leave their posts without properly handing off their work. “You can’t flee unconditionally,” he said. “Our professional ethos is to maintain the stability of the network.” He reminded them that theirs was a special vocation. “Tofu shops, fried dough stands, and the like can be shut down at any time, but we cannot.”[5] Ren advised his staff that they should “never” interfere in the politics of any country. “If we give up the network’s stability, then even more people will be sacrificed.”[6]

在访问伊拉克、阿富汗、利比亚和马里期间，任正非告诉华为员工，虽然他理解家属对他们安全的担忧，但他们不能在没有妥善交接工作的情况下离开岗位。“你们不能无条件地逃离，”他说，“我们的职业道德是维护网络的稳定。”他提醒他们，这是一份特殊的职业。“豆腐店、油条摊之类的可以随时关门，但我们不行。”[5] 任正非告诫员工“绝不要”干涉任何国家的政治。“如果我们放弃了网络的稳定性，那么会有更多人被牺牲。”[6]

Huawei helped the Chinese embassy in Turkey facilitate the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya, but some of Huawei’s own engineers stayed behind. The company had mobile and landline networks across Libya and also had an ongoing contract for a submarine cable.[7] “Huawei might be the only foreign company remaining there,” a Chinese newspaper reported.[8] Interviewed by local press in late February, the wife of one Huawei staffer reported that her husband was still there, and that Huawei had stocked lots of food and water. “You could hear the sound of machine guns all the time,” she said after getting off an evacuation flight.[9]

华为协助中国驻土耳其大使馆撤离了利比亚的中国公民，但华为自己的一些工程师留了下来。该公司在利比亚全境拥有移动和固定网络，并有一项正在进行的潜艇电缆合同。[7] “华为可能是唯一留在那里的外国公司，”一家中国报纸报道称。[8] 在2 月下旬接受当地媒体采访时，一名华为员工的妻子反映，她的丈夫仍在那里，华为储备了大量的食物和水。“你能一直听到机关枪的声音，”她在走下撤离航班后说道。[9]

Ren and his team also decided to stay put in Bahrain, despite the Chinese embassy urging them to withdraw.[10] They had a fledgling business relationship with mobile operator Viva Bahrain, owned by the Saudi Telecommunications Company, and wanted to honor their commitments. Huawei set up a fourteen-person emergency response team to monitor its customer’s network, which was nearly at a standstill at times as protesters thronged the streets.[11] In mid-March, Bahrain’s king declared a state of emergency and sent thousands of security forces out to crush the protests. In the chaos, network sites were at risk of losing power. The Huawei team raced out to hook up gasoline generators to keep the network running.[12]

尽管中国大使馆敦促撤离，任正非及其团队仍决定留在巴林。[10] 他们与沙特电信公司旗下的移动运营商 Viva Bahrain 建立了初步的业务关系，并希望履行承诺。华为成立了一个 14 人的应急响应小组来监控客户的网络，当抗议者涌上街头时，网络有时几乎处于停滞状态。[11] 3 月中旬，巴林国王宣布进入紧急状态，并派遣数千名安全部队镇压抗议活动。在混乱中，网络基站面临断电风险。华为团队冒着危险冲出去连接汽油发电机，以维持网络运行。[12]

Ren ended his visit to Iraq abruptly. His contact arranged a series of armed cars to shuttle him out of the country. Ren was apparently worse for wear after his trip. Meeting him weeks later in Shenzhen, Financial Times editor Lionel Barber found that Ren was ill but still anxious to keep the appointment. As Ren sat down, an assistant placed a silver spittoon at his feet while another prepared acupuncture.[13]

任正非匆忙结束了对伊拉克的访问。他的联系人安排了一系列武装车辆护送他出境。这次旅行显然让任正非疲惫不堪。几周后在深圳会面时，《金融时报》编辑莱昂内尔·巴伯（Lionel Barber）发现任正非身体不适，但仍急于履行预约。任正非坐下时，一名助手在他脚边放了一个银色痰盂，另一名助手则在准备针灸。[13]

—

Much remains unclear about Huawei’s role during those chaotic months in the Middle East, with Huawei employees having mentioned only fragments here and there. What is known is that Huawei made a push to sell its surveillance solutions in the region during this period. Four days after Tunisia’s president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, fled to Saudi Arabia—the first leader to fall in the Arab Spring—Huawei announced it was launching a Middle East enterprise business unit that would sell “Safe City” surveillance solutions to governments.[14] Huawei sent a truck equipped with demo Safe City gear on a tour through the region, and it wended its way from the UAE to Saudi Arabia.

关于华为在中东那段混乱岁月中的角色，外界仍有许多不明之处，华为员工仅在各处提及过一些片段。已知的是，华为在此期间在该地区大力推销其监控解决方案。在突尼斯总统齐纳·阿比丁·本·阿里逃往沙特阿拉伯（阿拉伯之春中首位下台的领导人）四天后，华为宣布成立中东企业业务部，向各国政府销售“平安城市”监控解决方案。[14] 华为派出一辆装载着“平安城市”演示设备的卡车在该地区巡回展示，路线从阿联酋一直延伸到沙特阿拉伯。

It is still unknown whether Huawei received requests from Middle East customers to help track protesters, censor online content, or otherwise help regimes stay in power during the Arab Spring. However, The Wall Street Journal reported that Huawei had earlier pitched such services to Iranian officials.[15] The paper noted that Huawei had signed a contract to provide Iran’s largest mobile operator with technology that would allow police to track people based on their cell-phone locations. “Many of the technologies Huawei supports in Iran—such as location services—are available on Western networks as well,” the paper said. “The difference is that, in the hands of repressive regimes, it can be a critical tool in helping to quash dissent.” The Journal added that Huawei had contracts for managed services in Iran—by which it carried out the operation of the network for telecom operators—and that during the 2009 protests, it had carried out government orders to suspend text messaging and block Skype, which was used by dissidents to communicate. Huawei disputed having blocked the services. The Journal said it had interviewed three Iranian student activists who said they were arrested shortly after turning on their phones.

目前尚不清楚华为是否收到过中东客户的请求，在“阿拉伯之春”期间协助追踪示威者、审查网络内容或以其他方式帮助政权维持统治。然而，《华尔街日报》曾报道，华为早前曾向伊朗官员推销过此类服务。[15] 该报指出，华为曾签署一份合同，向伊朗最大的移动运营商提供技术，允许警方根据手机位置追踪人员。该报称：“华为在伊朗支持的许多技术——如定位服务——在西方网络中也同样存在。区别在于，在专制政权手中，它可能成为镇压异见人士的关键工具。” 《华尔街日报》补充道，华为在伊朗拥有管理服务合同——据此为电信运营商执行网络运营——并且在 2009 年抗议期间，华为执行了政府指令，暂停了短信服务并屏蔽了异见人士用于沟通的 Skype。华为对屏蔽服务一事表示异议。《华尔街日报》称，其采访了三名伊朗学生活动家，他们表示自己在开机后不久便遭到逮捕。

Huawei executives have confirmed over the years that the gear they build tracks users’ locations for their customers, which they say is a standard function of all telecommunications networks, regardless of the brand. “If you think about what telecommunications does, it tries to connect you with a base station, wherever you are, in order to connect you to the network,” Huawei’s global cybersecurity officer, John Suffolk, once said in a UK parliamentary hearing. “It therefore does know where you are, because it knows where the information is coming from. In that context, telecommunications networks from all vendors know where you are, so as to connect you to those networks. Huawei’s equipment is no different from anyone else’s equipment.”[16]

多年来，华为高管一直证实，他们制造的设备会为客户追踪用户位置，并称这是所有电信网络的标准功能，无论品牌如何。 华为全球网络安全官约翰·萨福克（John Suffolk）曾在英国议会听证会上表示：“如果你思考电信的作用，它就是试图将你与基站连接，无论你在哪里，以便让你接入网络。因此，它确实知道你在哪里，因为它知道信息来自何处。在这种背景下，所有供应商的电信网络都知道你在哪里，以便将你连接到这些网络。华为的设备与其他任何人的设备并无二致。”[16]

Pushed by parliamentarians to confirm whether Huawei would follow even “wicked” laws in third countries, Suffolk replied, “Our starting point and our end point—I am sorry to repeat this—is that we understand the laws in the country. That can be a difficult thing to do, but once we understand the law, we will operate within the law. We do not make judgments.”

当议员逼问华为是否会遵守第三国甚至“邪恶”的法律时，萨福克回答道：“我们的起点和终点——我很抱歉重复这一点——就是我们理解该国的法律。这可能是一件困难的事情，但一旦我们理解了法律，我们就会在法律范围内运作。我们不作判断。”

By this point, Huawei had been hawking its Safe City video-surveillance solutions for several years, to mixed success, landing one of its earliest contracts in Pakistan in 2009.[17] The Middle East now gave this fledgling unit a boost. In the first half of 2011, Huawei’s Enterprise Business Group saw its global sales soar by 80 percent from a year earlier.

到此时，华为推销其“平安城市”视频监控解决方案已有数年，成败参半，并于 2009 年在巴基斯坦拿到了最早的合同之一。[17] 中东市场现在为这个雏形阶段的部门提供了助力。2011 年上半年，华为企业业务集团的全球销售额同比增长了 80%。

The idea of a Safe City had been dreamed up by IBM as it sought to drum up sales in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.[18] IBM touted its “Smarter Cities” as being able to streamline paperwork, save energy, and prevent pollution through the use of video cameras and other sensors hooked up to big data algorithms. But what made officials really sit up was the prospect of a new, omniscient sort of crime fighting.

“平安城市”的概念是由 IBM 在寻求提振 2008 年金融危机后的销售额时构想出来的。[18] IBM 宣传其“智慧城市”能够通过使用摄像头和其他连接到大数据算法的传感器，来简化文书工作、节约能源并防止污染。但真正让官员们关注的，是这种全新的、全知全能的犯罪打击前景。

IBM had a long history as a supplier of technologies to police, and now it had helped the NYPD build the Real Time Crime Center, an $11 million state-of-the-art facility with a two-story video wall, satellite imaging, and integration with databases holding more than thirty-three billion public records.[19] IBM executives went around the world selling this next-generation policing vision in which crimes could conceivably be predicted before they took place. “Ensuring public safety is crucial to cities’ quality of life,” IBM CEO Sam Palmisano said in Shanghai during a speech about Smarter Cities. “This no longer appears to be a losing battle. New York and other cities are using advanced data analysis to achieve historic reductions in crime.”[20]

IBM 作为警方技术供应商有着悠久的历史，现在它已帮助纽约市警察局（NYPD）建立了实时犯罪中心，这是一个耗资 1100 万美元的尖端设施，拥有两层楼高的视频墙、卫星成像，并集成了拥有超过 330 亿条公共记录的数据库。[19] IBM 的高管们在世界各地推销这种下一代警务愿景，即犯罪在发生前就可以被预见。IBM 首席执行官彭明盛（Sam Palmisano）在上海的一次关于智慧城市的演讲中表示：“确保公共安全对城市的生活质量至关重要。这似乎不再是一场注定失败的战斗。纽约和其他城市正在利用先进的数据分析来实现犯罪率的历史性下降。”[20]

Later on, during the Black Lives Matter protests and amid scrutiny over ingrained racial bias in policing, IBM would walk back its marketing about its technology’s ability to predict crimes. But at the time, the idea was alluring to many governments. As IBM traveled around China promoting Smarter Cities in 2009, China’s premier, Wen Jiabao, also gave the concept his seal of approval.[21] That year, Huawei launched its own versions, which it called “Smart Cities” and “Safe Cities.”

后来，在“黑人的命也是命”抗议活动期间，以及在对警务中根深蒂固的种族偏见的审查下，IBM 撤回了关于其技术预测犯罪能力的营销宣传。但在当时，这个想法对许多政府都极具诱惑力。2009 年，当 IBM 在中国各地推广智慧城市时，中国总理温家宝也对这一概念表示了认可。[21] 同年，华为推出了自己的版本，称之为“智慧城市”和“平安城市”。

—

In December 2011, Ren, sixty-seven, announced he was stepping back to allow younger hands to steer the company. “I increasingly don’t understand the technology, increasingly don’t understand finance, and only half understand management,” he told his staff. “If I can’t treat our group kindly and democratically, and fully unleash the talents of all our heroes, I will have achieved nothing.”[22] Without offering details, Ren also disclosed that he’d had two cancer surgeries over the years.[23] He blamed it in part on overwork: “I was too tired. My body just collapsed from fatigue.”

2011 年 12 月，六十七岁的任正非宣布退居二线，让更年轻的人才来掌舵公司。他告诉员工：“我越来越不懂技术，越来越不懂财务，管理也只懂一半。如果我不能仁慈、民主地对待我们的团队，不能充分发挥我们所有英雄的才华，我将一事无成。”[22] 任正非还透露，虽然没有提供细节，但他多年来动过两次癌症手术。[23] 他将其部分归咎于过度劳累：“我太累了。我的身体因为疲劳而垮掉了。”

People had wondered for years who Ren’s successor might be. Now Ren revealed there would be not one successor but three: Guo Ping, Eric Xu, and Ken Hu would serve as “rotating CEOs,” with each taking a six-month stint at the helm. Such a management setup was a curiosity. It brought with it the risk of the company’s strategy swinging back and forth every few months if the three rotating CEOs could not work in unison. Ren also risked the rotating CEOs quitting for full-fledged CEO positions at other companies. But the benefits of such an arrangement were also clear. Ren could delay fully handing over the reins to any one person while training several executives to be up to the task. Huawei was now the number-three vendor of wireless gear globally, behind only Sweden’s Ericsson and Finland’s Nokia. It had surpassed the French-US giant Alcatel-Lucent and the US’s Motorola. In 2010, Huawei’s annual revenue of $27 billion was higher than that of Google, McDonald’s, or Coca-Cola.

多年来，人们一直在猜测任正非的继任者会是谁。现在任正非透露，继任者不是一位，而是三位：郭平、徐直军（Eric Xu）和胡厚崑（Ken Hu）将担任“轮值 CEO”，每人轮流执掌帅印六个月。这种管理架构非常奇特。如果三位轮值 CEO 不能步调一致，这种模式就会带来公司战略每隔几个月就来回摆动的风险。任正非还面临着轮值 CEO 为了去其他公司担任正式 CEO 而辞职的风险。但这种安排的好处也很明显。任正非可以推迟将权力完全交给任何一个人，同时培养多名高管以胜任这项任务。华为当时已是全球第三大无线设备供应商，仅次于瑞典的爱立信和芬兰的诺基亚。它已经超越了法美巨头阿尔卡特朗讯和美国的摩托罗拉。2010 年，华为 270 亿美元的年营收高于谷歌、麦当劳或可口可乐。

The three successors had all been faithful Huawei employees for more than eighteen years, and each had played a pivotal role. Guo Ping had been Huawei’s early face to the West, spearheading Huawei’s defense against Cisco’s lawsuit and negotiating the potential takeovers of Marconi and Nortel. He’d overseen the company’s early entry into the European consumer sector with its 3G Wi-Fi dongles. More recently, in 2011, Guo had been overseeing Huawei’s settlement of a legal dispute with Motorola over intellectual property, as well as Symantec’s exit from a joint venture with the company. Guo had been so devoted to his work that he’d missed the births of both his children while on Huawei business, which he told colleagues was something his family members continued to hold over his head.[24] Sometime around the year 2010, Guo was diagnosed with lung cancer.[25] The doctor told him he had six months to live. “They said that around 80 percent of people with cancer die from the fear,” Guo told colleagues. “So I said I would believe in myself, and I would not give up easily.” Guo recovered and resumed his work, although going forward, he would spend a little more time on rest and exercise.

这三位继任者都是在华为效力超过十八年的忠实员工，且每人都发挥过关键作用。郭平曾是华为早期面向西方的面孔，带头应对思科对华为的诉讼，并就收购马可尼（Marconi）和北电（Nortel）的潜在交易进行谈判。他曾负责公司早期通过 3G 上网卡进入欧洲消费领域。更近一些的 2011 年，郭平一直负责处理华为与摩托罗拉关于知识产权的法律纠纷，以及赛门铁克（Symantec）退出与华为合资企业的事务。郭平对工作极度投入，以至于在处理华为业务期间错过了两个孩子的出生，他告诉同事，他的家人一直拿这件事数落他。[24] 大约在 2010 年，郭平被诊断出患有肺癌。[25] 医生告诉他，他还有六个月的生命。“他们说大约 80%的癌症患者死于恐惧，”郭平告诉同事。“所以我说我要相信自己，我不会轻易放弃。”郭平康复并恢复了工作，尽管此后他会花更多的时间休息和锻炼。

Eric Xu, the only PhD of the three, had steered Huawei’s fledgling wireless business in the early 2000s—the company had landed its first 3G contracts in Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates under his watch—and its early foray into cell phones. Xu had managed some of Huawei’s international partnerships, such as the setup of a joint venture with Germany’s Siemens and, in 2010, negotiations with India’s government involving the setup of a factory in the country to try to allay security concerns over its equipment. Before becoming one of the rotating CEOs, he’d worked his way up to global president of R&D. Some of Huawei’s foreign executives found him to be the most distant of the three. “Eric was a cipher to me,” one recalled, adding that Ken Hu and Guo Ping were “always on my calendar, but Eric, never.”

徐直军是三人中唯一的博士，他在 21 世纪初掌管了华为尚处于起步阶段的无线业务——在他的任期内，公司在香港和阿联酋拿到了首批 3G 合同——以及早期对手机业务的尝试。徐直军管理过华为的一些国际合作伙伴关系，例如与德国西门子建立合资企业，以及 2010 年与印度政府谈判，涉及在印度建立工厂以试图减轻对其设备的安全性担忧。在成为轮值 CEO 之一之前，他一路晋升至全球研发总裁。华为的一些外籍高管发现他是三人中最疏远的一位。“徐直军对我来说是个谜，”一位高管回忆道，并补充说胡厚崑和郭平“总是出现在我的日程表上，但徐直军从未出现过。”

Ken Hu had risen through the ranks of Huawei’s domestic sales team, then served as president of Huawei Latin America and later chairman of the board of Huawei USA. He’d represented Huawei when it launched “the Cell,” the center where UK officials could check Huawei’s software code for security vulnerabilities. He would increasingly become Huawei’s designated spokesperson at international conferences. His account on Weibo, China’s equivalent to Twitter, reflected his jet-setting schedule—oysters one day, Japanese ramen the next—as he traveled the world on Huawei business. “Ken Hu is perhaps the most well-rounded of the three,” a former Huawei executive said. “He’s strong in many areas, though there isn’t one area where he is particularly outstanding. When a company is that large, perhaps that’s the kind of person needed.”

胡厚崑从华为国内销售团队基层做起，随后担任华为拉美地区总裁，后来担任华为美国公司董事长。当华为启动“细胞”（the Cell）项目时，他代表华为出席，英国官员可以在该中心检查华为的软件代码是否存在安全漏洞。他越来越多地成为华为在国际会议上的指定发言人。他在中国版 Twitter——微博上的账号反映了他频繁出差的行程——在为华为业务环球旅行期间，某天在吃生蚝，第二天就在吃日本拉面。“胡厚崑或许是三人中最全面的一位，”一位前华为高管表示。“他在很多领域都很强，虽然没有哪个领域特别突出。当一家公司规模如此之大时，或许正需要这样的人。”

After the announcement of the rotating CEOs, many thought that Ren had abandoned the idea of a family succession. His son, Ren Ping, remained in a lower post running Smartcom, Huawei’s in-house hospitality arm, which encompassed Huawei’s banquets, hotels, receptionists, and chauffeur services for guests.[26] Smartcom operated a five-star hotel near Huawei’s campus for visiting executives. The wow factor of Huawei’s elaborate hospitality was a crucial ingredient in its efforts to win over global customers. Ren wanted foreign executives who arrived in China with preconceived notions of the nation’s technological level and manufacturing standards to be bowled over by the perfection they experienced from Smartcom’s service staff. Yet Smartcom was far afield from Huawei’s core technical business, and wasn’t seen as a stepping stone for higher leadership. “The longer you work in this industry, the more you will feel inadequate,” Ren Ping wrote of his work at Smartcom. “You must constantly study and spend all your time honing your skill, and still you may not make a big name for yourself.”[27] Ren’s brother, Steven Ren, was also still at Huawei as a vice president but did not appear to be groomed for succession.[28] Steven Ren once called his career at Huawei “just ordinary, without any grand achievements to show for it.”[29]

在宣布轮值 CEO 之后，许多人认为任正非已经放弃了家族继承的想法。他的儿子任平仍留在一个较低的职位，负责管理慧通（Smartcom），这是华为内部的后勤服务部门，涵盖了华为的宴会、酒店、接待和为客人提供的司机服务。[26] 慧通在华为园区附近经营着一家五星级酒店，用于接待来访的高管。华为精心款待所带来的震撼感，是其争取全球客户的关键要素。任正非希望那些带着对中国技术水平和制造标准固有成见来到中国的外国高管，能被慧通服务人员展现出的完美表现所折服。然而，慧通远离华为的核心技术业务，并不被视为通往更高领导层的垫脚石。“在这个行业工作得越久，你就越会感到力不从心，”任平在谈到他在慧通的工作时写道。“你必须不断学习，花全部时间磨练技能，即便如此，你可能还是无法成名。”[27] 任正非的弟弟任树录（Steven Ren）当时也仍在华为担任副总裁，但似乎并未被作为继任者培养。[28] 任树录曾称自己在华为的职业生涯“平淡无奇，没有什么宏伟的成就”。[29]

Out of Ren’s family, his daughter Meng Wanzhou had risen the highest at Huawei, getting promoted to CFO and becoming a member of the board of directors as part of the management overhaul.[30] Meng had told colleagues that the CFO position was one with upward potential. “In the vast majority of companies, the CFO becomes an assistant to the CEO, helping the CEO achieve business targets,” she said. “CFO is a good position for training executives. It’s both specialized and comprehensive.”[31] But Meng lacked the engineering chops that Huawei’s staff widely believed their leader needed. And it was unclear if she had the temperament for leadership. Ren roused his staff with sweeping speeches about historic battles, but Meng’s essays for Huawei’s internal publications were not quite as inspiring and often detailed her vacations. In one essay, she wrote that the lavender fields of France’s Provençal countryside were her favorite place in the world. “That day my dream came true,” she wrote of her visit to the lavender fields. “Long in servitude, I had finally returned to nature.”[32]

在任正非的家人中，他的女儿孟晚舟在华为的晋升之路最为顺遂，在管理层重组中被提拔为首席财务官（CFO）并成为董事会成员。[30] 孟晚舟曾告诉同事，CFO 是一个具有向上潜力的职位。“在绝大多数公司中，CFO 会成为 CEO 的助手，帮助 CEO 实现业务目标，”她说，“CFO 是培养高管的好职位。它既专业又全面。”[31] 但孟晚舟缺乏华为员工普遍认为其领导者所必需的工程背景。而且，她是否具备领导者的气质也不明朗。任正非用关于历史战役的宏大演讲来激励员工，而孟晚舟为华为内部刊物撰写的文章则没那么振奋人心，内容往往详述她的假期。在其中一篇文章中，她写道，法国普罗旺斯乡村的薰衣草田是她世界上最喜欢的地方。“那天我的梦想成真了，”她在描述参观薰衣草田时写道，“久在樊笼里，复得返自然。”[32]

—

Earlier in 2011, an open letter under Ken Hu’s name had been issued to the US government. In it, he pushed back against accusations of security risks inherent in Huawei’s equipment and suggested that the US government conduct an investigation to clear the company’s name. “We sincerely hope that the United States government will carry out a formal investigation on any concerns it may have about Huawei,” the letter said. “We believe the results of any thorough government investigation will prove that Huawei is a normal commercial institution and nothing more.”[33]

2011 年早些时候，一封以胡厚崑名义发表的公开信被呈交给美国政府。在信中，他反驳了有关华为设备存在固有安全风险的指控，并建议美国政府开展调查以洗清公司的名声。“我们诚挚地希望美国政府能就其对华为可能存在的任何疑虑开展正式调查，”信中写道，“我们相信，任何彻底的政府调查结果都将证明，华为只是一家普通的商业机构，仅此而已。”[33]

If the missive was meant to be just a literary flourish, it backfired. US lawmakers decided to take Hu at his word. “I appreciate that invitation, and I gladly accepted,” Mike Rogers, chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), told a Huawei representative. “We decided to give Huawei that investigation.”[34]

如果这封信原本只是一种修辞上的点缀，那么它起到了反作用。美国立法者决定对胡厚崑的话信以为真。“我感谢这一邀请，并欣然接受，”众议院情报常设特别委员会（HPSCI）主席迈克·罗杰斯告诉一位华为代表，“我们决定对华为进行那项调查。”[34]

The hearing was set for September 2012. The probe also covered other Chinese companies, including ZTE. But Rogers declared from the outset that Huawei was the “800-pound gorilla in the room.”[35]

听证会定于 2012 年 9 月举行。调查还涵盖了包括中兴在内的其他中国公司。但罗杰斯从一开始就宣称，华为是“屋子里那头 800 磅重的大猩猩（意指不容忽视的庞然大物）”。[35]

A chill came over Huawei’s DC office. The company’s senior leadership felt that the aggressive public relations campaign the DC office had orchestrated had boomeranged. The American managers felt that headquarters now viewed them as double agents and kept them out of the loop. This was not just paranoia: in July 2012, a leaked FBI affidavit had revealed that ZTE USA’s general counsel, Ashley Yablon, who had previously worked at Huawei, was serving as an informant. It was hard to know what Yablon or others were telling the feds.[36]

华为华盛顿特区办公室笼罩在一片寒意之中。公司高层领导认为，特区办公室策划的激进公关活动产生了回旋镖效应。美国经理们觉得总部现在将他们视为双重间谍，并让他们置身于核心圈子之外。这不仅仅是偏执：2012 年 7 月，一份泄露的 FBI 宣誓书披露，曾在华为工作、后任中兴美国公司总法律顾问的阿什利·亚布隆一直担任线人。很难知道亚布隆或其他人在向联邦调查局透露什么。[36]

“People in the industry often say Ren Zhengfei is as mysterious as he is great,” Ren told his staff in a speech. “This is actually not true. I understand myself better. I keep a low profile, not because I’m attempting to build myself up but because I am scared.”[37]

“业内人士常说任正非既伟大又神秘，”任正非在一次对员工的演讲中说道，“这其实不是真的。我更了解我自己。我保持低调，不是为了抬高自己，而是因为我害怕。”[37]

18

18

The Hearing

听证会

House Investigation: 2012

众议院调查：2012 年

Shortly before 10:00 a.m. on September 13, 2012, Charles Ding sat down at a gleaming wooden desk in room HVC-210 at the US Capitol Visitors Center. He had a fresh haircut,[1] a pale-blue tie, and a stiff black suit. There was a microphone, several black binders filled with notes, and bottled water. Behind him, the room was packed with spectators, sitting claustrophobically close. In front, two rows of grim Americans in suits stared him down from an elevated platform.

2012 年 9 月 13 日上午 10 点前不久，丁少华（Charles Ding）坐在美国国会大厦游客中心 HVC-210 会议室一张光亮的木制书桌前。他理了新发，[1]系着浅蓝色领带，穿着笔挺的黑色西装。桌上放着麦克风、几本装满笔记的黑色活页夹和瓶装水。在他身后，房间里挤满了观众，坐得密不透风。在他面前，两排神情严肃、身着西装的美国人从高台上俯视着他。

In the middle of the platform were two solid, squarish men: one light-haired with a touch of white coming in at his temples, one dark-haired with heavy eyebrows. The blond one was Rep. Mike Rogers (R-MI), a former army officer and FBI special agent. The dark-haired one was Rep. Charles “Dutch” Ruppersberger (D-MD), a former assistant state’s attorney in Baltimore. The two cochairs of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence were from different parties, but they worked well together and liked to joke about divine approval of their partnership: the first time they shook hands over a deal, an earthquake happened to shake the Capitol Building at that very moment.[2] Their staff had spent nearly a year preparing for this hearing, talking to Huawei’s customers and rivals and sending letter after question-filled letter to Huawei itself. They had flown to Hong Kong to interview Ren Zhengfei. They had declared that they’d use the full scope of the committee’s powers to uncover the truth.

高台中央坐着两名身材魁梧、方脸阔额的男子：一位头发浅色，鬓角微白；另一位头发乌黑，眉毛浓密。金发的那位是众议员迈克·罗杰斯（Mike Rogers，密歇根州共和党人），曾任陆军军官和 FBI 特别探员。黑发的那位是众议员查尔斯·“荷兰人”·鲁珀斯伯格（Charles “Dutch” Ruppersberger，马里兰州民主党人），曾任巴尔的摩助理州检察官。这两位众议院情报永久特设委员会的共同主席分属不同党派，但合作默契，并喜欢拿上天对他们伙伴关系的认可开玩笑：他们第一次为达成协议而握手时，国会大厦正好发生了一次地震。[2]他们的工作人员花了近一年时间为这次听证会做准备，走访了华为的客户和竞争对手，并向华为发出一封又一封充满疑问的信函。他们曾飞往香港采访任正非。他们曾宣称将动用委员会的所有权力来揭开真相。

Round-faced, bespectacled, and soft-spoken, Ding was now the face of Huawei in America. He was a seventeen-year Huawei veteran.[3] In 2010, he’d been appointed Huawei’s chief US representative after spending much of his career in the Middle East, where he’d worked his way up to regional president. Many would have considered such a Washington posting a reward. He’d moved into a comfortable house in Bethesda with his wife and children. But now, as he looked out at the stern faces, it was unclear if it was a reward or a punishment. “They are planning a massacre,” a contact had said in an email to one of Ding’s deputies.[4]

丁少华圆脸、戴眼镜、说话温和，现在他是华为在美国的代言人。他是在华为工作了 17 年的老兵。[3]2010 年，在其中东职业生涯的大部分时间里（他曾一路晋升至地区总裁）之后，他被任命为华为驻美首席代表。许多人会认为这样的华盛顿职位是一种奖赏。他与妻子和孩子搬进了贝塞斯达一栋舒适的房子。但现在，当他看着那些严厉的面孔时，不清楚这究竟是奖赏还是惩罚。“他们正计划一场大屠杀，”一位联系人在给丁少华一名副手的电子邮件中写道。[4]

The gavel sounded.

法槌敲响。

“Call the committee to order today for the purposes of an investigative hearing into the possible threat posed by telecommunication companies influenced by a foreign nation.”[5]

“今天召集委员会开会，目的是就受外国影响的电信公司可能构成的威胁进行调查听证。”[5]

Rogers told the room that Ding—along with his counterpart from ZTE—had been called there to answer the committee’s questions. He said there were rumors of “back doors.” There were questions about how closely Huawei was associated with China’s government. There were reports of trade-secret theft.

罗杰斯告诉全场，丁少华——以及他来自中兴通讯的同行——被传唤到此回答委员会的问题。他说有关于“后门”的传闻。有关于华为与中国政府关联程度的疑问。还有关于窃取商业机密的报告。

[picture]

Charles Ding, Huawei’s senior vice president and chief representative in the US, at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s hearing in September 2012.

2012 年 9 月，华为高级副总裁兼驻美首席代表丁少华在众议院情报永久特设委员会的听证会上。

“We must get to the truth and see if these companies are tied to or influenced by the Chinese government,” Rogers said.

“我们必须查明真相，看看这些公司是否与中国政府有联系或受其影响，”罗杰斯说。

Now Ding was asked to stand and raise his right hand.

现在，丁少华被要求起立并举起右手。

“Mr. Ding, do you swear or affirm that the statements you will make to this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?”

“丁先生，你是否宣誓或确认，你向本委员会作出的陈述将是事实，全部事实，且只有事实？”

Ding swore they would be.

丁少华宣誓如是。

—

“Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Ruppersberger, members of the committee, my name is Charles Ding. I have been with Huawei since 1995.”[6] Ding began his prepared remarks in English.

“罗杰斯主席、鲁珀斯伯格资深委员、委员会各位成员，我叫丁少华。我自 1995 年起就在华为工作。”[6] 丁少华开始用英语宣读他的准备发言。

He gave only a slight introduction of himself. He didn’t tell them that he had been one of Huawei’s earliest staffers in the Middle East. He and his team had landed their first contract in Saudi Arabia in the early days and, later on, their first international 3G contract outside Greater China—with Etisalat in the UAE.[7] Etisalat’s executives had been skeptical of Huawei, but Ding and his team had methodically eliminated their objections, one by one, until Etisalat could no longer find a reason to reject Huawei’s bid. When Huawei was declared the winner, Ding told his team, “We did each task perfectly, so the customer could no longer find a reason to reject us.”

他只对自己做了简短介绍。他没有告诉他们，他是华为最早派驻中兴的员工之一。他和他的团队在早期拿下了沙特阿拉伯的第一份合同，后来又拿下了大中华区以外的第一份国际 3G 合同——与阿联酋电信（Etisalat）签署。[7] 阿联酋电信的高管曾对华为持怀疑态度，但丁少华和他的团队有条不紊地逐一消除了他们的异议，直到阿联酋电信再也找不到拒绝华为投标的理由。当华为被宣布中标时，丁少华告诉他的团队：“我们把每一项任务都完成得无懈可击，让客户再也找不到拒绝我们的理由。”

Ding had met with US officials as early as 2006, when he briefed the US consulate in Guangzhou about Huawei’s university recruiting programs.[8] When he was transferred to Washington, he started going by Charles instead of his Chinese name, Ding Shaohua. The going was much harder in America, but they still made progress. They’d won 4G bids with smaller operators: SpeedConnect in Michigan, United Wireless in rural Kansas. They’d opened R&D centers in Santa Clara, California, and Bridgewater, New Jersey, and upgraded their headquarters in Plano, Texas.

丁少华早在 2006 年就与美国官员见过面，当时他向美国驻广州领事馆简要介绍了华为的大学招聘计划。[8] 当他被调往华盛顿后，他开始使用 Charles 这个名字，而不是他的中文名丁少华。在美国的进展要困难得多，但他们仍然取得了进步。他们赢得了与小型运营商的 4G 竞标：密歇根州的 SpeedConnect 和堪萨斯州农村地区的 United Wireless。他们在加利福尼亚州圣克拉拉和新泽西州布里奇沃特开设了研发中心，并升级了位于德克萨斯州普莱诺的总部。

Ding was not the only one being grilled that day. There was another man sitting to his left: ZTE’s senior vice president, Zhu Jinyun. He wore a jet-black suit, his hair slicked with gel. Behind closed doors, Huawei executives liked to protest how unfair it was that Huawei was always lumped in with its crosstown rival, ZTE; after all, ZTE was state-owned, and Huawei was not, so it shouldn’t have been in the same boat. By the same token, ZTE didn’t like being lumped in with Huawei. It might be state-owned, but it also had a publicly listed unit, which entailed opening the company’s books more transparently than Huawei ever had.

丁少华不是那天唯一接受质询的人。他的左边坐着另一位男士：中兴通讯高级副总裁朱进云。他穿着墨黑色西装，头发抹了发胶。在私下里，华为高管喜欢抗议华为总是被与同城对手中兴通讯混为一谈是不公平的；毕竟，中兴是国有的，而华为不是，所以不应该在同一条船上。同样，中兴也不喜欢被与华为混为一谈。它虽然可能是国有的，但它也有一个上市公司部门，这意味着它必须比华为更透明地公开公司账目。

Now ZTE’s Zhu seemed intent on drawing a distinction between the two, and one had to admit that some of his lines were snappier. “I’m pleased to appear today to represent ZTE, one of the world’s remarkable companies,” he said. “We believe that ZTE is the most transparent publicly owned telecom company in China,” he went on, “and that ZTE is the best choice to work in concert with the Congress and the United States government.”[9]

现在，中兴的朱进云似乎有意在两者之间划清界限，而且不得不承认，他的某些措辞更为干脆。“我很荣幸今天代表中兴通讯出席，它是世界上卓越的公司之一，”他说。“我们相信中兴通讯是中国最透明的上市电信公司，”他继续说道，“而且中兴通讯是与国会及美国政府协同工作的最佳选择。”[9]

As for Ding, he declared in his opening statement that Huawei had not engaged in any of the improper behavior of which it was accused and that, indeed, it would not be willing to risk ruining its reputation. “Our customers throughout the world trust Huawei. We would never do anything that undermines that trust. It would be immensely foolish for Huawei to risk involvement in national security or economic espionage.”[10]

至于丁少华，他在开场陈述中宣称，华为从未参与过任何被指控的不当行为，而且事实上，华为绝不愿冒毁掉声誉的风险。“我们在全球的客户都信任华为。我们绝不会做任何破坏这种信任的事。华为如果卷入国家安全或经济间谍活动，那将是极其愚蠢的。”[10]

—

Now the questioning began. Furrowing his brow, Rogers asked Ding about “unauthorized beaconing” in Huawei’s equipment, cases where overseas Huawei gear was allegedly found chattering back to China. He said there were also reports of “anomalies” in the code that would allow unauthorized access. “Can you explain to me, sir, why that might be?”[11]

质询正式开始。罗杰斯皱起眉头，询问丁少华关于华为设备中“未经授权的信标”问题，即据称发现海外的华为设备在向中国传回数据。他还表示，有报告称代码中存在允许未经授权访问的“异常”。“先生，您能向我解释一下这是为什么吗？”[11]

“Mr. Chairman, there are no back doors in any of Huawei’s equipment,” Ding said. “I’m also not aware of the issues you’ve mentioned just now…. Huawei has never and will never harm any country or any of our customers.” He shook his head emphatically and waited for the translator to repeat his words in English.[12]

“主席先生，华为的所有设备中都没有后门，”丁少华说。“我也不了解您刚才提到的那些问题……华为从未、也绝不会伤害任何国家或我们的任何客户。”他用力地摇了摇头，等待翻译将他的话重复成英文。[12]

Rogers did not look convinced. The Huawei team had earlier discussed whether it was better for Ding to reply in English or Chinese. Ding had settled on Chinese, followed by English translation, to avoid slipups. But there was the risk of looking like they were dithering, like they were trying to run out the clock by answering each question twice.

罗杰斯看起来并不信服。华为团队早些时候曾讨论过，丁少华是用英语还是中文回答更好。丁少华最终决定使用中文并辅以英文翻译，以避免口误。但这存在一种风险，即让他们看起来像是在犹豫不决，或者像是在通过双重回答每个问题来拖延时间。

Rogers turned to the question of Huawei’s Communist Party committee. The party committees within private companies were an object of fascination and concern for Westerners. There was haziness around what kind of powers they had—if they were like a sort of book club for employees to discuss Marxism after hours, or if they were actually meddling in major business decisions. Rogers noted that they had so far failed to get details on the compositions of those committees at Huawei and ZTE and their internal scope of influence.

罗杰斯转而问起华为党委的问题。私营企业内部的党委一直是西方人关注和担忧的对象。关于这些委员会拥有什么样的权力，外界一直模糊不清——它们究竟是员工在业余时间讨论马克思主义的某种读书会，还是实际上在干预重大商业决策。罗杰斯指出，到目前为止，他们未能获得有关华为和中兴这些委员会组成及其内部影响范围的详细信息。

Ding acknowledged that Americans might find it strange for a private company to have a party committee but said it was a requirement under Chinese law. Even Walmart and General Motors had them in their China operations. “In Huawei, however, I have not seen the party committee participating in any business management or decision-making,” he said.[13]

丁少华承认，美国人可能会觉得一家私营公司设立党委很奇怪，但他表示这是中国法律的要求。甚至沃尔玛和通用汽车在中国的业务中也设有党委。“然而，在华为，我没有看到党委参与任何经营管理或决策，”他说。[13]

His answer perhaps understated the role of the party committee at Huawei. It operated as a second, arguably more powerful human-resources department. Since 2006, the party committee had been vested with the power to reject managerial appointments or to fire managers. The company’s top executives were sometimes called in to make self-criticisms before the committee. In 2009, Huawei’s party organizations had ordered two managers fired after determining that they retaliated against a software engineer who was planning to quit.[14] The party organizations had also reviewed three thousand proposed managerial promotions, vetoing thirty-five and stipulating improvements for fifty-one of them.[15]

他的回答或许淡化了党委在华为的作用。党委作为一个平行的、甚至可以说更强大的人事部门在运作。自 2006 年以来，党委被赋予了否决管理层任命或解雇经理的权力。公司的高级管理人员有时会被召集到委员会面前进行自我批评。2009 年，华为的党组织在认定两名经理报复一名计划离职的软件工程师后，下令将其解雇。[14] 党组织还审查了三千项拟议的管理层晋升，否决了其中的三十五项，并规定其中五十一项需进行改进。[15]

By late 2011, Huawei had more than 30,000 party members,[16] out of some 140,000 employees. The company’s party cell leaders pledged that they would not “say or do anything that will cause negative effects for the company or for society” and that they would help maintain stability.[17]

截至 2011 年底，在约 14 万名员工中，华为拥有超过 3 万名党员。[16] 该公司的党小组组长承诺，他们不会“说或做任何对公司或社会造成负面影响的事情”，并将协助维护稳定。[17]

“The party committee in Huawei is focusing on promoting professional ethics and also employee caring,” Ding said. “Thank you.”[18]

“华为的党委专注于促进职业道德和员工关怀，”丁少华说。“谢谢。”[18]

Rogers asked him to name the members of the committee. Ding coughed up the name of the party secretary, Zhou Daiqi—who had succeeded the founding party secretary, Madam Chen Zhufang—but Rogers wasn’t satisfied. He wanted a full list, past members included. “I don’t think there would be a problem,” Ding said. “I think we can contact Professor Zhou Daiqi for that list off-line.”[19]

罗杰斯要求他提供委员会成员的名单。丁少华勉强说出了党委书记周代琪的名字——他接替了创始党委书记陈珠芳女士——但罗杰斯并不满意。他想要一份完整的名单，包括过去的成员。“我认为这不会有问题，”丁少华说。“我想我们可以线下联系周代琪教授索取那份名单。”[19]

Rogers turned the floor over to Ruppersberger. The former Baltimore prosecutor came out with guns blazing. “If you want to do business in the United States,” he told Ding and Zhu, “then you have to tell your Chinese government to stop cyberattacking our businesses.” Ruppersberger expressed concern that the two companies had declined to answer some of the earlier written questions by citing China’s state-secret law. He asked Ding what Huawei would do if the party asked it for information from its customers. “And I want a direct answer to that.”

罗杰斯将发言权交给了鲁珀斯伯格。这位前巴尔的摩检察官一上来就火力全开。“如果你想在美国做生意，”他告诉丁少华和朱进云，“那么你必须告诉你们的中国政府停止对我们企业的网络攻击。”鲁珀斯伯格对这两家公司以中国国家秘密法为由拒绝回答早前的一些书面问题表示担忧。他问丁少华，如果党要求华为提供其客户的信息，华为会怎么做。“我要一个直接的回答。”

Ding replied that Huawei would not be instigated by any third-party government, including China’s, into harming any other country. “We believe business is business, and this is very sure.”

丁少华回答说，华为不会受包括中国在内的任何第三方政府指使去伤害任何其他国家。“我们相信商场归商场，这是非常肯定的。”

“Even if that meant by denying your government, you would go to jail?”

“即使这意味着因为拒绝政府，你可能会入狱？”

“Huawei operates complying to laws and regulations. If Huawei had not…violated any law, how can the government—or why will they put us in jail?”[20]

“华为在遵守法律法规的前提下运营。如果华为没有……违反任何法律，政府怎么能——或者为什么要让我们入狱？”[20]

Ruppersberger did not seem satisfied by this response, but he allowed the questioning to move on to Iran.

鲁珀斯伯格似乎对这个回答并不满意，但他允许质询转向伊朗问题。

“We’ve heard that your companies sell equipment to Iran, perhaps in violation of US sanctions,” Rep. Sue Myrick (R-NC) asked. “So, Mr. Ding, does your company sell equipment to Iran?”

“我们听说你们的公司向伊朗出售设备，这可能违反了美国的制裁，”众议员苏·迈里克（北卡罗来纳州共和党人）问道。“那么，丁先生，你们公司向伊朗出售设备吗？”

“Congresswoman, Huawei, just like other Western vendors in Iran, we just perform our normal business in that country. And while we do that, we abide by all the applicable laws and regulations.”

“女议员，华为就像其他在伊朗的西方供应商一样，我们只是在该国开展正常的业务。在开展业务的同时，我们遵守所有适用的法律法规。”

“I also want to ask you: Has your company sold equipment to the Iranian government?”

“我还想问你：你们公司是否向伊朗政府出售过设备？”

“We have never provided any equipment to the Iranian government. All of—we provided are only for commercial, civilian use.”[21]

“我们从未向伊朗政府提供过任何设备。我们提供的所有设备——都仅用于商业和民用目的。”[21]

—

Now Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) circled back to a variation on Ruppersberger’s question. He read aloud a line from Article 11 of China’s State Security Law: “ ‘A state security organ may inspect the electronic communication instruments and appliances and other similar equipment and installations belonging to any organization or individual.’ ”

现在，众议员亚当·希夫（加利福尼亚州民主党人）绕回了鲁珀斯伯格问题的一个变体。他大声朗读了中国《国家安全法》第十一条的一行文字：“‘国家安全机关可以检查属于任何组织或个人的电子通信工具、器材及其他类似的设备、设施。’”

“If the Chinese government or the Chinese Communist Party were to come to you, Mr. Ding…are you not required to give them access?”

“如果中国政府或中国共产党找到你，丁先生……难道你没有义务让他们访问吗？”

“Thank you for your question, and it’s nice to see you again, Congressman. I personally do not know clearly about such law in China. And if Huawei is put into that situation, I think we would say no.”

“谢谢你的提问，很高兴再次见到你，议员先生。我个人并不清楚中国有这样的法律。如果华为被置于那种境地，我想我们会说不。”

“Would you agree, though, Mr. Ding, that the plain language of Article 11 provides that the state may inspect your communications equipment?”

“但是，丁先生，你是否同意《第 11 条》的字面意思规定了国家可以检查你们的通信设备？”

“As to the specific article you mentioned, I have not seen that, and I would not be able to explain or comment on that.”

“至于你提到的具体条款，我没有看到过，也无法对此做出解释或评论。”

Schiff was not willing for this to be the last word. “I think you are too well-informed…to be unfamiliar with the laws that directly apply to your industry,” he said. “The plain language of Chinese law would require you to make your equipment available to the Chinese government upon their request. And I see no opportunity for you to fight that in the Chinese court system. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.”[22]

希夫不愿让这成为定论。“我认为你消息非常灵通……不至于不熟悉直接适用于你所在行业的法律，”他说。“中国法律的字面意思要求你们在政府提出要求时提供设备。而且我认为你没有机会在中国法院系统中对此进行抗争。主席先生，我发言完毕。”[22]

The questions continued, fast and thick: How many of the banks that finance Huawei are state-owned? Does the party influence those banks? Was Cisco’s code in Huawei’s equipment? Who determines the price of shares in the company’s employee ownership program? Does Huawei plan to continue purchasing US companies? Ding fielded them as best he could. He spoke softly, sometimes tapping his hand emphatically as he spoke. At one point, he held up a three-ring binder to illustrate the wealth of detail that Huawei had shared with the committee.

提问接踵而至，既快又密：为华为融资的银行中有多少是国有的？党是否影响这些银行？思科的代码是否出现在华为的设备中？谁来决定公司员工持股计划中的股份价格？华为是否计划继续收购美国公司？ 丁子凌尽力应对。他说话声音轻柔，有时在说话时会用力敲击手部以示强调。有一次，他举起一个三环活页夹，以此说明华为与委员会分享的细节之详尽。

Ding had almost survived the gauntlet. Now there was time for just one more question. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) asked Ding why Huawei was more welcome in the UK than in the US. It was a good question. The answer was not obvious. Washington and London shared intelligence, so it stood to reason that they would have a similar evaluation of Huawei. Yet they didn’t.

丁子凌几乎挺过了这场严酷的考验。现在只剩下最后一个问题的时间了。众议员路易斯·古铁雷斯（伊利诺伊州民主党人）问丁子凌，为什么华为在英国比在美国更受欢迎。这是一个好问题。答案并不显而易见。华盛顿和伦敦共享情报，因此理所当然地，他们对华为的评估应该相似。然而事实并非如此。

Over the summer, Huawei’s chairwoman, Sun Yafang, had chitchatted with Prince Charles at a London trade event, with the prince asking her what she thought of investing in the UK.[23] Just two days before the hearing, Ren had met with Prime Minister David Cameron at Ten Downing Street, with Cameron declaring that Britain was “open for business.” Indeed, Huawei was the largest Chinese investor in the UK.[24]

就在那个夏天，华为董事长孙亚芳在伦敦的一次贸易活动中与查尔斯王子交谈，王子询问她对在英国投资的看法。[23] 就在听证会前两天，任正非在唐宁街 10 号会见了首相大卫·卡梅伦，卡梅伦宣布英国“对商业开放”。事实上，华为是英国最大的中国投资者。[24]

“In all of those countries Huawei operates in,” Ding said, “we always hope we can have booming development in these markets.”

“在华为运营的所有国家，”丁子凌说，“我们始终希望能在这些市场取得蓬勃发展。”

“Well, you didn’t answer the question,” Gutiérrez pressed. “I asked specifically why was it that the challenges that you have in the United States—you overcame them in the United Kingdom, and I didn’t hear an answer to that.”

“好吧，你没有回答这个问题，”古铁雷斯追问道。“我具体问的是，为什么你在美国遇到的挑战——你在英国克服了它们，而我没有听到答案。”

“I think the United Kingdom’s government also values cybersecurity a lot,” Ding ventured. “We communicated with the British government about what would be good solutions to cybersecurity issues.”[25]

“我认为英国政府也非常重视网络安全，”丁子凌试探性地回答。“我们与英国政府就网络安全问题的良好解决方案进行了沟通。”[25]

The UK and US’s divergence in opinion on Huawei was not something that policymakers had ever explained clearly. It might have had something to do with each country’s deep-seated view of its relationship to the rest of the world. “I think it might be because the Americans and the Chinese are more equal in terms of competition, perhaps,” ventured one British national who worked at Huawei’s cybersecurity center in the UK. “I don’t think the UK could ever compete with China in terms of its economy. Politically, I’ve always seen America as being much more anti-Chinese than in Europe.”[26]

英美两国在华为问题上的意见分歧，政策制定者从未给出清晰的解释。这可能与每个国家对其与世界其他地区关系的根深蒂固的看法有关。“我认为这可能是因为美国人和中国人在竞争方面更加平等，”一位在华为英国网络安全中心工作的英国公民推测道。“我不认为英国在经济方面能与中国竞争。在政治上，我一直觉得美国比欧洲更反华。”[26]

Sitting before the US lawmakers, Ding dodged the question of why the Americans were more hostile than the Brits. And then the clock ran out.

坐在美国立法者面前，丁子凌回避了为什么美国人比英国人更具敌意的问题。随后，时间到了。

“I can say I’m a little disappointed today,” Rogers said as he wrapped up. “I was hoping for more transparency, more directness.” It was “very concerning,” he added, that Ding had claimed not to be aware of certain details of Chinese law on disclosing information to authorities. He said that various inconsistencies in the statements worried him.

“我可以说明天我很失望，”罗杰斯在总结时说。“我原本希望能有更多的透明度，更多的直率。” 他补充说，丁子凌声称不了解中国关于向当局披露信息的某些法律细节，这“非常令人担忧”。他说，陈述中的各种不一致之处令他感到不安。

“So with that, this meeting is adjourned.”[27] Rogers hammered the gavel, the corners of his mouth turned downward. He stood up, gathered his papers, and walked out.

“那么，会议到此结束。”[27] 罗杰斯敲下法槌，嘴角向下撇着。他站起身，收拾好文件，走了出去。

—

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued its report in October. The committee expressed dissatisfaction with Huawei’s evasion of questions, including queries about the five original investors and how Ren had come to know them. It recommended that Huawei and ZTE be shut out of US government systems, particularly sensitive ones. It further recommended that US companies stop buying from Huawei and ZTE. It also suggested that US regulators block the two companies from acquiring US firms. “Huawei and ZTE cannot be trusted to be free of foreign state influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States and to our systems,” it said.[28]

众议院常设情报特别委员会于 10 月发布了报告。委员会对华为回避问题的做法表示不满，包括对最初五位投资者以及任正非是如何认识他们的询问。报告建议将华为和中兴排除在美国政府系统之外，特别是敏感系统。报告进一步建议美国公司停止购买华为和中兴的产品。它还建议美国监管机构阻止这两家公司收购美国公司。报告称：“不能信任华为和中兴不受外国政府影响，因此它们对美国及其系统构成了安全威胁。”[28]

The committee was also irked by Huawei’s reticence about Ren’s work during his years in the military. “Huawei refused to describe Mr. Ren’s full military background,” the committee’s report groused. “Huawei refused to state to whom he reported when he was in the military.”

委员会还对华为在任正非服役期间的工作经历保持沉默感到恼火。“华为拒绝描述任先生完整的军事背景，”委员会的报告抱怨道。“华为拒绝说明他在军队时向谁汇报工作。”

The report would immediately become political fodder. President Barack Obama’s reelection campaign seized on it the day it was published, using it to blast the incumbent’s Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, by reminding voters that Romney’s company, Bain Capital, had been a part of Huawei’s ill-fated bid to purchase 3Com in 2007. “The House Intelligence Committee concluded that a Chinese tech firm that previously partnered with Bain Capital on an attempted deal from which Romney stood to profit poses such a threat to our national security that it should be banned from doing business in the United States,” an Obama campaign spokesman told Politico. “But Romney refused, despite requests from his fellow Republicans, to oppose the deal that could have put our security at risk.”[29]

这份报告立即成为了政治素材。巴拉克·奥巴马总统的竞选团队在报告发布当天就抓住了它，以此抨击现任总统的共和党挑战者米特·罗姆尼，提醒选民罗姆尼的公司贝恩资本曾参与华为 2007 年收购 3Com 公司的失败竞标。“众议院情报委员会得出结论，一家此前曾与贝恩资本合作开展交易（罗姆尼本可从中获利）的中国科技公司对我们的国家安全构成了威胁，应禁止其在美国开展业务，”奥巴马竞选团队的一位发言人告诉《政客》杂志。“但罗姆尼拒绝了其共和党同僚的要求，拒绝反对那项可能危及我们安全的交易。”[29]

The report would prove to have lasting influence beyond the political moment, and it would be cited repeatedly by US officials and foreign governments over the years. “It was the first US government entity to put on paper what a lot of folks already knew was happening in the national security space,” said Andy Keiser, former chief of staff for Congressman Mike Rogers. “This was an official report. It was no longer being conveyed in a hushed tone.”[30]

这份报告被证明具有超越当时政治时刻的持久影响力，并在随后的几年里被美国官员和外国政府反复引用。“这是第一个以书面形式阐明许多人早已知晓的国家安全领域现状的美国政府机构，”国会议员迈克·罗杰斯的前幕僚长安迪·凯泽表示，“这是一份官方报告。这些内容不再只是以低声耳语的方式传播了。”[30]

Australia had joined the United States, citing cybersecurity concerns when it banned Huawei from bidding for its next-generation broadband network in March 2012. But the anti-Huawei camp was a small minority in the world. Even some other members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance—comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—were reluctant to follow suit.

澳大利亚已加入美国行列，在 2012 年 3 月禁止华为竞标其下一代宽带网络时引用了网络安全方面的担忧。但在全球范围内，反华为阵营仅占极少数。甚至五眼联盟（由澳大利亚、加拿大、新西兰、英国和美国组成）的其他一些成员也迟迟不愿效仿。

Shortly after the ban by Australia, New Zealand prime minister John Key was asked by a domestic lawmaker whether Huawei should continue to be allowed in the nation’s broadband infrastructure. “We are comfortable with the current arrangements,” Key said. He pointed out that Huawei wasn’t banned from all business in Australia, only from next-generation broadband contracts. “If it is so unwelcome in Australia, I was amazed to find out that it has just become the official sponsor of the Canberra Raiders.”[31]

在澳大利亚发布禁令后不久，新西兰总理约翰·基被国内一名立法者问及是否应继续允许华为参与该国的宽带基础设施建设。“我们对目前的安排感到满意，”基表示。他指出，华为并未被禁止在澳大利亚开展所有业务，而仅仅是被排除在下一代宽带合同之外。“如果它在澳大利亚如此不受欢迎，我很惊讶地发现它竟然刚刚成为了堪培拉奇袭者队的官方赞助商。”[31]

As 2012 drew to a close, Huawei was the world’s top telecom vendor, having deployed more than five hundred mobile networks, including in sixty-eight capital cities around the world. The company’s fixed-line switches and routers were being used by forty-five of the fifty top carriers in the world. Its fledgling smartphone business was number three in the world in sales, just behind Samsung and Apple. Huawei’s products now reached three billion people: two-fifths of humanity.

截至 2012 年底，华为已成为全球最大的电信供应商，部署了超过 500 个移动网络，覆盖全球 68 个首都城市。该公司的固定线路交换机和路由器正被全球 50 强运营商中的 45 家所使用。其羽翼渐丰的智能手机业务在销量上排名全球第三，仅次于三星和苹果。华为的产品现已触达 30 亿人：相当于人类总数的五分之二。

19

19

Low Visibility

低能见度

The Iran Affair: 2013

伊朗事务：2013 年

Meng Wanzhou traveled to Beijing in January 2013 to hold her first press conference amid China’s worst smog in years. The haze was so thick that it had shut down schools and grounded planes; years of careless industrialization had caught up with the nation. The reporters were intrigued by forty-year-old Cathy Meng appearing from behind the curtain at such a moment. Hardly anyone in the press had seen a member of the Ren family in the flesh, rain or shine (or fog).

2013 年 1 月，孟晚舟前往北京举行她的首场新闻发布会，当时中国正遭遇多年来最严重的雾霾。雾霾之浓重导致学校停课、飞机停飞；多年的粗放式工业化终于让这个国家付出了代价。记者们对四十岁的孟晚舟（Cathy Meng）在此时从幕后走向台前感到好奇。无论阴晴（或雾霾），媒体中几乎没有人见过任家成员的真身。

The appearance seemed to be at least partly in response to the criticism of opacity that had been leveled against Huawei at the House hearing the previous year. Meng told the gathered reporters that her father owned a 1.4 percent stake in Huawei, with the remaining shares divided among some sixty thousand employees, and she promised that Huawei was going to be sharing more information about its ownership and operations going forward. She said that the company had distributed $2 billion in dividends to employee shareholders the previous year.

这一亮相似乎至少在一定程度上是为了回应前一年众议院听证会上针对华为缺乏透明度的指责。孟晚舟告诉聚集的记者，她的父亲持有华为 1.4%的股份，其余股份由约六万名员工持有，并承诺华为未来将分享更多关于其所有权和运营的信息。她表示，公司前一年向员工股东发放了 20 亿美元的分红。

In an effort to soften the company’s image, Meng even shared a few personal details. The Financial Times reported that she was a mother of two who liked to go on power walks along the Shenzhen shoreline on weekends, and the business daily also described her as a fast talker with an agreeable smile.[1] “He was a forbearing father when I was little, and he has been a strict father ever since I entered Huawei,” she was quoted as saying about Ren Zhengfei. A local reporter even ventured to ask an impertinent question about whether there was any truth to the rumor that she had married William Xu, the early chip engineer who was now head of Huawei’s enterprise business division.[2] Meng acknowledged that the rumor was widespread, but she said it was untrue. She noted that her husband wasn’t in the telecom industry and that they had a ten-year-old boy and a four-year-old girl together. This was the truth but not entirely the whole truth—Carlos Liu, whom she had married in 2007, had been Huawei’s representative in Mexico before leaving the company to work in the investment field.

为了软化公司形象，孟晚舟甚至分享了一些个人细节。《金融时报》报道称，她是两个孩子的母亲，周末喜欢在深圳海岸线进行健步走；这家商业日报还形容她说话语速很快，带着亲切的微笑。[1] 在谈到任正非时，她被引用道：“我小时候他是个宽容的父亲，但自从我进入华为后，他一直是个严厉的父亲。”一位当地记者甚至冒昧地问了一个无礼的问题：传闻她嫁给了华为早期的芯片工程师、现任企业业务总裁徐文伟，这是否属实。[2] 孟晚舟承认这一传闻流传甚广，但表示并非事实。她指出，她的丈夫不在电信行业，他们育有一个十岁的男孩和一个四岁的女孩。这是事实，但并非全部事实——她于 2007 年结婚的丈夫刘晓棕（Carlos Liu）曾是华为驻墨西哥代表，后离开公司从事投资领域工作。

Meng’s appearance garnered largely favorable reviews, even as reporters pointed out that many questions about exactly how Huawei was controlled and how it operated remained a mystery. There were enough whispers about her being groomed for succession that Ren felt the need to clear the air. A couple months later, he told a meeting of shareholding employees that none of his four relatives working at Huawei would be his successors. “I am saying this clearly to everyone to reduce suspicions, and so you will not waste your energy,” he said. Ren said his successor must have vision, a deep understanding of customer needs, the ability to manage such a sprawling company, and the disposition not to rest on their laurels. “None of my family members have these abilities, and as a result, they will never enter the succession sequence,” he said.[3]

孟晚舟的亮相获得了大体正面的评价，尽管记者们指出，关于华为究竟如何被控制以及如何运作的许多问题仍是一个谜。关于她被培养为接班人的传言甚嚣尘上，以至于任正非觉得有必要澄清一下。几个月后，他在一次持股员工代表大会上表示，他在华为工作的四名亲属都不会成为他的接班人。“我今天把这个讲清楚，是为了减少大家的猜疑，让大家不要把精力浪费在这些地方，”他说。任正非表示，他的接班人必须具备视野、对客户需求的深刻理解、管理如此庞大公司的能力，以及不固步自封的性格。“我的家人都不具备这些能力，因此，他们永远不会进入接班人序列，”他说。[3]

—

Meng barely had a few days to enjoy the glow of her soft launch to the press before she was in the headlines again, this time for a much more unflattering reason.

孟晚舟还没来得及享受几天在媒体面前“软着陆”的光环，就再次登上了头条，而这一次的原因要糟糕得多。

For months, a Reuters investigative reporter named Steve Stecklow had been steadily digging into the Iran businesses of Huawei and its crosstown rival, ZTE. Indeed, Stecklow’s reporting on ZTE’s shipment of US technology to Iran the previous year had prompted the Commerce Department to launch an investigation into the company.[4] Late in 2012, Stecklow had revealed that a company called Skycom had offered to sell nearly 1.3 billion euros’ worth of embargoed Hewlett-Packard equipment to Iran’s leading mobile operator in 2010, which would have violated US sanctions on Iran. Skycom appeared to have very close ties to Huawei, Stecklow wrote, with staffers at the Skycom office in Tehran carrying Huawei badges and some employees’ résumés saying they worked at “Skycom-Huawei.”

几个月来，路透社调查记者史蒂夫·斯蒂克洛（Steve Stecklow）一直在稳步挖掘华为及其同城竞争对手中兴通讯在伊朗的业务。事实上，斯蒂克洛前一年关于中兴向伊朗运送美国技术的报道已促使商务部对该公司展开调查。[4] 2012 年底，斯蒂克洛披露，一家名为星通（Skycom）的公司曾在 2010 年提议向伊朗领先的移动运营商出售价值近 13 亿欧元的禁运惠普设备，这违反了美国对伊朗的制裁。斯蒂克洛写道，星通似乎与华为有着非常密切的联系，星通德黑兰办事处的工作人员佩戴华为工牌，一些员工的简历上写着他们在“星通-华为”工作。

Now, as Stecklow and his team scrutinized Skycom’s corporate filings in Hong Kong, they came across Meng Wanzhou’s name in Skycom’s list of board members. There was a panicked scramble at Skycom and Huawei when they learned of Reuters’ inquiries, an employee later recalled to US prosecutors.

现在，当斯蒂克洛及其团队仔细查阅星通在香港的公司注册文件时，他们在星通的董事会成员名单中发现了孟晚舟的名字。一名员工后来向美国检察官回忆说，当星通和华为得知路透社的查询时，内部陷入了一片恐慌。

“We are in trouble,” the employee recalled a colleague saying at Skycom’s office in Iran.[5]

“我们有麻烦了，”这名员工回忆起一位同事在星通伊朗办事处说的话。[5]

“They found out about the daughter of the chairman,” another said.

“他们发现了董事长的女儿，”另一人说道。

As Stecklow reported, Skycom’s corporate filings showed that Huawei’s CFO, Meng Wanzhou, had served on the company’s board from 2008 to 2009.[6] This meant that Huawei’s dealings in Iran could not be dismissed as the errancy of a few lower-level employees working beyond the purview of top management. Ren’s daughter would have known about the business, and by extension, Ren himself likely would have too. Stecklow’s article quoted Huawei as saying that its business in Iran was in compliance with all applicable laws.

正如斯蒂克洛所报道的，星通的公司注册文件显示，华为首席财务官孟晚舟曾在 2008 年至 2009 年期间担任该公司董事。[6] 这意味着华为在伊朗的交易不能被简单地归咎于少数基层员工在管理层监管之外的违规行为。任正非的女儿本应知晓这些业务，推而广之，任正非本人很可能也知情。斯蒂克洛的文章引用华为的话称，其在伊朗的业务符合所有适用法律。

Ren and his team were beginning to realize just how different doing business outside China really was. The country’s entire economic boom had been based on entrepreneurs pushing the bounds of what they could legally do—“crossing the river by feeling the stones.” As the nation emerged from total state control under Maoism, there were many capitalist practices that officials could not officially endorse, due to the apparent conflict with socialist theory, but that they would tacitly approve by turning a blind eye. As a result, the most fearless entrepreneurs—the roguish ones who erred on the side of asking for forgiveness instead of permission—had been the ones who’d reaped the biggest rewards of the market. Huawei fit such a profile. It had been founded in 1987 as a private company under a Shenzhen pilot program, without anyone knowing if such companies would be allowed in the long term or if they would be a brief experiment. In a nascent market free of conflict-of-interest restrictions, it had conquered the domestic landscape through a series of tie-ups with local telecom bureaus.

任正非和他的团队开始意识到，在中国境外做生意是多么地不同。中国整个经济繁荣的基础在于企业家们不断突破法律的边界——即“摸着石头过河”。随着国家从毛泽东时代的全面国家控制中脱离出来，出现了许多官员无法在正式场合认可的资本主义做法，因为这些做法与社会主义理论存在明显冲突，但他们会通过视而不见来予以默许。结果，那些最无畏的企业家——那些宁愿事后请求原谅也不愿事先请求许可的“草莽英雄”——成为了获得市场回报最丰厚的人。华为正符合这样的特征。它于 1987 年作为深圳试点计划下的一家民营企业成立，当时没人知道这类公司是否会被长期允许存在，还是仅仅是一次短暂的实验。在一个没有利益冲突限制的新兴市场中，它通过与地方电信局的一系列联姻征服了国内市场。

Such a fearlessness had served Huawei well in its early years, but this trait was now getting the company into trouble. In a memoir, Ashley Yablon, the assistant general counsel for Huawei’s US division from 2010 to 2011, recalled being taken aback when his boss remarked that the law was only a suggestion.[7]

这种无畏精神在华为早期发展中起到了很好的作用，但这种特质现在正给公司带来麻烦。在回忆录中，艾什莉·亚布隆（Ashley Yablon），这位在 2010 年至 2011 年间担任华为美国分公司助理总法律顾问的人回忆道，当他的老板评论说法律仅仅是一项建议时，他感到大吃一惊。[7]

—

Within the British multinational bank HSBC, a news article was being passed from banker to banker: “Please see below Reuters article on Huawei, self-explanatory. Most grateful if you could obtain an update from the company.”[8]

在英国跨国银行汇丰银行（HSBC）内部，一篇新闻报道在银行家之间传阅：“请参阅下面关于华为的路透社文章，内容不言自明。如果能从该公司获得最新情况，将不胜感激。”[8]

The Reuters Skycom exposé now sent HSBC’s bankers racing to check their books. One staffer confirmed to colleagues that an entity called Skycom Tech Co. Ltd., which shared an address with Huawei, had maintained an account with HSBC for over a year. Worse, Huawei had sent over Skycom’s annual report at the time, a sheaf of papers stamped Confidential. It was typed right there in black and white: Skycom’s purpose was “investment holding and acting as a contractor for contracts undertaking [sic] in Iran.”

路透社关于星通（Skycom）的揭露报道让汇丰银行的银行家们急于核查账目。一名员工向同事确认，一家名为星通技术有限公司（Skycom Tech Co. Ltd.）的实体与华为共用一个地址，且在汇丰开户已超过一年。更糟的是，华为当时提交过星通的年度报告，那是一叠盖有机密印章的文件。上面白纸黑字地写着：星通的宗旨是“投资控股以及作为承包商在伊朗承接合同[原文如此]”。

Founded in 1865 as the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, HSBC had deep business ties with China and was keen to grow them. Huawei was a key account. An HSBC staffer reached out to the company to ask it to confirm if the Skycom in the HSBC account was the same one that appeared in the Reuters article, and to find out what Skycom’s relationship was to Huawei. Huawei defensively responded that Skycom was its local business partner and insisted that it was fully compliant with all applicable laws. To be safe, HSBC closed the Skycom account on February 23, 2013.[9]

汇丰银行成立于 1865 年，原名香港上海汇丰银行，与中国有着深厚的业务往来，并渴望扩大这些联系。华为是一个关键客户。一名汇丰员工联系了华为，要求确认汇丰账户中的星通是否就是路透社文章中提到的那家公司，并查明星通与华为的关系。华为防御性地回应称，星通是其当地业务合作伙伴，并坚持认为其完全遵守了所有适用法律。为了安全起见，汇丰银行于 2013 年 2 月 23 日关闭了星通的账户。[9]

Meng had declined to comment for the Reuters piece. While it was unclear exactly what her thoughts were on the Skycom incident, that summer she was visibly preoccupied with reducing risks in the finance department. She wrote to colleagues that what was scary about risk was that one didn’t know where it was or what the effects would be. “Should we manage it?” she wrote. “And how do we manage it?”[10]

孟晚舟拒绝就路透社的报道发表评论。虽然目前尚不清楚她对星通事件的具体想法，但那年夏天，她显然正专注于降低财务部门的风险。她写信给同事说，风险的可怕之处在于人们不知道它在哪里，也不知道后果会是什么。“我们应该管理它吗？”她写道，“我们又该如何管理它？”[10]

—

HSBC’s bankers debated internally whether or not they should continue doing business with Huawei. They commissioned an internal report to evaluate the reputational risks.[11] On the one hand, there were reports of sanctions violations in Iran, concerns from US officials that Huawei’s equipment might pose security risks, and bribery allegations in countries like Algeria. On the other hand, Huawei was “an absolute global powerhouse” with “high earnings potential,” and it banked with HSBC across forty-two countries, according to the report, which laid out mitigating factors for each of the concerns. US lawmakers had failed to provide clear evidence substantiating their security concerns about the company. Huawei had said that its deals in Iran were of a civilian, not military, nature and that it was pulling back. The company denied the Algerian bribery allegations.

汇丰银行的银行家们在内部讨论是否应该继续与华为做生意。他们委托编写了一份内部报告来评估声誉风险。[11] 一方面，有报道称其在伊朗违反制裁，美国官员担心华为设备可能构成安全风险，以及在阿尔及利亚等国存在贿赂指控。另一方面，报告称华为是“绝对的全球巨头”，具有“高盈利潜力”，且在 42 个国家与汇丰有业务往来。报告针对每一项担忧都列出了缓解因素：美国立法者未能提供确凿证据来证实他们对该公司的安全担忧；华为曾表示其在伊朗的交易属于民用而非军用性质，且正在缩减业务；公司否认了阿尔及利亚的贿赂指控。

“Clearly this would have a very real impact on the franchise should the decision be made to withdraw,” an HSBC employee wrote in an email.[12]

“显然，如果决定退出，这将对特许经营业务产生非常实质性的影响，”一名汇丰员工在邮件中写道。[12]

HSBC wanted to continue working with Huawei. But to settle the dust, a meeting was arranged between Meng and Alan Thomas, HSBC’s deputy head of global banking for Asia-Pacific, on August 22, 2013, in a back room of a Hong Kong restaurant.[13]

汇丰银行希望继续与华为合作。但为了平息事态，2013 年 8 月 22 日，孟晚舟与汇丰银行亚太区环球银行副主管阿兰·托马斯（Alan Thomas）在香港一家餐厅的包间里安排了一次会面。[13]

Meng spoke in Chinese through an interpreter, saying that she wanted to be precise. She showed a PowerPoint presentation titled “Trust, Compliance & Cooperation.”

孟晚舟通过翻译用中文发言，表示她希望表达得准确。她展示了一份名为《信任、合规与合作》的演示文稿。

“Huawei operates in Iran in strict compliance with applicable laws, regulations and sanctions of UN, US and EU,” the PowerPoint said. “Huawei’s engagement with Skycom is normal business cooperation.”

“华为在伊朗的业务严格遵守联合国、美国和欧盟的适用法律、法规及制裁，”演示文稿称。“华为与星通的往来是正常的业务合作。”

The PowerPoint acknowledged that Huawei was once a Skycom shareholder but said that the company had since sold off its shares and that Meng had quit her board position. It also pointed out that Huawei was far from alone in the Iran market, with Ericsson, Nokia Siemens Networks, and ZTE also hawking their wares in the country.

演示文稿承认华为曾是星通的股东，但表示公司此后已出售了股份，且孟晚舟已辞去董事职务。文稿还指出，华为远非伊朗市场唯一的参与者，爱立信、诺基亚西门子通信和中兴通讯也在该国推销产品。

The PowerPoint presentation would end up being the linchpin in the US prosecutors’ case alleging that she had committed bank fraud by misleading HSBC about Huawei’s Iran business. But in the moment, the meeting appeared to be a success. Thomas dashed off an email to HSBC colleagues. “No new issues—which was a relief to me,” he wrote. “No new contracts, very high scrutiny of end customers, careful product and supply chain control, so everything appears to be above board.”[14]

这份演示文稿最终成为美国检察官指控的关键证据，指控她通过在华为伊朗业务上误导汇丰银行而犯下银行欺诈罪。但在当时，这次会面似乎取得了成功。托马斯给汇丰同事发了一封急件邮件。“没有新问题——这让我松了一口气，”他写道。“没有新合同，对终端客户的审查非常严格，产品和供应链控制严密，所以一切看起来都是合法的。”[14]

That same day, Huawei announced it had secured a $1.5 billion five-year loan from a consortium of banks that included HSBC, as well as Citibank, ANZ, DBS, and Standard Chartered, in the largest overseas loan that Huawei had raised to date.[15]

同一天，华为宣布从包括汇丰、花旗、澳新、星展和渣打在内的银行财团获得了 15 亿美元的五年期贷款，这是华为迄今为止筹集到的最大一笔海外贷款。[15]

“We are pleased by the strong support received from leading international banks,” Meng said in a press release.[16] “This highlights the trust and confidence that the financial community has in Huawei’s sustainable growth.”

“我们对国际领先银行给予的大力支持感到高兴，”孟在新闻稿中表示。[16]“这彰显了金融界对华为可持续增长的信任与信心。”

—

Meanwhile, Huawei’s crosstown rival, ZTE, was feeling the heat from the FBI probe into its Iran business. Reuters had reported that ZTE had sold Iran’s largest telecom firm a powerful surveillance system containing US technology and capable of monitoring landline, mobile, and internet communications.[17] This was in apparent violation of US restrictions on the sale of US technology to the country, and it pushed ZTE’s reclusive founder, Hou Weigui, to do something unprecedented.

与此同时，华为在同城的竞争对手中兴通讯正感受到联邦调查局（FBI）对其伊朗业务调查带来的压力。路透社曾报道，中兴向伊朗最大的电信公司出售了一套强大的监控系统，该系统包含美国技术，能够监控固定电话、移动和互联网通信。[17]这显然违反了美国对向该国出售美国技术的限制，并迫使中兴通讯深居简出的创始人侯为贵做出了一件史无前例的事。

In April 2013, Hou appeared in Beijing for an interview with Reuters.[18] Hou had kept an even lower profile than Ren over the years. Now, wearing a simple dark-blue collared coat zipped over a gray sweater, he sat with one leg crossed over the other as he spoke to Reuters’ Greater China bureau chief, Jason Subler.

2013 年 4 月，侯为贵在北京接受了路透社的采访。[18]多年来，侯为贵比任正非还要低调。当时，他穿着一件简单的深蓝色翻领外套，拉链拉在灰色毛衣外面，在与路透社大中华区总编苏保罗（Jason Subler）交谈时，他翘着二郎腿坐着。

Hou told Subler he felt aggrieved that ZTE had been singled out for practices that were common in the industry. He said that ZTE had by now “basically stopped” doing business in Iran, and that the compensation the company had had to pay Iranian clients for breaking off contracts contributed to ZTE’s first-ever annual loss in 2012.

侯为贵告诉苏保罗，中兴因行业内普遍存在的做法而受到针对，他对此感到委屈。他说，中兴目前已“基本停止”在伊朗的业务，而公司因终止合同必须向伊朗客户支付的赔偿金，导致了中兴在 2012 年出现了史上首次年度亏损。

“I think we’ve really been treated unjustly on this issue. Others are selling the same things, and we weren’t even selling the most,” Hou said. “Now we face these restrictions, and others in the industry aren’t facing any restrictions—they’re still selling. This is a bit unfair.”

“我认为在这个问题上我们确实受到了不公正的对待。别人也在卖同样的东西，而且我们卖得还不是最多的，”侯为贵说。“现在我们面临这些限制，而行业内的其他人却没有面临任何限制——他们仍在销售。这有点不公平。”

Hou said Huawei was still doing business in Iran: “We are not in a position to comment on what Huawei and others in the industry are doing. But in any case, they are still involved in the market. But we have stopped.”

侯为贵表示华为仍在伊朗开展业务：“我们不便评论华为和行业内其他公司的做法。但无论如何，他们仍参与该市场。而我们已经停止了。”

20

20

Shotgiant

“猎巨人”行动

The Snowden Leaks: 2013–2014

斯诺登泄密事件：2013–2014

In March 2014, The New York Times and German magazine Der Spiegel published startling news. Citing classified documents provided by the NSA contractor turned whistleblower Edward Snowden, they reported that the NSA had infiltrated Huawei years ago through a program code-named “Shotgiant.”[1]

2014 年 3 月，《纽约时报》和德国杂志《镜报》发布了令人震惊的消息。根据由美国国家安全局（NSA）外包商转为告密者的爱德华·斯诺登提供的机密文件，他们报道称，NSA 早在多年前就通过一个代号为“猎巨人”（Shotgiant）的项目渗透了华为。[1]

American spies had hacked into Huawei’s central email system in 2009 and had been reading the company’s emails ever since—including the communications of Chairwoman Sun and Ren Zhengfei himself, The Times and Der Spiegel reported. The NSA had accessed Huawei’s product source code, its most valuable intellectual property. And that was not all. The spy agency was using Huawei’s infrastructure to listen in on targets around the globe.

《纽约时报》和《镜报》报道称，美国间谍在 2009 年黑入了华为的中心邮件系统，并从那时起一直读取该公司的邮件——包括孙亚芳董事长和任正非本人的通信。NSA 获取了华为的产品源代码，这是该公司最宝贵的知识产权。而这还不是全部。该情报机构还利用华为的基础设施来监听全球各地的目标。

“Many of our targets communicate over Huawei produced products,” one of the leaked NSA PowerPoint slides read. “We want to make sure that we know how to exploit these products—we also want to ensure that we retain access to these communication lines, etc.”[2]

“我们的许多目标都通过华为生产的产品进行通信，”一份泄露的 NSA 幻灯片写道。“我们想要确保我们知道如何利用这些产品——我们还想确保我们保留对这些通信线路等的访问权限。”[2]

Another leaked PowerPoint slide showed a web around Ren’s and Sun’s names, suggesting that the NSA had analyzed their social networks based on their emails. Another slide stated, “This is what we are hoping to accomplish: Determine if Huawei is doing SIGINT [signal intelligence] for PRC [the People’s Republic of China]…. Leverage Huawei presence to gain access to networks of interest…. Obtaining actionable intelligence of Huawei’s (and potentially PRC’s) leadership plans and intentions.”

另一份泄露的幻灯片显示了一个围绕任正非和孙亚芳名字的社交网络图，表明 NSA 根据他们的电子邮件分析了他们的社交网络。另一份幻灯片指出：“这是我们希望实现的目标：确定华为是否在为中华人民共和国（PRC）从事信号情报（SIGINT）工作……利用华为的存在来获取感兴趣的网络访问权限……获取有关华为（以及潜在的中国政府）领导层计划和意图的可执行情报。”

It was now clear why Washington had been so confident that Beijing could use Huawei’s gear for snooping: the NSA had been doing exactly that for years.

现在很清楚为什么华盛顿一直如此确信北京可以利用华为的设备进行窥探了：因为 NSA 多年来一直在做同样的事情。

Ren was restrained in public comments, calling the disclosure of the NSA hack “within expectations.” Huawei’s US spokesman William Plummer declared: “The irony is that exactly what they are doing to us is what they have always charged that the Chinese are doing through us.”[3]

任正非在公开评论中表现得十分克制，称 NSA 黑客行为的披露“在预料之中”。华为美国发言人威廉·普拉默声明道：“讽刺的是，他们对我们所做的一切，正是他们一直指责中国人通过我们所做的事情。”[3]

—

Snowden’s path to becoming an exiled whistleblower had run through China. During his time at the NSA, he had been stationed in Tokyo under cover of being an employee for the US computer company Dell. In Tokyo, he was assigned to brief US defense officials on China’s surveillance capabilities.[4]

斯诺登成为流亡告密者的道路曾经过中国。在 NSA 工作期间，他曾以美国戴尔公司员工的身份被派驻东京。在东京，他的任务是向美国国防官员简报中国的监视能力。[4]

As he’d studied classified NSA and CIA reports to try to understand China’s capacity to electronically track US officials and informants, Snowden had been overwhelmed by the gargantuan amount of phone and internet data that China was gathering each day. As he later recalled in a memoir, it sparked the question in his mind of just how the US government could know so much about what China was doing without using some of the same tactics itself.

当他研究 NSA 和 CIA 的机密报告，试图了解中国电子追踪美国官员和线人的能力时，斯诺登被中国每天收集的庞大电话和互联网数据量所震撼。正如他后来在回忆录中所述，这在他脑海中引发了一个疑问：如果美国政府自己不使用同样的手段，又怎么能对中国的所作所为如此了如指掌？

Snowden had found his answers, and he was now sharing them with the world. He alleged that US spies had hacked Chinese mobile operators and stolen millions of text messages. He shared documents with the press that showed the NSA was collecting nearly five billion records pertaining to global cell-phone location data every day. He revealed that with the help of telecommunications operators, the NSA and its British counterpart, GCHQ, were tapping undersea cables carrying intercontinental phone calls and internet traffic. He alleged that the NSA had monitored phone conversations of dozens of world leaders and bugged Cisco routers sent to overseas targets.

斯诺登找到了他的答案，而他现在正与世界分享这些答案。他声称美国间谍黑入了中国移动运营商并窃取了数百万条短信。他向媒体分享的文件显示，NSA 每天收集近 50 亿条与全球手机位置数据相关的记录。他透露，在电信运营商的帮助下，NSA 及其英国同行政府通信总部（GCHQ）正在监听承载洲际电话和互联网流量的海底光缆。他声称 NSA 监听了数十位世界领导人的电话交谈，并在发往海外目标的思科路由器中安装了窃听装置。

In the wake of Snowden’s leaks, a pall of fear fell over China: a fear of Western technology.[5] “He’s Watching You,” warned a Chinese magazine cover, the line superimposed over an illustration of a shadowy figure in a helmet. China’s national broadcaster, CCTV, cautioned that the iPhone could pose national security risks due to its ability to track and time-stamp user locations. “This is extremely sensitive data,” a researcher told the broadcaster, adding that it could potentially expose state secrets. CCTV also advised against government institutions running Microsoft’s Windows 8 operating system, saying it could be used to gather information on Chinese citizens. “Your identity, account, contact book, phone numbers—all this data can be put together for big-data analysis,” a Chinese expert said on CCTV. Beijing security hawks called for a broad rip-and-replace program to remove American components from key infrastructure. China accelerated its programs to develop domestic technologies in key fields.

在斯诺登泄密事件之后，一种恐惧的阴影笼罩了中国：对西方技术的恐惧。[5] “他在看着你，”一家中国杂志的封面警告道，这句话印在一个戴着头盔的神秘人物插图上。中国国家电视台中央电视台（CCTV）警告称，iPhone 可能会带来国家安全风险，因为它具有追踪和记录用户位置时间戳的能力。“这是极其敏感的数据，”一位研究人员告诉该电视台，并补充说这可能会泄露国家机密。中央电视台还建议政府机构不要运行微软的 Windows 8 操作系统，称其可能被用于收集中国公民的信息。“你的身份、账号、通讯录、电话号码——所有这些数据都可以整合起来进行大数据分析，”一位中国专家在中央电视台节目中表示。北京的安全强硬派呼吁开展广泛的“拆除与更换”计划，从关键基础设施中移除美国组件。中国加速了在关键领域开发国产技术的计划。

There was also public backlash in countries around the world. The controversy pushed some major Western telecommunications operators to begin to pull back the curtain for the first time. Vodafone, the European mobile network giant, revealed that in around six countries, governments maintained “direct access” links to their networks, allowing authorities to access network data whenever they wanted, without having to produce a warrant or notify Vodafone. “These pipes exist, the direct access model exists,” Stephen Deadman, then Vodafone’s group privacy officer, was quoted as saying in The Guardian.[6] Privacy advocates called it a “nightmare scenario.”

世界各国也出现了公众的抵制。这场争议促使一些主要的西方电信运营商首次开始揭开内幕。欧洲移动网络巨头沃达丰透露，在约六个国家，政府保持着对其网络的“直接访问”链路，允许当局随时访问网络数据，而无需出示搜查令或通知沃达丰。“这些管道存在，直接访问模式也存在，”时任沃达丰集团隐私官的斯蒂芬·戴德曼在《卫报》[6] 隐私倡导者称之为“噩梦场景”。

Vodafone’s transparency report said the company’s networks were designed so that a government authority could only access communications in their own country. It noted, however, that “a number of governments have legal powers to order an operator to enable lawful interception of communications that leave or enter a country without targeting a specific individual or set of premises.”[7] Vodafone reported receiving tens of thousands of lawful intercept requests from governments around the world, including 7,677 from Czech authorities and 24,212 from Spain. In addition, Vodafone reported that it was unable to disclose statistics of lawful interception requests from Albania, Egypt, Hungary, India, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Qatar, Romania, Turkey, and the United Kingdom due to those countries’ legal requirements around maintaining secrecy.[8] In many cases, this wiretapping was being done with the help of specialized mass-surveillance technology developed by companies like Narus and Verint.[9]

沃达丰的透明度报告称，该公司的网络设计旨在确保政府当局只能访问其本国境内的通信。然而报告指出，“一些政府拥有法律权力，可以命令运营商对进出该国的通信进行合法拦截，而无需针对特定的个人或场所。”[7] 沃达丰报告称，收到了来自全球各国政府的数万次合法拦截请求，其中包括来自捷克当局的 7,677 次和来自西班牙的 24,212 次。此外，沃达丰报告称，由于阿尔巴尼亚、埃及、匈牙利、印度、爱尔兰、马耳他、荷兰、卡塔尔、罗马尼亚、土耳其和英国等国的法律保密要求，它无法披露这些国家的合法拦截请求统计数据。[8] 在许多案例中，这种窃听是在 Narus 和 Verint 等公司开发的专业大规模监控技术的帮助下完成的。[9]

These wiretapping requests were generally sent to operators like Vodafone, not to hardware makers like Huawei. But Huawei and its rivals were aware that such requests took place; indeed, they were required by governments around the world to design their products to have a standardized side door that authorities could use to access data. They also sometimes received requests for next-level help. In 2014, Ericsson told the London-based Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB) that an unnamed customer had once sought the company’s help in making major changes to its telephone and internet network that “would have enabled the surveillance of a large number of people and allowed the government in question to collect and store much more data on citizens across all methods of digital communications than was otherwise possible.” Ericsson said it had turned down the contract.[10]

这些窃听请求通常发送给沃达丰等运营商，而不是华为等硬件制造商。但华为及其竞争对手都清楚这类请求的存在；事实上，全球各国政府都要求他们在设计产品时预留一个标准化的侧门，以便当局访问数据。他们有时还会收到更深层次的协助请求。2014 年，爱立信告诉总部位于伦敦的人权与商业研究所（IHRB），曾有一位未具名的客户寻求该公司帮助，对其电话和互联网网络进行重大改造，这将“能够对大量人员实施监控，并允许相关政府通过所有数字通信手段，收集和存储比以往更多的公民数据”。爱立信表示拒绝了该合同。[10]

Hardware makers like Huawei and Ericsson also sold managed services, or outsourced IT support to operators, which sometimes put them in the path of wiretapping requests. Ericsson employees acknowledged that they could be involved in lawful interception: “Ericsson personnel would only carry out lawful interception under requests from the operator, as part of their Managed Services,” the IHRB reported.[11] Huawei’s global cybersecurity officer, John Suffolk, confirmed during a UK parliamentary hearing that Huawei would comply with government requests for lawful interception. “Lawful intercept is lawful,” he said. “Yes, of course we comply with lawful intercept.”[12]

华为和爱立信等硬件制造商也向运营商销售管理服务或外包 IT 支持，这有时使他们处于处理窃听请求的环节中。爱立信员工承认他们可能会参与合法拦截：IHRB 报告称，“作为管理服务的一部分，爱立信人员仅会根据运营商的请求执行合法拦截。”[11] 华为全球网络安全官约翰·萨福克（John Suffolk）在英国议会听证会上证实，华为会遵守政府关于合法拦截的请求。他说：“合法拦截是合法的。是的，我们当然会遵守合法拦截的要求。”[12]

Evidence was also emerging that the NSA had successfully exploited Cisco routers for spying. The journalist James Bamford had reported in 2009 that the NSA had targeted Cisco for years. “I really need somebody today and for the next couple of years who knows Cisco routers inside and out and can help me understand how they’re being used in target networks,” Terry Thompson, then the NSA’s deputy director for services, had said at a 1999 internal meeting, according to a recording reviewed by Bamford.[13] Now Snowden’s leaked files suggested that the NSA had succeeded. In a book based on Snowden’s files, the reporter Glenn Greenwald revealed that the NSA routinely intercepted routers and other networking devices being exported from the United States and implanted them with bugs before sending them onward to their intended recipients. He included a photo from an NSA document that showed three people carefully opening a Cisco box. “It is quite possible that Chinese firms are implanting surveillance mechanisms in their network devices. But the United States is certainly doing the same,” Greenwald concluded.[14]

证据还显示，美国国家安全局（NSA）已成功利用思科路由器进行间谍活动。记者詹姆斯·班福德（James Bamford）曾在 2009 年报道称，NSA 多年来一直将思科作为目标。根据班福德查看的一份录音，时任 NSA 服务部副主任的特里·汤普森（Terry Thompson）在 1999 年的一次内部会议上曾说：“我今天以及未来几年确实需要一些彻头彻尾了解思科路由器的人，来帮我弄清楚它们在目标网络中是如何被使用的。”[13] 现在，斯诺登泄露的文件表明 NSA 已经取得了成功。记者格伦·格林沃尔德（Glenn Greenwald）在一本基于斯诺登文件的书中透露，NSA 经常拦截从美国出口的路由器和其他网络设备，并在将其发往预期接收者之前植入窃听器。他展示了一张来自 NSA 文件的照片，显示三个人正在小心翼翼地拆开一个思科包装箱。格林沃尔德总结道：“中国公司很有可能在他们的网络设备中植入监控机制。但美国肯定也在做同样的事情。”[14]

US vendors like Cisco were now in the same boat as Huawei, facing shadowy allegations that by their very nature could not be disproven. As Cisco’s sales in China plunged, there was not much it could do beyond issue a denial to Chinese media that it had ever been a knowing participant in NSA spying operations. Cisco’s CEO, John Chambers, wrote a letter to President Obama pleading for “rules of the road.” “We simply cannot operate this way,” Chambers wrote. “Our customers trust us to be able to deliver to their doorsteps products that meet the highest standards of integrity and security.”[15]

思科等美国供应商现在与华为同病相怜，面临着由于其性质而无法被证伪的暗中指控。随着思科在中国的销售额暴跌，除了向中国媒体发表声明否认其曾知情参与 NSA 间谍行动外，它能做的事情并不多。思科首席执行官约翰·钱伯斯（John Chambers）致信奥巴马总统，恳求制定“行业准则”。钱伯斯写道：“我们根本无法以这种方式运作。我们的客户信任我们，相信我们能够将符合最高诚信和安全标准的产品送到他们家门口。”[15]

After so many years of defending their company against similar allegations, Huawei’s executives couldn’t resist throwing a jab or two. “PRISM, PRISM on the wall, who’s the most trustworthy of them all?” Guo Ping said in a speech at the Mobile World Congress. “If you don’t understand this question, go ask Edward Snowden.”[16]

在为公司辩护多年并对抗类似指控后，华为的高管们忍不住反唇相讥。郭平在移动世界大会的一次演讲中说：“棱镜，棱镜，墙上的棱镜，谁才是世界上最值得信赖的人？”[16] “如果你不明白这个问题，去问问爱德华·斯诺登。”

—

Ren was now sixty-eight, the gray coming in at his temples, lines etched across his forehead and around the corners of his eyes. For two years now, Huawei had been the world’s largest telecom gear vendor by sales. In 2014, Huawei would book $46.6 billion in revenue—half of Microsoft’s revenue that year but almost four times Facebook’s. Huawei had also catapulted itself into the place of world’s third-biggest smartphone maker, behind only Apple and Samsung, shipping seventy-five million smartphones in 2014. Huawei was filing more patent applications per annum than any other company in the world. Global operators like Spain’s Telefónica, the UK’s BT, and Germany’s Deutsche Telekom were not only its customers but also its research partners. Its Safe City surveillance solutions had been deployed to more than one hundred cities around the world. Not bad for a boy from the Guizhou hills who had grown up in a famine, without enough food or shirts.

任正非现在六十八岁了，鬓角已经斑白，额头和眼角刻满了皱纹。两年来，按销售额计算，华为一直是全球最大的电信设备供应商。2014 年，华为的营收将达到 466 亿美元——是微软当年营收的一半，但几乎是 Facebook 的四倍。华为还一跃成为全球第三大智能手机制造商，仅次于苹果和三星，2014 年出货量达 7,500 万部。华为每年提交的专利申请数量超过全球任何其他公司。西班牙电信（Telefónica）、英国电信（BT）和德国电信（Deutsche Telekom）等全球运营商不仅是其客户，也是其研究合作伙伴。其“平安城市”监控解决方案已部署到全球一百多个城市。对于一个在贵州大山里长大、经历过饥荒、缺衣少食的孩子来说，这成绩相当不错。

For most of Huawei’s history, just catching up to its rivals had seemed an impossible goal. When Ren had told his staff in the 1990s that Huawei would become one of the world’s biggest telecom vendors, they had thought he was tilting at windmills. But the company had indeed become the biggest, and Ren was now setting his sights higher.

在华为历史的大部分时间里，仅仅赶上竞争对手似乎都是一个不可能实现的目标。当任正非在 20 世纪 90 年代告诉员工华为将成为全球最大的电信供应商之一时，他们认为他是在挑战风车的唐吉诃德。但公司确实成为了最大的，而任正非现在的目标定得更高了。

Ren told Teresa He, a serious and discreet woman in charge of Huawei’s chips research, that she had $400 million at her disposal each year to advance the fundamental building blocks of Huawei’s technology. He told her he wanted twenty thousand staffers working on chip design.[17] Huawei also launched a Hong Kong–based lab for artificial-intelligence research that bore the evocative name Noah’s Ark Lab, and it set up branch offices from Moscow to Paris to Montreal so that it could recruit the brightest minds from around the world. As it sought to reach the global technological cutting edge, Huawei was now hiring not just engineers but also mathematicians and quantum physicists.

任正非告诉何庭波——一位严肃且谨慎、负责华为芯片研发的女性——她每年有 4 亿美元的支配额度，用于推进华为技术的基础构件。他告诉她，他希望有两万名员工从事芯片设计。[17] 华为还在香港成立了一家名为“诺亚方舟实验室”的人工智能研究实验室，名字极具启发性；并从莫斯科到巴黎再到蒙特利尔设立了分支机构，以便从全球范围内招募最聪明的头脑。在寻求达到全球技术前沿的过程中，华为现在不仅雇佣工程师，还雇佣数学家和量子物理学家。

Ren observed that the most powerful tech companies in the world—Microsoft, Google, Apple, and IBM, for instance—sold not a stand-alone product but a technological platform that served as a springboard for hundreds or thousands of other companies’ technology. He said that was Huawei’s goal. It would seek to be a global technological force, and that meant building the company’s chips, servers, and algorithms into platforms and getting partners and allies on board around the world. “If we only seek to dominate the world without learning to share the cake with our allies,” he told staff in late 2013, “we are like Genghis Khan, like Hitler, and our own demise will be the ultimate outcome.”[18]

任正非观察到，世界上最强大的科技公司——例如微软、谷歌、苹果和 IBM——销售的不是单一产品，而是一个技术平台，作为成百上千家其他公司技术的跳板。他说这就是华为的目标。华为将寻求成为全球技术力量，这意味着要将公司的芯片、服务器和算法构建成平台，并在全球范围内争取合作伙伴和盟友。“如果我们只追求称霸世界，而不学会与盟友分享蛋糕，”他在 2013 年底告诉员工，“我们就像成吉思汗，像希特勒，而我们自己的灭亡将是最终的结局。”[18]

When Huawei’s staffers had begun to go overseas in the late 1990s, they’d gotten doors slammed in their faces left and right. Against all likelihood, they had broken into the market in nearly every corner of the world. Huawei’s overseas sales teams continued to push. Guy Saint-Jacques, Canada’s ambassador from 2012 to 2016, recalled Huawei landing a meeting with him by winning a charity auction whose prize was a dinner at the ambassador’s residence. “I noticed that there was one table that was always bidding higher,” Saint-Jacques said. “It was a Huawei table. And they won.”[19] Chairwoman Sun Yafang was also doing much of the diplomacy personally. The world leaders she met in 2014 included Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev, and UK business secretary Vince Cable. Forbes ranked Sun as the most powerful woman in China for 2014.

当华为员工在 20 世纪 90 年代末开始走向海外时，他们到处碰壁。尽管困难重重，他们还是打入了世界几乎每一个角落的市场。华为的海外销售团队继续发力。2012 年至 2016 年担任加拿大驻华大使的赵朴（Guy Saint-Jacques）回忆说，华为通过赢得一场慈善拍卖获得了一次在他官邸共进晚餐的机会，从而争取到了与他的会面。“我注意到有一桌人总是出价更高，”赵朴说，“那是华为的一桌。他们赢了。”[19] 董事长孙亚芳也在亲自进行大量的外交工作。她在 2014 年接见的世界领导人包括埃及总统阿卜杜勒-法塔赫·塞西、斯里兰卡总统马欣达·拉贾帕克萨、哈萨克斯坦总统努尔苏丹·纳扎尔巴耶夫和英国商业大臣文斯·凯布尔。《福布斯》将孙亚芳评为 2014 年中国最有权势的女性。

Huawei had been using the rotating CEO system for several years now, with Guo Ping, Ken Hu, and Eric Xu taking six-month turns at the helm under the direction of Ren and Chairwoman Sun. It was an unorthodox succession approach, but it seemed to be working for the time being. But when Ren might retire and what would happen then remained the subject of much public speciation. At the company’s annual analyst conference in March 2014, Eric Xu remarked that Ren’s successor would likely be a team instead of a single person. “How we get there, only time will tell,” Xu said. A surprising number of Ren’s early team members had stuck with him for two decades, a testament to the success of Huawei’s employee shareholder business model. Zheng Baoyong, Ren’s early right-hand man, whom he had nicknamed “A-Bao,” even made a return to Huawei around this time, after recovering from a brain tumor that had unexpectedly sidelined him in the early 2000s.

华为已经实行轮值 CEO 制度好几年了，郭平、胡厚崑和徐直军在任正非和孙亚芳董事长的指导下，每人轮流执掌六个月。这是一种非传统的接班方式，但就目前而言似乎行之有效。但任正非何时退休以及届时会发生什么，仍然是公众广泛猜测的话题。在 2014 年 3 月的公司年度分析师大会上，徐直军评论说，任正非的接班人可能是一个团队，而不是一个人。“我们如何实现这一目标，只有时间能给出答案，”徐直军说。任正非早期团队中竟然有如此多的人追随了他二十年，这证明了华为员工持股商业模式的成功。任正非早期的得力助手、被他昵称为“阿宝”的郑宝用，在从 2000 年代初意外让他退居二线的脑肿瘤中康复后，甚至也在此时回到了华为。

Several of Ren’s family members remained involved in Huawei’s management. Ren’s son, Ren Ping, was still at Smartcom, the Huawei hospitality division that ran its restaurants and hotels. Ren’s younger brother, Steven Ren, held seats in powerful internal oversight units such as the audit committee and the supervisory board, and Ren’s daughter Meng Wanzhou was on the board of directors as the company’s chief financial officer. For now, the question of succession was anybody’s guess.

任正非的几位家人仍参与华为的管理。任正非的儿子任平仍在慧通公司（Smartcom），这是华为负责经营餐厅和酒店的行政服务部门。任正非的弟弟任树录在审计委员会和监事会等强大的内部监督机构中任职，而任正非的女儿孟晚舟则作为公司的首席财务官担任董事会成员。目前，接班人的问题仍是众说纷纭。

—

In June 2014, Meng arrived in New York for the latest Huawei ICT Finance Forum, an annual conference that the company organized for Huawei executives to hobnob with prominent global financiers. It wasn’t the most comfortable time to travel to the United States: US-China tensions had spiked after Snowden’s revelations. Beijing had just announced a security review of imported technology equipment, with state media calling US companies like Google and Apple a threat to the nation. Western executives were anxious that they were about to be shut out of China’s lucrative market. Meanwhile, Washington was adamant that the US was the more aggrieved party when it came to hacking.

2014 年 6 月，孟晚舟抵达纽约参加最新一届华为 ICT 金融论坛，这是该公司组织的年度会议，旨在让华为高管与全球知名金融家结交。这并不是前往美国的最佳时机：在斯诺登爆料后，美中紧张局势激增。北京刚刚宣布对进口技术设备进行安全审查，官方媒体称谷歌和苹果等美国公司是对国家的威胁。西方高管担心他们即将被排除在中国利润丰厚的市场之外。与此同时，华盛顿坚称，在黑客攻击问题上，美国才是更受委屈的一方。

Despite the controversies that swirled around Huawei, many banks were eager to do business with it. “All the political nonsense aside, the bankers were like, ‘This is real business, this is real money. And we want a piece of it,’ ” said former Huawei spokesman William Plummer, who noted that he helped make preparations for the conferences.

尽管围绕华为的争议不断，许多银行仍渴望与其做生意。“撇开所有的政治废话不谈，银行家们觉得，‘这是真正的业务，这是真金白银。我们也想分一杯羹，’”华为前发言人威廉·普拉默（William Plummer）说道，他指出自己曾协助筹备这些会议。

For this year’s conference, they had landed Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve chairman, as a keynote speaker. Meng had also prepared an address, an upbeat speech that praised US innovation and called Apple founder Steve Jobs a hero and visionary.[20]

在当年的会议上，他们请到了前美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘担任主旨演讲嘉宾。孟晚舟也准备了一份致辞，这是一篇乐观的演讲，赞扬了美国的创新，并称苹果创始人史蒂夫·乔布斯为英雄和远见卓识者。[20]

But as Meng arrived at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport, Department of Homeland Security agents took her in for secondary questioning, telling her the stop had something to do with her visa. They confiscated her electronics.

但当孟晚舟抵达纽约肯尼迪国际机场时，国土安全部特工将她带走进行二次问询，告诉她这次拦截与她的签证有关。他们没收了她的电子设备。

Plummer received a frantic call from a colleague on Meng’s team.[21]

普拉默接到了孟晚舟团队一名同事打来的急促电话。[21]

“You used to be a diplomat. You need to get her out.”

“你以前当过外交官。你得把她弄出来。”

Plummer replied that this wasn’t quite how it worked.

普拉默回答说，事情并不是这样运作的。

“They held her for three or four hours, and during that time they had her tablet, PC, and phone,” Plummer said.

“他们扣留了她三四个小时，在那段时间里，他们拿走了她的平板电脑、电脑和手机，”普拉默说。

Meng was allowed to enter the US after the search, and she continued her business trip.

搜查结束后，孟晚舟被允许进入美国，她继续了她的商务行程。

Afterward, Plummer says, he told other Huawei executives that Meng’s devices had likely been copied by the US authorities. He suggested that they discard them.

普拉默说，事后他告诉华为其他高管，孟晚舟的设备很可能已被美国当局复制。他建议他们丢弃这些设备。

“I told her people, ‘Burn them all. You can’t use them. Have them burned. They’re done.’ ”

“我告诉她的人，‘把它们全烧了。你们不能再用了。把它们烧掉。它们废了。’”

Part III

第三部分

We are like a small sesame seed, stuck in the middle of conflict between two great powers.[1]

我们就像一颗小小的芝麻，被夹在两个大国之间的冲突中。[1]

—Ren Zhengfei, January 15, 2019

——任正非，2019 年 1 月 15 日

21

21

Sharp Eyes

雪亮工程

Big Data Arrives: 2015–2016

大数据时代来临：2015–2016

On an overcast Wednesday afternoon in October 2015, London security officers in neon-yellow vests stopped traffic outside a glassy office tower on Wormwood Street.[1] Curious onlookers stood across the street outside a barber’s shop and an Indian restaurant, craning their necks. A dark-haired Chinese man in a suit and red tie got out of a car amid flashing cameras, accepted a bouquet of flowers, and walked into the global finance center of Huawei Technologies. The staff clapped and cheered: “We warmly welcome Chairman Xi!”

2015 年 10 月一个阴云密布的周三下午，身穿霓虹黄色背心的伦敦安保人员在沃姆伍德街一座玻璃办公大楼外拦截了交通。[1] 好奇的围观者站在马路对面的理发店和印度餐厅外，伸长脖子张望。在闪光灯的簇拥下，一名身着西装、系着红色领带的黑发中国男子走下轿车，接过一束鲜花，步入华为技术的全球金融中心。员工们鼓掌欢呼：“热烈欢迎习主席！”

China’s leader, Xi Jinping, was making time on his state visit to the UK to stop by one Chinese company, according to his public schedule, and the company he was bestowing this honor upon was Huawei.[2] It was a reflection of Huawei’s place in Beijing’s global ambitions. Here was a Chinese company that was not only a major seller to the UK but also an R&D partner in cutting-edge fields. This was a rare and precious thing for the nation. Timed to Xi’s visit, Huawei was set to announce a new partnership with the University of Manchester to research graphene, a next-generation material two hundred times stronger than steel, and Xi planned to tour the university’s graphene research center.[3]

根据公开行程，中国领导人习近平在对英国进行国事访问期间，专门抽时间造访了一家中国公司，而他授予这一殊荣的公司正是华为。[2] 这反映了华为在北京全球雄心图景中的地位。这是一家不仅向英国大量销售产品，而且在尖端领域开展研发合作的中国公司。对于这个国家来说，这是稀有且珍贵的。配合习近平的访问，华为准备宣布与曼彻斯特大学建立新的合作伙伴关系，共同研究石墨烯——一种强度是钢的两百倍的新一代材料，习近平还计划参观该大学的石墨烯研究中心。[3]

Wearing a whimsical pink-and-blue tie, Ren Zhengfei showed the Chinese leader around Huawei’s offices, energetically pointing a small baton at a robotic arm, smartwatches, and other gadgets. A gaggle of Huawei executives in black suits followed them around. So did Meng Wanzhou, who stood out in her burgundy-colored dress. Despite her scare at the JFK Airport the previous year, she had resumed her work travels. And a meeting with China’s leader was too important to miss.

任正非系着一条别致的粉蓝相间领带，陪同中国领导人参观了华为的办公室，并充满活力地用一根小指挥棒指向机械臂、智能手表和其他小设备。一群身着黑色西装的华为高管紧随其后。孟晚舟也在其中，她那一身酒红色的连衣裙格外显眼。尽管前一年在肯尼迪国际机场遭遇了惊魂时刻，但她已经恢复了出差工作。而与中国领导人的会面实在太重要了，不容错过。

Ren had reason to be proud. After a decade and a half of bloody competition, Huawei was one of the last ones standing. America’s Lucent had disappeared into France’s Alcatel, which had in turn been absorbed into Finland’s Nokia. Canada’s Nortel had gone under. Britain’s Marconi was subsumed into Sweden’s Ericsson. In quick succession, the United States, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom had all fallen by the wayside. China’s Huawei and ZTE now rounded out the Big Four along with Ericsson and Nokia.

任正非有理由感到自豪。经过十五年血腥的竞争，华为成为了最后的幸存者之一。美国的朗讯消失在法国的阿尔卡特之中，而后者又被芬兰的诺基亚吞并。加拿大的北电网络破产了。英国的马可尼被瑞典的爱立信收购。在接连不断的洗牌中，美国、法国、加拿大和英国都纷纷败下阵来。中国的华为和中兴通讯现在与爱立信、诺基亚并列，组成了“四大巨头”。

Xi had now been in power for three years out of the standard ten-year tenure for a Chinese president. He had proved more aggressive than anyone had predicted. Xi had declared ambitions for China’s global renaissance, launching the trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative to build roads, dams, and telephone networks across developing nations. He had also kicked off a bold, decade-long industrial program called “Made in China 2025,” its goal being to make the country a world leader in critical technologies like semiconductors, robotics, and artificial intelligence. Huawei was now stepping up into a key role in Belt and Road, Made in China 2025, and other Beijing flagship programs. Ren had once again successfully anticipated the policy winds and maneuvered Huawei to catch them.

习近平在通常为期十年的中国国家主席任期中已经执政三年。事实证明，他比任何人预料的都更具进取心。习近平宣布了中华民族全球复兴的雄心，启动了耗资万亿美元的“一带一路”倡议，在发展中国家兴建公路、大坝和电话网络。他还启动了一项大胆的、为期十年的工业计划，名为“中国制造 2025”，其目标是使中国在半导体、机器人和人工智能等关键技术领域成为世界领导者。华为现在正步入“一带一路”、“中国制造 2025”以及北京其他旗舰计划中的关键角色。任正非再次成功预判了政策风向，并操纵华为顺风起航。

Having come to power amid the aftershocks of the Arab Spring, Xi was preoccupied with security. He had immediately launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign, which was putting hundreds of thousands of officials and executives behind bars across the nation. It was a savvy move, providing cover for Xi to take down potential rivals, even as the campaign played well with the grassroots population. The crackdown had begun in the Ren family’s stronghold, Sichuan Province, which had a reputation for trying to go in its own direction far from the nation’s capital. Beijing’s anti-graft investigators were now scrutinizing officials’ business links at all levels, making it a tense time to be, like Huawei, in a line of work that was deeply intertwined with the government. Who hadn’t crossed paths with Huawei over the years? Its business interests were in every province, every city, possibly even every village. Everyone’s fortunes were now twisting in the wind. Back in 2000, Sichuan’s party secretary, Zhou Yongkang, a son of impoverished eel farmers, had toured Huawei’s Sichuan factory for caller ID–enabled telephones and had endeavored to persuade Ren to deepen his business investment in the province.[4] In 2001, Liaoning Province’s governor, a charismatic man named Bo Xilai, had come to visit Huawei, where he’d exclaimed in admiration that these comrades down south were building things they hadn’t even thought of yet in the far north.[5] Zhou had risen to become the nation’s security czar, and Bo tipped as a candidate for president, and now they had both been sentenced to life in prison for corruption.

习近平在阿拉伯之春的余震中上台，对安全问题极为关注。他上台后立即发起了一场席卷全国的反腐运动，导致全国数十万名官员和高管入狱。这是一个精明的举动，既为习近平清除潜在对手提供了掩护，又在基层民众中赢得了好评。这场整肃行动始于任家的根据地四川省，该省一直以试图远离京城、自搞一套而闻名。北京的反腐调查人员当时正在审查各级官员的商业联系，这使得像华为这样与政府有着千丝万缕联系的行业处于紧张时刻。这些年来，谁没有与华为打过交道？它的商业利益遍布每个省、每个城市，甚至可能每个村庄。每个人的命运现在都在风中摇摆。早在 2000 年，出身贫寒、父母是养鳗农的四川省委书记周永康曾参观华为在四川的来电显示电话工厂，并竭力说服任正非加大在该省的商业投资。[4] 2001 年，辽宁省省长、富有魅力的薄熙来也曾到访华为，他在那里赞叹不已，称南方的同志们正在制造北方人甚至还没想到的东西。[5] 周永康后来晋升为国家安全沙皇，薄熙来曾被视为主席候选人，而现在，他们都因腐败被判处无期徒刑。

At Huawei, executives had scrambled to ensure that their house was clean. Ren, Chairwoman Sun, Meng Wanzhou, and Huawei’s other board members had appeared onstage before staff in a solemn ceremony, raising their right hands and swearing that they would not embezzle or take bribes.[6] “Actually, there’s still quite a bit of corruption at Huawei,” Ren warned. “In the future, if you’ve been in prison, your children will always say, ‘My dad’s been in prison.’ ”[7]

在华为，高管们争先恐后地确保自家清白。任正非、孙亚芳董事长、孟晚舟以及华为的其他董事会成员在员工面前举行了庄严的仪式，他们站在台上举起右手宣誓，绝不贪污受贿。[6] “其实华为内部的腐败还是挺严重的，”任正非警告说，“将来如果你坐了牢，你的孩子总会说：‘我爸爸坐过牢。’”[7]

Huawei did not escape the crackdown unscathed. Teng Hongfei, sales head of Huawei’s smartphone division, was detained for investigation on allegations of “accepting bribes as a non-state functionary.”[8] Another Huawei sales executive, Tian Qingjun, admitted to giving a senior executive at China Unicom a string of bribes, including thousands of dollars’ worth of gift cards to restaurants, department stores, and a foot massage parlor, as well as plane tickets to Toronto.[9] The Unicom official was sentenced to four and a half years in prison; Tian, it appeared, was granted clemency for cooperating with prosecutors. Ren’s early “young prodigy” and onetime succession contender, Li Yinan, was arrested during this period and sentenced to two and a half years in prison for insider trading in a case that involved his work after he left Huawei.

华为也没能在这场打击行动中全身而退。华为智能手机业务销售主管滕鸿飞因涉嫌“非国家工作人员受贿罪”被带走调查。[8] 另一位华为销售高管田庆军承认向中国联通的一名高管行贿，包括价值数千美元的餐厅、百货公司和足疗店礼品卡，以及前往多伦多的机票。[9] 该联通官员被判处有期徒刑四年半；而田庆军似乎因配合检察机关工作而获得了宽大处理。任正非早期的“天才少年”、曾被视为接班人竞争者的李一男也在这一时期被捕，并因涉及其离开华为后工作的内幕交易案被判处有期徒刑两年半。

Xi was also bolstering Beijing’s legal powers. A slew of new laws governing national security, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity—which began rolling out in 2015—ordered individuals and companies to cooperate with government investigations. It was a thorn in Huawei’s side: foreign officials would repeatedly cite them as a reason why they couldn’t trust Huawei. But Huawei’s executives, who jet-setted around the world and saw all different kinds of political unrest, would have appreciated the reasoning behind Beijing’s tight controls. In 2016, after witnessing mass protests in South Korea’s capital, Seoul, to demand the removal of impeached president Park Geun-hye, rotating CEO Guo Ping posted a scared-face emoji on Facebook. “There are thousands of people gathering here to protest the step-down president,” he wrote. Park was deposed and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.

习近平还在强化北京的法律权力。2015 年开始出台的一系列涉及国家安全、反恐和网络安全的新法律，要求个人和公司配合政府调查。这成了华为的眼中钉：外国官员反复引用这些法律作为他们无法信任华为的理由。但华为的高管们常年飞往世界各地，见识过各种政治动荡，他们本应能理解北京严密管控背后的逻辑。2016 年，在目睹了韩国首都首尔要求罢免被弹劾总统朴槿惠的大规模抗议后，轮值 CEO 郭平在 Facebook 上发了一个惊恐表情。他写道：“成千上万的人聚集在这里抗议要求总统下台。”朴槿惠随后被罢免并被判处二十五年监禁。

In 2015, Xi’s administration also launched a program called “Sharp Eyes” that was aimed at blanketing the country with a network of security cameras, a lucrative new business opportunity for vendors like Huawei. The target was 100 percent coverage of China’s public spaces by 2020. As Xi set out on his UK trip, Beijing police announced that there were no more blind spots in China’s capital. Electronic eyes were watching over 100 percent of Beijing.[10]

2015 年，习近平政府还启动了一项名为“雪亮工程”的计划，旨在用安全摄像头网络覆盖全国，这为华为等供应商提供了利润丰厚的新商机。目标是到 2020 年实现中国公共场所 100%的全覆盖。在习近平开启访英之旅时，北京警方宣布中国首都已不再有盲点。电子眼正监控着北京 100%的区域。[10]

—

Ren had grown up without computers.[11] Now everything was becoming a computer. Everything was becoming smart: smartphones, smartwatches, smart thermostats, smart vacuums, smart refrigerators. The gadgeteers called it the big-data era or the Internet of Things and touted a Jetsons-esque life of incredible convenience. But it also meant that companies and governments could track individuals to a far greater degree than ever before. Years earlier, the US big-box store Target had drawn backlash after an attempt to predict which women were pregnant by analyzing their buying habits.[12] Now this act of peering into customers’ shopping baskets seemed quaintly innocent. In this new day of big data, major tech companies and governments could quite plausibly track not only an individual’s shopping cart but also their location twenty-four hours a day, their conversations and texts, their social contacts, and even their thoughts before they spoke them aloud, as extrapolated through their internet search history and notes jotted in their phone’s note-taking apps. Even their sleep patterns and heartbeat could no longer be said to be personal and private.

任正非在没有电脑的环境下长大。[11] 现在，一切都在变成电脑。一切都在变得智能化：智能手机、智能手表、智能温控器、智能吸尘器、智能冰箱。极客们将其称为大数据时代或物联网，并吹捧一种如《杰森一家》般极其便利的生活。但这也意味着公司和政府对个人的追踪程度远超以往。多年前，美国大卖场塔吉特（Target）曾因试图通过分析购物习惯来预测哪些女性怀孕而引发抵制。[12] 如今，这种窥探顾客购物篮的行为显得天真无邪。在这个大数据的新时代，大型科技公司和政府完全可以追踪一个人的购物清单，还能追踪其全天 24 小时的位置、谈话和短信、社交关系，甚至能通过互联网搜索记录和手机便签应用中的笔记，推断出他们尚未说出口的想法。甚至连他们的睡眠模式和心跳也无法再被称为个人隐私。

“The era of big-data traffic should be quite terrifying,” Ren told his executives. “Because we don’t really know what big data is. The sheer volume of traffic is also unimaginable.”[13]

“大数据流量时代应该是相当恐怖的，”任正非告诉他的高管们。“因为我们并不真正了解大数据是什么。流量之大也是难以想象的。”[13]

This flood of data was turning the wheels of Huawei’s Safe City surveillance systems, which were gaining traction at home and abroad. Huawei and its partners touted their systems as being able to help police combine real-time facial-recognition streams from surveillance cameras with users’ mobile data and social media to produce sophisticated automated tracking. They landed contracts across the nation, from Beijing’s elite Tsinghua University to Duyun No. 1 Middle School, where Ren’s father had been principal, in a sleepy Guizhou town.[14] One district in the city of Tianjin was rolling out a Huawei database that an official said could begin tracking residents even before they were born. “Beginning in utero, individual profiles are created for each person,” an official wrote about the system. “Additional information is added as residents progress through their lives.”[15]

这股数据洪流正推动着华为“平安城市”监控系统的运转，该系统在国内和海外都越来越受欢迎。华为及其合作伙伴宣称，他们的系统能够帮助警方将监控摄像头的实时人脸识别流与用户的移动数据和社交媒体相结合，从而产生复杂的自动化追踪。他们在全国各地赢得了合同，从北京顶尖的清华大学到贵州一座宁静小镇上的都匀一中（任正非的父亲曾在此担任校长）。[14] 天津市的一个区正在部署华为的数据库，一名官员表示，该数据库甚至可以在居民出生前就开始追踪他们。一位官员在描述该系统时写道：“从子宫开始，就为每个人创建了个人档案。随着居民生活轨迹的推进，更多信息会被添加进去。”[15]

Other countries were also signing on. Huawei touted its Safe City in Kenya, which it claimed had reduced crime rates in the covered areas by 46 percent from 2014 to 2015; the company said the system had even helped ensure a safe visit for Pope Francis in November 2015.[16] One of the most detailed overviews of such a system emerged as part of a lawsuit that a Huawei partner filed against it.[17] In 2016, the two companies had worked together to build a Safe City in Lahore, Pakistan, with the deal later souring. According to the filing by Huawei’s partner, Business Efficiency Solutions, the system they developed included a data warehouse that stored sensitive records from Pakistan’s government agencies and other parties, including national ID card information, data from cellular companies, land records, tax records, and immigration information. There was a “digital media forensic center” where captured video and still images could be enhanced and analyzed. A media monitoring system tracked platforms like Facebook and Twitter, as well as print and broadcast media. There were video feeds from surveillance cameras installed across the city, in addition to body-wearable cameras and covert miniaturized cameras for police. There were also “industrial-strength” drones that could broadcast real-time video to a control room and had thermal vision for nighttime surveillance.

其他国家也在签约。华为宣传其在肯尼亚的“平安城市”项目，声称该项目使覆盖区域的犯罪率在 2014 年至 2015 年间降低了 46%；公司表示，该系统甚至协助确保了教皇方济各在 2015 年 11 月的安全访问。[16] 关于此类系统最详尽的概述之一，出现在华为的一家合作伙伴对其发起的诉讼中。[17] 2016 年，两家公司合作在巴基斯坦拉合尔建设“平安城市”，但该交易后来破裂。根据华为合作伙伴 Business Efficiency Solutions 的诉状，他们开发的系统包含一个数据仓库，存储了来自巴基斯坦政府机构和其他方的敏感记录，包括国民身份证信息、蜂窝网络公司数据、土地记录、税务记录和移民信息。系统中设有一个“数字媒体取证中心”，可以对捕获的视频和静态图像进行增强和分析。媒体监控系统则追踪 Facebook 和 Twitter 等平台，以及印刷和广播媒体。除了安装在全市各处的监控摄像头视频流外，还有执法记录仪和供警察使用的隐蔽微型摄像头。此外还有“工业级”无人机，可以将实时视频传输到控制室，并具备用于夜间监控的热成像功能。

—

In 2014, Ren made a trip to Xinjiang.[18] Some of Huawei’s staffers posted to the region were unsettled. There had been a deadly blast at a train station in Ürümqi after Xi had declared a “People’s War on Terror.” Huawei employees’ family members pushed them to leave for safer assignments.

2014 年，任正非前往新疆考察。[18] 华为当时派驻该地区的部分员工感到惶惶不安。在习近平宣布开展“人民反恐战争”后，乌鲁木齐火车站发生了一起致命爆炸案。华为员工的家属纷纷催促他们离开，调往更安全的岗位。

Xinjiang is China’s largest region, bigger than Alaska or Texas, covering a full sixth of the nation’s land, with some twenty million people. It might be a borderland, but it is vital to the nation. Amid its steppes and deserts are China’s borders with key neighbors: Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India. Many of China’s oil fields are in Xinjiang. The region produces the vast majority of China’s cotton crop and much of its tomatoes, nuts, and fruits. The military has used remote stretches of Xinjiang for nuclear and military tests.

新疆是中国面积最大的地区，比阿拉斯加或德克萨斯州还要大，占国土总面积的整整六分之一，拥有约两千万人口。它虽是边疆，却对国家至关重要。在草原与沙漠之间，是中国与俄罗斯、阿富汗、巴基斯坦、印度等关键邻国的边界。中国许多油田都位于新疆。该地区生产了中国绝大部分的棉花，以及大量的番茄、坚果和水果。军方曾利用新疆偏远地带进行核试验和军事测试。

Huawei’s engineers on the eastern coast saw Xinjiang as a distant hardship posting with the promise of adventure and danger. A Huawei employee was once stuck for two days in the desert when a rockslide blocked their train’s passage from Kashgar to Hotan.[19] Outside major cities, many of the native Turkic Uyghur residents didn’t speak Mandarin Chinese, or resented having to do so, and viewed Han Chinese workers as colonial invaders who were trying to dominate their economy and erase their cultural heritage. The ethnic tension periodically erupted into violence. Authorities saw the phone and internet networks that Huawei had helped build as a tool for controlling the region. After deadly ethnic riots broke out in Ürümqi in 2009, authorities cut off internet access to Xinjiang for ten months.[20]

华为在东部沿海地区的工程师将新疆视为遥远且艰苦的驻地，既充满冒险也暗藏危机。一名华为员工曾因山体滑坡阻断了从喀什到和田的铁路，在沙漠中被困了两天。[19] 在大城市之外，许多土著维吾尔族居民不会说普通话，或者反感被迫说普通话，并将汉族工人视为试图主导其经济并抹杀其文化遗产的殖民侵略者。民族紧张局势周期性地演变为暴力冲突。当局将华为协助建设的电话和互联网网络视为控制该地区的工具。2009 年乌鲁木齐爆发致命的民族骚乱后，当局切断了新疆的互联网连接长达十个月。[20]

Now, despite the uncertainties, it was clear that new business opportunities were opening up in Xinjiang. The People’s War on Terror was in large part a technological war, an effort to build a digital net that no suspected Uyghur separatist could slip through. That meant potential big sales of Huawei’s Safe City solutions. Huawei had never been a company to shrink from danger. Indeed, it was the Huawei ethos to bravely push forward when others fled. In the autumn of 2014, Ren announced internally that employees who went to work in the region would receive accelerated promotions in line with war-zone postings. “In this way, people will go to difficult areas,” he said. “Otherwise, no one will go.”[21] Ren further told his staff: “The current approach is to use unique incentive schemes in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Xinjiang region to draw people to go.”[22] These incentive initiatives would ensure that Huawei remained robustly staffed in the region as the repression intensified over the next few years.

如今，尽管存在不确定性，但显而易见的是，新疆正在开启新的商业机遇。“人民反恐战争”在很大程度上是一场技术战争，旨在构建一张让任何疑似维吾尔分裂分子都无法逃脱的数字网。这意味着华为的“平安城市”解决方案有望获得巨额销售。华为从来不是一家畏惧危险的公司。事实上，当他人逃离时勇敢前行正是华为的精神。2014 年秋，任正非在内部宣布，前往该地区工作的员工将获得与战区驻地一致的破格提拔。他说：“这样人们才会去艰苦地区，[21]否则，没人会去。”任正非还告诉员工：“目前的做法是在阿富汗、伊拉克或新疆地区使用独特的激励方案来吸引人才前往。”[22] 随着未来几年镇压行动的加剧，这些激励措施确保了华为在该地区保持稳健的人员配置。

At the time, few could have predicted the full extent of the brutal crackdown that would take place—the vast detention camps, the forced labor, the allegations of torture. In the ensuing years, there must have been a moment when it dawned on Ren that his team would go down in the history books not for heroically helping to secure the peace in Xinjiang but for abetting what international human-rights experts were calling crimes against humanity.

在当时，很少有人能预料到随后发生的残酷镇压会达到何种程度——庞大的拘留营、强迫劳动以及酷刑指控。在接下来的几年里，任正非一定在某个时刻意识到，他的团队载入史册的原因，将不是因为英勇地协助维护新疆和平，而是因为助长了国际人权专家所称的危害人类罪。

—

One morning in March 2016, Huawei’s brass woke to shocking news out of Washington: after years of investigating Huawei’s crosstown rival, ZTE, the US Commerce Department had put the company on its sanctions list for violating Iran export controls. ZTE was now blocked from buying US technology, which was all but a death knell. Everyone knew that ZTE could not make its products without US chips and software, because no high-tech company could. If the sanctions weren’t quickly lifted, ZTE’s remaining lifespan would be measured not in years but in months.

2016 年 3 月的一个早晨，华为高层被来自华盛顿的震惊消息惊醒：在对华为的同城对手中兴通讯（ZTE）进行了多年调查后，美国商务部因其违反伊朗出口管制而将其列入制裁名单。中兴现在被禁止购买美国技术，这无异于敲响了丧钟。人人都知道，没有美国的芯片和软件，中兴无法制造产品，因为没有任何一家高科技公司能做到。如果制裁不迅速解除，中兴剩余的寿命将不再以年计，而是以月计。

To justify the sanctions, the US Commerce Department had published several incriminating internal ZTE records that it had somehow acquired. These records outlined how ZTE had set up shell companies to obscure its business dealings in Iran and North Korea. Incredibly, one of the documents laid out the penalties that ZTE executives might face if they were caught skirting sanctions:

为了证明制裁的合理性，美国商务部公布了几份通过某种渠道获取的、具有定罪性质的中兴内部记录。这些记录概述了中兴如何设立壳公司来掩盖其在伊朗和朝鲜的业务往来。令人难以置信的是，其中一份文件列出了中兴高管如果被发现规避制裁可能面临的处罚：

Company will be subject to a large amount of civil penalty;

公司将面临巨额民事罚款；

公司将面临巨额民事罚款；

High-level managers will face prison sentences in a criminal case;

高级管理人员将在刑事案件中面临监禁；

高级管理人员将在刑事案件中面临监禁；

Company will be placed on the Blacklist and be banned from purchasing U.S. products directly or indirectly for a period of time.[23]

公司将被列入黑名单，并在一段时间内被禁止直接或间接购买美国产品。[23]

公司将被列入黑名单，并在一段时间内被禁止直接或间接购买美国产品。[23]

ZTE’s plight set off alarm bells across China. Security hawks in Beijing saw it as proof that the country needed to reduce its reliance on US technology as fast as possible. For years, the idea that Washington could assassinate Chinese tech companies by severing their supply chains had floated in the realm of conspiracy theory. Few in Beijing believed that such a thing was possible in an age of globalized supply chains. But now it was real.

中兴的困境在中国全境敲响了警钟。北京的安全鹰派将其视为中国需要尽快减少对美国技术依赖的证据。多年来，华盛顿可以通过切断供应链来“暗杀”中国科技公司的想法一直停留在阴谋论领域。在北京，很少有人相信在供应链全球化的时代这种事会发生。但现在，它变成了现实。

At Huawei, there were more specific reasons for panic. Whispers swirled that Huawei was the top prize, the big fish that US investigators were actually seeking to bring down. Ashley Yablon, the ZTE whistleblower, had previously worked as a senior lawyer for Huawei in the United States. And one of the internal corporate documents published by the Commerce Department mentioned a ZTE rival, code-named “F7,” that was using similar tactics to get around US sanctions. Based on the descriptions, there was no ambiguity: F7 was Huawei.[24]

在华为内部，恐慌有着更具体的原因。传言四起，称华为才是真正的终极目标，是美国调查人员真正想要击落的大鱼。中兴的举报人阿什利·亚布隆（Ashley Yablon）此前曾担任华为在美国的高级律师。而且，商务部公布的一份公司内部文件提到了一个代号为“F7”的中兴竞争对手，该对手正采取类似策略规避美国制裁。根据描述，身份毫无悬念：F7 就是华为。[24]

The company had played fast and loose for years. Now Ren warned his staff that they must avoid violating US law in sensitive regions. “We must strictly stay within bounds,” he said. “We are only businesspeople. We only do business.”[25]

该公司多年来一直行事草率。现在，任正非警告员工，必须避免在敏感地区违反美国法律。他说：“我们必须严格守规。我们只是商人。我们只做生意。”[25]

22

22

A Thing of Beauty

美之事物

Huawei’s Smartphone Triumph: 2016–2017

华为智能手机的凯歌：2016–2017

Back when he had visited the United States in the 1990s, Ren Zhengfei had been struck by the grand architecture of Las Vegas, modeled after Roman palaces. He’d remarked that Las Vegas might be the most beautiful city in America. Now in the hinterland to the north of Shenzhen, he began building his own version. Huawei had outgrown its Shenzhen headquarters by 2016, with 180,000 employees globally and counting, and Ren’s team was searching for more space. This was hard to find in Shenzhen, which was a thicket of skyscrapers by now, with soaring property prices. They found what they were looking for in Dongguan, Shenzhen’s up-and-coming northern neighbor, which still had stretches of undeveloped land. Eager to woo the company, Dongguan officials offered Huawei a prime 1.2-square-kilometer tract of verdant land on the south shore of a lake.

早在 20 世纪 90 年代访问美国时，任正非就被拉斯维加斯仿照罗马宫殿建造的宏伟建筑所震撼。他曾评论说，拉斯维加斯可能是美国最美丽的城市。如今，在深圳北部的腹地，他开始建造属于自己的版本。到 2016 年，华为在全球拥有 18 万名员工且人数仍在增加，深圳总部已不敷使用，任正非的团队正在寻找更多空间。这在当时的深圳很难实现，因为那里已是摩天大楼林立，地价飞涨。他们在东莞找到了理想之地，东莞是深圳北边新兴的邻居，仍有大片未开发的土地。为了争取这家公司，东莞官员向华为提供了一块位于湖泊南岸、面积 1.2 平方公里的优质葱郁土地。

Ren’s younger brother, Steven Ren, was put in charge of the construction of these new Dongguan R&D grounds, which they called Ox Horn Campus. They hired Japan’s Nikken Sekkei, the world’s second-largest architectural firm, which produced a fever dream of a design: Ox Horn would be built to look like twelve miniature European cities, including Paris, Verona, Bruges, and Oxford. They would re-create some of the greatest hits of Western civilization, including Germany’s Heidelberg Castle and France’s Palace of Versailles. “What is important is not simply to copy certain architectural styles but to make them truly beautiful,” Steven Ren wrote of the project.[1]

任正非的弟弟任树录负责这个被称为“溪流背坡村”（Ox Horn Campus）的东莞新研发基地的建设。他们聘请了全球第二大建筑事务所——日本日建设计（Nikken Sekkei），后者交出了一份如梦似幻的设计方案：溪村将被建成十二个欧洲小镇的缩影，包括巴黎、维罗纳、布鲁日和牛津。他们将重现西方文明的一些经典之作，包括德国的海德堡城堡和法国的凡尔赛宫。“重要的不仅是简单地模仿某种建筑风格，而是要让它们真正具有美感，”任树录在谈到该项目时写道。[1]

Huawei would overlook no detail.[2] The architects were proud that none of the roofs of the 108 buildings were identical. Reflecting an eye for historical accuracy, some of the shingles were slate, others terra-cotta or copper. The pitches of the roofs ranged from twenty to ninety degrees. The buildings were faced in a range of materials, including granite, sandstone, limestone, dolomite, brick, and stucco (for Verona and Grenada). There were, of course, some concessions to modernity, such as treating the porous stones to prevent mildew and algae growth. Facial-recognition gates were installed at the entrances.[3]

华为不放过任何细节。[2] 建筑师们引以为傲的是，108 栋建筑的屋顶没有一个是完全相同的。为了体现对历史准确性的追求，一些屋顶瓦片采用了板岩，另一些则采用了赤陶或铜。屋顶的坡度从 20 度到 90 度不等。建筑外墙采用了多种材料，包括花岗岩、砂岩、石灰岩、白云石、砖块和灰泥（用于维罗纳和格拉纳达）。当然，设计也向现代性做出了一些妥协，例如对多孔石材进行处理以防止霉菌和藻类生长。入口处安装了人脸识别闸机。[3]

Replicating iconic Western buildings was widespread in China at the time, amid a broad fascination with the world among a rising Chinese middle class; Xi’s administration would later discourage the practice as suggestive of a lack of cultural confidence.[4] At Huawei, Ren thought the striking structures with historic resonances would inspire his engineers to think globally and aspire to greatness.[5] Huawei hired 150 Russian painters to cover the halls’ ceilings and walls with Renaissance-style murals, with the painters joking that even the Kremlin didn’t have such beautiful corridors.[6] Someone stocked the lake by the castle with black swans—a reference to the financial term for worst-case scenarios that are hard to forecast. Ren so frequently warned his staff to look out for black-swan events that, at some point, the bird became Huawei’s unofficial mascot.

当时，在中国新兴中产阶级对世界广泛向往的背景下，复制西方标志性建筑的现象十分普遍；习近平政府后来不鼓励这种做法，认为这暗示了文化自信的缺失。[4] 在华为，任正非认为这些具有历史共鸣的醒目建筑将激励他的工程师们具备全球视野并追求卓越。[5] 华为聘请了 150 名俄罗斯画家在礼堂的天花板和墙壁上绘制文艺复兴风格的壁画，画家们开玩笑说，连克里姆林宫都没有这么漂亮的走廊。[6] 有人在城堡旁的湖里放养了黑天鹅——这是借用金融术语，指代难以预测的最坏情况。任正非经常警告员工要警惕黑天鹅事件，以至于在某种程度上，这种鸟成为了华为非正式的吉祥物。

[picture]

A Huawei smartphone ad featuring Hollywood superstar Scarlett Johansson.

华为智能手机广告，由好莱坞巨星斯嘉丽·约翰逊主演。

—

On a balmy night in southern China in 2016, a singer in a glittering dress crooned in front of a three-piece band. A bartender sliced fresh pineapple for the cocktails. Piles of sashimi gleamed on ice. The room shimmered pink and purple under the spotlights. Then Hollywood superstar Scarlett Johansson walked out onto the stage.[7]

2016 年中国南方一个和煦的夜晚，一位身着闪亮礼服的歌手在三人乐队前低声吟唱。调酒师正在切新鲜菠萝准备鸡尾酒。成堆的刺身在冰块上闪闪发光。在聚光灯下，房间呈现出粉色和紫色的光泽。随后，好莱坞巨星斯嘉丽·约翰逊走上了舞台。[7]

The promotional event for Huawei’s new P9 smartphone was billed as a “fan party” for Chinese devotees of Scarlett Johansson. The audience of mostly young Chinese women cheered, waving signs with slogans like I Got Scarlett Fever. It was one among a string of glamorous soirees that Huawei was hosting around the world with the aim of getting consumers to not only recognize the name Huawei but also associate it with sophistication and luxury.

华为新款 P9 智能手机的促销活动被冠以斯嘉丽·约翰逊中国影迷“粉丝派对”的名号。观众大多是年轻的中国女性，她们欢呼雀跃，挥舞着印有“我得了斯嘉丽热”等口号的标语。这是华为在全球范围内举办的一系列华丽社交盛会之一，旨在让消费者不仅记住“华为”这个名字，还要将其与精致和奢华联系在一起。

Huawei was pulling out all the stops as it sought to catch up with the world’s smartphone kings—Samsung and Apple. To close the gap with Samsung would be a formidable challenge: Samsung was pouring $14 billion a year into advertising, more than Iceland’s GDP.[8] With the help of top-tier marketing agencies, Huawei rolled out billboards everywhere from London’s Heathrow Airport, to the banks of the Seine River in Paris, to New York’s Times Square. Huawei signed on A-listers like Johansson, Gal Gadot, and Henry Cavill to appear in its smartphone commercials. The company also became a sponsor of sports teams, including the Washington Redskins, the Canberra Raiders, and Arsenal Football Club.

华为正全力以赴，力求赶上世界智能手机之王——三星和苹果。要缩小与三星的差距将是一个艰巨的挑战：三星每年投入 140 亿美元用于广告，超过了冰岛的国内生产总值。[8] 在顶级营销机构的帮助下，华为的广告牌遍布各地，从伦敦希思罗机场到巴黎塞纳河畔，再到纽约时报广场。华为签约了约翰逊、盖尔·加朵和亨利·卡维尔等一线明星出演其智能手机广告。公司还成为了包括华盛顿红皮队、堪培拉突袭者队和阿森纳足球俱乐部在内的体育队伍的赞助商。

This lavish spending would not be a waste. Indeed, it would help Huawei achieve a pretty incredible transformation. A company that hawked telephone switches, undersea cables, and surveillance gear to dictators and strongmen was being reborn in soft focus as a fun and fashionable brand.

这些挥金如土的投入并非浪费。事实上，它帮助华为实现了一次相当惊人的转型。一家向独裁者和强人兜售电话交换机、海底电缆和监控设备的设备商，正在柔光镜下重生为一个充满乐趣且时尚的品牌。

In Huawei’s early days, Ren had been less than enthused at the idea of hawking handsets—which were called “terminals” in Huawei-speak—as he considered it too far afield from the company’s core businesses of switches, routers, and base stations. “Huawei will not make a mobile phone,” Ren once insisted indignantly. “Anyone who talks this nonsense is going to get laid off!”[9] Even after Huawei began pursuing smartphones seriously, Ren feared wasting money on marketing and was often harsh on the company’s head of consumer products, Richard Yu, or Yu Chengdong. “People always say I criticize Yu Chengdong,” Ren remarked to staff. “Actually, my criticism of him is my way of caring for him.”[10]

在华为早期，任正非对兜售手机（在华为语境中被称为“终端”）的想法并不热衷，因为他认为这偏离了公司交换机、路由器和基站的核心业务。“华为不做手机，”任正非曾愤慨地坚持道。“谁要是再说这种胡话，就让他下岗！”[9] 即使在华为开始认真追求智能手机业务之后，任正非仍担心在营销上浪费钱，并经常对公司消费者业务负责人余承东严厉批评。“人们总说我批评余承东，”任正非对员工评论道。“其实，我对他的批评是我关心他的一种方式。”[10]

[picture]

Huawei’s consumer products head, Richard Yu.

华为消费者业务负责人余承东。

By 2015, it was becoming impossible to dismiss mobile phones. More than half of China’s population was online, with most connecting through a smartphone in lieu of a computer.[11] It was increasingly clear to Huawei’s executives—and equally clear to tech execs in Silicon Valley—that smartphones should be viewed not so much as telephones but as the most powerful personal computers in history, and as gold mines in terms of consumer data. William Xu, Huawei’s strategic marketing chief, explained the company’s expansion into smartphones as following the data “from the ocean to the rivers to the faucets around the world.”[12]

到 2015 年，移动电话已变得不容忽视。中国超过一半的人口已经联网，其中大多数人使用智能手机而非电脑上网。[11] 华为的高管们日益清晰地认识到——硅谷的科技高管们也同样清楚——智能手机不应仅仅被视为电话，而应被视为历史上最强大的个人电脑，以及消费者数据的金矿。华为战略营销总裁徐文伟将公司向智能手机领域的扩张解释为追随数据，“从海洋到河流，再到世界各地的水龙头”。[12]

Huawei had introduced a smartphone brand called Honor back in 2011, spinning it out in 2013 as a stand-alone brand aimed at the youth market.[13] The inspiration came from the Chinese startup Xiaomi, which had seen overnight success by selling a sleek iPhone-esque smartphone for less than half the price of an Apple device in buzzy “flash sales.” Huawei thought it could beat Xiaomi at its own game, staging publicity stunts such as destroying seventeen thousand brand-new phones for allegedly falling a little short of Huawei’s stringent quality standards. “We weren’t after the sales themselves; we just needed to generate some headlines,” Honor CEO Zhao Ming wrote.[14] Xiaomi never had a chance under Huawei’s crushing weight. “Huawei is really good at copying,” a friend of Xiaomi’s founder, Lei Jun, bemoaned.[15] Huawei stampeded past Xiaomi in sales in 2015, the year it launched Honor. Only Samsung and Apple were ahead now.

华为早在 2011 年就推出了名为“荣耀”的智能手机品牌，并于 2013 年将其拆分为面向青年市场的独立品牌。[13] 其灵感来自中国初创企业小米，后者通过在热闹的“闪购”活动中以不到苹果设备一半的价格销售外观类似 iPhone 的时尚智能手机，取得了夜以继日的成功。华为认为自己可以在小米擅长的领域击败它，并上演了一些公关噱头，例如销毁了 1.7 万部据称略低于华为严苛质量标准的全新手机。“我们追求的不是销量本身；我们只是需要制造一些头条新闻，”荣耀首席执行官赵明写道。[14] 在华为排山倒海般的压力下，小米毫无还手之力。“华为真的很擅长模仿，”小米创始人雷军的一位朋友哀叹道。[15] 2015 年，也就是推出荣耀品牌的当年，华为的销量便横扫小米。现在，排在它前面的只有三星和苹果。

In 2016, Huawei launched two gem-encrusted watches in partnership with Swarovski. The company hired legendary tenor Andrea Bocelli to sing at a private event and partnered with the National Opera of Paris. When Ren met with Huawei executives in North Africa, he encouraged them to follow the US military’s example of buying top-of-the-line stuff. “That includes buying a brand-new car. Don’t just go rent used ones,” he told them. “Buy a house, then buy the land next to it to build facilities like a basketball court and swimming pool.” He green-lit them to splash out on these expenses across Africa.[16]

2016 年，华为与施华洛世奇合作推出了两款镶嵌宝石的手表。公司聘请了传奇男高音安德烈·波切利在私人活动中献唱，并与巴黎国家歌剧院建立了合作关系。当任正非在北非会见华为高管时，他鼓励他们效仿美军购买顶级装备的做法。“这包括买一辆全新的车。不要只去租旧车，”他告诉他们。“买一栋房子，然后买下旁边的土地来建造篮球场和游泳池等设施。”他批准他们在整个非洲大肆挥霍这些开支。[16]

As Huawei’s smartphone business boomed, it began to draw attention to an obscure corner of the company’s business empire. Gadget reviewers began noticing, with intrigue, that some of Huawei’s phones ran on processors designed by Huawei’s in-house HiSilicon label. These chips were surprisingly good for a brand that Huawei did little to promote. The ability of a telecom company to design its own chips reflected an advanced technical level, with few smartphone makers aside from Apple and Samsung able to do so. In 2014, reviewers reported that the HiSilicon processor in Huawei’s Honor 6 smartphone was outperforming even the iPhone in certain benchmarks, though it had marked problems in areas like power consumption. “This is a very interesting result,” one reviewer remarked.[17]

随着华为智能手机业务的蓬勃发展，它开始引起人们对该公司商业帝国中一个隐秘角落的关注。数码产品评论家们开始好奇地注意到，华为的一些手机运行的是由华为内部海思品牌设计的处理器。对于一个华为几乎没有宣传过的品牌来说，这些芯片的表现出奇地好。一家电信公司能够设计自己的芯片反映了其先进的技术水平，除了苹果和三星之外，很少有智能手机制造商能做到这一点。2014 年，评论家报告称，华为荣耀 6 手机中的海思处理器在某些基准测试中甚至超过了 iPhone，尽管它在功耗等领域存在明显问题。“这是一个非常有趣的结果，”一位评论家评价道。[17]

Ren was wary of HiSilicon getting too much attention. It risked disrupting Huawei’s relationships with third-party chip suppliers like Qualcomm; the companies might start to see Huawei as a rival instead of a partner. HiSilicon was also still a major supplier for the surveillance-camera industry, something Huawei didn’t tend to talk too much about.[18]

任正非对海思获得过多关注持谨慎态度。这存在破坏华为与高通等第三方芯片供应商关系的风险；这些公司可能会开始将华为视为竞争对手而非合作伙伴。海思当时仍是监控摄像头行业的主要供应商，而华为往往不愿过多谈论这一点。[18]

A reporter at China’s national broadcaster, CCTV, once told Ren it was a pity that more people didn’t know about HiSilicon. “Why does the outside world need to know?” Ren replied. “The outside world doesn’t need to know this.”[19]

中国国家电视台中央电视台（CCTV）的一名记者曾对任正非说，遗憾的是没有更多的人知道海思。任正非回答道：“外界为什么要知晓呢？外界不需要知道这些。”[19]

—

Huawei’s AI-focused research center, Noah’s Ark Lab, had more than fifty full-time researchers and engineers by 2015,[20] and it was forging research partnerships with top-tier universities around the world. Beijing officials had begun expressing their hopes that China would become a global AI leader in the near future, perhaps as soon as the year 2025. Huawei employees excitedly debated the prospects of AI. “No matter how smart machines become, the human mind will evolve more,” one commented in a discussion on Huawei’s online employee forum. Another countered: “There is no doubt that this level of technology in the wrong hands can cause mass destruction where robots could perhaps malfunction or be corrupted.”

到 2015 年，华为专注于人工智能的研究中心——诺亚方舟实验室已拥有 50 多名全职研究人员和工程师，[20] 并且正在与全球顶尖大学建立研究伙伴关系。北京官员已开始表达他们的希望，即中国在不久的将来成为全球人工智能的领导者，或许最早在 2025 年。华为员工兴奋地辩论着人工智能的前景。“无论机器变得多么聪明，人类的思想都会进化得更多，”一位员工在华为内部员工论坛的讨论中评论道。另一位则反驳道：“毫无疑问，这种水平的技术如果落入坏人之手，可能会造成大规模破坏，机器人可能会发生故障或被腐蚀。”

Since Huawei’s earliest days, it had relied heavily on research partnerships with Chinese universities, such as the Huazhong University of Science and Technology in Wuhan. Now Huawei was wooing universities around the world with research dollars. Few were saying no. Academic researchers generally considered themselves to be engaging in intellectual inquiry for the benefit of the world, with their research findings published for all to read. They didn’t see a problem in partnering with a Chinese company on research that would be published publicly in a scientific journal. The researchers at Noah’s Ark Lab were working with international universities to study hot emerging topics like natural language processing, which would allow computers to “understand” text or speech in a more humanlike way. They were studying techniques such as image quality enhancement, data mining, and action recognition in video clips.

自华为成立初期起，它就严重依赖与中国大学的研究合作，例如武汉的华中科技大学。现在，华为正用研究经费吸引世界各地的大学。很少有人拒绝。学术研究人员通常认为自己是在为了造福世界而进行智力探索，其研究成果会公开发表供所有人阅读。他们认为与一家中国公司合作进行将在科学期刊上公开发表的研究并没有问题。诺亚方舟实验室的研究人员正与国际大学合作，研究自然语言处理等新兴热门课题，这将使计算机能够以更像人类的方式“理解”文本或语音。他们还在研究图像质量增强、数据挖掘和视频剪辑中的动作识别等技术。

Huawei’s long list of research partners was prestigious indeed. It included Oxford and Stanford and UC Berkeley and a host of other universities. The company was working on research projects with the European Commission. It opened a math research center in France, with France’s secretary of state for higher education and research, Thierry Mandon, showing up for the launch.

华为的研究合作伙伴名单确实名声显赫。其中包括牛津大学、斯坦福大学、加州大学伯克利分校以及许多其他大学。该公司正与欧盟委员会开展研究项目。它在法国开设了一个数学研究中心，法国高等教育与研究国务秘书蒂埃里·曼东出席了启动仪式。

Huawei’s name was starting to consistently pop up in lists of top lobbying spenders in countries around the world, a sign it had become fluent in the ways of influence buying that its Western rivals had long utilized. In 2014, Huawei was ranked as the number-eight lobbying spender in the EU, with only Microsoft and Germany’s Siemens outspending it among tech companies.[21] From 2010 to 2018, Huawei paid for more overseas trips for Australian federal politicians than any other company, according to a tally taken by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).

华为的名字开始频繁出现在全球各国的顶级游说支出名单中，这标志着它已熟稔于西方竞争对手长期利用的利益输送手段。2014 年，华为在欧盟游说支出排行榜上名列第八，在科技公司中仅次于微软和德国西门子。[21] 根据澳大利亚战略政策研究所（ASPI）的统计，从 2010 年到 2018 年，华为资助澳大利亚联邦政界人士海外旅行的次数超过了其他任何公司。

—

In November 2016, Huawei’s lead 5G scientist, Wen Tong, and several dozen of his colleagues arrived at the Peppermill in Reno, Nevada.[22] The resort and casino looked like a Roman palace. It boasted indoor and outdoor pools, geothermal-heated spas, and eighty-two thousand square feet of gaming tables and slots. But the Huawei engineers were not there for vacation. The next five days in Reno would determine which nations owned the technology inside the next generation of mobile communications: 5G. Huawei’s engineers had toiled for years for this moment, but this was bigger than them. Beijing wanted to reach the front lines of 5G. China had put in more effort than any other nation.[23]

2016 年 11 月，华为 5G 首席科学家童文和他的几十名同事抵达了内华达州里诺市的培普米尔酒店。[22] 这座度假村兼赌场看起来像一座罗马宫殿。它拥有室内外泳池、地热温泉，以及八万二千平方英尺的赌桌和老虎机。但华为的工程师们并非来此度假。在里诺度过的接下来的五天，将决定哪些国家能拥有下一代移动通信技术——5G 的核心技术。华为的工程师们为这一刻奋斗了多年，但这不仅仅关乎他们个人。北京希望冲向 5G 的最前沿。中国投入的努力比其他任何国家都多。[23]

Mobile phones could work globally because companies around the world had agreed to use shared technical standards—first 3G, then 4G, and now 5G. Which companies’ patented technologies became part of these standards was a fiercely contentious issue, as it meant that other companies around the world had to pay licensing fees to the standards setters for years to come. The 3rd Generation Partnership Project, or 3GPP, had been set up so that these far-flung companies could hash out the shared standards. The stakeholders who participated ran the gamut, from chipmakers like Qualcomm and Intel, to internet giants like Google and Facebook, to gear makers like Nokia, Ericsson, ZTE, and Huawei.

手机之所以能在全球范围内通用，是因为世界各地的公司都同意使用共同的技术标准——先是 3G，然后是 4G，现在是 5G。哪些公司的专利技术能成为这些标准的一部分，是一个竞争异常激烈的问题，因为这意味着全球其他公司在未来数年内都必须向标准制定者支付许可费。第三代合作伙伴计划（3GPP）的成立，就是为了让这些分布广泛的公司能够商讨出共同的标准。参与其中的利益相关者范围极广，从高通、英特尔等芯片制造商，到谷歌、脸书等互联网巨头，再到诺基亚、爱立信、中兴和华为等设备制造商。

As one standards representative recalled, 3GPP’s meetings were notoriously long and grueling.[24] The group operated by “consensus,” which in practice meant that standoffs dragged on for hours until one side or the other broke from sheer exhaustion. “It’s hell,” said Michael Thelander, a telecom industry consultant who has attended the meetings. “There’s no better way to describe it.”[25]

正如一位标准代表所回忆的那样，3GPP 的会议是出了名的漫长且折磨人。[24] 该小组按“共识”原则运作，这在实践中意味着僵局会持续数小时，直到一方或另一方因精疲力竭而妥协。“简直是地狱，”参加过会议的电信行业顾问迈克尔·塞兰德说道，“没有比这更贴切的描述了。”[25]

Tong had been hired by Huawei out of the ashes of Nortel, where he had been head of the Canadian tech giant’s networking technology labs before the company went bankrupt in 2009. He had hundreds of patents to his name. When Tong had joined Huawei, he’d been tasked with the ambitious goal of bringing the company up to the cutting edge of mobile technology by the time 5G was launched, which would be around the year 2020. A decade was a frightfully short amount of time to try to close such a gap. Tong’s team got to work.

童文是在北电网络倒闭后被华为聘用的，在 2009 年这家加拿大科技巨头破产之前，他曾担任其网络技术实验室负责人。他名下拥有数百项专利。童文加入华为时，被赋予了一个宏伟目标：在 2020 年左右 5G 发布时，带领公司达到移动技术的尖端水平。要在十年内弥补如此巨大的差距，时间短得令人心惊。童文的团队随即投入了工作。

The advent of 2G had brought text messaging; 3G, mobile photos and video clips; 4G, mobile video. Now mobile engineers expected 5G to bring one-thousand-fold gains in network capacity, making possible data-intensive applications that had previously been the realm of science fiction: self-driving cars, perhaps, or remote surgeries, self-regulating factories, and next-generation surveillance systems.

2G 的出现带来了短信；3G 带来了移动照片和视频剪辑；4G 带来了移动视频。现在，移动工程师们预期 5G 将带来千倍的网络容量增长，使此前仅存在于科幻小说中的数据密集型应用成为可能：比如自动驾驶汽车、远程手术、自我调节的工厂，以及下一代监控系统。

As the date of the 3GPP summit approached, Tong and his team found themselves on firm footing. Through the help of research partnerships with prestigious institutions across the globe, they had filed for a long list of patents in many areas of 5G technology.

随着 3GPP 峰会日期的临近，童文和他的团队发现自己已站稳了脚跟。通过与全球知名机构的研究合作，他们已在 5G 技术的多个领域申请了长长的专利清单。

One of the technologies that they were most excited about was something called “polar coding,” a new way of cleaning up the noise in data transmissions. As data speeds increased from 4G to 5G, it was crucial to find better ways of reducing the noise. Huawei’s advances in polar coding reflected how it was leaning on top academic researchers the world over to help it develop trailblazing technologies. Polar coding had been proposed by a Turkish scientist named Erdal Arıkan in 2008, after he had worked on the problem for decades. The coding scheme laid out in Arıkan’s paper was hailed as a theoretical breakthrough in the field. But it required an immense amount of engineering to turn a promising theory into a workable product. “It takes an army of engineers to develop a new technology to the level of maturity required by standardization committees,” Arıkan said.

他们最兴奋的技术之一是所谓的“极化码”（polar coding），这是一种清理数据传输中噪声的新方法 。随着数据速度从 4G 提升到 5G，寻找更好的降噪方法至关重要。华为在极化码方面的进展，反映了它是如何依靠全球顶尖学术研究人员来帮助其开发开拓性技术的。极化码是由土耳其科学家埃尔达尔·阿里坎在 2008 年提出的，此前他已在这个问题上研究了数十年。阿里坎论文中提出的编码方案被誉为该领域的理论突破。但要将一个前景光明的理论转化为可用的产品，需要巨大的工程投入。“需要一支工程师大军才能将一项新技术开发到标准化委员会所要求的成熟水平，”阿里坎说。

Huawei’s engineers knew they were going to come up against opposition at 3GPP. Their polar coding technology was not the only proposal for cleaning up noise. The US chip giant Qualcomm was pushing a rival technology called LDPC. Qualcomm was a formidable foe, owning more key 4G patents than any other company and technologically powering two of every five smartphones in the world. To improve its chances, Huawei had in advance rustled up a coalition of fifty-four companies willing to support polar coding.[26] Virtually all the Chinese companies participating in 3GPP were on board, including Alibaba, Lenovo, and Xiaomi. So were Japan’s Toshiba, US chipmaker Broadcom, and Canadian telecom operator Telus. Some of Huawei’s rivals were irked. A Samsung representative sniffed that it was “not really fair” that some companies had lined up “a nice combination of supporting companies.”[27]

华为的工程师们知道他们在 3GPP 会面临反对。他们的极化码技术并非清理噪声的唯一方案。美国芯片巨头高通正在推行一种名为 LDPC 的竞争技术。高通是一个强大的对手，它拥有的核心 4G 专利比其他任何公司都多，并且为全球五分之二的智能手机提供技术动力。为了增加胜算，华为预先拉拢了一个由 54 家愿意支持极化码的公司组成的联盟。[26] 几乎所有参加 3GPP 的中国公司都加入了进来，包括阿里巴巴、联想和小米。日本的东芝、美国芯片制造商博通和加拿大电信运营商 Telus 也位列其中。华为的一些竞争对手对此感到恼火。三星的一位代表嗤之以鼻地表示，某些公司拉拢了“一个庞大的支持公司阵容”，这“并不太公平”。[27]

The debate between Huawei and Qualcomm over polar coding versus LDPC took place at an evening session.[28] In anticipation of spectators, 3GPP organizers had moved the meeting into a larger room. Hours passed, with neither side relenting. Both sides had spent significant resources developing their rival technologies, and neither wanted to go home empty-handed. “It was early morning hours,” recalled Thelander, who was at the session. “Finally, everybody kind of realized, You know, look, we gotta get 5G done.”

华为与高通之间关于极化码与 LDPC 的辩论在一次晚间会议上展开。[28] 预料到会有旁听者，3GPP 的组织者将会议移到了一个更大的房间。几个小时过去了，双方互不退让。双方都投入了大量资源开发各自的竞争技术，谁也不想空手而归。“那是凌晨时分，”当时在场的塞兰德回忆道，“最后，每个人似乎都意识到，听着，我们得把 5G 搞定。”

The meeting ended in a truce: both Huawei’s and Qualcomm’s noise-reduction technologies would be adopted for different parts of the 5G standard. From a technological point of view, it was an inelegant and redundant solution. The system would have worked with just one or the other. But telecommunications had never been just a matter of technology. It had always also involved politics.

会议以休战告终：华为和高通的降噪技术都将被采纳，用于 5G 标准的不同部分。从技术角度来看，这是一个既不优雅且冗余的方案。系统只需其中之一即可运行。但电信从来不仅仅是技术问题，它始终也涉及政治。

In the months that followed, there was acknowledgment in the industry that against all odds, Huawei had caught up. For the fifth generation of mobile, Huawei had jumped to number one in standard-essential patents (SEPs), leapfrogging over the likes of Qualcomm and LG. Huawei’s long climb had begun in 1987, and now the company had reached the summit.

在接下来的几个月里，业界公认华为在重重困难中实现了赶超。在第五代移动通信领域，华为的标准必要专利（SEP）数量已跃居第一，超越了高通和 LG 等公司。华为漫长的攀登始于 1987 年，而现在，这家公司已经登顶。

“There is only one true 5G supplier right now, and that is Huawei,” Neil McRae, chief network architect for the UK’s BT Group, said at a Huawei-organized conference. “The others need to catch up.”[29]

“目前真正的 5G 供应商只有一家，那就是华为，”英国电信集团（BT Group）首席网络架构师尼尔·麦克雷（Neil McRae）在华为组织的一次会议上表示，“其他公司需要迎头赶上。”[29]

—

After the dust settled, Huawei held a celebration for the key researchers behind its 5G breakthrough, such as its Ottawa-based lead 5G scientist, Tong Wen.[30] Erdal Arıkan, the Turkish inventor of polar coding, also received an invitation. Huawei had not paid him directly for developing a technology that ended up in the company’s products, but it had made a donation to his university to support his ongoing research.[31]

尘埃落定后，华为为 5G 突破背后的核心研究人员举行了庆祝活动，其中包括常驻渥太华的首席 5G 科学家童文。[30] 极化码的土耳其发明者埃尔达尔·阿里坎（Erdal Arıkan）也收到了邀请。华为并未直接支付他开发这项最终应用在公司产品中的技术的费用，但向他所在的大学捐款以支持其持续的研究。[31]

A sleek black Mercedes picked him up and drove him down a curving road through Huawei’s lush green campus.[32] When the car stopped, two footmen in white suits and gloves opened the door. Guo Ping was standing there, waiting to greet him. A red carpet had been unfurled up the steps into a building that looked like a European-style palace. Two rows of Huawei employees flanked the red carpet, applauding. Inside, the ballroom was adorned with Roman-style pillars and had a pyramidal glass ceiling reminiscent of the Louvre. A row of violinists played classical music. Fresh flowers spilled over the railings. After greeting Arıkan heartily, Ren, Guo, and other Huawei executives sat down in a row of silver-trimmed blue seats. Arıkan was ushered to a golden throne.

一辆线条流畅的黑色梅赛德斯接上他，沿着蜿蜒的道路穿过华为郁郁葱葱的绿色园区。[32] 车停稳后，两名身着白色西装、戴着手套的侍者拉开了车门。郭平正站在那里迎接他。红地毯沿着台阶铺开，通向一座看起来像欧式宫殿的建筑。两排华为员工分列红地毯两侧，鼓掌欢呼。宴会厅内部装饰着罗马柱，金字塔形的玻璃天花板让人联想到卢浮宫。一排小提琴手演奏着古典音乐。鲜花从栏杆上溢出。在热烈欢迎阿里坎之后，任正非、郭平和其他华为高管坐在一排银边的蓝色座椅上。阿里坎则被引向一个金色的宝座。

As the crowd clapped and cheered, Ren handed Arıkan a golden medal engraved with a victorious goddess. The medal had been crafted by the Monnaie de Paris, the French capital’s mint, and it was encrusted with a precious red Baccarat crystal.

在众人的掌声和欢呼声中，任正非递给阿里坎一枚刻有胜利女神像的金牌。这枚奖牌由巴黎造币厂（Monnaie de Paris）打造，上面镶嵌着珍贵的红色巴卡拉水晶。

Arıkan stepped up to the microphone. “Mr. Ren, you have created the world’s largest telecommunications company in the last thirty years. I have spent the last thirty years working at Bilkent University, doing research on a variety of problems that culminated in polar codes. Today, our roads cross on a happy occasion,” Arıkan said. “It gives me great pleasure again to acknowledge that without the vision and technical contributions of Huawei directors and engineers, polar codes would not have made it from lab to 5G in less than ten years. And, as engineers, there is no greater reward than seeing our ideas turn into reality. Thank you for making it happen.”[33]

阿里坎走上麦克风前。“任先生，您在过去三十年里创建了全球最大的电信公司。而我过去三十年一直在比尔肯特大学工作，研究各种问题，并最终形成了极化码。今天，我们的道路在这样一个愉快的时刻交汇，”阿里坎说，“我非常荣幸地再次承认，如果没有华为董事和工程师的远见和技术贡献，极化码不可能在不到十年的时间里从实验室走向 5G。作为工程师，没有比看到我们的想法变成现实更大的回报了。感谢你们让这一切发生。”[33]

Ren looked emotional as he listened to Arıkan through a simultaneous-interpretation headset. He smiled and clapped, blinking his eyes rapidly.

任正非戴着同声传译耳机听着阿里坎的发言，显得有些动容。他微笑着鼓掌，快速地眨着眼睛。

23

23

The Listening State

监听国家

The Modern Surveillance Era: 2017–2018

现代监控时代：2017–2018

By late 2017, there were growing signs that something was very wrong in China’s far-west Xinjiang region.[1] Guards with machine guns manned checkpoints in and out of cities; travelers had to have their faces scanned and walk through full-body scanners. On the streets, pedestrians were stopped by police at random to have their phones checked for illegal political or religious content. Gas stations were barricaded and ringed with razor wire as a precaution against bombings. Officials warned that even modest expressions of Islamic faith, such as growing a beard or wearing a headscarf, would be scrutinized as potential signs of extremism. And a growing number of people—especially members of the Uyghur ethnic minority—were being hauled off without trial to prisonlike sites called “reeducation centers.” Estimates of how many people were detained (in either short-term or long-term detention) ranged from the hundreds of thousands to more than a million. Reports of torture, abuse, and deaths trickled out.

到 2017 年底，越来越多的迹象表明，中国偏远的西部新疆地区出现了严重的问题。[1] 持机枪的守卫把守着进出城市的检查站；旅行者必须接受面部扫描并走过全身扫描仪。在街上，行人会被警察随机拦下，检查手机中是否有非法的政治或宗教内容。加油站被封锁并围上铁丝网，作为防范爆炸的预防措施。官员们警告说，即使是适度的伊斯兰信仰表达，如留胡子或戴头巾，也会被视为潜在的极端主义迹象而受到审查。越来越多的人——尤其是维吾尔族少数民族成员——在未经审判的情况下被带往被称为“再教育中心”的类似监狱的场所。关于被拘留人数（无论是短期还是长期拘留）的估计从数十万到超过一百万不等。酷刑、虐待和死亡的报告陆续传出。

Under the banner of counterterrorism, Xinjiang had become the world’s most repressive high-tech surveillance state. And Huawei had helped build it. The company’s next-generation fast networks, facial-recognition algorithms, and high-definition cameras had all combined to build an invisible net of enormous scale. Huawei was not the only tech company to sell surveillance gear into Xinjiang. But it was certainly among the major suppliers.

在反恐的旗帜下，新疆已成为世界上压制性最强的高科技监控区。而华为帮助建立了这一体系。该公司的下一代快速网络、人脸识别算法和高清摄像头共同织就了一张规模巨大的无形之网。华为并非唯一向新疆销售监控设备的科技公司，但它无疑是主要的供应商之一。

In Xinjiang, and across the nation, Huawei was hawking a fulsome portfolio of advanced surveillance technologies, built in cooperation with hundreds of startups and other partner companies. There were smart glasses that police could wear on patrol to scan crowds for faces on a watch list. There were high-definition police body cams that streamed live to a big screen back at the command center.[2] There was a listening device that could monitor and analyze conversations within a ten-meter radius outdoors, day and night.[3] There were biometric scanners that picked up iris patterns in the eyes, which could be used to identify a person, similarly to fingerprints.[4] There was a voiceprint database to match voices on audio recordings against known individuals. These gadgets were often marketed under the brands of Huawei’s partner companies, with Huawei satisfied to take a low-key role.

在新疆以及全国各地，华为正在推销一套完整的先进监控技术组合，这些技术是与数百家初创公司及其他合作伙伴共同开发的。有警察巡逻时佩戴的智能眼镜，可以扫描人群中出现在观察名单上的面孔。有高清警察执法仪，可以将画面实时传输到指挥中心的大屏幕上。[2] 有一种监听设备，可以在户外昼夜监控并分析方圆十米内的对话。[3] 有可以采集眼睛虹膜特征的生物识别扫描仪，其识别功能类似于指纹。[4] 还有一个声纹数据库，用于将录音中的声音与已知个体进行匹配。这些设备通常以华为合作伙伴公司的品牌进行销售，而华为则甘于扮演低调的角色。

By August 2016, Huawei was named the Xinjiang region’s strategic partner for deploying “cloud computing” technologies across the government,[5] a business category that included Huawei’s surveillance products. Huawei-based facial-recognition solutions were set up at transportation hubs in Xinjiang’s capital, Ürümqi, and along the highways crisscrossing the region. By 2017, Huawei had set up a database for Ürümqi police that the facial-recognition surveillance cameras fed into, which boasted a trove of some fifty million images of faces. A slide deck created by Huawei and one of its partners touted the systems as producing “thousands of accurate alerts to police.”[6]

到 2016 年 8 月，华为被任命为新疆地区在全政府范围内部署“云计算”技术的战略合作伙伴，[5] 这一业务类别涵盖了华为的监控产品。基于华为的人脸识别解决方案被安装在新疆首府乌鲁木齐的交通枢纽以及横跨该地区的高速公路上。到 2017 年，华为为乌鲁木齐警方建立了一个人脸识别监控摄像头接入的数据库，据称拥有约五千万张面部图像。由华为及其合作伙伴制作的一份演示文稿吹嘘该系统能向警方提供“数千条准确的警报”。[6]

The Xinjiang crackdown—coupled with harsh restrictions against pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong—would have a significant effect on how the international community viewed China. Since the early 2000s, when China was in the process of joining the WTO, there had been a widespread belief both within and outside the country that the nation’s growing economic openness would bring a freer flow of information and a gradual shift toward more democratic governance. Now people had to wonder if they had been wrong.

新疆的镇压——加上对香港亲民主示威者的严厉限制——对国际社会如何看待中国产生了重大影响。自 21 世纪初中国加入世贸组织的过程中，国内外普遍认为，中国日益增长的经济开放将带来更自由的信息流动，并逐渐转向更民主的治理。现在，人们不得不怀疑自己是否错了。

If Ren Zhengfei had any opinions out of step with the official line on the Xinjiang crackdown, he would have known to keep them to himself. Beijing was warning Chinese nationals of consequences if they were caught “spreading rumors” about the situation in Xinjiang. Years later, pushed by foreign reporters to give his opinion on the Xinjiang repression, Ren largely echoed Beijing’s talking points. “Which do you think is better for people—the approach the U.S. has taken toward problems in the Middle East or the approach the Chinese government has taken on the Xinjiang issue?” Ren said to Canada’s The Globe and Mail. “In the past few years, Xinjiang hasn’t seen major social incidents or unrest. Xinjiang is becoming stable.”[7] Asked by the UK’s Sky News if he agreed with the crackdown, Ren replied, “I am not familiar with government policies in Xinjiang. I only know the overall living standards there are improving…. I am not a politician, and I don’t study policies.”[8]

如果任正非对新疆镇压有任何与官方口径不一致的看法，他也会知道要保持沉默。北京当时正警告中国公民，如果被发现“散布关于新疆局势的谣言”，将面临后果。多年后，在外国记者的追问下，任正非在谈到对新疆的压制时，基本上重复了北京的论点。“你认为哪种方式对人民更好——美国处理中东问题的方式，还是中国政府处理新疆问题的方式？”任正非对加拿大的《环球邮报》表示。“在过去的几年里，新疆没有发生重大社会事件或动乱。新疆正在变得稳定。”[7] 当英国天空新闻问及他是否赞同这种镇压时，任正非回答说：“我不熟悉新疆的政府政策。我只知道那里的整体生活水平正在提高……我不是政治家，我不研究政策。”[8]

—

By the fall of 2017, Huawei’s HiSilicon unit had launched its first smartphone chip embedded with AI functions, the Kirin 970, which the company said was capable of recognizing two thousand images per minute.[9] Huawei touted its fledgling AI technologies as helpful to consumers in many ways. These technologies, the company said, had helped China Merchants Bank shorten the time it took to issue a credit card—from fifteen days to five minutes. It was also working with the Chinese startup iFLYTEK on speech-recognition systems, which would be integrated into Huawei smartphones and could help people who spoke different dialects in different parts of China bridge the linguistic gap.

到 2017 年秋，华为的海思部门推出了首款嵌入人工智能功能的智能手机芯片麒麟 970，公司称该芯片每分钟能够识别两千张图像。[9] 华为宣称其初创的 AI 技术在许多方面对消费者都有帮助。该公司表示，这些技术帮助招商银行将信用卡发放时间从 15 天缩短到了 5 分钟。它还与中国初创公司科大讯飞合作开发语音识别系统，该系统将集成到华为智能手机中，帮助中国不同地区说不同方言的人跨越语言障碍。

But Huawei was also marketing its AI solutions for advanced internet censorship. In a slide deck, it said its “video fingerprinting” solution could identify similar video clips online, even when someone tried to obscure them by stitching on a different beginning, reversing the images, or overlaying text.[10] Political dissidents were known to use these methods on Chinese social media platforms in an effort to foil censors. Huawei’s slide deck said that the company’s algorithms were able to do “political detection,” which could pick out “sensitive political content and figures” in pictures, text, and video.

但华为也在推销其用于先进互联网审查的 AI 解决方案。在一份演示文稿中，它表示其“视频指纹”解决方案可以识别网络上类似的视频片段，即使有人试图通过拼接不同的开头、翻转图像或覆盖文字来掩盖它们。[10] 众所周知，政治异见人士在中国社交媒体平台上使用这些方法来挫败审查。华为的演示文稿称，该公司的算法能够进行“政治检测”，可以识别图片、文字和视频中的“敏感政治内容和人物”。

What’s more, Huawei was pushing AI-equipped surveillance cameras, considering them to be a major market opportunity. In an internal study of 5G use cases, Huawei ranked AI-enabled video surveillance among its top ten AI applications in terms of market potential.[11] In Shenzhen, traffic police began testing out Huawei’s AI algorithms on traffic lights at nine intersections; the algorithms adjusted the length of the lights based on real-time traffic flow. Ken Hu, one of Huawei’s rotating chairmen, plugged the technology as increasing average vehicle speed by 15 percent. “In the past, drivers looked up at traffic lights to determine whether they should stop or go,” he wrote. “Today, traffic lights are looking back at vehicles, counting them up and deciding when to give the green light.”

此外，华为正在推动配备人工智能的监控摄像头，将其视为一个重大的市场机遇。在华为内部的一项 5G 应用案例研究中，就市场潜力而言，华为将支持人工智能的视频监控列为其十大人工智能应用之一。[11]在深圳，交通警察开始在九个路口测试华为的人工智能算法；这些算法根据实时车流量调整红绿灯的时长。华为轮值董事长之一胡厚崑宣传称，该技术使车辆平均行驶速度提高了 15%。“过去，司机抬头看红绿灯来决定是走还是停，”他写道。“今天，红绿灯在回看车辆，清点数量并决定何时给绿灯。”

Ren expressed mixed feelings about AI. Speaking to researchers in 2017, he compared AI to nuclear energy, saying it could be used for both good and bad. “I also fear that artificial intelligence will damage human values,” he added. “But we cannot stop the progress of human society.”[12] After watching a Star Trek movie, Ren commented that he found the vision of a spaceship staffed by robots depressing. “I felt really let down when I left the theater,” he said. “This movie shows how lonely and horrifying life could be in the AI era. While AI is able to meet some human needs, people will still need a human touch.”[13]

任正非对人工智能表达了复杂的情绪。2017 年在对研究人员讲话时，他将人工智能比作核能，称其既可以用于好事，也可以用于坏事。“我也担心人工智能会损害人类价值观，”他补充道。“但我们无法阻止人类社会的进步。”[12]在看了一部《星际迷航》电影后，任正非评论说，他觉得由机器人担任船员的飞船愿景令人沮丧。“离开电影院时，我感到非常失落，”他说。“这部电影展示了在人工智能时代，生活可能是多么孤独和恐怖。虽然人工智能能够满足人类的一些需求，但人们仍然需要人情味。”[13]

Overseas, Huawei’s Safe City surveillance solutions were now in use in more than eighty countries, covering some eight hundred million people. As it sought further growth in 2018, the company announced $1.5 billion in financing for African nations to purchase its Safe City solutions. Huawei’s technologies were being met with open arms in some countries. After Donald Trump, then president, tweeted that the US had gotten “nothing but lies & deceit” from Pakistan in exchange for billions of dollars in aid, furious Pakistani officials unveiled with fanfare a Safe City project for Punjab Province. At the project’s launch, Punjab’s chief minister, Shehbaz Sharif, said that Pakistan’s answer to the US was that “we do not need your money, loan, or grant. We will eat simple food but will not let our nation be insulted.”[14]

在海外，华为的“平安城市”监控解决方案已在 80 多个国家投入使用，覆盖约 8 亿人口。在 2018 年寻求进一步增长时，该公司宣布为非洲国家提供 15 亿美元融资，用于购买其平安城市解决方案。华为的技术在一些国家受到了热烈欢迎。在时任总统唐纳德·特朗普发布推文称美国从巴基斯坦得到的只是“谎言与欺骗”以换取数十亿美元援助后，愤怒的巴基斯坦官员大张旗鼓地为旁遮普省揭幕了一个平安城市项目。在项目启动仪式上，旁遮普省首席部长夏巴兹·谢里夫表示，巴基斯坦对美国的回答是：“我们不需要你们的钱、贷款或赠款。我们宁愿吃简单的食物，也不会让我们的国家受到侮辱。”[14]

But Huawei’s growing surveillance footprint was raising alarm in Washington. “This coupling of innovation and authoritarianism is deeply troubling and has spread beyond China itself,” Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said at a hearing. “The export of this technology gives countries the technological tools they need to emulate Beijing’s model of social and political control.”[15]

但华为日益扩大的监控足迹引起了华盛顿的警觉。“这种创新与威权主义的结合令人深感不安，并已蔓延到中国以外，”众议院常设情报委员会主席、加利福尼亚州民主党众议员亚当·希夫在一次听证会上表示。“这种技术的出口为各国提供了效仿北京社会和政治控制模式所需的技术工具。”[15]

Even within China, the growing ubiquity of video surveillance was eliciting some concern. Authorities had discovered with alarm that a number of surveillance cameras in Jiangsu Province had been hacked and were being controlled remotely from overseas. In Shenzhen, officials had Huawei and other local companies publicly pledge that they would not abuse facial recognition and other surveillance technologies.[16]

即使在中国国内，日益普及的视频监控也引起了一些担忧。有关部门惊恐地发现，江苏省的一些监控摄像头遭到黑客攻击，并受到来自海外的远程控制。在深圳，官员们要求华为和其他当地公司公开承诺，他们不会滥用面部识别和其他监控技术。[16]

—

After returning from the Reno 5G summit, where Huawei had made its breakthrough, Michael Thelander, the telecom industry consultant, got a voicemail from a woman who said she was with the FBI and wanted to talk to him.[17] Thinking it a scam, Thelander didn’t reply. Then he got an email from the same FBI agent. She mentioned that she’d dropped by his office, which was also his home. “So I’m getting a visit by the FBI, an email, and a voicemail, all within the period of about two days,” he said. Thelander noted that the FBI knew he’d been to the standards meeting and wanted to ask if Huawei’s inclusion in 5G raised any espionage concerns. By his own account, he told her that he didn’t think it did. A mobile standard was like an open recipe, he said, with everyone knowing the ingredient list. “I said, ‘You know, everybody comes together—everybody works together—and there’s no secrets being stolen,’ ” he reported.

从华为取得突破的里诺 5G 峰会归来后，电信行业顾问迈克尔·瑟兰德接到了一名女性的语音留言，对方自称是联邦调查局（FBI）的，想找他谈谈。[17]瑟兰德以为是诈骗，没有理会。随后，他收到了同一名 FBI 探员的电子邮件。她提到她顺道去了他的办公室，而那里也是他的家。“所以我在大约两天的时间里，接到了 FBI 的造访、一封邮件和一条语音留言，”他说。瑟兰德注意到 FBI 知道他参加了标准会议，并想询问华为加入 5G 是否会引发任何间谍担忧。据他自己描述，他告诉她，他不认为会。他说，移动标准就像一个公开的食谱，每个人都知道成分列表。“我说，‘你看，大家聚在一起——大家共同工作——没有秘密被窃取，’”他报告说。

The quiet FBI inquiries were an early sign of what was to come. On the campaign trail, Trump had promised to confront China, and now his administration began laying the groundwork for a broad trade war—and, specifically, a war against Huawei. Following the levying of sanctions against ZTE, the Commerce Department had served an administrative subpoena on Huawei, ordering it to turn over all information about its export of US technology to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Then, in December 2017, US prosecutors reached out to Huawei’s lawyers, telling them that they were going to file criminal charges against Huawei for intellectual-property theft from US companies.

FBI 悄无声息的询问是未来动向的早期信号。在竞选期间，特朗普曾承诺对抗中国，现在他的政府开始为一场广泛的贸易战——特别是针对华为的战争——奠定基础。在对中兴通讯实施制裁后，商务部向华为发出行政传票，要求其移交有关向古巴、伊朗、朝鲜、苏丹和叙利亚出口美国技术的所有信息。随后，在 2017 年 12 月，美国检察官联系了华为的律师，告知他们将针对华为从美国公司窃取知识产权的行为提起刑事诉讼。

By the start of 2018, US mobile operators were beginning to distance themselves from Huawei’s smartphones under pressure from Washington. Some stopped carrying Huawei’s handsets—first AT&T, then Verizon.

到 2018 年初，在华盛顿的压力下，美国移动运营商开始与华为智能手机保持距离。一些运营商停止销售华为手机——先是 AT&T，接着是 Verizon。

Then came an explosive report from the French newspaper Le Monde. The paper published an exposé revealing that officials at the African Union’s headquarters had discovered its servers were mysteriously sending data to China each night between midnight and 2:00 a.m. The futuristic compound, a gift from Beijing, had been constructed by China in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa. “According to several sources within the institution, all sensitive content could have been spied on by China,” Le Monde Afrique reported. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), a think tank funded by Australia’s Department of Defence and the US State Department, published a follow-up piece that expanded on the story: the equipment in question had been supplied by Huawei.

随后，法国《世界报》(Le Monde)发表了一篇爆炸性报道。该报发表了一篇揭露性文章，披露非盟总部的官员发现其服务器在每天午夜至凌晨 2:00 之间神秘地向中国发送数据。这座充满未来感的建筑群是北京赠送的礼物，由中国在埃塞俄比亚首都亚的斯亚贝巴建造。“根据该机构内部的多个消息来源，所有敏感内容都可能已被中国监视，”《世界报非洲版》报道。由澳大利亚国防部和美国国务院资助的智库——澳大利亚战略政策研究所（ASPI）发表了一篇后续文章，对该事件进行了补充：涉事设备是由华为提供的。

In the media frenzy that followed, Huawei called the allegations of impropriety “completely unsubstantiated” and declared that it had “never” installed a back door in its thirty-year history. “The solutions provided to the AU was controlled, managed, and operated by the organization’s IT staff, and Huawei had no access to AU data,” Huawei said. The reports of Huawei servers pinging data back to China fell short of a smoking gun, as there was no indication that Huawei was aware of the espionage or participated in it. But to Huawei’s critics, the scandal was proof that Huawei gear could contain security risks, whether Huawei’s top brass was aware of them or not.

在随后的媒体狂热中，华为称这些不当行为指控“完全没有根据”，并声明在其三十年的历史中“从未”安装过后门。华为表示：“向非盟提供的解决方案由该组织的 IT 人员控制、管理和运营，华为无法访问非盟的数据。”关于华为服务器向中国回传数据的报告尚不足以成为确凿证据，因为没有迹象表明华为对间谍活动知情或参与其中。但对华为的批评者来说，这桩丑闻证明了华为设备可能存在安全风险，无论华为高层是否知情。

It was amid this string of unfortunate events that Sun Yafang, Huawei’s chairwoman for nineteen years, stepped down. Huawei didn’t explain the reason. Sun was in her early sixties, which was already past retirement age for many women in China, where the government encouraged early withdrawal from the workforce to make jobs available to younger workers. But perhaps the albatross that was her MSS background had become too much of a liability in light of the growing pressure from Washington.

正是在这一系列不幸事件中，担任华为董事长十九年之久的孙亚芳卸任了。华为没有解释原因。孙亚芳当时六十出头，这在中国已经超过了许多女性的退休年龄，当时政府鼓励提前退出劳动力市场，以便为年轻工人提供就业机会。但或许，鉴于来自华盛顿的压力日益增大，她那国安部背景的包袱已经成为一种沉重的负担。

Sun was going to remain at Huawei, but she would take on a less prominent role. Her successor as chairman was Howard Liang, also known as Liang Hua, a company veteran who had joined in 1995 and worked his way up through positions like president of the supply chain and CFO.

孙亚芳将留在华为，但她将承担一个不那么显赫的角色。她的继任董事长是梁华（Howard Liang），他是一位公司老兵，于 1995 年加入公司，曾先后担任供应链总裁和首席财务官等职。

Up through the end, the division of power between Sun and Ren as chairwoman and CEO remained shrouded in mystery to many. “Honestly, I never really understood what the relationship was between them,” said one senior industry executive who worked with them both. Another executive at a Huawei vendor remarked: “We were confused as to what her authority was. We had very little direct interaction with her, apart from her being the sign-off person for a bunch of things.” After he left the company, William Plummer, a onetime US spokesman for Huawei, said: “To hear it from the Chinese side, she couldn’t possibly have any influence [from MSS]. To hear it from the US side, she was groomed and then inserted into this company as the ministry’s source. I would imagine there’s probably a little truth to all of it.”

直到最后，孙亚芳作为董事长与任正非作为首席执行官之间的权力分配对许多人来说仍然笼罩在迷雾中。“老实说，我从未真正理解过他们之间的关系，”一位曾与两人共事的高级行业高管表示。另一位华为供应商的高管评论道：“我们对她的职权感到困惑。除了她是许多事务的签字人之外，我们与她的直接互动非常少。”在离开公司后，曾任华为美国发言人的威廉·普拉默（William Plummer）表示：“听中方的说法，她不可能受到[国安部]的任何影响。听美方的说法，她是受过培养后被安插进这家公司作为该部门的线人。我想，所有这些说法中可能都有一点事实。”

—

The Trump administration had begun a diplomatic outreach campaign to try to get other countries to ban Huawei and ZTE from their 5G networks.

特朗普政府已经开始了一场外交游说活动，试图让其他国家禁止华为和中兴进入其 5G 网络。

Governments around the world were in the middle of testing 5G systems and picking suppliers for their network upgrades, which would freeze them in with those vendors for the next decade or so, until the arrival of 6G. Huawei had a running start, thanks in part to Beijing’s early rollout of 5G across China. The company had all but a lock on emerging markets, and it was looking strong in developed markets too: Huawei announced that, in cooperation with local partners, it was moving forward with 5G trials in Germany, France, and Italy. US officials were unsettled. “It looked like Huawei was going to run the tables,” recalled Keith Krach, the Trump administration’s undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy, and the environment. “Both sides of the aisle were hitting the panic button.”

世界各地的政府正处于测试 5G 系统并为网络升级选择供应商的过程中，这将使他们在接下来的十年左右（直到 6G 到来）与这些供应商绑定。华为拥有领先优势，部分归功于北京在中国各地早期部署的 5G。该公司几乎锁定了新兴市场，在发达市场也表现强劲：华为宣布，正与当地合作伙伴合作，在德国、法国和意大利推进 5G 试点。美国官员感到不安。“看起来华为将横扫全场，”特朗普政府负责经济增长、能源和环境的副国务卿基思·克拉奇（Keith Krach）回忆道。“两党都在按下恐慌按钮。”

John Bolton, national security adviser to Trump, said that 5G networks were more “flat” than previous generations, which theoretically made it easier for a hacker to burrow from one part of a network into others, elevating the risk of relying on an untrusted supplier. “The threat to 5G was not the physical equipment,” he said in an interview. “It was the ability to put programming in that could divert communications and otherwise pick up communications down the line.”[18]

特朗普的国家安全顾问约翰·博尔顿（John Bolton）表示，5G 网络比前几代网络更“扁平”，这在理论上使黑客更容易从网络的一个部分潜入其他部分，从而增加了依赖不可信供应商的风险。他在一次采访中说：“对 5G 的威胁不在于物理设备。而在于植入程序的可能性，这些程序可以转移通信，或者在后续截获通信。”[18]

Republican lawmakers were ramping up their rhetoric. Speaking on the Senate floor in June 2018, Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) called for Huawei and ZTE to be blocked from doing business in the US. “These companies have proven themselves to be untrustworthy, and at this point I think the only fitting punishment would be to give them the death penalty—that is, to put them out of business in the United States,” he said.[19] Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) called for the government to “put them out of business by denying them the ability to buy U.S. semiconductors.”[20] Eric Xu, Huawei’s plainspoken rotating chairman, blasted the lawmakers as “closed-minded and ill-informed” in an interview with the industry publication Light Reading. “It seems to me their bodies are in the information age but their minds are still in the agrarian age,” Xu said. Huawei later took out ads in The New York Times and the Financial Times to backpedal Xu’s words, supplanting them with more diplomatic ones.

共和党议员正在升级他们的言辞。2018 年 6 月，参议员汤姆·科顿（Tom Cotton，阿肯色州共和党人）在参议院发言，呼吁禁止华为和中兴在美开展业务。他说：“这些公司已被证明是不可信的，在这一点上，我认为唯一合适的惩罚就是判处它们死刑——也就是说，让它们在美国倒闭。”[19] 参议员马可·卢比奥（Marco Rubio，佛罗里达州共和党人）呼吁政府“通过剥夺它们购买美国半导体的能力来让它们倒闭”。[20] 华为心直口快的轮值董事长徐直军在接受行业刊物 Light Reading 采访时，抨击这些议员“思想封闭、孤陋寡闻”。徐直军说：“在我看来，他们的身体处于信息时代，但他们的头脑仍处于农耕时代。”华为后来在《纽约时报》和《金融时报》上刊登广告，收回了徐直军的话，并代之以更具外交辞令的表述。

In August 2018, shortly after the trade war officially began, Trump signed into law a defense bill that included a broad ban on US government agencies buying ZTE and Huawei. That month, Australia became the first country in the world to formally ban Huawei and ZTE from its future 5G network. In his memoir, Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull recalled wrestling over the issue and talking it over with Trump and US vice president Mike Pence, as well as with Australian intelligence chief Mike Burgess. Turnbull felt that the risk of infrastructure being shut down or infiltrated by a state-sponsored adversary was not one they could ignore.[21]

2018 年 8 月，在贸易战正式开始后不久，特朗普签署了一项国防法案，其中包括广泛禁止美国政府机构购买中兴和华为的设备。当月，澳大利亚成为世界上第一个正式禁止华为和中兴进入其未来 5G 网络的国家。澳大利亚总理马尔科姆·特恩布尔（Malcolm Turnbull）在回忆录中回忆了在这个问题上的纠结，并与特朗普、美国副总统迈克·彭斯以及澳大利亚情报局长迈克·伯吉斯（Mike Burgess）进行了讨论。特恩布尔认为，基础设施被受国家资助的对手关闭或渗透的风险，是他们无法忽视的。[21]

Ren was adamant that Huawei’s work in 5G was not a threat. He said that his company was just trying to contribute apolitically to technological research in a way that could benefit all of humanity. “5G is not an atomic bomb,” he insisted.[22]

任正非坚称华为在 5G 方面的工作不是威胁。他表示，他的公司只是试图以一种造福全人类的方式，不带政治色彩地为技术研究做出贡献。他坚持说：“5G 不是原子弹。”[22]

—

ZTE’s seventy-five-year-old founder and chairman, Hou Weigui, had retired under the cloud of ignominy swept in by US sanctions, though the company said that Hou’s retirement was planned and unrelated. In order to get the sanctions lifted, ZTE fired its CEO, pleaded guilty to three felony counts, agreed to pay the US government $1.2 billion in fines, and made other humiliating concessions. And the first time the sanctions were lifted, it turned out to be a false start. In April 2018, the Trump administration again clamped down on ZTE, claiming that the company had not followed through on its agreement to punish employees who violated US sanctions against Iran.

中兴通讯七十五岁的创始人兼董事长侯为贵在美方制裁引发的耻辱阴云中退休，尽管公司表示侯为贵的退休是计划内的且与此无关。为了解除制裁，中兴通讯解雇了其首席执行官，对三项重罪指控认罪，同意向美国政府支付 12 亿美元罚款，并做出了其他令人羞辱的让步。而制裁的首次解除后来被证明只是虚晃一枪。2018 年 4 月，特朗普政府再次对中兴通讯进行打压，声称该公司未履行惩罚违反美国对伊朗制裁规定的员工的协议。

Unexpectedly, ZTE was saved in the end by Trump himself, who did an about-face that people found hard to explain. “President Xi of China, and I, are working together to give massive Chinese phone company, ZTE, a way to get back into business, fast,” Trump tweeted in May 2018. “Too many jobs in China lost. Commerce Department has been instructed to get it done!” After extracting an additional monetary penalty of $1.4 billion from ZTE, the administration lifted the sanctions again that July. Some thought Trump had made the concession in hopes of sealing a trade deal with China. “I thought the whole thing was a mistake on his part,” Bolton said. “He gave it to Xi Jinping as kind of a gift, which is the way Xi Jinping took it, and I think it sent the wrong signal. You know, if you’re going to have a coherent policy, it has to be applied coherently.”[23]

出人意料的是，中兴通讯最终被特朗普本人救了回来，他做出了一个令人费解的转变。“中国国家主席习近平和我正在共同努力，为大型中国手机公司中兴通讯提供一条快速恢复业务的途径，”特朗普在 2018 年 5 月发推文称。“中国失去了太多工作岗位。商务部已接到指示去完成这件事！”在从中兴通讯额外榨取了 14 亿美元的罚款后，美国政府于当年 7 月再次解除了制裁。一些人认为特朗普做出让步是希望达成中美贸易协议。“我认为整件事是他犯的一个错误，”博尔顿说。“他把它当作一份礼物送给了习近平，习近平也是这么认为的，我认为这发出了错误的信号。你知道，如果你想要有一项连贯的政策，就必须连贯地执行。”[23]

There was one part of ZTE’s plea deal that would have particularly stung: the company had to assist the US government with any criminal investigations of third parties for three years. ZTE would have to provide the feds with “any document, record, or other materials” for which they asked. For years, ZTE had sought to convince the world that it was not the Chinese government’s informant. Now it was compelled to be an informant—but for Washington.

中兴通讯认罪协议中有一部分内容尤为刺痛：该公司必须在三年内协助美国政府对第三方进行的任何刑事调查。中兴通讯必须向联邦调查局提供他们要求的“任何文件、记录或其他材料”。多年来，中兴通讯一直试图向世界证明它不是中国政府的情报员。现在，它被迫成为一名情报员——却是为华盛顿效力。

—

That November, Ren’s youngest daughter, Annabel Yao, glided into a Parisian ballroom on the arm of Belgian count Gaspard de Limburg-Stirum. Draped in peach tulle, she was one of only nineteen young women selected to make their debut that year at Le Bal, an exclusive debutante ball, and one of just three who opened the event with a waltz. It was elite company: the other debutantes included Countess Gabrielle de Pourtalès, a descendant of French nobility; Princess Ananya Raje Scindia of the Indian city of Gwalior; True Whitaker, daughter of Oscar-winning actor Forest Whitaker; and Julia McCaw, daughter of AT&T Wireless’s founder, Craig McCaw. “I really wanted an opportunity to feel like I’ve grown up, and to step out into the world,” she was quoted as saying in a Vogue write-up of the event.[24] She told Paris Match that even though she was born into a privileged family, she had worked hard, practicing ballet fifteen hours a week and doing homework until late at night. “My goal is to make the world a better place to live,” she said.[25] To mark the occasion, Ren had consented to a rare family photograph with his daughter and her mother, Yao Ling. It was splashed across the press.

那年 11 月，任正非最小的女儿姚安娜挽着比利时伯爵加斯帕德·德·林堡-斯提鲁姆的手臂，滑入巴黎的一处舞厅。她身着桃色薄纱长裙，是当年入选参加名门千金成年舞会（Le Bal）的仅有的 19 名年轻女性之一，也是仅有的三位以华尔兹开场的嘉宾之一。这是一个精英荟萃的群体：其他名媛包括法国贵族后裔加布里埃尔·德·波塔莱斯伯爵小姐、印度瓜廖尔市的阿南亚·拉杰·辛迪亚公主、奥斯卡影帝福里斯特·惠特克的女儿特鲁·惠特克，以及AT&T Wireless创始人克雷格·麦考的女儿朱莉娅·麦考。“我真的很想有一个机会，感觉自己已经长大了，并步入这个世界，”她在Vogue对该活动的报道中被引用道。[24] 她告诉《巴黎竞赛画报》，尽管她出生在一个特权家庭，但她一直很努力，每周练习 15 小时芭蕾舞，并做功课到深夜。“我的目标是让世界变得更美好，”她说。[25] 为了纪念这一时刻，任正非同意与女儿及其母亲姚凌拍摄一张罕见的全家福。这张照片在媒体上广为流传。

At the time of the debutante ball, Annabel Yao was beginning her junior year at Harvard, where she studied computer science. According to the Paris Match profile, she had gotten a perfect score on her ACT after attending an international high school in Shanghai. She led an active campus life, serving as finance chair for the Harvard College China Forum and dancing in the student-run Harvard Ballet Company. The piece said that Annabel Yao, discouraged by the grueling training schedules, had once considered giving up ballet, but her father had encouraged her to continue, saying it was not the Ren family way to quit something halfway.

在名媛舞会举行时，姚安娜正开始她在哈佛大学的大三学年，她在那里学习计算机科学。根据《巴黎竞赛画报》的人物专访，她在上海的一所国际高中就读后，在 ACT 考试中获得了满分。她的校园生活非常活跃，担任哈佛中国论坛的财务主席，并在学生运营的哈佛芭蕾舞团跳舞。文章提到，姚安娜曾因艰苦的训练计划而感到沮丧，一度考虑放弃芭蕾，但她的父亲鼓励她坚持下去，说半途而废不是任家的作风。

There seemed to be some jealousy between Annabel Yao and Meng Wanzhou—perhaps inevitable for two half sisters whose paths had diverged so thoroughly. Meng had grown up in the early days of material want and patchy education, her wish to study in the US scuttled by her poor command of English. But out of all the children, she had emerged as her father’s apprentice at Huawei, and Annabel Yao could never hope to take that place, despite her Harvard degree in computer science. Ren’s younger daughter had grown up amid luxury, speaking fluent English effortlessly and moving with ease in international circles. But she wished for more attention from her father. The domestic press didn’t help things by constantly comparing the two. “I often wonder, Why do they speak ill of me? And why everyone likes my sister but not me,” Annabel Yao once told a documentary maker.

姚安娜和孟晚舟之间似乎存在一些嫉妒——对于这两位人生轨迹截然不同的同父异母姐妹来说，这或许是不可避免的。孟晚舟成长于物质匮乏、教育资源不均的早期年代，她去美国留学的愿望因英语水平欠佳而化为泡影。但在所有的孩子中，她脱颖而出，成为了父亲在华为的学徒，而姚安娜尽管拥有哈佛计算机科学学位，却永远无法指望取代那个位置。任正非的小女儿在奢华中长大，能毫不费力地讲流利的英语，在国际社交圈中游刃有余。但她渴望得到父亲更多的关注。国内媒体不断将两人进行比较，这让情况变得更糟。“我经常在想，为什么大家要这样骂我？ 为什么大家都喜欢我姐姐，而不喜欢我，”姚安娜曾对一位纪录片制作者说道。

In 2018, in a surprise to many, Huawei announced that while Ren was remaining CEO, he was handing over his role as one of the company’s four vice-chairs—forty-six-year-old Meng would take on this mantle. People debated if Ren was quietly maneuvering his daughter to succeed him, despite his consistent protests that his children would not be his successors.

2018 年，令许多人感到意外的是，华为宣布任正非虽然留任首席执行官，但他将卸下公司四位副董事长之一的职务——四十六岁的孟晚舟将接任这一重担。人们争论任正非是否在悄悄安排女儿接班，尽管他一再坚称他的子女不会成为他的接班人。

Ren would later say that Meng was considering leaving Huawei during this period; perhaps the promotion was a bid to get her to stay. She had occasionally hinted that she wished for more independence. In an essay about the accomplishments of her finance department within Huawei, Meng cited Shu Ting’s “To the Oak,” a popular contemporary Chinese poem in which Shu writes that she wants to be intertwined with her love yet independent, like a ceiba tree growing alongside an oak. “I am confident that we won’t be clinging morning glories hanging on the great oak’s branches, nor infatuated birds singing endless praise,” Meng wrote. “We are tall and upright ceiba trees in our own right!”[26]

任正非后来曾表示，孟晚舟在那段时期正考虑离开华为；或许这次晋升是为了挽留她。她偶尔会暗示自己渴望更多的独立性。在关于华为财务部成就的一篇文章中，孟晚舟引用了舒婷的《致橡树》，这是一首广受欢迎的中国当代诗歌，舒婷在诗中写道，她希望与爱人紧紧相依却又各自独立，就像生长在橡树旁的木棉树。“我相信，我们不会是攀援在橡树枝头上的凌霄花，也不是痴情的鸟儿重复单调的歌曲，”孟晚舟写道。“我们本身就是高大挺拔的木棉树！”[26]

In what might have been her last public appearance in 2018, Meng spoke to university students in her hometown, Chengdu, that autumn. She sounded thoughtful and a bit melancholy. Meng counseled the students that it took ten thousand hours to become great at something, and that a person might have only seventy thousand work hours in their life. “Life is fleeting, and energy is finite,” she said. “If we still have dreams, if we still have aspirations, then we have to make choices and focus our limited energy on those choices. The coming days are not endless, and our choices determine our future.”[27] Meng didn’t know it yet, but a New York court had already issued a sealed warrant for her arrest.

在 2018 年秋天，孟晚舟在其家乡成都对大学生发表了讲话，这可能是她当年的最后一次公开露面。她的语气显得深思熟虑且略带忧郁。孟晚舟告诫学生们，要精通某件事需要一万小时的磨练，而一个人一生中可能只有七万个工作小时。“生命转瞬即逝，精力是有限的，”她说，“如果我们仍有梦想，仍有抱负，那么我们就必须做出选择，并将有限的精力集中在这些选择上。未来的日子并非无穷无尽，我们的选择决定了我们的未来。”[27] 孟晚舟当时还不知道，纽约一家法院已经签发了逮捕她的密封令。

Financial Times editor Lionel Barber recalled Ken Hu, one of Huawei’s rotating chairmen, visiting him in London that fall and asking him what he thought about the developments in Washington. Barber told Hu that he wasn’t in the business of giving advice but that Huawei certainly had a problem, given the perception of the company as an arm of the Chinese state. Barber said: “You guys are going to get whacked!”[28]

《金融时报》编辑莱昂内尔·巴伯回忆起华为轮值董事长之一胡厚崑在那年秋天访问伦敦时，曾询问他对华盛顿局势发展的看法。巴伯告诉胡厚崑，他并不负责提供建议，但鉴于华为被视为中国政府的分支机构，该公司确实面临问题。巴伯说：“你们要挨揍了！”[28]

24

24

Hostage Diplomacy

人质外交

Several Detentions: December 2018

数起拘留事件：2018 年 12 月

Meng Wanzhou had not packed light.[1] She’d checked two large suitcases, four cardboard boxes, and a large purple duffel bag for the twelve-day trip.[2] The first stop was Vancouver. She’d be there less than a day before catching an 11:25 p.m. red-eye to Mexico City with her deputy, Ji Hui, Huawei’s finance president. From there, she would be continuing on to Costa Rica, Argentina, and France.

孟晚舟的行李并不少。[1] 在这趟为期十二天的行程中，她托运了两个大行李箱、四个纸箱和一个紫色的大旅行袋。[2] 第一站是温哥华。她将在那里停留不到一天，然后与她的副手、华为首席财务官姬辉一起乘坐晚上 11:25 的红眼航班前往墨西哥城。从那里开始，她将继续前往哥斯达黎加、阿根廷和法国。

She’d kept up her busy travel schedule as 2018 drew to a close. She’d spent much of the year jet-setting across the globe, making stops in Paris, London, Nice, Dublin, Warsaw, Singapore, Vancouver, Tokyo, and Brussels.[3] But as she prepared to squeeze in one more trip, a plan for her detention was being drawn up in Vancouver.

随着 2018 年接近尾声，她依然保持着繁忙的旅行日程。这一年的大部分时间里，她都在全球各地奔波，足迹遍布巴黎、伦敦、尼斯、都柏林、华沙、新加坡、温哥华、东京和布鲁塞尔。[3] 但就在她准备挤出时间再进行一次旅行时，温哥华方面正在制定一项拘留她的计划。

A week before Meng’s flight on December 1, 2018, the Vancouver International Airport’s police outpost received a phone call from Ottawa asking if it was possible for an arriving passenger to exit the airport without encountering a customs officer. Then, the morning before her departure, the Canadian Justice Department’s Vancouver office emailed a unit of the national police service—the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, nicknamed “the Mounties”—that was focused on international organized crime. “Please send an officer this afternoon,” the email said. “We expect an urgent request for a provisional arrest from abroad.”

在 2018 年 12 月 1 日孟晚舟登机的一周前，温哥华国际机场的警察分局接到了来自渥太华的电话，询问抵达的乘客是否有可能在不接触海关官员的情况下离开机场。随后，在她出发前的那个早晨，加拿大司法部温哥华办公室给国家警察服务机构——皇家加拿大骑警（绰号“骑警”）的一个专门负责国际有组织犯罪的部门发了一封电子邮件。“请在今天下午派一名警官过来，”邮件写道，“我们预计会收到一份来自国外的临时逮捕紧急请求。”

Constable Winston Yep had joined the Mounties in 2001, starting out on bicycle patrol.[4] Over the next seventeen years, he slowly climbed the ranks to acting corporal of his unit, which specialized in extradition requests from other countries and cooperation with Interpol. He was already going to the Justice Department that day on other business, so he was selected to handle this mysterious assignment. At the office, Yep was told that Meng was his target. Back on August 22, a New York court had issued a sealed arrest warrant for her. Now US officials were invoking their country’s extradition treaty with Canada.

警员温斯顿·叶（Winston Yep）于 2001 年加入骑警，最初从事自行车巡逻。[4] 在接下来的十七年里，他慢慢晋升为该单位的代理警长，该单位专门负责处理来自其他国家的引渡请求以及与国际刑警组织的合作。那天他本就因其他事务要去司法部，因此被选中处理这项神秘的任务。在办公室，叶被告知孟晚舟是他的目标。早在 8 月 22 日，纽约一家法院就对她发出了密封逮捕令。现在，美国官员正在援引该国与加拿大的引渡条约。

The instructions for Yep were specific. He was to locate her discreetly, confirm her identity, and tell her she was under arrest. After giving her an opportunity to call a lawyer, he needed to make sure she was fingerprinted and booked into jail. The FBI was involved, but it was staying off-site for optics reasons. “FBI will not be present in an effort to avoid the perception of influence,” the Canadian Security Intelligence Service wrote in an internal report.[5]

给叶的指示非常具体。他要谨慎地找到她，确认她的身份，并告知她被捕了。在给她打电话联系律师的机会后，他需要确保她被采集指纹并登记入狱。联邦调查局（FBI）也参与其中，但出于形象考虑，他们留在现场之外。“为了避免产生受影响的印象，FBI 将不会到场，”加拿大安全情报局在一份内部报告中写道。[5]

As Yep and his team formulated their plan, one big question was when to arrest her. They could potentially board the plane as soon as it pulled into the gate and haul her off. But they nixed that idea, not wanting to create a scene. Instead, they decided to let border officers stop her. These officers would ask her some questions and check her luggage before Yep stepped in to tell her she was under arrest.

当叶和他的团队制定计划时，一个大问题是什么时候逮捕她。他们本可以在飞机靠桥后立即登机将她带走。但他们否决了这个想法，不想引起骚乱。相反，他们决定让边境官员拦截她。这些官员会询问她一些问题并检查她的行李，然后叶再介入并告知她被捕。

A colleague texted Yep, eagerly observing that they would all earn overtime pay for working on a Saturday: “OT for everyone!”

一位同事给叶发了短信，兴奋地观察到他们周六加班都能拿到加班费：“大家都有加班费！”

“Unwanted OT!” Yep typed back. “We didn’t want it!”[6]

“不想要的加班！”叶回信道，“我们不想要这个！”[6]

First thing the next morning, the FBI sent confirmation that Meng had boarded the overnight flight from Hong Kong. She was traveling with a female companion. The FBI sent over a physical description: Meng’s hair was slightly longer than shoulder-length, and she was wearing white shoes, dark pants, and a white T-shirt with lettering on the front.[7]

第二天一早，FBI 发来确认函，证实孟晚舟已登上从香港出发的过夜航班。她与一名女性同伴同行。FBI 发来了一份外貌描述：孟晚舟的头发略长过肩，穿着白鞋、深色裤子和一件正面带字样的白色 T 恤。[7]

—

Meng’s flight had gone smoothly, pulling into gate 65 of YVR twelve minutes early, at 11:18 a.m. But things went amiss as soon as she stepped into the airport. Two customs officers were at the gate, checking passengers’ passports. When they got to her, they asked her for her phones.

孟晚舟的航程很顺利，比原定时间提前 12 分钟，于上午 11:18 降落在温哥华机场（YVR）的 65 号登机口。但她一踏入机场，情况就变得不对劲了。两名海关官员守在登机口检查乘客护照。当轮到她时，他们要求她交出手机。

When she surrendered her devices, one of the officers slipped them into a shiny silver pouch. They asked her to go with them through customs and immigration, and she ended up at a secondary inspection counter in a deserted corner of the airport. Unbeknownst to Meng, there was a one-way mirror nearby, and Yep was behind it, watching.

当她交出设备时，其中一名官员将它们滑进了一个闪亮的银色袋子里。他们要求她随他们办理海关和入境手续，最后她被带到了机场一个僻静角落的二次检查柜台。孟晚舟并不知道，附近有一面单向透明玻璃，叶就在后面观察着。

The two border agents, Sowmith Katragadda and Scott Kirkland, started questioning her and going through her luggage.[8] They asked if she wanted an interpreter, but she declined. Katragadda, the one who had asked for her phones at the start, was now asking most of the questions while Kirkland scribbled notes in a little notebook. They searched her purse, which jangled with a key chain of the Eiffel Tower and miniature macarons. They rifled through each suitcase. They pulled out an iPad decorated with a sticker of Winnie-the-Pooh skipping, a MacBook Air embellished with a big sticker of a fairylike woman wearing a flower crown, and a USB stick connected to a pink charm with white flowers. They confiscated all the electronics.

两名边境官员索米斯·卡特拉加达（Sowmith Katragadda）和斯科特·柯克兰（Scott Kirkland）开始询问她并检查她的行李。[8] 他们询问她是否需要翻译，但她拒绝了。最初索要手机的卡特拉加达现在负责大部分提问，而柯克兰则在小笔记本上记录。他们搜查了她的手提包，包里挂着埃菲尔铁塔和微型马卡龙的钥匙扣，发出叮当声。他们翻遍了每一个手提箱。他们翻出了一个贴着跳跃的小熊维尼贴纸的 iPad，一台装饰着戴花环仙女图案大贴纸的 MacBook Air，以及一个连接着带有白花图案粉色挂饰的 U 盘。他们没收了所有的电子设备。

Meng told them that she visited Canada two to three times a year and owned two properties in the country. She also owned three apartments in London, two houses in Hong Kong, and two houses in Shenzhen, she said. She mentioned that she used to have a People’s Republic of China passport but relinquished it when she got her Hong Kong passport. The stamps in her passport reflected that she traveled widely, including to the UK, Mexico, Senegal, Germany, Panama, and Brunei.

孟晚舟告诉他们，她每年访问加拿大两到三次，并在该国拥有两处房产。她说，她还在伦敦拥有三套公寓，在香港拥有两栋房子，在深圳拥有两栋房子。她提到她以前持有中华人民共和国护照，但在获得香港护照时放弃了。她护照上的印章反映出她旅行广泛，包括前往英国、墨西哥、塞内加尔、德国、巴拿马和文莱。

At some point, Kirkland piped up to ask if Meng was traveling to Argentina for the G20 summit and if she would be meeting with foreign diplomats and telecom representatives there. Meng said that she would not be, and that she was attending strictly internal Huawei meetings. Kirkland scratched this down in his notebook: 4 day Argentina for internal meetings, then on to France.

在某个时刻，柯克兰插话询问孟晚舟是否是去阿根廷参加 G20 峰会，以及她是否会在那里会见外国外交官和电信代表。孟晚舟表示她不会，她参加的完全是华为内部会议。柯克兰在笔记本上草草记下：在阿根廷待 4 天参加内部会议，然后前往法国。

Katragadda disappeared for lengths of time, leaving Meng alone with Kirkland. It had now been two hours since she entered the airport, and there was no sign of the interrogation ending. Meng needed to use the washroom, and an officer accompanied her there and back. She was getting more alarmed. She repeatedly asked why she had been selected for secondary inspection. Meng told Kirkland about the time she was questioned by immigration officials at JFK four years ago. They had released her after two hours, she said, allowing her to continue her travels.

卡特拉加达消失了很长一段时间，留下孟晚舟独自与柯克兰在一起。此时距离她进入机场已经过去了两个小时，审讯仍没有结束的迹象。孟晚舟需要使用洗手间，一名官员陪同她往返。她变得越来越惊慌，反复询问为什么自己被选中接受二次检查。孟晚舟告诉柯克兰，四年前她在肯尼迪国际机场也曾被移民官员询问过。她说，当时他们在两个小时后就释放了她，让她继续行程。

Now, Katragadda’s supervisor, Sanjit Dhillon, came out and asked her some questions, homing in on finding out if Huawei did business in Iran. “I don’t know,” Meng replied. Dhillon pushed back, saying that she was the CFO of a multibillion-dollar company and that he didn’t believe she wouldn’t know such a thing. Meng conceded that Huawei did have an office in Iran.

此时，卡特拉加达的上级桑吉特·迪伦出来向她提出了一些问题，重点在于查明华为是否在伊朗开展业务。“我不知道，”孟晚舟回答道。迪伦反驳说，她是一家价值数十亿美元公司的首席财务官，他不相信她会不知道这种事情。孟晚舟随后承认华为在伊朗确实设有办事处。

Then Kirkland asked Meng to provide the PINs for both phones. He wrote them down on a loose sheet of paper.

接着，柯克兰要求孟晚舟提供两部手机的密码。他把密码写在了一张散纸上。

At 2:11 p.m., nearly three hours after Meng arrived at the airport, Katragadda told her that the customs examination was complete. But she still could not go. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police also wanted to speak with her. Meng agreed, and Yep appeared with a translator.[9] “The reason we’re here today is regarding an extradition matter,” he said. “We have issued a warrant against Ms. Meng for her arrest and eventually an extradition to the United States.” He told her she was accused of fraud.

下午 2 点 11 分，在孟晚舟抵达机场近三个小时后，卡特拉加达告诉她海关检查已经结束。但她仍然不能离开。加拿大皇家骑警也想找她谈话。孟晚舟同意了，叶（Yep）带着一名翻译出现了。[9] “我们今天来到这里是关于引渡的事宜，”他说，“我们已经对孟女士发出了逮捕令，准备将其逮捕并最终引渡到美国。”他告诉她，她被指控涉嫌欺诈。

Meng was confused. “Right, I’m not clear what has happened,” she said. “Why would I have an arrest warrant, and I have got involved in fraud?”

孟晚舟感到困惑。“对，我不清楚发生了什么，”她说，“为什么会有针对我的逮捕令，而且我怎么会卷入欺诈案？”

“Okay, I don’t have the details here. Basically, this charge originated from the United States. They have a fraud charge against you regarding your company, Huawei,” Yep said. “This is from the United States, not in Canada.” He told her she had a right to counsel.

“好的，我这里没有详细信息。基本上，这项指控源自美国。他们针对你的公司华为对你提出了欺诈指控，”叶说，“这是来自美国的，不是在加拿大。”他告诉她，她有权聘请律师。

“Can I tell my family members?”

“我可以告诉我的家人吗？”

“You cannot.”

“不可以。”

“My family members will be worried if they can’t find me.”

“如果我的家人找不到我，他们会担心的。”

“We will talk about this later.”

“我们稍后再谈这个。”

Meng also asked if she could say a few words to her travel companion before being taken away, and if she could use her iPad in jail. No and no. Just like that, she had been cut off from the outside world.

孟晚舟还询问在被带走前是否可以和她的随行同伴说几句话，以及在监狱里是否可以使用她的 iPad。得到的回答都是否定。就这样，她与外界的联系被切断了。

After she was booked and fingerprinted, Meng was brought to the Alouette Correctional Centre for Women, a low white building hidden behind a thick stand of evergreen trees on the rural outskirts of Vancouver. She would call her time there the worst days of her life.[10]

在办理完登记并采集指纹后，孟晚舟被带到了阿卢埃特女子惩教中心，那是温哥华郊外一片茂密的常青树林后的一座白色低矮建筑。她后来称在那里的时光是她生命中最糟糕的日子。[10]

—

News of Meng’s detention did not reach the wider world until several days later. But at Huawei, Ren Zhengfei and his advisers had to make an immediate decision. Within days, Ren was scheduled to appear in Argentina for business meetings. The plan had been that he would meet Meng there. They debated whether to call off the trip. Meng had sent a note to her father through her husband: “Dad, they are coming after you. Please be careful.”[11] Ren decided to go through with the trip, transferring in Dubai and steering clear of stops in Western countries. “It was risky, but if I acted scared, everyone else would too, right? I had to go ahead.” Ren’s wife was worried. She stayed up late, checking in with him—“Have you crossed out of China yet? Have you boarded the plane?”—and was only able to relax upon his safe return to China.

孟晚舟被拘留的消息直到几天后才传到外界。但在华为内部，任正非和他的顾问们必须立即做出决定。几天后，任正非原定前往阿根廷参加商务会议。原本的计划是他将在那里与孟晚舟会合。他们争论是否要取消这次行程。孟晚舟通过丈夫给父亲传了一张纸条：“爸爸，他们是冲着你来的。请务必小心。”[11] 任正非决定按计划前往，在迪拜转机，并避开在西方国家的停留。“这很冒险，但如果我表现出害怕，其他人也会害怕，对吧？我必须继续前进。”任正非的妻子很担心。她熬夜守候，不断询问他的情况——“你出境了吗？上飞机了吗？”——直到他平安回到中国，她才放下心来。

It would remain a mystery what, exactly, had compelled Ren to keep his travel plans despite such dire extradition risks. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, was in Buenos Aires at that moment for G20, along with other Beijing officials. So were other political leaders, including American president Donald Trump and Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau. It seemed reasonable to think that the urgency of his trip had to do with the high-level officials gathered for G20. But Ren and his team echoed what Meng had told the Canadian border officers: they said the trip was only for internal meetings. Huawei’s human-resources chief, Jack Lyu, who had accompanied Ren on the trip, told reporters that Ren did not allow his team to discuss Meng’s detention, expecting them to focus on the meeting about the company’s transformation of its overseas subsidiary structure. “He thinks this is his personal thing,” Lyu said. “He communicated with our lawyer teams in Canada, but all the people should 100 percent engage in the discussion of the transformation project.”

究竟是什么迫使任正非在面临如此严峻的引渡风险下仍坚持其旅行计划，这仍然是一个谜。当时，中国领导人习近平正与北京其他官员一起在布宜诺斯艾利斯参加 G20 峰会。其他政治领导人，包括美国总统唐纳德·特朗普和加拿大总理贾斯廷·特鲁多也在那里。有理由认为，他行程的紧迫性与聚集在 G20 的高层官员有关。但任正非和他的团队重申了孟晚舟告诉加拿大边境官员的话：他们说这次旅行只是为了内部会议。陪同任正非参加此次行程的华为人力资源主管吕克（Jack Lyu）告诉记者，任正非不允许团队讨论孟晚舟被拘留的事，要求他们专注于关于公司海外子公司结构转型的会议。“他认为这是他的私事，”吕克说，“他与我们在加拿大的律师团队沟通，但所有人必须百分之百投入到转型项目的讨论中。”

News of Meng’s detention finally emerged four days later, with the Canadian Justice Department issuing a terse statement. The department said it could not provide more detail, as Meng had sought and been granted a publication ban. China’s ambassador to Canada canceled an appearance before Canadian lawmakers that day, though Beijing’s response was otherwise cautious. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it had lodged stern requests with Canadian officials, demanding that they clarify the situation and release Meng. As the daughter of Huawei’s founder, she was corporate royalty. It was hard to imagine that Beijing would not respond more forcefully. Indeed, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was warning internally to brace for diplomatic “shock waves.” Then, nine days after Meng’s arrest, the other shoe dropped.

孟晚舟被拘留的消息终于在四天后传出，加拿大司法部发表了一份简短声明。该部门表示无法提供更多细节，因为孟晚舟申请并获准了报道禁令。中国驻加拿大大使取消了当天在加拿大立法者面前的露面，不过北京方面的反应在其他方面表现得较为谨慎。中国外交部表示已向加拿大官员提出严正交涉，要求他们澄清情况并释放孟晚舟。作为华为创始人的女儿，她是企业界的显赫人物。很难想象北京不会做出更强有力的回应。事实上，加拿大安全情报局在内部发出警告，要为外交“冲击波”做好准备。随后，在孟晚舟被捕九天后，另一只靴子落地了。

Chinese authorities detained two Canadian men in China. The first, Michael Kovrig, was a former Canadian diplomat now working for the International Crisis Group. The second, Michael Spavor, led tours to North Korea and had high-level contacts in the country, having facilitated NBA player Dennis Rodman’s 2014 meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The two men were thrown into detention, kept in cells with the lights on day and night.[12] While Beijing denied that their detainment had anything to do with Meng, it was clear that the two Michaels were Beijing’s leverage for negotiating Meng’s return.

中国当局在中国境内拘留了两名加拿大男子。第一位是康明凯（Michael Kovrig），他曾是加拿大外交官，当时在国际危机组织工作。第二位是迈克尔·斯帕弗（Michael Spavor），他负责组织前往朝鲜的旅游业务，并在该国拥有高层人脉，曾促成 NBA 球员丹尼斯·罗德曼在 2014 年与朝鲜领导人金正恩会面。这两名男子被投入拘留所，关押在昼夜亮灯的牢房里。[12] 虽然北京方面否认他们的被捕与孟晚舟有任何关系，但显而易见，这两位“迈克尔”是北京谈判孟晚舟回国的筹码。

There would later be varying accounts as to whether or not Trump knew about the plan to detain Meng and who, exactly, made the decision. Trump’s national security adviser, John Bolton, said in an interview that it had been the Justice Department’s call. “I mean, obviously any issue at the Justice Department is subject to presidential reversal,” he stated. “But on something like this, that’s really a tactical call on their part.” Bolton said that Trump was regularly briefed on the investigation, despite later claiming that he had no advance knowledge of the plan to arrest Meng. “He knew about it. There’s no question about that,” Bolton maintained. “Whether he remembered or not, it’s always an interesting question.”

关于特朗普是否知晓拘留孟晚舟的计划，以及究竟是谁做出的决定，后来出现了多种说法。特朗普的国家安全顾问约翰·博尔顿在一次采访中表示，这是司法部的决定。“我的意思是，显然司法部的任何问题都可能被总统推翻，”他陈述道，“但对于这类事情，这确实是他们在战术上的决定。”博尔顿称，尽管特朗普后来声称对逮捕孟晚舟的计划并不知情，但他其实定期听取有关该调查的简报。“他知道这件事。这是毫无疑问的，”博尔顿坚持说，“至于他是否记得，那始终是个有趣的问题。”

“We had stepped on some big toes,” Bolton continued. “You know, he knew everything about this before it happened. But like many examples in Trump’s administration, when a decision happened that didn’t necessarily go the way he wanted it to—even though he knew about it or had made the decision—he’d find somebody else to try to blame it on.”

“我们踩到了一些大人物的脚，”博尔顿继续说道，“你知道，他在事情发生前了解这一切。但就像特朗普政府中的许多例子一样，当一个决定的结果不一定如他所愿时——即使他知情或就是他做的决定——他也会找别人来背锅。”

At the White House Christmas party, Trump seemed conflicted about Meng’s detention, describing her as “the Ivanka Trump of China.” Asked by Reuters if he would intervene in Meng’s case, Trump said he might if it could help him close a trade deal with China. “If I think it’s good for what will be certainly the largest trade deal ever made—which is a very important thing—what’s good for national security—I would certainly intervene if I thought it was necessary.”[13]

在白宫圣诞派对上，特朗普对拘留孟晚舟一事似乎显得很矛盾，称她为“中国的伊万卡·特朗普”。当路透社问及他是否会干预孟晚舟案时，特朗普表示，如果这能帮助他与中国达成贸易协议，他可能会干预。“如果我认为这有利于达成那项肯定是有史以来最大的贸易协议——这是一件非常重要的事情——有利于国家安全——如果我认为有必要，我肯定会干预。”[13]

—

“On the continuum of offenses,” Meng’s attorney was saying, “we’re not dealing with military issues, or dual-use goods, or—or murder.”[14]

“在罪行的连续光谱上，”孟晚舟的律师当时说道，“我们处理的不是军事问题，也不是军民两用货物，或者——或者谋杀。”[14]

It was several days after Meng’s arrest, and she was in court for her bail hearing. Whatever came next, she hoped she could await it in her own home. One of Meng’s attorneys, David Martin, was telling the court that she was an upstanding executive who would not risk the embarrassment of attempting to flee.

那是孟晚舟被捕几天后，她正出庭参加保释听证会。无论接下来的命运如何，她都希望能在自己家里等待。孟晚舟的律师之一大卫·马丁告诉法庭，她是一位正直的高管，不会冒着蒙羞的风险尝试潜逃。

“Again, I don’t trivialize any allegation, but on the continuum of conduct, I’m sure Your Lordship has seen more serious offenses,” Martin said.

“我再次重申，我并不轻视任何指控，但在行为的连续光谱上，我相信法官大人见过更严重的罪行，”马丁说。

Meng had written a statement to Justice William Ehrcke. “If this Honourable Court grants me judicial interim release, I will abide by any condition imposed,” she wrote. “I will surrender both of my passports…. I will scrupulously abide by any curfew…. My father founded Huawei and I would never do anything that would cause the company reputational damage.”

孟晚舟给威廉·厄克法官写了一份陈述书。“如果贵法院准予我司法临时释放，我将遵守任何施加的条件，”她写道，“我将交出我的两本护照……我将严格遵守任何宵禁规定……我父亲创办了华为，我绝不会做任何损害公司声誉的事情。”

Meng’s bail hearing was the biggest event that the Vancouver courthouse had seen in years. Reporters from around the world poured in, along with protesters. Free Ms. Meng, one protester’s sign read. We love you Huawei, another said.

孟晚舟的保释听证会是温哥华法院多年来见过的最大盛事。来自世界各地的记者和抗议者蜂拥而至。一名抗议者的标语上写着释放孟女士。另一名抗议者的标语写着我们爱你华为。

Until this moment, Meng had closely guarded her privacy, hardly ever disclosing anything about her personal life. But the stakes were now too high. Her lawyers shared what they hoped was a sympathetic portrait with the court.[15] She was a mother of four, her lawyers said. She had a ten-year-old daughter with her current husband, Liu Xiaozong, and three sons from previous marriages, one of whom was attending school in the United States. She suffered from hypertension and had undergone surgery for thyroid cancer in 2011. She spent two to three weeks each year in Vancouver, where her in-laws summered. She had held permanent residency status in Canada at one point, though she had since relinquished it.

直到这一刻，孟晚舟一直严密保护着自己的隐私，几乎从未透露过任何个人生活细节。但现在的赌注太高了。她的律师向法庭展示了一幅他们希望能够博得同情的画像。[15] 律师说，她是四个孩子的母亲。她与现任丈夫刘晓棕育有一个十岁的女儿，与前夫育有三个儿子，其中一个正在美国上学。她患有高血压，并于 2011 年接受过甲状腺癌手术。她每年在温哥华度过两到三周，她的公婆在那里避暑。她曾一度拥有加拿大永久居民身份，尽管后来放弃了。

She submitted photos to the court that painted a picture of them as a down-to-earth family. Meng was accustomed to attending work events in designer dresses, but in these snapshots, she hung out with her husband and children, casually dressed in colorful sweatsuits. Here they were sitting in the grass at a park; here, gathered by a piece of driftwood on the beach; here, smiling outside their house on West Twenty-Eighth Avenue, a large, sturdy gray house with a cross-gabled roof and big windows trimmed in black paint.

她向法庭提交了一些照片，描绘了一家人朴实生活的画面。孟晚舟习惯于穿着名牌礼服参加工作活动，但在这些快照中，她和丈夫及孩子们待在一起，穿着休闲的彩色运动服。照片里，他们有时坐在公园的草地上；有时聚集在海滩的一块漂流木旁；有时在西 28 大道的家门外微笑，那是一座高大稳固的灰色房子，有着交叉山墙屋顶和黑漆装饰的大窗户。

Several friends submitted character reference letters on her behalf. One was written by Bao Fan, the high-flying Chinese investment banker at China Renaissance who counted many of the nation’s buzziest internet companies among his clients. In his letter, he called her “a person of highest professional and moral standards,” saying they had worked together. A Vancouver neighbor also penned a letter, sharing that Meng gave the impression of being a “quiet and modest individual” during her brief summer stays there with her family. “I believe that Sabrina would not jeopardize the well-being and future status of her children,” the neighbor wrote.

几位朋友代表她提交了性格参考信。其中一封是由包凡撰写的，他是华兴资本赫赫有名的中国投资银行家，中国许多最热门的互联网公司都是他的客户。他在信中称她为“具有最高专业和道德标准的人”，并表示他们曾一起工作。一位温哥华的邻居也写了一封信，分享说孟晚舟在与家人短暂避暑期间，给人留下了“安静谦逊”的印象。“我相信萨布丽娜（Sabrina）不会拿她孩子的福祉和未来地位冒险，”这位邻居写道。

There was some legal uncertainty over whether Meng’s husband could guarantee her bail as a noncitizen who was only in Canada on a six-month visitor’s visa. Several friends who were permanent Canadian residents stepped in as additional guarantors. One told the court that they had worked with Meng at Huawei in the 1990s and had traveled to Moscow with her in 1997. They had since settled in Vancouver as an insurance agent. “We also understand that should Ms. Meng violate her bail conditions, we might lose one-half million dollars net equity value of our home, which will impact our family’s life significantly,” they wrote to the court. “We’re confident Ms. Meng will not breach any conditions imposed upon her given her character and integrity.”

关于孟晚舟的丈夫作为一名仅持有六个月访客签证在加拿大的非公民，是否能为她的保释提供担保，在法律上存在一些不确定性。几位拥有加拿大永久居民身份的朋友出面担任额外担保人。其中一人告诉法庭，他们曾在 20 世纪 90 年代与孟晚舟在华为共事，并于 1997 年与她一起前往莫斯科。此后，他们作为保险代理人在温哥华定居。“我们也明白，如果孟女士违反保释条件，我们可能会损失房屋净值的五十万美元，这将对我们家庭的生活产生重大影响，”他们写给法庭，“鉴于孟女士的人品和正直，我们有信心她不会违反任何施加于她的条件。”

When Justice Ehrcke announced that Meng would be released on bail, she burst into tears. Meng had to wear a GPS tracking anklet at all times, but she would have relative freedom. She could travel around Vancouver between 6:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m., so long as she was accompanied by security guards.

当厄克法官宣布孟晚舟获准保释时，她失声痛哭。孟晚舟必须时刻佩戴 GPS 追踪脚镣，但她将拥有相对的自由。只要有保安陪同，她可以在早上 6 点到晚上 11 点之间在温哥华四处走动。

As Meng walked out into the cold night air in a purple parka, she was swarmed by reporters.

当孟晚舟穿着紫色派克大衣走进寒冷的夜色中时，记者们一拥而上。

“Ms. Meng! Ms. Meng!”

“孟女士！孟女士！”

“Ms. Meng, what’s your reaction to being granted bail today?”

“孟女士，你对今天获准保释有什么反应？”

Meng tried to avoid eye contact. She looked at her feet, then to the road. There was no car at the curb.

孟晚舟试图避开眼神接触。她看着自己的脚，然后看向马路。路边没有车。

“The vehicle is not in place,” someone on her security detail said urgently into their phone. “She’s out on the sidewalk. Vehicle’s not in place.”

“车辆未到位，”她安保小组的一名成员对着电话急促地说道。“她已经到人行道上了。车辆没有到位。”

The press scrum surged forward, cameras flashing. “Back up a bit, please,” a security guard said. One of her staffers put his arm around her to try to shield her from view.

媒体群蜂拥而上，闪光灯狂闪。“请往后退一点，”一名保安说道。她的一名随行人员搂住她的肩膀，试图挡住众人的视线。

“Ms. Meng, what’s your reaction to being granted bail today?”

“孟女士，对于今天获准保释，您有什么反应？”

“Ms. Meng, why should people believe you that you won’t breach your bail?”

“孟女士，人们为什么要相信您不会违反保释条例？”

The car finally arrived. Meng scrambled in, out of sight from prying eyes. The big gray house on West Twenty-Eighth Avenue had long been her summer retreat. Now it was her gilded cage. Under the watch of security guards, she walked up the steps.

车终于到了。孟钻进车内，避开了窥探的目光。位于西 28 大道的那栋灰色大宅长期以来一直是她的避暑胜地。而现在，它成了她的金丝雀笼。在保安的注视下，她走上了台阶。

25

25

Waterloo

滑铁卢

The Trade War: 2019–2020

贸易战：2019–2020

“Is that everybody?” asked Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker, looking to his right and left. Beside him on the stage were a row of officials, including Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, and FBI Director Christopher Wray. “Good-looking crew,” Whitaker said.[1]

“人都到齐了吗？”代理总检察长马修·惠特克环顾左右问道。在他身旁的讲台上坐着一排官员，包括国土安全部部长基尔斯滕·尼尔森、商务部部长威尔伯·罗斯和联邦调查局局长克里斯托弗·雷。“阵容不错，”惠特克说。[1]

It was hard to think of the last time that so many top officials had shown up just to announce a corporate investigation. None wanted to miss the unsealing of criminal charges against Huawei and its CFO, Meng Wanzhou, at the US Justice Department’s headquarters in January 2019. Now Whitaker announced that prosecutors had filed twenty-three charges against “Wah-way”—this pronunciation of Huawei’s name, with a silent h, had persisted in the West for inscrutable reasons—along with its CFO. Whitaker said that the criminal activity went back at least ten years and extended “all the way to the top.”

很难想起上一次这么多高级官员齐聚一堂仅仅是为了宣布一项公司调查是什么时候。2019 年 1 月，在美国司法部总部，谁也不想错过针对华为及其首席财务官孟晚舟刑事指控的公开。惠特克随后宣布，检察官已对“Wah-way”（华为这个名字在西方一直因不明原因被发音为不带 h 音的“Wah-way”）及其首席财务官提起了 23 项指控。惠特克表示，这些犯罪活动至少可以追溯到十年前，并且一直延伸到“最高层”。

If Huawei’s executives had any lingering hopes that Meng’s detention could be smoothed over as a misunderstanding, these were swiftly dashed. Huawei, Meng Wanzhou, and the Huawei shell company Skycom were charged with thirteen counts related to Huawei’s business in Iran, including bank fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering. A second indictment charged Huawei with ten counts tied to theft of trade secrets.

如果华为高管还抱有任何希望，认为孟晚舟被拘留只是一个可以化解的误会，那么这些希望很快就破灭了。华为、孟晚舟以及华为的壳公司星通（Skycom）被控犯有 13 项与华为在伊朗业务相关的罪名，包括银行欺诈、合谋进行电汇欺诈和洗钱。第二份起诉书指控华为犯有 10 项与窃取商业机密相关的罪名。

US authorities said they had uncovered a series of shell companies that Huawei was using to obscure its business dealings in Iran. Skycom and Canicula weren’t separate companies; they were just Huawei by other names. The prosecutors said a former Skycom employee in Iran had told them that upon showing up for work at Skycom’s offices, the employee had discovered that all fellow employees in the building wore Huawei badges and used Huawei email addresses.[2] Two other former Skycom employees had also provided details about the intertwined nature of Huawei and Skycom, including contracting documents that bore Huawei’s logo at the top but were signed by an individual on behalf of Skycom. US authorities had also searched the laptop of a Huawei finance manager leaving the United States in 2018, obtaining confidential company spreadsheets that included Skycom and Canicula alongside known Huawei subsidiaries. Prosecutors said this was proof that Skycom and Canicula were viewed internally as part of Huawei, not as third-party companies.[3]

美国当局表示，他们发现了一系列华为用来掩盖其在伊朗业务往来的壳公司。星通和 Canicula 并非独立公司，它们只是华为的化名。检察官称，一名曾在伊朗星通工作的员工告诉他们，该员工到星通办公室上班后发现，大楼里的所有同事都佩戴华为工牌，并使用华为的电子邮箱地址。[2] 另外两名星通前员工也提供了有关华为与星通关系交织的细节，包括顶部印有华为标志但由个人代表星通签署的合同文件。美国当局还搜查了一名于 2018 年离开美国的华为财务经理的手提电脑，获取了机密的公司电子表格，其中星通和 Canicula 与已知的华为子公司并列。检察官表示，这证明星通和 Canicula 在内部被视为华为的一部分，而非第三方公司。[3]

They now revealed just how closely they had been watching Huawei all these years, starting with the FBI’s interview of Ren Zhengfei back in 2007 in New York. They accused him of having made false statements all those years ago when he’d said that Huawei complied with US export controls on Iran. They also alleged that Huawei had pinpointed Chinese employees who knew about the company’s Iran business and whisked them back to China in an attempt to obstruct the investigation.

他们现在披露了这些年来对华为的监视是多么严密，最早可以追溯到 2007 年联邦调查局在纽约对任正非的问询。他们指控他在多年前声称华为遵守美国对伊朗出口管制时作了虚假陈述。他们还指控华为精准锁定了了解公司伊朗业务的中国籍员工，并将他们匆忙送回中国，企图阻挠调查。

The indictment revealed that even as HSBC had been wooing Huawei with more financing, the bank had been cooperating with the US Justice Department, helping it build its case. As it turned out, HSBC was obliged to help the feds, due to an earlier sanctions-violation run-in with the Justice Department in 2012. Under the terms of its deferred prosecution agreement, HSBC had agreed to cooperate with the Justice Department in the future.[4] Now it had handed its books over to the DOJ. According to prosecutors, between 2010 and 2014, Skycom had conducted some $100 million in transactions through HSBC, which ultimately cleared these transactions through the US financial system.

起诉书披露，就在汇丰银行（HSBC）以更多融资拉拢华为的同时，该银行一直在与美国司法部合作，协助其立案。事实证明，由于 2012 年曾因违反制裁规定与司法部发生过冲突，汇丰银行有义务协助联邦调查局。根据延期起诉协议的条款，汇丰银行同意在未来与司法部合作。[4] 现在，它已将账目移交给司法部。据检察官称，在 2010 年至 2014 年间，星通通过汇丰银行进行了约 1 亿美元的交易，这些交易最终通过美国金融系统进行了结算。

Perhaps most alarming to the Ren family was that prosecutors had zeroed in on Meng. They had gotten their hands on a PowerPoint presentation about Huawei’s Iran business that Meng had delivered to HSBC in August 2013. Prosecutors accused Huawei of therein making “numerous misrepresentations” about its Iran unit, Skycom, and its compliance with US laws.

对任氏家族来说，最令他们警觉的或许是检察官已经盯上了孟晚舟。他们获得了一份关于华为伊朗业务的幻灯片演示文稿，那是孟晚舟于 2013 年 8 月向汇丰银行展示的。检察官指控华为在文中对其伊朗分支机构星通及其遵守美国法律的情况作了“大量虚假陈述”。

The indictment also revealed that Huawei executives were right in their suspicions that US authorities had copied information off Meng’s electronic devices when she was stopped at New York’s JFK Airport in 2014. Prosecutors cited a file that had been in the “unallocated space” of one of Meng’s devices, which suggested it might have been deleted and recovered. The file read:

起诉书还证实了华为高管的猜疑：2014 年孟晚舟在纽约肯尼迪机场被拦下时，美国当局确实拷贝了她电子设备中的信息。检察官引用了孟晚舟其中一个设备“未分配空间”中的一个文件，这表明该文件可能曾被删除后又被恢复。文件内容如下：

Suggested Talking Points

建议谈话要点

The core of the suggested talking points regarding Iran/Skycom: Huawei’s operation in Iran comports with the laws, regulations and sanctions as required by the United Nations, the United States and the European Union. The relationship with Skycom is that of normal business cooperation. Through regulated trade organizations and procedures, Huawei requires that Skycom promises to abide by relevant laws and regulations and export controls. Key information 1: In the past—ceased to hold Skycom shares 1, With regards to cooperation: Skycom was established in 1998 and is one of the agents for Huawei products and services. Skycom is mainly an agent for Huawei.

关于伊朗/星通建议谈话要点的核心：华为在伊朗的业务符合联合国、美国和欧盟要求的法律、法规和制裁。与星通的关系是正常的业务合作。通过规范的贸易组织和程序，华为要求星通承诺遵守相关法律法规和出口管制。关键信息 1：过去——停止持有星通股份 1，关于合作：星通成立于 1998 年，是华为产品和服务的代理商之一。星通主要是华为的代理商。

It seemed clear that prosecutors were trying to build a case that Meng had not only known the details of Huawei’s business in Iran but had also actively conspired to mislead others about them.

显而易见，检察官正试图证明孟晚舟不仅了解华为在伊朗业务的细节，而且还积极合谋误导他人。

—

Up to this point, Ren’s public appearances had been so rare that The Economist once dubbed him “the Invisible Mr. Ren,” describing him as “the most reclusive boss in the technology industry.”[5] But the crisis prompted him to do something he’d hardly ever done before: step into the media limelight. A month and a half after his daughter’s detention, a seventy-four-year-old Ren walked out to face the international press corps.[6]

在此之前，任正非在公开场合露面的次数极少，以至于《经济学人》曾称他为“隐形人任先生”，并形容他是“科技行业最深居简出的老板”。[5] 但这场危机促使他做出了几乎从未做过的事情：走到媒体的聚光灯下。在女儿被拘留一个半月后，74 岁的任正非走出来面对国际媒体团。[6]

He had gone for a dignified but friendly look: a dark-blue sport coat over a light-blue shirt, no tie. Before him were journalists from The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, the Associated Press, CNBC, and other major media outlets from around the world. Ren sat down before a microphone, took a breath, and began to tell his life story.

他选择了一身庄重而不失亲和的打扮：深蓝色运动外套内搭浅蓝色衬衫，没有系领带。在他面前的是来自《纽约时报》、《华尔街日报》、《金融时报》、美联社、CNBC 以及世界其他各大媒体的记者。任正非在麦克风前坐下，深吸一口气，开始讲述他的人生故事。

“I joined the military during China’s Cultural Revolution,” he said. “At that time, there was chaos almost everywhere, including in agriculture and the industry. The country was facing very difficult times.”

“我是在中国文化大革命期间参军的，”他说。“那时，几乎到处都处于混乱状态，包括农业和工业。国家正面临非常困难的时期。”

Asked how he felt about his daughter’s detention, Ren said he was declining to comment on the case, as it was best left to the judicial process. But he began reciting a string of thanks. “As Meng Wanzhou’s father, I miss her very much. And I’m deeply grateful to the fairness of the Honourable Justice William Ehrcke. I’m also much grateful to prosecutor John Gibb-Carsley and prosecutor Kerry Swift. I also thank the Alouette Correctional Centre for Women for its humane management. Thanks to Meng Wanzhou’s cellmates for treating her kindly.”

当被问及对女儿被拘留的感受时，任正非表示他拒绝就此案发表评论，因为最好将其交给司法程序。但他开始列出一串感谢名单。“作为孟晚舟的父亲，我非常想念她。我深深感谢威廉·厄克大法官的公正。我也非常感谢约翰·吉布-卡斯利检察官和凯里·斯威夫特检察官。我还感谢阿卢埃特女子惩教中心的人道管理。感谢孟晚舟的室友们对她的友善对待。”

Ren had only praise for Trump, perhaps hoping he was susceptible to flattery. “For President Trump as a person, I still believe he’s a great president, in the sense that he was bold to slash taxes,” he said. “I think that’s conducive to the development of industries in the US.”

任正非对特朗普赞不绝口，或许是希望他能听进奉承话。“对于特朗普总统个人，我仍然相信他是一位伟大的总统，因为他敢于大幅减税，”他说。“我认为这有利于美国工业的发展。”

If Ren had thought he might charm Trump into quickly resolving Meng’s case, he would have no such luck. When the soft appeal failed, Huawei began to consider its legal options. In March 2019, Meng’s lawyers announced that she was suing the Canadian government, claiming it had been illegal for them to detain, search, and interrogate her without telling her she was under arrest.[7] It wasn’t clear if her suit would stand up in court—border agents generally have wide berth to question and search individuals before they enter a country—but it might help public perception of her plight if her lawyers could prove breaches in protocol on the part of the Canadian agents. Soon after, Huawei sued the US government, challenging the constitutionality of the defense bill that Trump had signed into law on August 13, 2018. Section 889 prohibited US government agencies from buying Huawei products. “We are compelled to take this legal action as a proper and last resort,” Guo Ping told a packed room of journalists. “We look forward to the court’s verdict and trust that it will benefit both Huawei and the American people.”

如果任正非认为自己能通过魅力攻势让特朗普迅速解决孟晚舟案，那他并没那么走运。当软性诉求失败后，华为开始考虑法律手段。2019 年 3 月，孟晚舟的律师宣布她正在起诉加拿大政府，声称他们在没有告知她已被逮捕的情况下对其进行拘留、搜查和审讯是非法的。[7] 目前尚不清楚她的诉讼在法庭上是否站得住脚——边境官员在个人进入国家之前通常拥有广泛的询问和搜查权——但如果她的律师能证明加拿大官员存在违规行为，这可能有助于公众对她处境的认知。不久后，华为起诉美国政府，挑战特朗普于 2018 年 8 月 13 日签署成法的国防法案的合宪性。该法案第 889 条禁止美国政府机构购买华为产品。“我们被迫采取这一法律行动，是作为正当且最后的手段，”郭平面对满屋的记者说道。“我们期待法院的裁决，并相信这将造福于华为和美国人民。”

Trump’s deputies flooded the zone to declare Huawei a threat. “To say that they don’t work with the Chinese government is a false statement,” Mike Pompeo said on CNBC’s Squawk Box. “It is required to by Chinese law.”[8] Steve Bannon called Huawei a “dirty bomb inside industrial democracies.”[9]

特朗普的下属们密集发声，宣布华为是一个威胁。“说他们不与中国政府合作是虚假陈述，”迈克·蓬佩奥在 CNBC 的Squawk Box节目中说道。“中国法律要求他们这样做。”[8] 史蒂夫·班农称华为是“工业民主国家内部的脏弹”。[9]

—

As Huawei’s legal team scrambled to build its defense, the fallout began. A number of prominent universities announced they were distancing themselves from the company. First, the University of Oxford said it was suspending all new research grants and donations from Huawei.[10] “This decision will be revisited by the committee in 3–6 months and does not impact existing donations or research projects,” the university told its computer science doctoral students in an email. UC Berkeley and Stanford followed suit. “The severity of these accusations raises questions and concerns that only our judicial system can address,” a Berkeley administrator wrote to colleagues.[11] These universities had long been under public pressure from politicians on the right to break ties with Huawei. They had resisted, partly because Huawei’s donations were welcome funding and partly because they held the loftier belief that science should transcend political squabbles. But the indictments were the last straw.

就在华为法律团队紧锣密鼓地准备辩护时，连锁反应开始了。多所知名大学宣布与该公司保持距离。首先，牛津大学表示将暂停接受华为所有新的研究资助和捐赠。[10] “委员会将在 3 至 6 个月内重新审视这一决定，这不影响现有的捐赠或研究项目，”该大学在给计算机科学博士生的一封电子邮件中写道。加州大学伯克利分校和斯坦福大学也纷纷效仿。“这些指控的严重性引发了只有我们的司法系统才能解决的问题和担忧，”伯克利的一位管理人员在给同事的信中写道。[11] 长期以来，这些大学一直面临着来自右翼政客要求其与华为断绝关系的公众压力。他们此前一直抵制，部分原因是华为的捐赠是受欢迎的资金来源，部分原因是他们持有更高尚的信念，即科学应该超越政治纷争。但起诉书成了最后一根稻草。

There was grim news abroad too: a Huawei sales director, Wang Weijing, had just been detained in Poland and charged with espionage. During a trip to Warsaw, US vice president Mike Pence publicly praised Polish president Andrzej Duda for the arrest. The Huawei director was proclaiming his innocence. But reeling from Meng’s detention, Huawei decided to cut him loose. A Huawei spokesman told reporters that the company had fired Wang “because the incident in question has brought Huawei into disrepute.”[12]

海外也传来了严峻的消息：华为销售总监王伟晶刚在波兰被拘留，并被指控从事间谍活动。在访问华沙期间，美国副总统迈克·彭斯公开赞扬波兰总统安杰伊·杜达实施了这次逮捕。这位华为总监坚称自己清白。但由于正因孟晚舟被拘留而焦头烂额，华为决定与其撇清关系。华为发言人告诉记者，公司已解雇王伟晶，“因为涉事事件已导致华为声誉受损”。[12]

In May 2019, Donald Trump invoked a presidential power generally reserved for wars, terrorist attacks, and pandemics: he declared Huawei a national emergency. “I, Donald J. Trump, President of the United States of America, find that foreign adversaries are increasingly creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications technology and services,” the declaration began.[13] It did not mention Huawei by name, but everyone knew the target. The executive order directed relevant government agencies to take “all appropriate measures” to neutralize Huawei.

2019 年 5 月，唐纳德·特朗普动用了一项通常保留给战争、恐怖袭击和流行病的总统权力：他宣布华为进入国家紧急状态。“我，美利坚合众国总统唐纳德·J·特朗普，发现外国对手正日益制造并利用信息和通信技术及服务中的漏洞，”声明开头写道。[13] 声明中没有点名华为，但所有人都知道目标是谁。该行政命令指示相关政府机构采取“一切适当措施”来消除华为的影响。

The same day, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, which serves as the nation’s economic sanctions authority, announced export controls on Huawei.[14] This was the same death blow that ZTE had faced in 2016. Now it was Huawei’s turn to confront this existential terror. Like tech companies around the world, Huawei would struggle to make its products without US technology, especially chips and operating systems.

同日，作为国家经济制裁机构的商务部工业和安全局宣布对华为实施出口管制。[14] 这正是中兴通讯在 2016 年面临的致命打击。现在轮到华为面对这种生存恐怖了。与全球各地的科技公司一样，如果没有美国的技术，特别是芯片和操作系统，华为将很难制造出自己的产品。

The company relied on Qualcomm and Intel for chips, Google for its Android operating system for smartphones, and Microsoft Windows for laptops. These US companies were reluctant to lose millions of dollars in sales overnight owing to hazy talk of national security. Some executives lobbied the Trump administration behind closed doors, and a few even did so openly. Microsoft’s president, Brad Smith, told Bloomberg Businessweek that he and his cohorts were pushing US regulators for proof that Huawei was a threat. “Oftentimes, what we get in response is, ‘Well, if you knew what we knew, you would agree with us,’ ” Smith said. “And our answer is, ‘Great, show us what you know so we can decide for ourselves. That’s the way this country works.’ ”[15]

该公司在芯片方面依赖高通和英特尔，在智能手机的 安卓操作系统方面依赖谷歌，在笔记本电脑方面则依赖微软的 Windows。由于关于国家安全的模糊说法，这些美国公司不愿在一夜之间损失数百万美元的销售额。一些高管在闭门会议中游说特朗普政府，少数人甚至公开表达了立场。微软总裁布拉德·史密斯告诉 《彭博商业周刊》，他和他的同行们正在敦促美国监管机构提供华为构成威胁的证据。“通常情况下，我们得到的回复是：‘如果你知道我们所知道的情况，你就会同意我们的看法，’”史密斯说。“而我们的回答是：‘太好了，把你们知道的展示给我们看，这样我们才能自己做决定。这才是这个国家的运作方式。’”[15]

Huawei’s executives cried foul at this fusillade of attacks. “Politicians in the US are using the strength of an entire nation to come after a private company,” Huawei’s chief legal officer, Song Liuping, exclaimed to reporters. “They want to put us out of business. This is not normal. Almost never seen in history.”[16]

华为的高管们对这一连串的攻击表示抗议。“美国的政客们正在动用整个国家的力量来对付一家私营公司，”华为首席法务官宋柳平对记者惊呼道。“他们想让我们倒闭。这不正常。在历史上几乎闻所未闻。”[16]

To rally his staff, Ren circulated an old photograph of a World War II–era Soviet bomber jet that was somehow managing to stay aloft despite being riddled with bullets.[17] Ren told them that, like the plane, they would somehow keep flying. Teresa He, the reclusive head of Huawei’s chip unit, HiSilicon, also emerged to hearten staff through a rare public letter. If Huawei was really cut off from Qualcomm and Intel, its only hope would be HiSilicon. For years, the unit had worked building “spare tires” for Huawei, He wrote, uncertain if it would ever get to show its full strength, as Huawei prioritized relationships with international vendors. “Now today, it is the decision of history,” she wrote. “Overnight, all the spare tires that we built have become the ‘main’ tires! Our years of blood, sweat, and tears have been cashed in overnight to help the company fulfill its commitment to keep serving customers.” Her letter was upbeat, but none of the staff had illusions. The indictment meant that Meng could spend years behind bars. The sanctions meant that Huawei’s days might be numbered.

为了鼓舞员工士气，任正非传阅了一张二战时期苏联轰炸机的旧照片，尽管机身布满弹孔，这架飞机仍设法保持飞行。[17] 任正非告诉他们，就像这架飞机一样，他们也会设法继续飞行。华为芯片部门海思半导体深居简出的负责人何庭波也通过一封罕见的公开信来激励员工。如果华为真的与高通和英特尔断绝往来，海思将是其唯一的希望。何庭波写道，多年来，该部门一直在为华为打造“备胎”，由于华为优先考虑与国际供应商的关系，她并不确定这些备胎是否有机会展示其全部实力。“而今，历史作出了选择，”她写道。“一夜之间，我们建立的所有备胎都变成了‘主’胎！我们多年的血汗和泪水在一夜之间兑现，帮助公司履行了继续服务客户的承诺。”她的信充满斗志，但员工们都没有幻想。起诉意味着孟晚舟可能会在牢狱中度过多年。制裁则意味着华为的日子可能屈指可数了。

The Commerce Department had given Huawei’s US suppliers a grace period of three months to adjust to the sanctions.[18] This was later extended to a year. Huawei seized on this lifeline, rushing to stockpile US chips and other components as it raced to figure out how to survive without US technology. Huawei’s US suppliers generally wanted to keep selling to the company. They would be losing big business. Behind closed doors, they lobbied officials in Washington to ease up, warning that sanctions might strengthen China’s resolve to develop domestic alternatives to US technology.

商务部给了华为的美国供应商三个月的宽限期来适应制裁。[18] 这一期限后来延长到了一年。华为抓住了这条生命线，在竞相研究如何在没有美国技术的情况下生存的同时，加紧囤积美国芯片和其他零部件。华为的美国供应商通常希望继续向该公司销售。他们将失去巨额业务。在闭门会议中，他们游说华盛顿官员放宽限制，并警告说制裁可能会增强中国开发美国技术国产替代品的决心。

Ren told Chinese reporters that Eric Xu, one of the rotating chairs, had phoned him up in the middle of the night to tell him that Huawei’s US suppliers were scrambling to fulfill the company’s orders. “I was in tears,” Ren said. “As a Chinese saying goes, a just cause attracts much support, while an unjust one finds little.”[19]

任正非告诉中国记者，轮值董事长之一徐直军在半夜给他打电话，告诉他华为的美国供应商正在争分夺秒地完成公司的订单。“我流泪了，”任正非说。“正如中国古话所说，得道多助，失道寡助。”[19]

—

The Trump administration was intensifying its diplomatic campaign to push other governments into excluding Huawei from their upcoming 5G networks.

特朗普政府正在加强其外交攻势，以推动其他国家政府将华为排除在即将到来的 5G 网络之外。

“Objective number one of the strategic imperative was to take the momentum away from Huawei and replace it with ours,” recalled Keith Krach, undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy, and the environment.[20] “You do it by a rolling thunder of announcements, endorsements, wins. I mean, we had a scoreboard.”

“战略任务的第一目标是夺走华为的势头，并用我们的势头取而代之，”负责经济增长、能源和环境事务的副国务卿基思·克拉奇回忆道。[20] “你通过接连不断的公告、背书和胜利来实现这一目标。我的意思是，我们有一个计分板。”

Krach would develop a sales patter that he would use to try to win over foreign officials. “Even if you’re just putting a little bit in your system, you’re only as strong as your weakest link,” he would say when officials told him they were only using Huawei on the periphery of their networks. Krach would ask them how much cheaper Huawei gear was, then retort, “Well, you’re getting ripped off.”

克拉奇开发了一套推销辞令，用来试图争取外国官员。当官员们告诉他，他们只在网络边缘使用华为设备时，他会说：“即使你只在系统中放入一点点，你的强度也取决于你最薄弱的一环。”克拉奇会问他们华为的设备便宜多少，然后反驳道：“好吧，你被坑了。”

“How much is your citizens’ personal data worth?” he asked them. “Your companies’ proprietary technology and your government’s most precious secrets? How much is that worth? Well, that’s priceless.”

“你公民的个人数据值多少钱？”他问他们。“你公司的专利技术和你政府最珍贵的秘密？那值多少钱？那是无价的。”

The State Department suffered a setback in April 2019, when the British daily The Telegraph reported that Prime Minister Theresa May had given Huawei the green light to build “noncore” parts of the UK’s 5G network.[21] The backlash was swift. NSA officials warned that the US would have to reassess its intelligence-sharing relationship with London. An infuriated May launched an internal hunt for the leaker. Within days, she had sacked her defense secretary, Gavin Williamson, telling him in a letter that there was “compelling evidence” pointing to his culpability.[22] It was reflective of just how touchy the Huawei issue had become. The US and UK were close allies, and the company had created a rift between them. Williamson admitted to speaking by phone with Steven Swinford, deputy political editor of The Telegraph, on the day the National Security Council had met to discuss the topic, but he swore on his children’s lives that he was innocent of leaking.[23]

美国国务院在 2019 年 4 月遭遇挫折，当时英国日报 《电讯报》 报道称，首相特蕾莎·梅已批准华为建设英国 5G 网络的“非核心”部分。[21] 反应迅速而激烈。美国国家安全局官员警告说，美国将不得不重新评估与伦敦的情报共享关系。愤怒的梅在内部展开了泄密者搜寻。几天之内，她解雇了国防大臣加文·威廉姆森，并在信中告诉他，有“确凿证据”指向他的过失。[22] 这反映出华为问题已经变得多么敏感。美国和英国是亲密盟友，而这家公司却在他们之间制造了裂痕。威廉姆森承认在国家安全委员会讨论该话题的当天与 《电讯报》 的副政治编辑史蒂文·斯温福德通了电话，但他以孩子的生命起誓，他没有泄密。[23]

Pompeo arrived in London soon after to push May on the issue. “Insufficient security will impede the United States’ ability to share certain information with trusted networks,” Pompeo warned. “This is exactly what China wants. They want to defy Western alliances through bits and bytes, not bullets and bombs.”[24]

蓬佩奥不久后抵达伦敦，就此问题向梅施压。“安全性不足将阻碍美国与受信任网络共享某些信息的能力，”蓬佩奥警告说。“这 正是中国想要的。他们想通过比特和字节，而不是子弹和炸弹，来挑战西方联盟。”[24]

Trump would later go on Fox & Friends to give his own account of the UK push. “With UK, we said, ‘We love Scotland Yard very much, but we’re not going to do business with you. Because if you use the Huawei system, that means they are spying on you. That would mean they’re spying on us.’ ”[25]

特朗普后来登上 《福克斯与朋友们》 节目，讲述了他对英国施压的情况。“对于英国，我们说：‘我们非常爱苏格兰场，但我们不会和你们做生意。因为如果你使用华为系统，那意味着他们在监视你。那也意味着他们在监视我们。’”[25]

British officials were taken aback by the American saber-rattling. They didn’t understand why Huawei was the issue to end all issues, and they didn’t understand why the time had to be now to cast them out of the network. With the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union imminent, it was a particularly inconvenient time for May’s administration to draw swords with China, a major trade partner. They also found the bombast and pushiness of the Trump administration hard to stomach.

英国官员对美国的武力威胁感到措手不及。他们不明白为什么华为成了解决所有问题的核心，也不明白为什么必须现在就将其逐出网络。随着英国脱离欧盟在即，对于梅政府而言，此时与主要贸易伙伴中国拔刀相向显得尤为不合时宜。他们还发现特朗普政府那种夸夸其谈和咄咄逼人的作风令人难以忍受。

“Look, Ambassador,” one senior UK security official said, levelly addressing US national security adviser John Bolton during a meeting, “what we can’t understand is why, out of all the things—chips, AI, rare earth metals, whatever it is—out of all the things, your administration has decided that a modest amount of base stations on hilltops in England is the epicenter of your new declared tech war with China. Why?”[26]

“听着，大使，”一位英国高级安全官员在一次会议上平稳地对美国国家安全顾问约翰·博尔顿说，“我们不能理解的是，在所有事物中——芯片、人工智能、稀土金属，无论是什么——在所有这些事物中，你们政府竟然认定英格兰山顶上那少量的基站，就是你们对华发起的这场新科技战争的震中。为什么？”[26]

“You gotta pick something,” Bolton replied.

“你总得挑点什么，”博尔顿回答道。

As the year 2019 progressed, Beijing and Washington tallied their wins and losses. Huawei had landed the Philippines, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia among its early 5G customers. Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, had, in particular, come to Huawei’s defense. “There are unceremonious attempts at pushing Huawei away from the global markets,” Putin said at a conference in St. Petersburg.[27] The US had won over Australia, New Zealand, and Japan by pledging to shut Huawei out of 5G.

随着 2019 年的推进，北京和华盛顿各自盘算着得失。华为已在早期 5G 客户中拿下了菲律宾、阿联酋和俄罗斯。俄罗斯领导人弗拉基米尔·普京尤其站出来为华为辩护。“有人正不择手段地试图将华为挤出全球市场，”普京在圣彼得堡的一次会议上表示。[27] 美国则通过承诺将华为排除在 5G 之外，赢得了澳大利亚、新西兰和日本的支持。

Several key battleground countries remained on the fence. Chief among these was Germany, Europe’s largest economy, which was still distrustful of Washington after Edward Snowden revealed that the NSA had tapped German chancellor Angela Merkel’s calls for years. Merkel declined to get in line on Huawei. “I tend to trust ourselves to define high security standards, higher than with 4G, 3G, and 2G, but not to shut out vendors from the beginning,” Merkel said in a speech, adding that she did not want to isolate the country from entire areas.[28] French president Emmanuel Macron declined to outright exclude Huawei from 5G bidding, though he said he favored European vendors for security reasons. “You would do the same as me,” Macron said he told China’s leader, Xi Jinping.[29] India’s government was allowing Huawei to participate in 5G trials, though it held off on deciding if Huawei could build the actual networks. Canada, which was already up to its eyeballs in political fallout from Meng’s detention, was also punting the 5G decision.

几个关键的战场国家仍持观望态度。其中最主要的是欧洲最大经济体德国，在爱德华·斯诺登披露美国国家安全局曾监听德国总理安格拉·默克尔的电话多年后，德国对华盛顿仍心存疑虑。默克尔拒绝在华为问题上与美国保持一致。“我倾向于相信我们自己能定义高安全标准，比 4G、3G 和 2G 更高，而不是从一开始就排除供应商，”默克尔在一次演讲中说，并补充道她不想让国家与整个领域隔绝。[28] 法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙拒绝将华为完全排除在 5G 竞标之外，尽管他表示出于安全原因更青睐欧洲供应商。“你也会和我做同样的选择，”马克龙称他曾这样告诉中国领导人习近平。[29] 印度政府允许华为参与 5G 测试，但推迟了是否允许华为建设实际网络的决定。而加拿大已经深陷孟晚舟被捕带来的政治后果中，同样也在推迟 5G 决策。

For many other countries in the developing world, it didn’t matter how persuasively the Trump administration made its pitch. There were hard numbers. They would have to pay significantly more for equipment from other vendors, and they would also incur the wrath of Beijing. “It didn’t even make a tiny dent in the emerging markets, or even the middle-income markets that are normally our partners,” said Ken Zita, a telecom expert who has, in recent years, helped advise the US government on how to compete against Huawei. “Israel, for example, basically thumbed their nose at Washington. The entire Middle East.”[30]

对于许多其他发展中国家来说，无论特朗普政府的游说多么有说服力，现实的数据摆在那里。他们如果采用其他供应商的设备，将不得不支付高得多的费用，而且还会招致北京的愤怒。“这甚至没能在新兴市场，或者那些通常是我们的合作伙伴的中等收入市场产生微小的影响，”电信专家肯·齐塔说，他近年来一直协助美国政府就如何与华为竞争提供咨询。“例如以色列，基本上对华盛顿嗤之以鼻。整个中东地区也是如此。”[30]

Among those who came to Huawei’s defense was Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, who declared that Malaysia would use Huawei gear “as much as possible.” “Huawei may be powerful in spying or whatever. They can spy as much as they like, because we have no secrets,” he said. “America is apparently afraid of the advancement made by Huawei, and they are suspicious that Huawei might be able to, well, spy on them. Maybe that is grounds for condemning. But I think that is not the way to go.”[31]

在为华为辩护的人中包括马来西亚总理马哈蒂尔·穆罕默德，他宣布马来西亚将“尽可能多地”使用华为设备。“华为在间谍活动或其他方面可能很强大。他们想怎么监视就怎么监视，因为我们没有秘密，”他说。“美国显然害怕华为取得的进步，他们怀疑华为可能，嗯，监视他们。也许那是谴责的理由。但我认为那不是解决问题的办法。”[31]

China switched on the world’s largest 5G network in November 2019, with most of the West far behind in network construction. There was considerable dismay in the United States. “America is far behind in almost every dimension of 5G,” political scientist Graham Allison and former Google CEO Eric Schmidt warned in an op-ed.[32]

2019 年 11 月，中国启动了全球最大的 5G 网络，而大多数西方国家在网络建设方面远落其后。美国国内出现了相当大的忧虑。“美国在 5G 的几乎每个维度都远远落后，”政治学家格雷厄姆·艾利森和谷歌前首席执行官埃里克·施密特在一篇专栏文章中警告道。[32]

—

Soon after the Trump administration’s offensive began in 2019, Huawei purchased a full-page ad in The Wall Street Journal. In three lines of large print, it read:

在特朗普政府的攻势于 2019 年开始后不久，华为在《华尔街日报》上刊登了整版广告。三行大字写道：

Don’t believe everything you hear.

不要相信你听到的一切。

Come and see us.

过来看看我们。

An open letter to the US media[33]

致美国媒体的公开信[33]

Beneath this was a signed letter by Catherine Chen, a longtime Huawei executive who was now a senior vice president and head of public and government relations. Chen was willowy, soft-spoken, and a little nervous-looking, but she was one of the most powerful women at Huawei. She had joined the company in 1995, around the same time as Meng Wanzhou. As head of Huawei’s Beijing representative office in the 1990s, she had been the one who smoothed things over after Ren’s gift of cash to a Chinese diplomat had created a kerfuffle at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Her husband, Cao Yi’an, had been one of Ren’s earliest engineers, back when Huawei was trying to build its first digital switch. Cao had later left the company and taken on much of the childcare responsibilities in their family as Chen continued to climb the corporate ladder. Now, in this open letter published in The Wall Street Journal, she wrote that she was seeking greater understanding from the West. “There are only so many people we can reach out to,” she said. “On behalf of Huawei, I would like to invite members of the US media to visit our campuses and meet our employees. I hope that you can take what you see and hear back to your readers, viewers, and listeners, and share this message with them, to let them know that our doors are always open.”

信件下方是陈黎芳的签名，她是华为的资深高管，当时担任高级副总裁兼公共及政府事务部总裁。陈黎芳身材苗条、言语温和，看起来有些紧张，但她是华为最有权势的女性之一。她于 1995 年加入公司，大约与孟晚舟同期。作为 20 世纪 90 年代华为北京代表处负责人，在任正非向一名中国外交官赠送现金并在外交部引起轩然大波后，正是她出面平息了事态。她的丈夫曹贻安是任正非最早的工程师之一，当时华为正试图开发其第一台数字交换机。后来曹贻安离开了公司，在陈黎芳继续攀登公司阶梯时承担了大部分育儿责任。现在，在这封发表于《华尔街日报》的公开信中，她写道，她正在寻求西方更多的理解。“我们能接触到的人有限，”她说。“我代表华为，诚挚邀请美国媒体成员访问我们的园区并会见我们的员工。我希望你们能将所见所闻带回给你们的读者、观众和听众，并与他们分享这一信息，让他们知道我们的大门永远敞开。”

Journalists the world over took her up on the offer: CNN, the LA Times, Sky News, Handelsblatt, Dagens industri, Kyodo News, Al-Ahram. The journalists came in gaggles each week and found a strange sight. Huawei was a vision of eclectic opulence that would have put Jay Gatsby himself to shame. At Ox Horn Campus, they rode the little red train and gawked at the imitations of Heidelberg Castle and the Palace of Versailles. They saw the black swans gliding on the lake. There were towering Greek caryatids, the sky-high pillars shaped to look like goddesses. In the conference rooms, the napkins were emblazoned with a cheerful message: “Decent Positive Enthusiastic.”

世界各地的记者都接受了她的邀请：CNN、《洛杉矶时报》、天空新闻、《商报》、《每日工业报》、《共同社》以及《金字塔报》。记者们每周成群结队而来，目睹了一番奇特的景象。华为展现出一种不拘一格的奢华，足以让杰伊·盖茨比本人也相形见绌。在溪流背坡村校区，他们乘坐红色小火车，惊叹于仿建的海德堡城堡和凡尔赛宫。他们看到黑天鹅在湖面上滑行。那里还有高耸的希腊女像柱，直插云霄的柱子被雕刻成女神的模样。在会议室里，餐巾上印着一句欢快的话语：“体面、积极、热诚”。

In the grand European-style hall where Ren generally greeted reporters, there was a painting of the coronation of Napoleon on one wall and a mural of the 1815 Battle of Waterloo, where Napoleon met his final defeat. Puzzling at the artwork, a Der Spiegel journalist ventured to ask: “Is Huawei a rising or falling empire?”[34] Ren deflected the question lightly, saying that he’d liked the Waterloo mural when he saw it at a Belgium museum, and that the coronation painting had been a gift from a family member of an employee. “Those two paintings don’t have anything to do with the situation Huawei faces today,” Ren said.

在任正非通常接见记者的欧式大厅里，一面墙上挂着拿破仑加冕礼的油画，另一面则是 1815 年滑铁卢战役的壁画，那是拿破仑遭遇最终失败的地方。看着这些艺术品，一位《明镜周刊》的记者试探性地问道：“华为是一个正在崛起还是正在衰落的帝国？”[34] 任正非轻松地化解了这个问题，说他在比利时一家博物馆看到滑铁卢壁画时就很喜欢，而那幅加冕图是一位员工家属送的礼物。“这两幅画与华为今天面临的处境没有任何关系，”任正非说。

Ren granted each news organization an exclusive interview, an astonishing shift from his previous corporate hermitage. His deputies joked that he was carrying out decades’ worth of media engagements in a span of weeks.[35]

任正非给予了每家新闻机构独家专访的机会，这与他此前深居简出的企业隐士形象相比，是一个惊人的转变。他的下属开玩笑说，他在几周内完成了几十年的媒体公关量。[35]

It seemed that due to the impossibility of Ren traveling to Canada to testify on his daughter’s behalf, his media interviews were a stand-in way for him to serve as a character witness and provide corroborating testimony. Ren praised his daughter as a person with integrity, recounting how she had been careful to repay him the money she borrowed as a college student. “It would be impossible for her to have engaged in any criminal conduct,” he said.[36] Ren and his deputies also backed up what Meng had told the border agents—that she was traveling to Argentina purely for internal meetings and not for anything associated with G20. It seemed like an extraordinary timing coincidence, almost defying belief—but that was their story, and they stuck to it.

似乎由于任正非无法前往加拿大为女儿作证，他的媒体采访成了一种替代方式，让他能够作为品格证人并提供佐证。任正非称赞女儿是一个正直的人，讲述了她读大学时如何细心地偿还向他借的钱。“她不可能从事任何犯罪行为，”他说。[36] 任正非和他的下属还支持了孟晚舟告诉边境官员的说法——即她前往阿根廷纯粹是为了参加内部会议，与 G20 无关。这看起来像是一个非同寻常的时间巧合，几乎令人难以置信——但这就是他们的说法，而且他们坚持这一说法。

Ren also used the media interviews to float a modest proposal: that Huawei sell its 5G patents to a Western buyer who could verify and tweak its source code to ensure it was secure, even coming from Huawei.[37]

任正非还利用媒体采访提出了一项温和的提议：华为将其 5G 专利出售给西方买家，后者可以验证并修改其源代码，以确保即使来自华为也是安全的。[37]

The company’s media blitz coincided with a renewed public controversy over Huawei’s obscure ownership structure. In April 2019, a preprint titled “Who Owns Huawei?” had been posted online. Cowritten by Christopher Balding of Fulbright University Vietnam and Donald C. Clarke of George Washington University, the paper was stirring up old dust with its striking declaration that Huawei might be “state-controlled and even state-owned,” as 98.86 percent of Huawei’s shares—all except the 1.14 percent that Ren owned himself—were owned by the company’s opaque trade union.[38] “Regardless of who, in a practical sense, owns and controls Huawei, it is clear that the employees do not,” the paper concluded. Huawei vociferously disagreed, saying that its employees did indeed own and control the company.

该公司的媒体攻势恰逢公众对华为模糊的所有权结构再次产生争议。2019 年 4 月，一篇题为《谁拥有华为？》的预印本论文在网上发布。这篇由越南富布赖特大学的克里斯托弗·鲍尔丁和乔治·华盛顿大学的唐纳德·克拉克合著的论文重提旧事，其惊人宣言称华为可能“受国家控制，甚至是国有企业”，因为华为 98.86%的股份——除了任正非本人持有的 1.14%以外——都由该公司不透明的工会持有。[38] “无论从实际意义上讲是谁拥有和控制华为，显然员工并不拥有，”论文总结道。华为对此表示强烈反对，称其员工确实拥有并控制着公司。

Visiting reporters were now ushered into a gleaming white room with a little sign at the entrance that read ESOP Room.[39] ESOP was Huawei shorthand for Employee Stock Ownership Plan. The room had glass-covered display cases that held key Huawei records, like its handwritten corporate registration certificate from 1987 and booklets filled with the names of Huawei’s employee shareholders. With only a few moments to peer into the display cases before the tour proceeded, it was hard for visitors to make heads or tails of it.

随后的访问记者被带入一个闪亮的白色房间，入口处挂着一个小牌子，上面写着ESOP 室。[39] ESOP 是华为对“员工持股计划”的简称。房间里有玻璃展示柜，陈列着华为的关键记录，比如 1987 年手写的企业注册证书，以及填满华为员工股东姓名的名册。在参观继续之前，记者们只有几分钟时间窥视展示柜，很难理清其中的头绪。

“It’s kind of like Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory,” one visitor recalled. “You don’t really know what you saw. You could see very clean rooms and smiling people.”[40]

“这有点像《威利·旺卡与巧克力工厂》，”一位访客回忆道。“你并不真正知道自己看到了什么。你能看到非常干净的房间和微笑的人们。”[40]

—

If the goal was to charm the press, then Ren seemed to have largely succeeded. “What struck me the most from our roughly one-hour-and-twenty-minute conversation was how candid and frank Ren was,” a CNBC reporter remarked.[41] The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman came away from his interview with Ren thinking that Ren’s modest proposal was worth consideration if there wasn’t proof the company was a threat. “Get to know that name—Huawei,” he wrote. “The issues it represents are as important as all the rest of the trade talks combined.” Friedman wrote that it was hard to know which side was telling the truth. “If Huawei really is a bad actor, let’s get the proof out there and blacklist the hell out of it. If it’s not so clear, the Trump team should at least explore Ren’s offer to see if there is a pathway for Huawei to assure American intelligence experts and demonstrate good behavior.”[42]

如果目标是争取媒体的好感，那么任正非似乎在很大程度上取得了成功。“在我们大约一小时二十分钟的交谈中，最令我印象深刻的是任正非是多么坦率和真诚，”一位 CNBC 记者评论道。[41] 《纽约时报》专栏作家托马斯·弗里德曼在采访完任正非后认为，如果没有证据证明该公司构成威胁，任正非的温和提议值得考虑。“去了解这个名字——华为，”他写道。“它所代表的问题与所有其他贸易谈判加起来一样重要。”弗里德曼写道，很难知道哪一方在说真话。“如果华为真的是个坏角色，那就把证据拿出来，狠狠地封杀它。如果不那么明确，特朗普团队至少应该探讨任正非的提议，看看是否有一条路径能让华为向美国情报专家提供保证并展示良好行为。”[42]

In the interviews, Ren continued to praise Trump and his deputies. Asked by a CNN reporter what he would say to Trump, Ren replied, “I would tell him that he is great. No other country in the world can cut taxes in such a short period of time.”[43] Speaking with Bloomberg TV, he said, “Even if Huawei collapsed today, we would still be proud. Because it was Trump, not a nobody, that defeated us.”[44] Ren called Mike Pence “great” for fighting for his ideals and praised Mike Pompeo as well. “Mike Pompeo is also a great man, with a PhD degree in political science from Harvard University,” Ren said to CBS.[45]

在采访中，任正非继续赞扬特朗普及其下属。当被 CNN 记者问及他想对特朗普说些什么时，任正非回答说：“我会告诉他，他很伟大。世界上没有其他国家能在这么短的时间内减税。”[43] 在接受彭博电视采访时，他说：“即使华为今天倒闭了，我们仍然会感到自豪。因为击败我们的不是无名小卒，而是特朗普。”[44] 任正非称迈克·彭斯为理想而奋斗是“伟大的”，同时也赞扬了迈克·蓬佩奥。“迈克·蓬佩奥也是一位伟大的人物，拥有哈佛大学政治学博士学位，”任正非对 CBS 表示。[45]

Perhaps the one question he got the most was if Huawei helped China’s government spy. The journalists asked him that question week after week, sometimes citing China’s State Security Law, which says that companies are required to assist in investigations. Each time, Ren denied that Huawei had ever been asked by the Chinese government to aid espionage efforts and said that it would not be willing to do so if asked. “We will certainly say no to any such request,” Ren said.[46] He encouraged the reporters to check back in a couple of decades to see if any evidence had come out to the contrary.[47]

或许他被问到最多的一个问题就是华为是否帮助中国政府从事间谍活动。记者们周复一周地提出这个问题，有时还会引用中国的《国家安全法》，该法律规定公司有义务协助调查。每一次，任正非都否认中国政府曾要求华为协助间谍活动，并表示如果被要求，华为也不会愿意这样做。“对于任何此类请求，我们肯定会说不，”任正非说。[46] 他鼓励记者们几十年后再来核实，看看是否有任何相反的证据出现。[47]

Ren was also repeatedly asked about reports that former chairwoman Sun Yafang used to work for China’s intelligence agency, the MSS. In 2018, Sun had stepped down as chairwoman but was continuing to play a lower-key role, including serving as Huawei’s representative at the Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development, an international organization established by the UN.[48] Ren did not confirm or deny that Sun used to work for the MSS, but he said her background shouldn’t disqualify her from working at Huawei. “We cannot say that only people with a spotless record as elementary school students can be employed,” he told the BBC. “Our employees come from all different places. We need to assess their behavior, not where they are from.”[49]

任正非还多次被问及有关前董事长孙亚芳曾在中国情报机构——国家安全部工作的报道。2018 年，孙亚芳卸任董事长一职，但继续发挥着较为低调的作用，包括担任华为在联合国成立的国际组织“宽带可持续发展委员会”的代表。[48] 任正非没有确认或否认孙亚芳曾在国安部工作，但他表示她的背景不应使她失去在华为工作的资格。“我们不能说只有小学记录清白的人才能被录用，”他告诉英国广播公司（BBC）。“我们的员工来自五湖四海。我们需要评估的是他们的行为，而不是他们的出身。”[49]

Ren batted away questions about whether or not he was going to retire. He said that he continued to keep a regular work schedule, having breakfast at 7:30 a.m., then going into the office. “My wife often criticizes me and says that I don’t have many friends or hobbies,” he told CBS. “I reply that I do have hobbies: reading and writing documents. I especially enjoy working on documents.”[50]

任正非回绝了关于他是否即将退休的问题。他说自己继续保持着规律的作息，早上 7:30 吃早餐，然后去办公室。“我妻子经常批评我，说我没多少朋友，也没什么爱好，”他告诉哥伦比亚广播公司（CBS）。“我回答说我有爱好：阅读和撰写文件。我特别喜欢处理文件。”[50]

26

26

The Trial

审判

Meng’s Extradition Case: 2019–2021

孟晚舟引渡案：2019–2021

The hills around Vancouver turned flaming red as 2019 waned. Meng Wanzhou was coming up on a year under house arrest. At Huawei, she’d always been in meetings or on the road. Her aides packed her schedule so tightly that she’d sometimes gripe she didn’t even have time for a tea break.[1] Now she had nothing but time. She read, painted, looked at the autumn leaves. “If a busy life has eaten away at my time, then hardship has in turn drawn it back out,” she wrote.[2] Her husband came for stretches to keep her company, and the children came during breaks from school. Her mother also came to visit. As fall turned to winter, the security guards shoveled the walk. Meng sometimes spoke to her father by phone, though they didn’t believe the calls to be private, so they kept the talk at surface level.[3] Her bail terms gave her a long leash, but the leash was still there. When she’d stayed out on her back porch past 11:00 p.m. one night, she and her husband had been obliged to explain to the court that it was a one-off accident.

随着 2019 年接近尾声，温哥华周边的山峦变得火红。孟晚舟被软禁已近一年。在华为时，她总是忙于开会或奔波在路上。助手们把她的日程排得满满当当，以至于她有时会抱怨连喝茶的时间都没有。[1] 现如今，她除了时间一无所有。她读书、作画、观赏秋叶。“如果说繁忙的生活蚕食了我的时间，那么苦难则反过来将其拉长，”她写道。[2] 她的丈夫会过来陪她住上一段时间，孩子们则在学校放假期间过来。她的母亲也曾来探望。秋冬交替之际，安保人员会清扫步道上的积雪。孟晚舟有时会和父亲通电话，尽管他们认为通话并不保密，因此谈话内容仅停留在表面。[3] 她的保释条件给了她很大的自由空间，但束缚依然存在。有一晚她在后廊待到了晚上 11 点以后，她和丈夫不得不向法庭解释这只是个意外。

In China, Meng’s detention stirred up patriotic fervor. People put stickers on their cars that read Go Huawei, Go China. The Chinese embassy declared it “political persecution.”[4] Huawei phones were sold out in shops, as people snatched them up in support. In early 2015, Huawei had unveiled an ad featuring a close-up photograph of a ballet dancer’s feet, one in a pointe shoe, the other bare and bruised. Though the ad got mixed reviews from consumers, Huawei executives thought the image conveyed the company’s spirit of hard work and perseverance. Now a coffee shop on Huawei’s campus began serving drinks in paper cups emblazoned with the infamous bare ballerina foot juxtaposed alongside Meng’s foot, her ankle shackled with a monitor. “Meng Wanzhou’s foot and the bruised ballerina foot both reflect the hardship of success,” read the caption across the cups.

在中国，孟晚舟被拘押激起了爱国热潮。人们在车上贴上写有“华为加油，中国加油”的贴纸。中国大使馆称其为“政治迫害”。[4] 华为手机在商店里被抢购一空，人们以此表示支持。2015 年初，华为曾发布过一张广告，特写了一位芭蕾舞者的双脚，一只穿着足尖鞋，另一只则赤裸且伤痕累累。尽管消费者对这则广告褒贬不一，但华为高管认为这张图片传达了公司艰苦奋斗、坚持不懈的精神。现在，华为园区内的一家咖啡馆开始用纸杯供应饮品，杯身上印着那只著名的赤裸芭蕾舞足，旁边并列着孟晚舟的脚，脚踝上戴着电子监控脚镣。杯子上的说明文字写道：“孟晚舟的脚与伤痕累累的芭蕾舞足，都反映了成功的艰辛。”

Meng’s lawyers felt they had reason for optimism. Wasn’t it egregious, after all, that she had been questioned and searched for nearly three hours before being told she was under arrest and had the right to remain silent? The provisional arrest warrant issued by the Canadian court had commanded police to “immediately arrest” her.[5] Was a three-hour delay not a flouting of the court’s order? Meng’s legal team declared it an illegal search and detention, arguing that since due process was violated, the Vancouver judge was obliged to halt her extradition to the US.

孟晚舟的律师感到有理由乐观。毕竟，她在被告知被捕及拥有保持沉默的权利之前，被盘问和搜查了近三个小时，这难道不恶劣吗？加拿大法院签发的临时逮捕令曾命令警察“立即逮捕”她。[5] 三个小时的延迟难道不是对法庭命令的蔑视吗？孟晚舟的法律团队称这是一次非法的搜查和拘押，辩称由于正当程序遭到破坏，温哥华法官有义务停止将其引渡至美国。

To improve their odds, her defense lawyers were also presenting three other arguments for why the extradition hearings must be halted. First, they said that the Trump administration had corrupted the judicial process by seeking to use Meng as a “bargaining chip” in the trade war. Trump had said himself that he’d consider intervening “if I think it’s good for what will be certainly the largest trade deal ever made.” Second, they said that the Justice Department had misrepresented her 2013 PowerPoint presentation to HSBC, which was focused on Huawei’s Iran business, by only citing select parts of it. Third, they argued that Meng’s communication with a British bank about a Chinese company’s work in Iran lacked substantial connection to the United States and should not fall under the jurisdiction of a US court.[6]

为了增加胜算，她的辩护律师还提出了另外三项理由，主张必须停止引渡听证。首先，他们表示特朗普政府试图将孟晚舟作为贸易战中的“筹码”，从而腐蚀了司法程序。特朗普本人曾表示，如果他认为“这对达成史上最大的贸易协议有好处”，他会考虑干预。其次，他们称司法部通过仅引用部分内容，歪曲了她 2013 年向汇丰银行提交的关于华为伊朗业务的演示文稿。第三，他们辩称，孟晚舟与一家英国银行就一家中国公司在伊朗的工作进行的沟通，与美国缺乏实质性联系，不应受美国法院管辖。[6]

[picture]

Meng Wanzhou with her husband, Carlos Liu (second right), outside their house in Vancouver.

孟晚舟与丈夫刘晓棕（右二）在温哥华家门外。

Meng only needed to convince the judge that one of these arguments had validity. Some thought her chances were good. In fact, Canada’s ambassador to China, John McCallum, remarked to reporters that Meng might have a strong case against extradition, and that it would be “great for Canada” if the US dropped the issue.[7] As it turned out, this was too frank an opinion for a Canadian ambassador to make aloud. McCallum resigned soon afterward at the request of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Across the border, Huawei’s US lawyers were filing a slew of Freedom of Information Act requests with government agencies, seeking to learn what kind of evidence prosecutors might be holding in reserve.

孟晚舟只需要说服法官其中一个论点成立即可。有些人认为她的机会很大。事实上，加拿大驻华大使麦家廉（John McCallum）曾向记者评论说，孟晚舟在反对引渡方面可能有很强的理由，如果美国放弃此案，对“加拿大将是件好事”。[7] 事实证明，对于一名加拿大大使来说，这种观点表达得过于直白了。不久后，麦家廉应总理贾斯廷·特鲁多的要求辞职。在边境另一侧，华为的美国律师正向政府机构提交大量《信息自由法》申请，试图了解检察官可能掌握着什么样的预留证据。

[picture]

A coffee cup from a Huawei campus café draws a parallel between Meng Wanzhou’s wearing of a tracking anklet and the pain that ballerinas suffer to achieve greatness.

华为园区咖啡馆的一个咖啡杯，将孟晚舟佩戴追踪脚镣与芭蕾舞者为成就卓越所遭受的痛苦相类比。

—

Not everyone saw Meng as a martyr. Some in China quietly said that if she had broken the law, she should face the consequences like anyone else. And scandalous national news had broken that Meng and the two Michaels weren’t the only ones who’d been detained in December 2018: so had several former Huawei employees.

并非所有人都将孟晚舟视为烈士。中国国内也有人私下表示，如果她触犯了法律，就应该像其他人一样承担后果。此外，一则令人震惊的全国性新闻曝光：在 2018 年 12 月被拘留的不仅仅是孟晚舟和两名迈克尔，还有几名华为前员工。

One of them, Li Hongyuan, had been jailed for 251 days after Huawei reported him to police for alleged extortion; he was eventually released without charges. Another, Zeng Meng, had been detained while in Thailand on vacation and deported back to Shenzhen, where he was jailed for three months on varying allegations from Huawei before being released. These cases sparked a domestic backlash against the company, with people feeling that it had been exposed as a hypocrite and a bully. Even as it was protesting that its CFO had been unfairly detained, its executives hadn’t thought twice about throwing innocent employees behind bars. Too stark was the contrast between Meng’s cushy house arrest and the bleak jail conditions that Li and Zeng had endured.

其中一人名叫李洪元，在华为向警方举报其涉嫌敲诈勒索后被关押了 251 天；他最终被无罪释放。另一人曾梦，在泰国度假时被拘留并被遣返回深圳，因华为提出的各种指控被关押了三个月，随后获释。这些案件引发了国内对该公司的抵制，人们觉得它被揭露出了虚伪和霸道的一面。就在它抗议其首席财务官被不公拘押的同时，其高管们却毫不犹豫地将无辜员工送进监狱。孟晚舟舒适的软禁生活与李、曾两人所忍受的凄凉监狱环境形成了过于鲜明的对比。

Given the political sensitivities of the issue, it was remarkable that censors allowed the news to be published in China. But Chinese readers would not know that they were getting only half the story. A salient detail the domestic press could not report was that shortly before their detentions, these former Huawei employees had all been in the same online chat group, where they were discussing lodging protests against the company for what they believed was their improper firings. One of them had piped up to say that they had evidence of Huawei’s business dealings in Iran and wanted to expose it to the media. Zeng said he believed that their detentions had to do with the WeChat chatter about Iran, because when his colleague’s wife hired a lawyer to go see her husband in jail, the police told the lawyer it was a “sensitive case” and wouldn’t allow the detainee access to counsel. “This wasn’t normal,” Zeng said. “I realized this had something to do with my colleague saying in the WeChat group that he was part of the Iran project and was going to report it.”[8]

鉴于该问题的政治敏感性，审查机构允许这类新闻在中国发表是极不寻常的。但中国读者并不知道他们只了解到了故事的一半。国内媒体无法报道的一个显著细节是，在被拘留前不久，这些华为前员工都在同一个在线聊天群里，讨论针对他们认为的不当解雇向公司提出抗议。其中一人曾插话称，他们掌握了华为在伊朗业务往来的证据，并想向媒体曝光。曾表示，他相信他们的被拘留与微信上关于伊朗的聊天有关，因为当他同事的妻子聘请律师去监狱探视丈夫时，警方告诉律师这是一个“敏感案件”，不允许被拘留者会见律师。“这不正常，”曾说，“我意识到这与我同事在微信群里说他是伊朗项目的一员并准备举报有关。”[8]

Meanwhile, Canada’s Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor had, by this point, been detained in China for a full year. Kovrig had spent the first five months in Beijing, placed in solitary confinement inside a padded cell, with relentless rounds of interrogation, including questioning about his prior diplomatic work, in apparent violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. He had then been transferred to a cell with multiple cellmates. In the transfer process, his glasses were confiscated for containing metal, and it was more than a month before he was able to obtain a replacement pair. As for Spavor, he was at a detention center in Dandong, near China’s northeast border with North Korea. He shared a cell with up to eighteen other detainees and was only allowed fifteen minutes outside his cell each day.[9] Both men endured sensory manipulation, with the lights in their cells kept on day and night. “They have not had access to a lawyer and have been denied contact with their families and loved ones,” Canada’s minister of foreign affairs, François-Philippe Champagne, told the public in a statement. “These two Canadians are and will remain our absolute priority.”[10]

与此同时，加拿大的康明凯（Michael Kovrig）和迈克尔·斯帕弗（Michael Spavor）此时已被中国拘留整整一年。康明凯在北京度过了前五个月，被单独关押在加垫的牢房里，接受了轮番不断的审讯，包括关于他此前外交工作的询问，这显然违反了《维也纳外交关系公约》。随后他被转移到一间有数名室友的牢房。在转移过程中，他的眼镜因含有金属被没收，一个多月后他才拿到替换的眼镜。至于斯帕弗，他被关押在靠近中国东北与朝鲜边境的丹东看守所。他与多达 18 名其他被拘留者共用一间牢房，每天只允许在牢房外活动 15 分钟。[9] 两人都遭受了感官操纵，牢房里的灯昼夜长明。“他们无法会见律师，也被剥夺了与家人和亲人联系的机会，”加拿大外交部长商鹏飞（François-Philippe Champagne）在给公众的一份声明中表示，“这两名加拿大人现在是、也将永远是我们的绝对优先事项。”[10]

—

Meng’s extradition hearing began on January 20, 2020, more than a year after her detention in Vancouver. A press gaggle had gathered at daybreak outside her house, and she had given them a polite but distant “Good morning” as she climbed into her black SUV.

孟晚舟的引渡听证会于 2020 年 1 月 20 日开始，距离她在温哥华被拘留已过去一年多。天刚亮，一群记者就聚集在她家门外，她在爬进黑色 SUV 时，礼貌但疏离地对他们说了声“早上好”。

When Meng had first begun her house arrest, she’d shied away from the press. On days she had to appear in court, her SUV would whisk her to the courthouse’s underground parking garage, and she would try to rush past the TV cameras on her way in, sometimes with her face obscured by a hat. But that day, she walked out of her house with a smile and greeted the press pack. When her SUV arrived at the courthouse, she walked aboveground through the front door. Wow, where did that one-eighty come from? thought David Molko, a journalist covering the trial for a Canadian TV station. As Meng strode by, head held high, the reporters saw that there had been a change of strategy. “The Huawei team understood that winning the PR victory among the Canadian public—or at least making that impression—was as important, if not more important, than what was happening inside the courtroom,” Molko said.[11]

孟晚舟刚开始被软禁时，她一直回避媒体。在必须出庭的日子里，她的 SUV 会迅速将她送到法院的地下停车场，她会试图在进入时冲过电视摄像机，有时用帽子遮住脸。但那天，她微笑着走出家门，向记者群打招呼。当她的 SUV 到达法院时，她从正门步行进入。哇，这种 180 度的大转变是从哪儿来的？ 为加拿大一家电视台报道审判的记者大卫·莫尔科（David Molko）心想。当孟晚舟昂首阔步走过时，记者们看到策略发生了变化。“华为团队明白，在加拿大公众中赢得公关胜利——或者至少制造出这种印象——与法庭内发生的事情同样重要，甚至更重要，”莫尔科说。[11]

The first phase of the hearing would be to determine something called “double criminality.” This meant that the conduct Meng was accused of had to be illegal in both Canada and the US in order for the extradition to proceed. The double criminality issue helped explain why a case that seemed, at first glance, to be about Iran sanctions was stuck on this question of whether Meng had misled a bank. In 2018, the US had reinstated sanctions on Iran after Trump withdrew from an international nuclear deal in a much-criticized move. Canada had not followed suit. Meng’s lawyers now argued that the threshold requirement of double criminality had not been met, as the crux of the US government’s case against Huawei had to do with violations of Iran sanctions, which Canada did not enforce. “It’s all based on sanctions,” defense lawyer Richard Peck said. “Canada is a sovereign nation. We have our own heritage, our own ethos, our own identity, our own standards, our own laws.”[12] Prosecutors retorted that the charges against her were for bank fraud, which was clearly illegal in both countries.

听证会的第一阶段是确定所谓的“双重犯罪”。这意味着孟晚舟被指控的行为必须在加拿大和美国都属于违法，引渡才能进行。双重犯罪问题有助于解释，为什么一个乍看之下关乎伊朗制裁的案件，会卡在孟晚舟是否误导了银行这一问题上。2018 年，在特朗普退出一项国际核协议这一备受批评的举动后，美国恢复了对伊朗的制裁。加拿大并未效仿。孟晚舟的律师现在辩称，双重犯罪的门槛要求并未满足，因为美国政府对华为指控的核心与违反伊朗制裁有关，而加拿大并不执行这些制裁。“这完全是基于制裁，”辩护律师理查德·派克（Richard Peck）说，“加拿大是一个主权国家。我们有自己的传承、自己的民族精神、自己的身份、自己的标准和自己的法律。”[12] 检察官反驳称，对她的指控是银行欺诈，这在两国显然都是违法的。

Three days into Meng’s extradition hearing, a fifty-six-year-old man with a fever and dry cough arrived by ambulance to a Toronto hospital. The man had felt ill since traveling to Wuhan, the Chinese city where many of Huawei’s senior executives attended university, and which was about to become known as ground zero of the COVID-19 pandemic. As that first COVID patient was being confirmed in Canada, Wuhan’s eleven million residents had just received the shocking news that their city was being locked down. No one was allowed in or out except for emergency vehicles. No one knew what this mysterious disease was or how things would turn out. For its part, Huawei had gotten an urgent phone call. Wuhan was building a massive new field hospital that needed to be completed within two weeks. A team of Huawei engineers was rushed in to set up a 5G connection so that those sealed inside could communicate with the outside. “I won’t get infected. I haven’t had a girlfriend yet,” one young Huawei engineer joked as he prepared to go.[13] Overseas, Huawei adopted its traditional disaster response of throwing itself into relief efforts. It offered up thermal scanners and millions of masks to governments around the world. Officials in Canada and France found themselves pushed to publicly deny that Huawei’s mask donations would sway their decisions on 5G suppliers.[14]

在孟晚舟引渡听证会进行的第三天，一名发烧并干咳的 56 岁男子乘救护车抵达多伦多的一家医院。该男子自前往武汉后就感到不适。武汉是许多华为高管就读大学的城市，也即将成为众所周知的 COVID-19 大流行的零点。就在加拿大确认首例新冠患者时，武汉的 1100 万居民刚刚收到城市封锁的震惊消息。除了应急车辆外，任何人不得进出。没有人知道这种神秘的疾病是什么，也不知道结果会如何。就华为而言，它接到了一个紧急电话。武汉正在建设一座大型的新型方舱医院，需要在两周内完工。一组华为工程师被紧急派往现场建立 5G 连接，以便被封锁在里面的人能与外界沟通。“我不会被感染的，我还没谈过女朋友呢，”一名年轻的华为工程师在准备出发时开玩笑说。[13] 在海外，华为采取了其传统的灾难应对方式，全身心投入到救援工作中。它向世界各地的政府提供热像仪和数百万个口罩。加拿大和法国的官员发现自己不得不公开否认华为捐赠口罩会影响他们在 5G 供应商问题上的决定。[14]

In May 2020, as Meng awaited the judge’s ruling on the question of double criminality, her team members were upbeat enough that they chartered a plane so she could fly out quickly if there was good news. They also did a group photo shoot on the court steps as a final memento. But the news was disappointing. The judge sided with prosecutors, ruling that since bank fraud was illegal in both Canada and the US, the extradition hearings would continue.[15] Hard on the heels of the ruling, Chinese prosecutors formally charged the two Michaels with espionage—after they had been held for 550 days without charges and without being able to speak to their lawyers. In China, opaque national security regulations allowed authorities to keep someone detained almost indefinitely before charging them. And once they were charged in a high-profile case like this, the probability that they would be found guilty was close to 100 percent.

2020 年 5 月，正当孟等待法官就“双重犯罪”问题做出裁决时，她的团队成员情绪乐观，甚至包下了一架飞机，以便在有好消息时让她能迅速飞离。他们还在法院台阶上拍摄了集体照作为最后的纪念。但消息令人失望。法官支持检方，裁定由于银行欺诈在加拿大和美国均属违法，引渡听证会将继续进行。[15] 裁决下达后不久，中国检察机关正式指控两名迈克尔犯有间谍罪——此时他们已被关押了 550 天，期间未获指控，也无法与律师交谈。在中国，不透明的国家安全法规允许当局在起诉前几乎无限期地拘留某人。而一旦在这样备受瞩目的案件中被起诉，被判有罪的概率就接近 100%。

Around this time, Meng’s younger half sister, Annabel Yao, graduated from Harvard University with a bachelor’s degree in computer science.[16] Due to the pandemic, the ceremony was held virtually. “I guess this isn’t exactly the senior post that I’ve rehearsed so many times in my head,” she wrote on Instagram, posting an old photo of herself outside Harvard’s Widener Library. “Here’s to being ‘broken up over text’ by Harvard after devoting 3.75 years of our souls to this school.”[17]

大约在这个时候，孟同父异母的妹妹姚安娜从哈佛大学毕业，获得计算机科学学士学位。[16] 受疫情影响，毕业典礼改为线上举行。“我想这并不完全是我在脑海中排练过无数次的那条毕业动态，”她在 Instagram 上写道，并配了一张自己在哈佛怀德纳图书馆外的旧照。“致在我们将 3.75 年的灵魂奉献给这所学校后，被哈佛‘通过短信分手’的我们。”[17]

In Vancouver, Meng and her security guards regarded each other with a new distrust, forced to breathe one another’s air as they shared car rides and other tight spaces. It did not go unnoticed among her guards that when Meng’s husband and their children flew over from Hong Kong for the winter holiday, they did not quarantine separately as they were supposed to. For Christmas, Meng’s group booked out a restaurant for a fourteen-person dinner party in disregard of Vancouver’s social-distancing rules.[18] Images from Meng’s group photo shoot had also leaked, showing Meng and her friends standing in a tight cluster, none of them wearing masks.

在温哥华，孟和她的安保人员带着一种新的不信任感审视着彼此，由于共乘汽车和其他狭窄空间，他们被迫呼吸着彼此的空气。安保人员注意到，当孟的丈夫和孩子们从香港飞来过冬假时，他们并没有按规定进行单独隔离。圣诞节期间，孟的一行人不顾温哥华的社交距离规定，包下了一家餐厅举行 14 人的晚宴。[18] 孟的集体照也流传了出来，照片显示孟和她的朋友们紧紧聚在一起，没有人戴口罩。

Meng’s lawyers tried to get her bail terms loosened at one point, arguing that the rotating security detail put her at risk of contracting COVID. Prosecutors pushed back, pointing out that Meng didn’t seem overly concerned about COVID, what with her group dinners, shopping sprees to high-end retailers, and hangouts with maskless friends. Some of the details of her lavish lifestyle outraged Canadians, given the plight of the two Michaels. For much of the past year, Chinese authorities had denied them their monthly consular visits—their only connection to the outside world—citing pandemic-control restrictions. Kovrig had been permitted just two phone calls to family in two years; Spavor, just one.

孟的律师曾试图申请放宽保释条件，理由是轮换的安保小组让她面临感染新冠的风险。检方予以反击，指出孟似乎并不怎么担心新冠，因为她参加集体晚宴、去高端零售店疯狂购物，还与不戴口罩的朋友聚会。鉴于两名迈克尔的处境，她奢华生活的一些细节令加拿大人感到愤怒。在过去一年的大部分时间里，中国当局以防疫限制为由，拒绝了他们每月的领事访问——这是他们与外界唯一的联系。康明凯在两年内仅获准给家人打两次电话；斯帕弗仅获准打一次。

Meng’s request to have her bail conditions loosened was denied.

孟放宽保释条件的请求被驳回。

—

A year into the sanctions, Huawei was still alive. By some measures, it was even curiously on the ascent. It was still the world’s number-one vendor of telecom gear, aided by Beijing’s ambitions to construct the world’s earliest and largest 5G network. China was already rolling out Huawei and ZTE 5G base stations across the country, even as most nations were still formulating their 5G plans. Huawei had also become the world’s number-one smartphone vendor for the first time, in the second quarter of 2020, as rivals like Samsung saw sales plummet during the pandemic. The Trump administration was not pleased. It squeezed harder.

制裁实施一年后，华为依然挺立。从某些指标来看，它甚至呈现出一种奇特的上升势头。在北京建设全球最早、规模最大的 5G 网络的雄心助推下，它仍是全球第一大电信设备供应商。当大多数国家还在制定 5G 计划时，中国已经在全国范围内部署华为和中兴的 5G 基站。2020 年第二季度，由于三星等竞争对手在疫情期间销量暴跌，华为还首次成为全球第一大智能手机厂商。特朗普政府对此并不高兴，于是加大了施压。

“Any country that uses it, we’re not going to do anything in terms of sharing intelligence,” Trump said in a rambling appearance on Fox & Friends. “Absolutely, Huawei is a disaster. They used to have free rein over our country. They know everything—they knew everything we were doing. Huawei is a way of—is really—I call it ‘the Spyway.’ What happens is Huawei comes out, and they spy on our country. This is very intricate stuff. You have microchips. You have things that you can’t even see. The average person and beyond the average person. The people that do this can’t even find it. No, they spy.”[19]

“任何使用它的国家，我们都不会在情报共享方面做任何事，”特朗普在《福克斯与朋友们》节目中漫谈时说道。“绝对的，华为是一场灾难。他们过去在我们的国家畅通无阻。他们知道一切——他们知道我们所做的一切。华为是一种——实际上是——我称之为‘间谍路’（Spyway）。发生的情况是华为出现了，然后他们监视我们的国家。这是非常复杂的东西。你有微芯片。你有甚至看不见的东西。普通人甚至超越普通人的人。做这些事的人甚至都找不到它。不，他们在监视。”[19]

In February 2020, the Justice Department filed an expanded indictment against Huawei, accusing the company of lying to banks about not only its business in Iran but also its activities in North Korea. Prosecutors accused Huawei of concealing its North Korea projects, including by instructing a supplier to omit Huawei’s logo from shipments to North Korea in 2013, and by referring to the country by the code name “A9.”

2020 年 2 月，司法部对华为提交了一份扩大起诉书，指控该公司不仅在伊朗业务上，而且在北韩的活动上也对银行撒谎。检察官指控华为隐瞒其北韩项目，包括在 2013 年指示一家供应商在运往北韩的货物中隐去华为标志，并用代号“A9”称呼该国。

Weeks later, Trump signed into law a bill earmarking up to $1 billion for small rural US carriers to “rip and replace” Huawei and ZTE gear. As they grasped for more levers to pull, Attorney General William Barr even made the unusual suggestion that the US government should buy a controlling stake in Nokia or Ericsson to counter Huawei, which Vice President Mike Pence and White House economic adviser Larry Kudlow quickly walked back. The US government was “not in the business of buying companies,” Kudlow said.

几周后，特朗普签署了一项法案，拨专款高达 10 亿美元用于美国小型农村运营商“拆除并更换”华为和中兴的设备。在他们寻找更多可利用的杠杆时，司法部长威廉·巴尔甚至提出了一个不同寻常的建议，即美国政府应购买诺基亚或爱立信的控股权以对抗华为，但副总统迈克·彭斯和白宫经济顾问拉里·库德洛迅速收回了这一说法。库德洛表示，美国政府“不从事收购公司的业务”。

What the US government was in the business of doing was blocking the export of US technology to entities considered a security threat. In May 2020, the Commerce Department tightened the sanctions on Huawei, preventing not only the direct sale of US technology to the company but also the sale of any chips that were made using US technology without a special license. This new rule was wonky, but its implications for Huawei were massive. While Huawei had been designing some of its chips in-house through HiSilicon, it relied on the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC, to produce them. When it came to manufacturing advanced chips, TSMC was the very best. One time when Ren met with TSMC’s founder, Morris Chang, the two men marveled at how their lives had diverged. Born thirteen years before Ren in mainland China, Chang had also spent his early years in the tumult of war, but had left in 1949 to study at Harvard University. After a flourishing career at Texas Instruments, he’d moved to Taiwan and went on to build the most advanced chip manufacturer in the world. “Why have the two of us walked different paths?” Chang mused.[20] Ren replied that Taiwan was decades ahead of the mainland in opening up to the world, decades ahead in developing technology. TSMC had supplied Huawei for years, but now, under the threat of sanctions, it could not risk losing access to US technology to run its own operations. TSMC shut its doors to Huawei.

美国政府当时致力于阻止向被视为安全威胁的实体出口美国技术。2020 年 5 月，商务部收紧了对华为的制裁，不仅禁止直接向该公司销售美国技术，还禁止在没有特殊许可证的情况下销售任何利用美国技术制造的芯片。这项新规定虽然晦涩难懂，但对华为的影响却是巨大的。尽管华为一直通过海思半导体自主设计部分芯片，但它依赖台湾积体电路制造公司（简称台积电，TSMC）来生产这些芯片。在制造先进芯片方面，台积电是业界的佼佼者。有一次任正非与台积电创始人张忠谋会面时，两人感叹彼此的人生轨迹是如何分道扬镳的。张忠谋比任正非大 13 岁，出生于中国大陆，早年同样在战乱中度过，但他于 1949 年离开并前往哈佛大学深造。在德州仪器度过了辉煌的职业生涯后，他移居台湾，并着手建立了世界上最先进的芯片制造厂。“为什么我们两个走上了不同的道路？”张忠谋沉思道。[20]任正非回答说，台湾在向世界开放方面领先大陆几十年，在技术发展方面也领先几十年。台积电多年来一直为华为供货，但现在，在制裁的威胁下，它不能冒着失去使用美国技术运行自身业务的风险。台积电对华为关上了大门。

Huawei’s only hope now was for China’s domestic chip foundry, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, or SMIC, to learn how to produce advanced chips at lightning speeds. This was a real Hail Mary: SMIC had been endeavoring for two decades to advance its technologies but still lagged several generations behind global leaders in advanced chipmaking.

华为现在的唯一希望寄托在中国本土芯片代工厂——中芯国际（SMIC）身上，寄望其能以闪电般的速度学会生产先进芯片。这无异于孤注一掷：中芯国际二十年来一直致力于提升技术，但在先进芯片制造方面仍落后于全球领先者数代。

This second round of US sanctions cut deep. In July 2020, citing the new US sanctions, the UK announced that it was reversing its position on Huawei and would remove all Huawei equipment from the nation’s 5G networks by the end of 2027.[21] British officials said that due to the sanctions, Huawei could no longer use trusted international suppliers, increasing the level of its risk. This was a major win for Washington, which for several years had been pushing the UK to quit Huawei. “The British were in an impossible position,” said Vince Cable, former UK secretary of state for business, innovation, and skills. “They basically accepted that if the American boycott of sensitive components was operational, the British couldn’t act independently. So the government changed its view.”[22]

第二轮美国制裁影响深远。2020 年 7 月，英国援引美国的新制裁措施，宣布扭转其在华为问题上的立场，并将在 2027 年底前从该国 5G 网络中移除所有华为设备。[21]英国官员表示，由于制裁，华为无法再使用值得信赖的国际供应商，这增加了其风险水平。这对华盛顿来说是一个重大胜利，多年来华盛顿一直向英国施压，要求其弃用华为。“英国人处于一个不可能的境地，”前英国商业、创新与技能大臣文斯·凯布尔表示。“他们基本上接受了这样一个事实：如果美国对敏感组件的抵制生效，英国就无法独立行动。因此，政府改变了看法。”[22]

Over the summer, Canada, which had worked with Huawei for 4G, also effectively shut the company out of its 5G networks, with its two major operators, Bell Canada and Telus, opting for Ericsson and Nokia as 5G suppliers. This meant that Washington had succeeded in getting all of the Five Eyes—the intelligence alliance consisting of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to ditch Huawei. However, Canada, still suffering from the fallout of Meng’s detention and also trying to negotiate the two Michaels’ release, did not institute a formal ban.

那个夏天，曾在 4G 领域与华为合作的加拿大也实际上将该公司排除在其 5G 网络之外，其两大运营商贝尔加拿大和研科（Telus）选择爱立信和诺基亚作为 5G 供应商。这意味着华盛顿已成功促使“五眼联盟”——由澳大利亚、加拿大、新西兰、英国和美国组成的清报联盟——全部弃用华为。然而，加拿大仍受孟晚舟被拘留事件的影响，并试图就两名迈克尔的释放进行谈判，因此并未发布正式禁令。

Much of continental Europe was reluctant to fall in line with a Trump-led Huawei ban. After members of the European Parliament visited Washington in February 2020 to participate in talks on high-tech and security issues, they put this in the summary of their trip: “With today’s end-to-end encryption technology, it is possible to run ultra-secure applications on untrusted hardware or potentially insecure hardware. The Huawei issue is clearly therefore more political and commercial than technical.”[23]

欧洲大陆的大部分国家并不愿意追随特朗普领导的华为禁令。2020 年 2 月，欧洲议会议员访问华盛顿参加高科技和安全问题会谈后，在行程总结中写道：“凭借当今的端到端加密技术，在不可信的硬件或潜在不安全的硬件上运行超安全的应用是可能的。因此，华为问题显然更多是政治和商业问题，而非技术问题。”[23]

One former senior British security official recalled a heated meeting at which a British minister demanded that they work harder with Five Eyes partners to build alternatives to Huawei. “What do you want me to do?” he said he retorted. “Do you want me to phone up Admiral Rogers at the NSA, or General Nakasone at the NSA, and say, ‘Do you fancy building a telco to rival Huawei?’ ”[24]

一位前英国高级安全官员回忆起一次激烈的会议，会上的一位英国部长要求他们更努力地与五眼联盟伙伴合作，以建立华为的替代方案。“你想让我怎么做？”他回忆自己反驳道，“你想让我给国家安全局（NSA）的罗杰斯上将或中曾根将军打电话，问他们：‘你们想建一个能与华为匹敌的电信公司吗？’”[24]

The Trump administration was now touting a “Clean Network” of global telecom networks that did not use Huawei or ZTE. The term drew swift backlash from some foreign-policy observers, who pointed out its place in the long, racist tradition of suggesting that something foreign is “dirty.” “Is it just me or does calling for a ‘clean’ network and only mentioning removing Chinese tech and companies make China ‘dirty’ and therefore all racist AF?” asked Simon Sharwood, Asia-Pacific editor for the British technology publication The Register, on Twitter.[25] “The repetition of the word ‘clean’…Pompeo & his racist dogwhistle at it again,” tweeted Juan Ortiz Freuler, an affiliate at Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center, a hub for cyberspace research.[26] Susan Ariel Aaronson, an international affairs professor at George Washington University, called the Trump administration’s use of the term “racist and paranoid.”

特朗普政府当时正在吹捧一个不使用华为或中兴设备的全球电信网络“清洁网络”（Clean Network）。这个词遭到了部分外交政策观察人士的迅速抵制，他们指出这个词带有长久以来暗示外国事物是“肮脏”的种族主义传统。英国技术刊物《The Register》的亚太区编辑西蒙·沙伍德在 Twitter 上问道：“是只有我这么觉得，还是这种呼吁‘清洁’网络并只提到移除中国技术和公司的做法，让中国显得‘肮脏’，从而显得极其种族主义？”[25]“反复使用‘清洁’这个词……蓬佩奥和他那套种族主义暗示又来了，”哈佛大学伯克曼·克莱因互联网与社会研究中心（网络空间研究枢纽）的成员胡安·奥尔蒂斯·弗罗伊勒在推特上写道。[26]乔治·华盛顿大学国际事务教授苏珊·阿里尔·阿伦森称特朗普政府使用该词是“种族主义且偏执的”。

Nevertheless, Pompeo announced five “Clean” initiatives to combat Huawei and other Chinese tech companies: Clear Carrier, Clean Store, Clean Apps, Clean Cloud, and Clean Cable. He also encouraged other nations to become “Clean Countries.” “We’ve urged countries to become Clean Countries so that citizens’ private information doesn’t end up in the hand of the Chinese Communist Party,” Pompeo said.[27] The State Department announced in August 2020 that it had built a coalition of thirty “Clean Countries,” including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, Israel, Japan, Sweden, and Vietnam. Some countries were less than thrilled to join the club. In Eswatini, the African country previously called Swaziland, Keith Krach welcomed officials into the Clean Network through a festive ceremony. Weeks later, Eswatini quietly withdrew. An Eswatini official was quoted in Chinese state media as saying that the kingdom believed it should place “equal emphasis on development and security.”[28]

尽管如此，蓬佩奥还是宣布了五项旨在打击华为及其他中国科技公司的“清洁”倡议：清洁运营商、清洁商店、清洁应用、清洁云和清洁电缆。他还鼓励其他国家成为“清洁国家”。“我们已敦促各国成为清洁国家，以确保公民的私人信息不会落入中国共产党手中，”蓬佩奥表示。[27] 美国国务院于 2020 年 8 月宣布，已建立了一个由三十个“清洁国家”组成的联盟，其中包括英国、加拿大、澳大利亚、法国、以色列、日本、瑞典和越南。有些国家对加入这个俱乐部并不那么热衷。在埃斯瓦蒂尼（这个非洲国家此前被称为斯威士兰），基思·克拉奇通过一场喜庆的仪式欢迎官员们加入清洁网络。几周后，埃斯瓦蒂尼悄然退出。中国官方媒体援引一名埃斯瓦蒂尼官员的话称，该王国认为应“发展与安全并重”。[28]

Ren Zhengfei’s team was putting on a brave face, but Huawei’s business was floundering in the face of the Trump administration’s multipronged attack. Ren made the bitter decision to cut off some limbs. The first to go was the company’s undersea cable joint venture, Huawei Marine Systems Co. The unit had put Huawei in the business of carrying the world’s data between continents, in competition with Microsoft, Google, and Facebook. Huawei Marine Systems had laid some thirty-one thousand miles of undersea cable over ninety projects. But with all the geopolitical pressure, it was hard for Huawei Marine Systems to do business. Huawei announced that it was selling its 51 percent stake to a Chinese buyer.

任正非的团队表现得无所畏惧，但在特朗普政府的多管齐下攻击下，华为的业务正陷入困境。任正非做出了断臂求生的痛苦决定。首先被剥离的是该公司的海底电缆合资企业——华为海洋网络有限公司。该部门让华为跻身于跨大洲承载全球数据的业务中，与微软、谷歌和脸书展开竞争。华为海洋已在 90 个项目中铺设了约 3.1 万英里的海底电缆。但在重重地缘政治压力下，华为海洋很难开展业务。华为宣布将其持有的 51%股份出售给一家中国买家。

In November 2020, the company revealed that it was also selling off its cherished Honor smartphone line to a consortium. Aggressively priced, sleekly designed, and promoted through viral marketing campaigns to tech-savvy young consumers, Huawei’s Honor phones had rocketed the company to number one in smartphone sales globally, dethroning Samsung and Apple. But the US sanctions cut Honor smartphones off from their key components—Qualcomm processors and Google’s Android operating system. Ren decided that Honor’s hopes for survival depended on it striking out alone. “Become Huawei’s strongest global competitor, surpass Huawei, and even shout ‘Down with Huawei,’ ” Ren told the departing team. “Make this a motivational slogan for yourselves.”

2020 年 11 月，该公司透露还将把其珍视的荣耀（Honor）智能手机业务出售给一个财团。凭借极具竞争力的价格、时尚的设计以及针对科技敏感型年轻消费者的病毒式营销活动，华为的荣耀手机曾助力公司跃居全球智能手机销量第一，超越了三星和苹果。但美国的制裁切断了荣耀智能手机的关键零部件供应——高通处理器和谷歌的安卓操作系统。任正非认定，荣耀生存的希望取决于独立发展。“做华为全球最强的竞争对手，超越华为，甚至喊出‘打倒华为’，”任正非对离职团队说。“把这作为你们的激励口号。”

Behind closed doors, Huawei was racing with SMIC and others to figure out how to make the chips it needed. This was a sensitive project, with national significance, and the company kept a cone of silence around the endeavor in public. Rumors circulated of secret microchip factories. Ren appealed for help from the nation’s top scientific minds. “We as a company cannot do two things at once: make products and manufacture chips,” he told researchers from China’s elite Peking and Tsinghua Universities.[29]

在闭门会议中，华为正与中芯国际等公司赛跑，研究如何制造所需的芯片。这是一个具有国家意义的敏感项目，公司在公开场合对这一努力保持缄默。有关秘密微芯片工厂的传闻四起。任正非向国家顶尖的科学头脑寻求帮助。“我们作为一家公司不能同时做两件事：既做产品又造芯片，”他对来自中国精英学府北京大学和清华大学的研究人员说道。[29]

To the outside world, Ren no longer talked too much of defeating rivals or becoming the global leader. He said Huawei’s goal was simply to survive.

对外界而言，任正非不再过多谈论击败对手或成为全球领导者。他说华为的目标仅仅是生存。

—

Protesters sometimes stood outside Meng’s house in Vancouver with a banner calling for the Chinese government to release Uyghur detainees from camps in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region.[30] There was growing international horror about the government’s Uyghur detention campaign, which reportedly included torture and forced labor. Foreign researchers said the campaign met the United Nations’ definition of “crimes against humanity.” Some activists and scholars also described it as a “cultural genocide.”

抗议者有时会站在孟晚舟位于温哥华的家门外，打着横幅要求中国政府释放中国西北新疆地区[30]营地中的维吾尔族被拘留者。国际社会对政府在新疆开展的维吾尔族拘留行动日益感到震惊，据报道其中涉及酷刑和强迫劳动。外国研究人员表示，这一行动符合联合国对“危害人类罪”的定义。一些活动人士和学者也将其描述为“文化灭绝”。

There was a vague understanding among China watchers that Huawei might have something to do with the Xinjiang crackdown, though the specifics were largely unknown. Huawei’s executives maintained that if the company’s products ended up in Xinjiang, it was through third parties, and they didn’t know how their customers used them.

中国观察家们模糊地意识到华为可能与新疆的镇压行动有关，尽管具体细节在很大程度上尚不为人知。华为高管坚称，如果公司的产品最终出现在新疆，那也是通过第三方进入的，他们并不清楚客户是如何使用这些产品的。

From one perspective, Huawei was simply following well-trod footsteps in being purposefully dense about how its technologies were being used. After all, IBM had supplied punch-card computing systems to the Nazis, who used them in their concentration camps during World War II, with IBM executives later protesting that they hadn’t known.[31] Cisco had helped China build its Great Firewall, marketing the gear as being able to help Beijing crack down on dissidents.[32] When employees at Nortel’s precursor, Bell-Northern Research, were unhappy that the company was hosting the Soviet Union’s leader, Leonid Brezhnev, back in the day, the company’s president, Don Chisholm, emailed staff to say that anyone who disagreed could take the day off.[33]

从某种角度来看，华为在对其技术用途刻意保持模糊方面，只是在步前人的后尘。毕竟，IBM 曾向纳粹提供打孔卡计算系统，纳粹在二战期间将其用于集中营，而 IBM 高管后来抗辩称他们对此并不知情。[31] 思科曾帮助中国建设“防火长城”，并在营销中宣称该设备能帮助北京打击异见人士。[32] 当北电网络的前身贝尔-北方研究公司的员工对公司当年接待苏联领导人列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫感到不满时，公司总裁唐·奇泽姆给员工发邮件称，任何不同意的人都可以放假一天。[33]

In June 2019, Huawei’s global cybersecurity officer, John Suffolk, had been hauled before the UK House of Commons’ Science and Technology Committee to be grilled on the topic.[34]

2019 年 6 月，华为全球网络安全官约翰·萨福克被带到英国下议院科学技术委员会，就该话题接受质询。[34]

“Do you have no concern about being, in a sense, complicit with such outrageous human rights abuses?” asked the committee chair, Norman Lamb, a thin man with a shock of white hair.

“从某种意义上说，你们成了这种令人发指的人权侵犯行为的帮凶，难道你们一点都不担心吗？”委员会主席诺曼·兰姆问道，他是一个身材瘦削、满头白发的男人。

“I do not think it is for us to make such judgments,” Suffolk replied. “Our judgment is: Is it legal within the countries in which we operate?”

“我认为不应由我们来做出此类判断，”萨福克回答道。“我们的判断标准是：这在我们经营的国家是否合法？”

“Should we do business with a company that is complicit in human rights abuses?”

“我们是否应该与一家参与人权侵犯的公司做生意？”

“I think you should do business with all companies that stick to the law.”

“我认为你们应该与所有守法的公司做生意。”

“There is a lot of law in China, isn’t there?” asked Julian Lewis, chair of the Defence Select Committee. “Just like there was a lot of law in Nazi Germany.”

“中国有很多法律，不是吗？”国防特别委员会主席朱利安·刘易斯问道。“就像纳粹德国也有很多法律一样。”

“We do not make judgments about whether laws are right or wrong. It is for others to make those judgments.”

“我们不对法律的对错做出判断。那是其他人该做的判断。”

“Do you have a view as to whether China is a one-party state?”

“对于中国是否是一个一党制国家，你有什么看法吗？”

“China is a one-party state, yes.”

“中国是一个一党制国家，是的。”

“Do you have a view as to whether that Chinese one-party state is repressive of human rights?”

“对于那个中国一党制国家是否压制人权，你有什么看法吗？”

“I don’t have a view on that, no.”

“我对此没有看法，没有。”

“You don’t have a personal view on that.”

“你对此没有个人看法。”

“I don’t have a personal view on that.”

“我对此没有个人看法。”

“You are a moral vacuum.”

“你就是一个道德真空。”

“I don’t believe so, no.”

“我不这么认为，不。”

—

In the latter part of 2020, new details emerged of Huawei’s participation in the government’s crackdown on Uyghurs. A small Pennsylvania-based research outlet called IPVM published an internal report from Huawei outlining the company’s tests of a facial-recognition system.[35]

2020 年下半年，华为参与政府镇压维吾尔族人的新细节浮出水面。一家名为 IPVM、总部位于宾夕法尼亚州的小型研究机构发布了一份华为内部报告，概述了该公司对人脸识别系统的测试。[35]

“Huawei Confidential, No Circulation Without Permission,” it said across each page. Dated January 8, 2018, the seven-page PDF was an “interoperability” report outlining the test performance of a facial-recognition tracking system built jointly by Huawei and a partner company, Megvii, one of China’s largest facial-recognition providers. It listed dozens of functions they had tested, such as “real-time face capture” and “offline maps.” There were two lines that jumped out:

“华为机密，未经许可不得传阅，”这几个字出现在每一页上。这份日期为 2018 年 1 月 8 日、长达七页的 PDF 是一份“互操作性”报告，概述了由华为与合作伙伴旷视科技（Megvii，中国最大的人脸识别供应商之一）共同构建的人脸识别追踪系统的测试性能。报告列出了他们测试的数十项功能，如“实时人脸抓拍”和“离线地图”。其中有两行文字格外引人注目：

Supports Offline File Uyghur Alarm: Passed

支持离线文件维吾尔族报警：通过

Supports Recognition Based on Age, Sex, Ethnicity and Angle of Facial Images: Passed

支持基于年龄、性别、种族和人脸图像角度的识别：通过

The interoperability report showed that Huawei’s technology wasn’t being used to track Uyghurs by accident. It was by design. Huawei and Megvii engineers had put a “Uyghur alarm” feature into their facial-recognition system to automatically flag faces that appeared to belong to members of the ethnic minority. And they had tested it to make sure it worked.

这份互操作性报告表明，华为的技术并非偶然被用于追踪维吾尔族人。这是有意为之。华为和旷视科技的工程师在他们的人脸识别系统中加入了一个“维吾尔族报警”功能，以自动标记那些看起来属于该少数民族的面孔。而且他们还进行了测试，以确保该功能有效。

When news of Huawei’s “Uyghur alarm” was published in The Washington Post in December 2020, it hit a nerve. Human-rights activists and politicians decried it. The French soccer star Antoine Griezmann announced he was ending his sponsorship deal with Huawei. “Due to strong suspicions that the company Huawei may have contributed to the development of a Uyghur alert through facial recognition software, I’m announcing that I am immediately terminating my partnership with this company,” Griezmann said in an Instagram post to his more than thirty million followers. “I take this opportunity to urge Huawei not to merely deny these accusations but to quickly take concrete actions to condemn this mass repression and to use its influence to contribute to the respect of human rights within society.”[36] Huawei tried to downplay the news at first, but with the escalating attention drawn by Griezmann’s breaking of ties with the company, Huawei issued a crisis-control statement saying that the language in the interoperability report was “completely unacceptable” and that its technology was not designed to target ethnic groups.[37]

当华为“维吾尔族报警”的消息于 2020 年 12 月在《华盛顿邮报》上发表时，触动了公众的神经。人权活动家和政治家对此表示谴责。法国足球明星安托万·格里兹曼宣布终止与华为的代言协议。“由于有强烈迹象表明华为公司可能通过人脸识别软件参与开发了‘维吾尔族警报’，我宣布立即终止与该公司的合作，”格里兹曼在拥有超过三千万粉丝的 Instagram 贴文中表示。“我借此机会敦促华为不仅要否认这些指控，还要迅速采取具体行动谴责这种大规模镇压，并利用其影响力为社会尊重人权做出贡献。”[36] 华为起初试图淡化这一消息，但随着格里兹曼与公司断绝关系引发的关注不断升级，华为发布了一份危机处理声明，称互操作性报告中的措辞“完全不可接受”，并称其技术并非设计用于针对特定族群。[37]

When Tommy Zwicky, vice president of communications at Huawei Denmark, saw the report, he felt distressed.[38] “I had a big hole in my stomach,” he said. He had vigorously defended the company when people criticized it in the past, asking where the proof was that Huawei had engaged in the various shadowy misdeeds of which it was accused. But the interoperability report was hard proof that Huawei knew its technology was being used to track an ethnic group, and that executives were okay with it. “This is not something that might have happened,” he said. “This happened. Beyond any doubt.”

当华为丹麦分公司传播副总裁汤米·兹威基看到这份报告时，他感到非常痛苦。[38] “我感到胃里像开了个大洞，”他说。过去当人们批评华为时，他曾极力为公司辩护，询问华为参与其被指控的各种暗中勾当的证据在哪里。但这份互操作性报告是确凿的证据，证明华为知道其技术正被用于追踪一个族群，且高管们对此表示认可。“这不是可能发生过的事情，”他说。“这是已经发生的事。毋庸置疑。”

After raising internal protests, he tendered his resignation. He said that Huawei offered him a year’s salary in severance if he would leave quietly, but he turned it down. “I couldn’t do that,” he said. “Then I would still be part of the problem.”

在内部提出抗议后，他递交了辞呈。他说，华为提出如果他悄无声息地离开，就给他一年的薪水作为遣散费，但他拒绝了。“我不能那样做，”他说。“那样我仍将是问题的一部分。”

—

“I knew it would end up in court,” Scott Kirkland said.[39]

“我知道这最终会闹上法庭，”斯科特·柯克兰说。[39]

In the autumn of 2020, Kirkland and the other officers involved in Meng’s detention were being hauled onto the witness stand in Vancouver to face questioning from Meng’s lawyers about whether they’d followed the law. At issue was her search and interrogation at customs before she was told she was under arrest. On the one hand, border officers had expansive powers to stop and question people entering the country as they saw fit. On the other hand, they should not have been coordinating with police to gather evidence from a suspect before she was informed of her rights.

2020 年秋天，柯克兰和其他参与拘留孟晚舟的官员被传唤到温哥华的证人席上，接受孟晚舟律师的质询，内容是关于他们是否遵守了法律。争议的焦点在于她在被告知被捕之前，在海关接受的搜查和审讯。一方面，边境官员拥有广泛的权力，可以根据需要拦截并询问入境人员。另一方面，他们不应该在告知嫌疑人权利之前，就与警方协调从嫌疑人那里收集证据。

The officers admitted that such concerns had crossed their minds. Kirkland told the court he’d originally suggested that the police take custody of Meng immediately, out of concern a delay might be seen as a violation of her rights. “Our examination would be argued as a delay in due process,” he said. But he had been overridden by colleagues who felt it was both legal and proper for customs to do a thorough exam before handing Meng over to police.

官员们承认，他们脑海中曾闪过此类顾虑。柯克兰告诉法庭，他最初曾建议警方立即拘留孟晚舟，因为担心延误可能被视为侵犯她的权利。“我们的检查会被辩称为正当程序的延误，”他说。但他的意见被同事们否决了，他们认为海关在将孟晚舟移交给警方之前进行彻底检查既合法又妥当。

Sowmith Katragadda, the customs officer who had led the questioning of Meng, said he’d also been concerned about the impression of the border agency and police being in cahoots. “I understood this was a serious case. I understood the likelihood of the whole process being reviewed, and I felt we needed to take appropriate measures to ensure the processes were separate and clear,” he said.[40]

领导询问孟晚舟的海关官员索米斯·卡特拉加达表示，他也曾担心边境机构和警方给人留下勾结的印象。“我明白这是一个严重的案件。我明白整个过程被审查的可能性，我觉得我们需要采取适当措施，确保程序是独立且清晰的，”他说。[40]

The border agents denied that police had fed them any of the questions they’d asked Meng. Katragadda said he’d left a couple of times to seek guidance from the customs agency’s national security unit, not police, on what to ask Meng. Their supervisor, Sanjit Dhillon, who had come out near the end to ask Meng pointed questions about Iran, also denied that police suggested the interrogatories, claiming he developed them after reading Huawei’s Wikipedia page.[41] Katragadda did allow that when he confiscated Meng’s phones, he knew that both the police—the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)—and the FBI were interested in the devices. “I knew of the RCMP’s interest and the FBI’s interest,” he said.[42]

边境探员否认警方曾向他们提供过任何询问孟晚舟的问题。卡特拉加达说，他曾几次离开去向海关机构的国家安全部门（而非警方）寻求关于询问孟晚舟的指导。他们的主管桑吉特·狄龙在接近尾声时出来向孟晚舟询问了关于伊朗的尖锐问题，他也否认警方建议了这些询问内容，声称他是在阅读了华为的维基百科页面后构思出这些问题的。[41] 卡特拉加达确实承认，当他没收孟晚舟的手机时，他知道警方——加拿大皇家骑警（RCMP）——和联邦调查局（FBI）都对这些设备感兴趣。“我知道皇家骑警的兴趣，也知道联邦调查局的兴趣，”他说。[42]

The border officers had all curiously developed amnesia when it came to some key points, such as who had made the decision for police to delay the arrest, and who had suggested they ask for the passcodes to Meng’s phones.[43] The one procedural flaw that Meng’s lawyers had managed to pin down was that the sheet of paper with Meng’s phone passcodes had ended up in the hands of police. Border officers weren’t supposed to just share such information directly with police. Kirkland called it an honest slipup. “It was heart-wrenching to realize I made that mistake,” he told the court. It was hard to know what the judge would think. Was the passcode mishap serious enough to throw off the extradition?

边境官员们在某些关键点上都离奇地集体失忆了，比如是谁决定让警方延迟逮捕，又是谁建议向孟索要手机密码的。[43] 孟的律师成功锁定的一个程序瑕疵是，写有孟手机密码的那张纸条最终落入了警方手中。边境官员本不应该直接与警方共享此类信息。柯克兰称这是一个无心之失。“意识到自己犯了那个错误，我感到很揪心，”他在法庭上说道。很难预料法官会怎么想。密码失误的严重程度是否足以推翻引渡程序？

Meanwhile, Meng’s lawyers were hoping to strike a deal with US prosecutors for her release. In China, Ren had received a visit from the new Canadian ambassador, Dominic Barton, the former managing director of McKinsey & Company. Barton had lived for years in Shanghai while running the consulting firm’s Asia practice. Trudeau hoped his extensive China connections could help him break the impasse in negotiating the return of the two Michaels. Indeed, Barton was told that securing their release was one of his top priorities. Though no one liked to publicly admit they were open to a prisoner swap, they all knew that any deal would have to account for both Meng’s return to China and the two Michaels’ return to Canada.

与此同时，孟的律师正希望与美国检察官达成协议以释放她。在中国，任正非接待了新任加拿大驻华大使鲍达民（Dominic Barton），他是麦肯锡公司的前全球管理合伙人。鲍达民在经营这家咨询公司的亚洲业务期间曾在上海生活多年。特鲁多希望他广泛的中国关系网能帮助打破僵局，通过谈判换回“两个迈克尔”。事实上，鲍达民被告知，确保他们获释是他的首要任务之一。虽然没有人愿意公开承认他们对交换囚犯持开放态度，但大家都清楚，任何协议都必须同时考虑到孟回中国以及两个迈克尔回加拿大。

Once a month, Barton visited the two Michaels at their separate detention centers. This half hour was their only contact with the outside world. Barton spoke to them in a rapid-fire way, trying to cover as much ground as possible.

鲍达民每月去不同的拘留中心探望两个迈克尔一次。这半小时是他们与外界唯一的联系。鲍达民用连珠炮式的话语与他们交谈，试图涵盖尽可能多的信息。

—

In March 2021, the two Michaels were tried behind closed doors in separate Chinese courts. Canadian officials said that they were denied access to the courtrooms in violation of diplomatic agreements. There were no immediate verdicts. Nor was there any word about when they would come out. The sword dangled over their necks, and it was clear that their fates were intertwined with Meng’s.

2021 年 3 月，两个迈克尔在中国不同的法院接受了不公开审理。加拿大官员表示，他们被拒绝进入法庭，这违反了外交协议。法庭没有立即宣判，也没有任何关于他们何时能出来的消息。利剑悬在他们的颈上，显而易见，他们的命运与孟的命运交织在一起。

In August 2021, Meng’s extradition hearings entered the final weeks. Summing up their case, Meng’s lead lawyer, Richard Peck, declared that she had been illegally searched and detained at the airport. He said that Trump’s willingness to intercede in her case to secure a trade deal was the “very definition of ransom.”[44] “When before has a head of state interfered with an extradition?” he asked.[45] Prosecutors asserted that proper procedure had been followed and there was more than enough evidence to warrant her extradition to the US for trial. “No one has received a fairer extradition hearing in this country than Ms. Meng,” the Canadian Justice Department’s chief counsel, Robert Frater, said.[46]

2021 年 8 月，孟的引渡听证会进入最后几周。孟的首席律师理查德·佩克在总结陈述时宣布，她在机场遭到了非法搜查和拘留。他表示，特朗普愿意为了达成贸易协议而干预此案，这正是“勒索的定义”。[44] “以前什么时候有过国家元首干预引渡的情况？”他问道。[45] 检察官则坚称程序正当，且有充足证据证明应将其引渡至美国受审。加拿大司法部首席法律顾问罗伯特·弗雷特表示：“在这个国家，没有人比孟女士获得了更公正的引渡听证会。”[46]

A week before the end of Meng’s extradition hearing, a Chinese court announced that Michael Spavor had been sentenced to eleven years in prison for espionage. There was no word yet on the verdict for Michael Kovrig, though it seemed likely he would face similar punishment: Chinese authorities had tied the two cases together, accusing Spavor of passing sensitive information to Kovrig. And Chinese courts had a near 100 percent conviction rate in prominent political cases.

在孟的引渡听证会结束前一周，中国一家法院宣布迈克尔·斯帕弗因间谍罪被判处有期徒刑十一年。康明凯的判决结果尚未公布，但他似乎很可能面临类似的惩罚：中国当局已将两起案件关联在一起，指控斯帕弗向康明凯传递敏感信息。而在重大的政治案件中，中国法院的定罪率接近 100%。

The week after Spavor’s sentencing, Meng’s extradition hearings concluded. She had fought extradition tooth and nail for two and a half years. Now there was nothing to do but wait for the judge’s decision.

在斯帕弗被判刑后的第二周，孟的引渡听证会宣告结束。为了反抗引渡，她已经竭力抗争了两年半。现在，除了等待法官的裁决，别无他法。

27

27

A Hero’s Welcome

英雄般的欢迎

Meng’s Return: 2021–2023

孟的回归：2021–2023

In the end, the decision did not fall to a judge. US president Joe Biden and Xi had talked by phone in September 2021, and both wished for the prisoners to come home. With a consensus at top levels, Meng Wanzhou’s lawyers quickly came to a deferred prosecution agreement with the US Justice Department. She would sign a statement admitting that she had misled HSBC about Huawei’s relationship with Skycom, but she would not have to plead guilty. If she abided by the terms of the agreement, the US would drop the charges after a year.

最终，决定权并不在法官手中。美国总统乔·拜登与习近平在 2021 年 9 月进行了通话，双方都希望在押人员能够回家。在高层达成共识后，孟晚舟的律师很快与美国司法部达成了一份延期起诉协议。她将签署一份声明，承认她在华为与星通（Skycom）的关系上误导了汇丰银行，但她无需认罪。如果她遵守协议条款，美国将在一年后撤销指控。

Meng appeared in Vancouver court for the last time on September 24, 2021. Judge Heather Holmes stayed Meng’s extradition proceedings, lifted her bail restrictions, and praised her courteousness.

2021 年 9 月 24 日，孟最后一次出现在温哥华法庭。法官希瑟·霍尔姆斯（Heather Holmes）中止了对孟的引渡程序，解除了她的保释限制，并赞扬了她的礼貌。

“Thank you, my lady,” Meng replied.

“谢谢您，法官阁下，”孟回答道。

China’s ambassador to Canada, Cong Peiwu, escorted her onto the flight home. At the same time that Meng left Vancouver, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor boarded a plane out of China, accompanied by Canada’s ambassador, Dominic Barton.

中国驻加拿大大使丛培武陪同她登上了回国的航班。就在孟离开温哥华的同时，康明凯（Michael Kovrig）和迈克尔·斯帕弗（Michael Spavor）在加拿大驻华大使鲍达民（Dominic Barton）的陪同下，登上了离开中国的飞机。

The usual flight path from Vancouver to Shenzhen would have passed through US airspace over Alaska. The pilot swung wide to avoid it. Watching on flight-tracking websites, thousands followed along as a little plane icon inched across Russia, down through Mongolia, then finally toward the southern coast of China. “The most tracked flight right now is #CA552 (Vancouver–Shenzhen),” a flight-tracking website announced.[1]

从温哥华到深圳的常规航线本应经过阿拉斯加附近的美领空。飞行员绕了一个大圈以避开它。成千上万的人在航班追踪网站上关注着，看着一个小飞机图标缓缓穿过俄罗斯，南下蒙古，最后飞向中国南方海岸。“目前最受关注的航班是#CA552（温哥华—深圳），”一家航班追踪网站宣布。[1]

Meng gazed out her window at the pitch darkness outside, punctuated by only the flashing navigation lights on the wings. One thought after another rushed through her mind. Nearly three years had passed since she’d last been home. She was forty-nine. As they approached Chinese airspace, Meng felt her vision blur with tears.

孟凝视着窗外漆黑的夜空，只有机翼上闪烁的导航灯点缀其中。思绪万千。距离她上次回家已经过去了近三年。她四十九岁了。当飞机接近中国领空时，孟感到泪水模糊了视线。

She had changed on the plane into a crimson dress, and she emerged on the Shenzhen tarmac to flashing cameras.[2] Two people in hazmat suits, goggles, and latex gloves darted out to present her with red roses. China was still in the depths of the pandemic, with the world’s strictest COVID controls. Before she was whisked away for a three-week quarantine, Meng had a brief moment with the cameras. She bowed deeply to a crowd of supporters who stood at a safe distance, wearing masks and waving red flags.

她在飞机上换了一身深红色的连衣裙，在深圳机场的停机坪上，她在闪光灯的簇拥下走出机舱。[2] 两名穿着防护服、戴着护目镜和乳胶手套的工作人员快步上前，向她献上红玫瑰。中国当时仍处于疫情深处，执行着世界上最严格的防疫控制。在被送往为期三周的隔离之前，孟在镜头前停留了片刻。她向站在安全距离外、戴着口罩并挥舞着红旗的支持者们深深鞠躬。

“I’ve finally returned to the motherland’s embrace,” Meng said, her voice catching. “It’s been full of struggles and difficulties.”

“我终于回到了祖国的怀抱，”孟说道，声音有些哽咽。“这一路充满了斗争和艰辛。”

Across the nation, she received a hero’s welcome. The side of Shenzhen’s tallest skyscraper, the Ping An Finance Center, was transformed into a neon billboard that read Welcome home, Meng Wanzhou. Elementary school students were studying the lesson of Meng Wanzhou’s ordeal. Senior officials praised her. Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng declared Meng freed not only from the ankle tracker but from “the shackles of hegemony.”[3] Now that the operation had succeeded, Chinese officials started to say this too: that President Xi Jinping had personally worked for her release.

在全国范围内，她受到了英雄般的欢迎。深圳最高建筑平安金融中心的外墙变成了一个霓虹灯广告牌，上面写着欢迎孟晚舟回家。小学生们正在学习关于孟晚舟磨难的课程。高级官员赞扬了她。外交部副部长乐玉成宣布，孟不仅摆脱了电子脚镣，还摆脱了“霸权的枷锁”。[3] 既然行动已经成功，中国官员也开始这样说：习近平主席亲自为她的获释做出了努力。

Meng’s younger half sister, Annabel Yao, posted on her Weibo microblog that she was so excited her hands were shaking. “Thanks to the Party and our great motherland,” she wrote. “Sister, you are always my role model, and our whole family’s pride.”[4]

孟同父异母的妹妹姚安娜在她的微博上发帖称，她激动得手都在发抖。“感谢党，感谢伟大的祖国，”她写道。“姐姐，你永远是我的榜样，是我们全家的骄傲。”[4]

—

Although Meng was now safe, US prosecutors were continuing to pursue the cases against Huawei as a company for alleged intellectual-property theft and bank fraud surrounding its business in Iran. Those in Huawei’s top leadership used to spend much of their time jet-setting around the world to woo clients, but now they thought twice about leaving Chinese soil. The FBI also fired another warning shot: it filed criminal charges against two Chinese men, calling them intelligence agents posing as magazine employees who had tried to use bribes to obtain nonpublic information about the US government’s case against Huawei.

尽管孟现在安全了，但美国检察官仍在继续推进针对华为公司的诉讼，指控其涉嫌盗取知识产权以及在伊朗业务中涉及银行欺诈。华为的高层领导过去常花大量时间在世界各地飞来飞去争取客户，但现在他们离开中国领土时都会三思。联邦调查局（FBI）也发出了另一个警告信号：它对两名中国男子提起刑事指控，称他们是伪装成杂志社员工的情报人员，试图通过贿赂获取有关美国政府起诉华为案件的非公开信息。

After completing her three-week COVID quarantine, Meng returned to the Huawei office on October 25, Ren Zhengfei’s seventy-seventh birthday. She was greeted by a sea of employees who cheered, hugged her, and raised their Huawei smartphones to snap a picture of the thrilling moment.

在完成三周的防疫隔离后，孟于 10 月 25 日（任正非七十七岁生日那天）回到了华为办公室。迎接她的是员工的海洋，他们欢呼、拥抱，并举起华为智能手机拍下这一激动人心的时刻。

In March 2022, Meng emerged in her role as CFO to present Huawei’s annual results for the first time in four years. “I really feel great to have this face-to-face communication with you,” she told reporters covering the event. “There’s no substitute for such interactions.” Meng avoided talking about her detention, but she said that much had changed while she was gone. “In the few months that I’ve been back, I’ve been trying to catch up. I hope I will catch up.”

2022 年 3 月，孟以首席财务官（CFO）的身份亮相，这是她四年来首次发布华为年度业绩。“能够与大家进行这种面对面的交流，感觉真的很棒 ，”她告诉报道该活动的记者。“这种互动是无可替代的。”孟避而不谈她的被捕经历，但她表示，在她离开期间发生了很多变化。“在我回来的这几个月里，我一直在努力跟上进度。我希望我能赶上。”

A few days after the event, Huawei announced that fifty-year-old Meng Wanzhou was being promoted to one of the company’s three rotating chairs, alongside Ken Hu and Eric Xu, with the three taking turns at six-month stretches to steer the company. To make room for Meng, Ren’s longtime trusted deputy, Guo Ping—who was in his midfifties and not that much older than Meng—had taken a step back to the supporting role of supervisory board chairman. Ren remained chief executive. Huawei told the press that the company’s succession plan had not changed and continued to be based on collective leadership.

活动几天后，华为宣布五十岁的孟晚舟被提升为公司三位轮值董事长之一，与胡厚崑（Ken Hu）和徐直军（Eric Xu）并列，三人轮流担任为期六个月的职务以掌舵公司。为了给孟腾出位置，任正非长期信任的副手郭平——他五十多岁，并不比孟大多少——退居二线，担任监事会主席的辅助角色。任正非继续担任首席执行官。华为向媒体表示，公司的接班计划没有改变，继续基于集体领导制度。

Ren had repeatedly sworn over the years that Meng would not be his heir. “Ms. Meng is a manager,” he’d said. “My successor will definitely be a fighter.” He said his daughter lacked the leadership quality of “pointing the way forward like a beacon.” His reassurances that he would not make succession decisions out of selfish family considerations had stabilized his executive team, helping him avoid the sorts of C-suite upheaval that wreaked havoc on many companies. Even so, some of Huawei’s staffers always suspected that Ren had never quite relinquished the idea of a family succession.

多年来，任正非曾多次发誓孟不会是他的接班人。“孟女士是一名管理者，”他曾说。“我的接班人一定是一名战士。”他说他的女儿缺乏“像灯塔一样指明方向”的领导素质。他保证不会出于自私的家庭考虑来决定接班人，这稳定了他的高管团队，帮助他避免了在许多公司中造成混乱的高层动荡。即便如此，一些华为员工始终怀疑，任正非从未完全放弃家族传承的念头。

Now, after her ordeal in Canada, Meng had finally earned her place. In the eyes of the Huawei team, she was no longer just the boss’s pampered daughter. She had suffered for the company. She had put her own neck on the line.

如今，在经历了加拿大的磨难之后，孟晚舟终于赢得了属于自己的地位。在华为团队眼中，她不再仅仅是老板宠溺的女儿。她为公司受过苦，她曾以身犯险。

Guo’s step back to the supervisory committee marked the end of an era for Huawei. He had been at the company since 1988, and he’d been Ren’s right-hand man for years. In the 2000s, Guo had been Huawei’s point man in its defense against Cisco’s lawsuit and in negotiations over possible mergers with Nortel in Canada and Marconi in the UK. Since 2011, he had been one of Huawei’s rotating CEOs. At his last appearance at a Huawei annual conference, before the world knew he was stepping down, Guo had looked a little somber and reflective. “Our fight to survive is not over yet,” he’d said. Jeffrey Towson, an Asia-based tech consultant, recalled meeting with Guo after he moved to the supervisory committee.[5] “He’s working on more, like, institutional memory,” he said. “Before, he’s hard-charging. Now, he’s kind of hanging out in a sweater, you know, having lattes by the lake.”

郭平退居监事会标志着华为一个时代的结束。他自 1988 年起就在公司工作，多年来一直是任正非的得力助手。在 21 世纪初，郭平是华为应对思科诉讼，以及与加拿大北电网络和英国马可尼进行潜在并购谈判的前线负责人。自 2011 年起，他一直担任华为轮值 CEO 之一。在他最后一次出席华为年度发布会时（当时外界还不知道他即将卸任），郭平显得有些忧郁和深沉。“我们生存的战斗尚未结束，”他说道。常驻亚洲的科技顾问杰弗里·陶森回忆起郭平转任监事会后的会面。[5] “他现在更多是在做类似‘机构记忆’的工作，”他说，“以前他总是冲锋陷阵。现在，他穿着毛衣在湖边喝着拿铁，过得很悠闲。”

As for Meng, she tried to make up for lost time. China had changed while she was gone. Pop-up COVID test stands now dotted the Shenzhen sidewalks, with residents required to take a test every few days to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. At convenience stores, customers could now pay by scanning their faces. And the rumors about Xi’s audacious ambitions turned out to be true: in March 2023, Xi was appointed to an unprecedented third presidential term by a unanimous vote of the rubber-stamp legislature, allowing him time to continue pursuing his dream of transforming China from a developing nation into a world leader.

至于孟晚舟，她试图弥补失去的时间。在她离开期间，中国已经发生了变化。核酸检测亭现在散布在深圳的人行道上，居民被要求每隔几天进行一次检测，以防止新冠病毒传播。在便利店，顾客现在可以通过刷脸支付。而关于习近平宏大雄心的传言也证实为真：2023 年 3 月，习近平在橡皮图章式的立法机构全票表决下，开启了史无前例的第三个国家主席任期，这使他有时间继续追求将中国从发展中国家转变为世界领导者的梦想。

In April 2023, Meng began her first half-year tenure as rotating CEO of Huawei Technologies.

2023 年 4 月，孟晚舟开始了她作为华为技术有限公司轮值董事长的首个半年任期。

—

Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau was waiting on the tarmac in Calgary when the plane carrying Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor landed. “These past one-thousand-plus days have been terribly arduous for these two men, yet they have shown determination, grace, and resilience at every turn,” Trudeau said. “I will be—I always have been—and I always will be moved and impressed by the strength of character these two men possess.”[6]

当载着康明凯和迈克尔·斯帕弗的飞机降落时，加拿大总理贾斯廷·特鲁多正在卡尔加里的停机坪上等候。“过去这一千多天对这两个人来说极其艰难，但他们在每一个转折点都表现出了坚韧、风度和韧性，”特鲁多说，“我过去、现在、将来都会被这两个人所展现的人格力量所感动和折服。”[6]

[picture]

Teresa He (left), head of Huawei’s chip division, HiSilicon, and Meng Wanzhou.

华为芯片部门海思总裁何庭波（左）与孟晚舟。

While the two Michaels were detained in China, Canada had put off officially deciding whether to allow Huawei in its 5G network, in a bid to avoid further destabilizing relations. But with the Michaels safely home, Trudeau announced that Canada was officially banning Huawei from its 5G network. “We took the time to carefully analyze the situation, look at all sorts of factors,” he said.

在两名迈克尔被中国拘留期间，加拿大推迟了是否允许华为进入其 5G 网络的正式决定，以避免关系进一步动荡。但随着两名迈克尔平安归家，特鲁多宣布加拿大正式禁止华为参与其 5G 网络。“我们花时间仔细分析了形势，审视了各种因素，”他说。

After their release, the two Michaels largely kept low public profiles. Michael Kovrig resumed his work with Crisis Group and spent time with his two-year-old daughter, Clara X. Kovrig, whom he was meeting for the first time. His girlfriend, the geopolitical analyst Yanmei Xie, had given birth to Clara in 2019, while he was in detention. Michael Spavor had it tougher—it was hard for him to resume his previous work of organizing business and cultural exchanges in North Korea. His brother, Paul, and close friends organized a fundraiser for him, saying it would help cover his legal costs and living expenses. “This episode could seriously affect his livelihood, possibly result in deportation and loss of possessions,” Paul Spavor wrote on the fundraiser’s webpage.

获释后，两名迈克尔在很大程度上保持了低调。康明凯恢复了在危机组织的工作，并陪伴他两岁的女儿克拉拉·X·康明凯，这是他第一次见到她。他的女友、地缘政治分析师谢艳梅在 2019 年他被拘留期间生下了克拉拉。迈克尔·斯帕弗的处境则更为艰难——他很难恢复之前在朝鲜组织商业和文化交流的工作。他的兄弟保罗和亲密朋友为他组织了募捐，称这将有助于支付他的法律费用和生活开支。“这一事件可能严重影响他的生计，可能导致被驱逐出境和财产损失，”保罗·斯帕弗在募捐网页上写道。

In November 2023, astonishing news emerged in Canada’s Globe and Mail: Michael Spavor was seeking millions of dollars from the Canadian government as compensation for his detention in China. According to the report, he felt that his arrest was due to sensitive information he’d shared with fellow detainee Michael Kovrig, who’d relayed it to Western intelligence agencies without his knowledge. Chinese state media seized on this story to trumpet that China had been right all along—the two Canadians were spies. Kovrig broke his silence to defend himself to Canadian media, saying that China’s government was well aware of his work as a diplomat and think-tank analyst, and that he was regularly invited to meet with Chinese officials, analysts, and scholars. “Repeating gaslighting and disinformation about why we were detained only prolongs pain that we’re all trying to heal from,” Kovrig told the National Post.[7]

2023 年 11 月，加拿大《环球邮报》爆出惊人消息：迈克尔·斯帕弗正向加拿大政府索赔数百万美元，作为他在中国被拘留的补偿。据报道，他认为自己被捕是因为他与同被拘留的康明凯分享了敏感信息，而康明凯在斯帕弗不知情的情况下将这些信息转达给了西方情报机构。中国官方媒体抓住这一报道大肆宣传，称中国一直以来都是正确的——这两名加拿大人就是间谍。康明凯打破沉默向加拿大媒体自辩，称中国政府非常清楚他作为外交官和智库分析师的工作，而且他经常受邀与中国官员、分析师和学者会面。“重复关于我们为何被拘留的这种煤气灯操纵和虚假信息，只会延长我们所有人都在努力愈合的痛苦，”康明凯告诉《国家邮报》。[7]

Within Canada, opinions differed on the lesson of the entire thing, and on whether Ottawa should have helped the US at all when it came to Meng’s detention. While the US had a solid case, even Western lawyers agreed it was unusual to make an economic sanctions case personal by detaining a family member of the company’s founder. The country certainly hadn’t done so in the case of ZTE. “It was definitely a bad move,” said Michel Juneau-Katsuya, a former senior Canadian intelligence officer, about Canada’s detainment of Meng. “We did the dirty job for the US.” Former foreign minister John Manley told Canadian media that officials should have deployed “creative incompetence” to fail to catch Meng.[8] Guy Saint-Jacques, former Canadian ambassador to China, said that in addition to Canada’s responsibilities under the bilateral extradition treaty, there was an added factor to contend with: the country was in the middle of trying to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement with Washington. “It would have been difficult to go against the wishes of the US administration, to refuse to extradite Ms. Meng while we were hoping to renegotiate,” he said. “That’s why we were stuck.”

在加拿大国内，对于整件事的教训，以及渥太华在孟晚舟被捕一事上是否根本不该协助美国，意见不一。虽然美国的指控有理有据，但即使是西方律师也认为，通过拘留公司创始人的家属来处理经济制裁案件是不寻常的。在对待中兴通讯时，美国显然没有这样做。“这绝对是一记昏招，”前加拿大高级情报官员米歇尔·朱诺-卡苏亚在谈到加拿大拘留孟晚舟时说，“我们为美国干了脏活。”前外交部长约翰·曼利告诉加拿大媒体，官员们本应运用“创造性的无能”来放过孟晚舟。[8] 前加拿大驻华大使赵朴表示，除了加拿大在双边引渡条约下的责任外，还有一个额外的因素需要应对：该国当时正处于与华盛顿重新谈判《北美自由贸易协定》的过程中。“在希望重新谈判的同时，违背美国政府的意愿、拒绝引渡孟女士是很困难的，”他说，“这就是我们陷入困境的原因。”

28

28

Black Swan

黑天鹅

Huawei’s Future: 2023–

华为的未来：2023 年至今

As Meng Wanzhou approached the end of her first half-year term at Huawei’s helm, the company quietly launched a new smartphone at the end of August 2023. Huawei had skipped the usual fanfare and hadn’t even disclosed the Mate 60 Pro’s specs. But people were whispering that Huawei had found a way around the US sanctions.[1]

就在孟晚舟作为华为轮值董事长的首个半年任期即将结束之际，公司于 2023 年 8 月底悄然推出了一款新智能手机。华为省去了惯常的造势活动，甚至没有披露 Mate 60 Pro 的规格参数。但坊间传闻，华为已经找到了绕过美国制裁的方法。[1]

Rarely had so many people bought a brand-new phone just to crack it open and tear it to pieces. Analysts soon confirmed the rumors were right. Huawei had managed to produce a 5G processor through the Chinese foundry SMIC, despite both companies being under US sanctions that were meant to stop them from manufacturing such an advanced chip. No one could say for sure how it had happened. Huawei and SMIC might have achieved the feat by violating sanctions, or they might have managed it by pushing less-advanced tools to the limit. It was like trying to paint a very thin line with the edge of a fat brush: technically possible, but requiring great skill. SMIC and Huawei weren’t saying what brushes they were using, or how they’d gotten them.

很少有这么多人在购买一部全新的手机后，仅仅是为了将其拆解并研究得支离破碎。分析师很快证实了传言属实。尽管华为和中芯国际（SMIC）都处于旨在阻止其制造此类先进芯片的美国制裁之下，但华为仍成功通过中芯国际生产出了 5G 处理器。没人能确切说明这是如何实现的。华为和中芯国际可能是通过违反制裁实现了这一壮举，也可能是通过将不太先进的工具推向极限而做到的。这就像尝试用粗刷子的边缘画出极细的线条：技术上可行，但需要极高的技巧。中芯国际和华为并未透露他们使用的是什么样的“刷子”，以及是如何得到它们的。

Many outsiders sought a peek inside Huawei’s mysterious chip unit HiSilicon around this time, to no avail. “I was told that any visit to HiSilicon required the approval of Ren Zhengfei himself,” said the Washington-based researcher Paul Triolo.[2]

此时，许多外界人士试图窥探华为神秘的芯片部门海思（HiSilicon）内部，但都无功而返。“我被告知，任何对海思的访问都需要任正非本人的批准，”驻华盛顿的研究员保罗·特里奥洛（Paul Triolo）表示。[2]

Huawei’s new phone created a ruckus in Washington and put the company back in the crosshairs. “The reports about Huawei are incredibly disturbing,” Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo told US lawmakers.[3] She said the Commerce Department needed more resources for sanctions enforcement. Weeks after Huawei’s phone launch, the Biden administration tightened its ban on exporting advanced chipmaking tools to China.

华为的新手机在华盛顿引起了骚动，并使该公司再次成为众矢之的。“有关华为的报告令人极其不安，”商务部长吉娜·雷蒙多（Gina Raimondo）告诉美国国会议员。[3] 她表示，商务部需要更多资源来执行制裁。在华为发布手机几周后，拜登政府收紧了对向中国出口先进芯片制造工具的禁令。

If there had been hopes among Huawei’s executives that Biden would be softer on China than Trump, they were quickly dispelled. The Biden administration was more careful in its rhetoric to avoid fanning anti-Chinese racism. It didn’t use terms like “Clean Network” and “Clean Nations.” But in many ways, it was only picking up where the Trump administration had left off and deepening the efforts to contain China. There was no indication that Washington would lift its sanctions against Huawei anytime soon.

如果华为高管曾希望拜登对华态度会比特朗普温和，那么这种希望很快就破灭了。拜登政府在措辞上更加谨慎，以避免煽动反华种族主义。它没有使用“清洁网络”和“清洁国家”等词汇。但在许多方面，它只是在特朗普政府结束的地方继续推进，并深化了遏制中国的努力。没有任何迹象表明华盛顿会在短期内解除对华为的制裁。

The United States was now pushing a new alternative to Huawei. Begun under the Trump administration and taken to the finish line by the Biden administration, Washington now had something called “Open RAN.” This was a system of mix-and-match parts for cell towers—sort of like the open Android ecosystem—that could allow upstart US vendors back in the game, even if they could make only one piece of the kit, not the whole set, like Huawei could. Open RAN had plenty of skeptics, with EU officials pointing out that a system with many interconnected vendors was more vulnerable to cybersecurity attacks. But Washington was pushing it full tilt. “This has been a whole-of-government approach,” said Alan Davidson, assistant secretary of commerce and an administrator for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration. “We’ve been working very closely with the State Department, with the White House…. We’re trying to bring all the tools that we have to bear.” In his meetings with world leaders, Biden was personally singing its praises. The US government was subsidizing the technology’s rollout around the world, in Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, and even villages of the Amazon rainforest.

美国现在正推动一种新的替代方案来取代华为。这项由特朗普政府启动并由拜登政府完成的工作，让华盛顿拥有了所谓的“Open RAN”。这是一个针对基站的混搭部件系统——有点像开放的安卓生态系统——它可以让新兴的美国供应商重新回到竞争中，即使他们只能制造其中一个部件，而不是像华为那样提供整套设备。Open RAN 面临许多质疑，欧盟官员指出，一个由众多互联供应商组成的系统更容易受到网络安全攻击。但华盛顿正在全力推进。“这是一种全政府参与的方式，”商务部助理部长兼国家电信和信息管理局局长艾伦·戴维森（Alan Davidson）说。“我们一直与国务院、白宫密切合作……我们正试图动用所有可以动用的工具。”在与世界各国领导人的会晤中，拜登亲自为其赞誉有加。美国政府正在资助该技术在全球范围内的推广，包括印度尼西亚、尼日利亚、菲律宾，甚至亚马逊雨林的村庄。

Huawei’s rise had been a Sputnik moment. It had changed the way that people around the world thought about innovation, trade, and their own pasts and futures. “A country without its own program-controlled switches is like one without an army,” Ren Zhengfei had told General Secretary Jiang Zemin back in 1994, as he argued for China’s central government to increase investment in telecommunications gear. Similar calls were now being made in nations worldwide. Across the United States, terms like “industrial policy” and “strategic technologies” were suddenly on lots of lips. After decades of believing that the end of history had arrived with free markets and democracy, people came to the realization that history hadn’t, in fact, ended. And the future was starting to look like the past.

华为的崛起是一个“卫星时刻”。它改变了世界各地人们对创新、贸易以及自身过去和未来的看法。“一个国家如果没有自己的程控交换机，就像没有军队一样，”早在 1994 年，任正非在争取中国中央政府增加对电信设备投资时，曾对江泽民总书记这样说过。类似的呼声现在正出现在世界各国。在美国各地，“产业政策”和“战略技术”等词汇突然出现在许多人的嘴边。在坚信历史已随着自由市场和民主而终结了几十年后，人们意识到历史实际上并未终结。而未来正开始变得像过去一样。

It wasn’t a complete retreat from globalization. That was impossible. But it was an acknowledgment that stock prices and balance sheets could not fully capture the societal value of a nation’s technological competency—nor could they fully express the feeling of loss when that was gone.

这并非完全退回到全球化之前。那是不可行的。但这是一种承认，即股票价格和资产负债表无法完全体现一个国家技术能力的社会价值，也无法完全表达这种能力丧失时的失落感。

[picture]

Huawei’s largest data center in China, designed to look like a European town and built in the Guizhou hills, began operating in 2021 with one million servers.

华为在中国最大的数据中心位于贵州山区，设计风格酷似欧洲小镇，于 2021 年开始运行，拥有 100 万台服务器。

With Meng’s safe return, Ren’s string of remarkable press interviews came to an end. The company reverted to its former inscrutable self. For two years, a brief, extraordinary window into the company had been open. Now it had slammed shut again. Ren’s younger daughter, Annabel Yao, who had for years chronicled her jet-setting life and ballet dancing on Instagram, abruptly removed all her posts. Ren announced a company-wide policy of writing shorter emails and deleting older records that did not need to be retained. Huawei scrubbed old posts from its website. The company’s party secretary, Zhou Daiqi, had retired quietly at some point. It was unclear from the outside who had been named as his successor.[4] In 2024, Huawei opted to skip an annual press conference, a yearslong tradition.

随着孟晚舟平安归来，任正非一系列引人注目的媒体采访也告一段落。公司恢复了以往高深莫测的状态。在两年的时间里，一个了解该公司的短暂而非凡的窗口曾被打开。现在，它又砰地一声关上了。任正非的小女儿姚安娜多年来一直在 Instagram 上记录她周游世界的社交生活和芭蕾舞，她突然删除了所有帖子。任正非宣布了一项全公司范围的政策，要求缩短邮件篇幅并删除无需保留的旧记录。华为从其官网上清理了旧帖子。公司的党委书记周代琪在某个时间点悄然退休。外界并不清楚谁被任命为他的继任者。[4] 2024 年，华为选择跳过年度新闻发布会，而这是一项延续多年的传统。

The diplomatic battles continued behind closed doors. In July 2024, Germany’s government announced that its major telecom companies would stop using Huawei and ZTE 5G equipment within five years, a big victory for Washington. The West was continuing to grow more inhospitable toward Huawei. Yet—almost incredibly—Huawei was still number one in the world in 5G gear sales. Buoyed by patriotic domestic purchases and continued brisk demand in emerging markets, Huawei was holding its own.

外交博弈在闭门会议中继续进行。2024 年 7 月，德国政府宣布其主要电信运营商将在五年内停止使用华为和中兴的 5G 设备，这对华盛顿来说是一个重大胜利。西方对华为的态度持续变得更加冷淡。然而——几乎令人难以置信的是——华为在 5G 设备销售方面仍位居世界第一。在爱国主义驱动的国内采购和新兴市场持续旺盛的需求支撑下，华为依然屹立不倒。

—

Long before anyone had heard of Ren Zhengfei or Huawei, Wan Runnan had been China’s star entrepreneur in the 1980s, with his company, the Stone Group, touted as “China’s IBM.” Wan had believed that economic change could lead to political change. He had thrown his support behind the pro-democracy protesters in 1989. As a result, he had to flee to France, with an arrest warrant hanging over his head. He was never able to return home.

早在人们听说任正非或华为之前，万润南曾是 20 世纪 80 年代中国最耀眼的创业明星，他的四通集团被誉为“中国的 IBM”。万润南曾相信经济变革可以带动政治变革。他在 1989 年对民主抗议者表示了支持。结果，他不得不背负着逮捕令流亡法国。他再也没能回到家乡。

Now, decades later and in failing health in Paris, Wan recalled something that had happened one day in the late 1980s, when he was still living in Beijing.[5] Local officials had invited him to dinner. This was unusual. He was usually the one to invite officials to dine, so as to curry favor with the show of hospitality. Over the meal, the officials told Wan that the Ministry of State Security was going to send agents to work undercover at his company in positions dealing with international relations. The officials cast the move to embed these minders as an act of protection for Wan and the company’s other executives, a security measure that would keep them from stumbling into unseen risks in their dealings with foreigners. “You have a lot of international business, which raises security issues for you. There are situations that you don’t understand,” Wan recalled the officials telling him. “They said, ‘We are sending some people over. You can just treat them like regular employees.’ ”

如今，几十年过去了，身在巴黎且健康状况不佳的万润南回忆起 80 年代后期在北京生活时发生的一件事。[5] 当地官员邀请他共进晚餐。这很不寻常。通常是他为了通过展示好客来讨好官员而邀请他们用餐。席间，官员们告诉万润南，国家安全部将派遣特工以处理国际关系的职位为掩护，潜伏在他的公司工作。官员们将嵌入这些“监护人”的举动描述为对万润南及公司其他高管的一种保护，称这是一种安全措施，可以防止他们在与外国人打交道时陷入不可预见的风险。“你们有很多国际业务，这给你们带来了安全问题。有些情况你们并不了解，”万润南回忆官员们当时对他这样说。“他们说，‘我们要派几个人过去。你就把他们当成普通员工就行了。’”

Wan said he knew that around this time, state intelligence also contacted other tech companies in Beijing with the same request. He couldn’t say what the situation was for Huawei, which was still a little startup far to the south in Shenzhen, not yet on anyone’s radar. But Wan said he didn’t believe that Huawei would have been able to escape similar demands. “That is a certainty,” he said. “Telecommunications is an industry that has to do with keeping control of a nation’s lifeline…and actually in any system of communications, there’s a back-end platform that could be used for eavesdropping.”

万润南说，他知道在那段时间前后，国家情报部门也以同样的要求联系了北京的其他科技公司。他无法说明当时华为的情况，因为华为那时还是远在南方深圳的一家小创业公司，尚未进入任何人的视野。但万润南表示，他不相信华为能够逃脱类似的要求。“那是肯定的，”他说。“电信是一个关系到掌握国家命脉的行业……事实上，在任何通信系统中，都有一个可以用于窃听的后端平台。”

It was a rare moment of an executive lifting the cone of silence surrounding the MSS’s relationship with China’s high-tech industry. It was rare, in fact, in any country. Around the world, such spying operations rank among governments’ closest-held secrets. When Edward Snowden had exposed the NSA’s operations abroad, he’d ended up in exile in Russia. Wan, too, might have risked arrest had he still been living in China.

这是一个罕见的时刻，一位高管揭开了围绕着国安部与中国高科技行业关系的“沉默之锥”。事实上，这在任何国家都很罕见。在世界各地，此类间谍行动都属于政府最核心的机密。当爱德华·斯诺登曝光美国国家安全局（NSA）在海外的行动时，他最终流亡俄罗斯。如果万润南仍住在中国，他也可能面临被捕的风险。

Over the years, foreign government officials and journalists had repeatedly asked Huawei’s executives if they were willing to stand up against China’s government and refuse to help with overseas surveillance. In truth, it was an unanswerable question. Governments around the world, including in both China and the United States, do compel tech companies to assist in investigations, and they also compel them to keep silent about it. Google has notably criticized the frequency of court-issued “gag orders” that prevent it from disclosing government demands for user data.

多年来，外国政府官员和记者反复询问华为高管，他们是否愿意挺身对抗中国政府，拒绝协助海外监控。事实上，这是一个无法回答的问题。包括中国和美国在内的世界各国政府，都会强迫科技公司协助调查，并强迫它们对此保持沉默。谷歌曾公开批评法院频繁下达“禁言令”，阻止其披露政府对用户数据的调取要求。

And while the practices are shrouded in secrecy, there has also been acknowledgment that governments not only hack into networking equipment but also use “direct access” to tap data from telecommunications networks without the network operators knowing the details.

虽然这些做法笼罩在神秘之中，但人们也承认，政府不仅会入侵网络设备，还会利用“直接访问”从电信网络中截取数据，而网络运营商并不知晓详情。

A 2016 report by the UN’s special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression describes such practices this way:

联合国关于增进和保护见解和言论自由权特别报告员在 2016 年的一份报告中这样描述此类做法：

States may also covertly tap into the technical infrastructure belonging to service providers and content platforms in order to intercept a wide variety of information, including communications, user account information, and telephone and Internet records. States reportedly tamper with computer hardware while en route to customers, infiltrate private networks and platforms with malicious software, hack into specific devices, and exploit other digital security loopholes.[6]

各国还可能秘密接入属于服务提供商和内容平台的基建设施，以拦截各种信息，包括通信、用户账户信息以及电话和互联网记录。据报道，各国会在计算机硬件运往客户途中对其进行篡改，用恶意软件渗透私人网络和平台，入侵特定设备，并利用其他数字安全漏洞。[6]

When speaking in confidence, industry executives often express a belief that networks are hacked and surveilled to a much greater degree than the general public may suspect. They also acknowledge the difficulty of ascertaining if a back door exists in millions of lines of code. When AT&T conducted a survey of cybersecurity professionals in 2016, 64 percent said they did not expect to be able to have a private conversation on any device.[7]

在私下交谈时，行业高管经常表达这样一种信念：网络被入侵和监控的程度远比公众怀疑的要深得多。他们也承认，要确定数百万行代码中是否存在后门是非常困难的。当 AT&T 在 2016 年对网络安全专业人士进行调查时，64%的人表示，他们不指望能在任何设备上进行私密交谈。[7]

For Huawei, this means that concerns about its equipment being exploitable by China’s intelligence agencies are unlikely to abate—in the same way that China will continue to be wary of Western-made technologies.

对于华为来说，这意味着对其设备可能被中国情报机构利用的担忧不太可能消减——正如中国将继续对西方制造的技术保持警惕一样。

“I think there is a genuine fear that there is a back door in Huawei equipment that the Chinese government can access if they want to get whatever information they need. I think that’s a genuine fear,” said Michael Joseph, founder of the Kenyan mobile operator Safaricom. “You know, well, so what? What are you going to do?” He added: “You also don’t know what other governments are up to. And all governments—can you trust any government?—might be listening to your conversations and doing whatever they do.”[8]

“我认为人们确实担心华为设备中存在后门，如果中国政府需要获取任何信息，他们就可以访问。我认为这是一种真实的恐惧，”肯尼亚移动运营商 Safaricom 的创始人迈克尔·约瑟夫说道。“你知道，那又怎样？你能怎么办？”他补充道：“你也不知道其他政府在干什么。所有的政府——你能信任任何政府吗？——都可能在听你的谈话，做他们该做的事。”[8]

Little is definitively known by the public about the MSS’s overseas wiretapping operations, partly because the MSS does not widely declassify its older records the way that US intelligence agencies do. Nor has there emerged from within the system a massive whistleblowing effort or a leaker the likes of Edward Snowden. “No defector yet has taken the Mitrokhin path to document past Chinese intelligence operations and the seepage of classified material out of China remains glacial,” writes David Ian Chambers, a former British government official who has extensively researched China’s intelligence operations.[9]

公众对国安部（MSS）海外窃听行动的了解微乎其微，部分原因是国安部并不像美国情报机构那样广泛解密其历史档案。该系统内部也未曾出现过像爱德华·斯诺登那样的大规模举报行动或泄密者。“目前还没有叛逃者走上米特罗欣之路，记录中国过去的情报行动，而机密材料流出中国的速度依然极其缓慢，”曾深入研究中国情报行动的前英国政府官员大卫·伊恩·钱伯斯写道。[9]

What’s worth pointing out is that the knowledge that such risks exist in telecommunications gear is not new. Policymakers have always known about these risks, and in the heyday years of globalization, they factored them into their considerations.

值得指出的是，电信设备中存在此类风险并非新闻。决策者一直深知这些风险，在全盛时期的全球化浪潮中，他们已将这些因素纳入考量。

“I’m quite sure for a long time, the CIA, for example, have been reporting on everything that is done in Malaysia and China,” Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad told reporters when asked about Huawei. “We did not carry out a boycott of America because of that. They have that capacity; now Huawei has got that capacity. Let them do their worst.”[10]

“我非常确定，长期以来，例如中央情报局（CIA）一直在报告马来西亚和中国发生的一切，”马来西亚总理马哈蒂尔·穆罕默德在被问及华为时告诉记者。“我们并没有因此抵制美国。他们拥有那种能力；现在华为也拥有了那种能力。随他们去吧。”[10]

What is new is the onset of a fresh cold war between the United States and China, which has changed calculations. Now the assumption on both sides is that the other nation sees the competition as a zero-sum game and believes that it will not act in good faith, that it will be willing to go to extreme lengths to come out ahead, and that if backed into a corner, it will be willing to entertain pushing the big red button for mutually assured destruction, simply out of spite.

不同以往的是美中之间新冷战的爆发，这改变了权衡。现在双方的假设都是：对方将竞争视为零和博弈，且相信对方不会秉持诚信，愿意为了领先而不择手段，并且如果被逼入绝境，对方甚至会仅仅出于报复而考虑按下代表“同归于尽”的大红按钮。

“It depends on what threat you’re trying to manage, right?” said Charles Clancy, the former NSA cybersecurity researcher, about why Western governments had until recently largely considered Huawei equipment safe enough to use. “If the threat you’re managing does not presume China activating their intelligence law and going much more aggressively against adversaries across the globe, then the threat is manageable. But if you do not have sufficient confidence…”[11]

“这取决于你试图应对什么样的威胁，对吧？”前美国国家安全局（NSA）网络安全研究员查尔斯·克兰西在谈到西方政府为何直到最近仍普遍认为华为设备足够安全时说道。“如果你应对的威胁并不假设中国会启动其情报法，并对全球对手采取更具攻击性的行动，那么威胁是可控的。但如果你没有足够的信心……”[11]

Clancy added that the rip-and-replace program to take out Huawei gear was based on some of these disastrous but unlikely scenarios—the kinds of things that economists call black-swan events.

克兰西补充说，旨在拆除华为设备的“拆除并更换”计划是基于某些灾难性但极不可能发生的场景——即经济学家所称的“黑天鹅事件”。

“We don’t know how to quantify that risk,” Clancy said. “It really is more of a geopolitical lever that China could pull if they need to or wanted to, perhaps as part of a Taiwan invasion scenario.”

“我们不知道如何量化这种风险，”克兰西说。“它实际上更像是一个地缘政治杠杆，如果中国需要或想要，他们可以动用它，或许是作为入侵台湾场景的一部分。”

This was similar to former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull’s stance when banning Huawei from the country’s 5G networks: not innocent until proven guilty, but better safe than sorry. “That didn’t mean we thought Huawei was currently being used to interfere with our telecommunication networks,” Turnbull wrote in his memoir. “Our approach was a hedge against a future threat: not the identification of a smoking gun but a loaded one.”[12]

这与澳大利亚前总理马尔科姆·特恩布尔禁止华为进入该国 5G 网络时的立场相似：并非在证明有罪前是清白的，而是宁可事先谨慎，也不事后后悔。“这并不意味着我们认为华为目前正被用于干扰我们的电信网络，”特恩布尔在回忆录中写道。“我们的做法是对冲未来威胁：不是发现了一把正在冒烟的枪，而是一把上膛的枪。”[12]

Black-swan events can come in flocks. One highly unlikely event triggers another thing that no one thought could happen. That Meng Wanzhou would be detained in Vancouver over sanctions violations committed by her company years ago was an extremely unlikely scenario. And yet unlikelier still was that a little switchmaker in Shenzhen could become successful enough for anyone to care at all.

黑天鹅事件往往接踵而至。一个极不可能发生的事件会触发另一个无人预料到的事件。孟晚舟因其公司多年前违规制裁行为而在温哥华被拘留，是一个极不可能发生的场景。然而更不可能的是，深圳的一家小交换机制造商竟能获得如此巨大的成功，以至于让所有人都在意。

So what happens next? Huawei has survived Washington’s offensives, perhaps better than anyone could have expected. It has emerged stronger in some ways, developing its own alternatives to US technologies that it had long relied on. The crisis has revealed Huawei as the apple of Beijing’s eye, with officials willing to move mountains to ensure the company escapes death. Huawei looks poised to remain an important actor in world affairs for some time.

那么接下来会发生什么？华为在华盛顿的攻势下幸存了下来，其表现或许比任何人的预期都要好。在某些方面，它变得更加强大，开发出了替代其长期依赖的美国技术的自主方案。这场危机揭示了华为是北京的掌上明珠，官员们愿意移山填海以确保该公司免于覆灭。华为看来将在未来一段时间内继续作为世界事务中的重要参与者。

But make no mistake: The US government has succeeded in halting Huawei’s rise. Huawei is no longer setting new sales records each year but is instead working to regain its 2020 levels. It is no longer expanding farther into the West but is instead defending its turf in emerging markets. The company has lost valuable R&D partnerships with US and European universities, which had helped drive its innovation. Huawei is still on the cutting edge of technology today—a testament to the research work it began many years ago on emerging sectors like artificial intelligence. But with walls up against it in every direction, it remains to be seen if Huawei can maintain its place as an R&D leader in the next generation, and the one after that.

但请不要误会：美国政府已成功遏制了华为的崛起。华为不再每年刷新销售纪录，而是致力于恢复到 2020 年的水平。它不再向西方进一步扩张，而是在新兴市场守住阵地。该公司失去了与美国和欧洲大学宝贵的研发合作关系，而这些合作曾助力其创新。华为今天仍处于技术前沿——这证明了它多年前在人工智能等新兴领域开启的研究工作。但在四面围墙的情况下，华为能否在下一代乃至再下一代技术中保持研发领先地位，仍有待观察。

Then there is the matter of Ren himself. Ren has fretted over succession planning for well over two decades, implementing one system after another to try to insulate the company from the missteps of any individual executive, himself included. “If the soul of an enterprise is its entrepreneur, then it’s the most miserable, hopeless, and unreliable of enterprises,” Ren once told his staff. “If I were a bank, I’d never give him a loan. Why? Who knows, maybe when he gets on a plane tomorrow, he’ll fall out of the sky.”[13] In recent years, Ren has maintained that he has already passed on much of the power to his colleagues and is no more than a “mascot.” But it remains an open question how Huawei will fare without Ren there to inspire staff and remind them of their mission. His successors face a formidable test in carrying on the most successful corporate enterprise that has ever arisen in their nation.

此外还有任正非本人的问题。任正非为接班计划焦虑了二十多年，实施了一套又一套制度，试图使公司免受包括他自己在内的任何个人高管失误的影响。“如果一个企业的灵魂是其企业家，那么这就是最痛苦、最绝望、最不可靠的企业，”任正非曾对员工说。“如果我是银行，我绝不会贷款给他。为什么？谁知道呢，也许他明天上飞机，就从天上掉下来了。”[13] 近年来，任正非坚称他已将大部分权力移交给同事，自己只是一个“吉祥物”。但如果没有任正非在那里激励员工并提醒他们的使命，华为将如何发展，仍是一个悬而未决的问题。他的继任者在延续这个国家有史以来最成功的企业方面，面临着巨大的考验。

—

Some years ago, Huawei had tweaked its organizational chart in its annual reports. It had added something at the very top called the “Shareholders’ Meeting,” which Huawei mysteriously called its “highest authority.”[14] The board of directors reported up to the Shareholders’ Meeting. So did the CEO. So did everyone else. And it was perhaps more than met the eye, regarding the perennial question of who exactly controlled Huawei.

几年前，华为在年报中调整了组织架构图。它在最顶端增加了一个名为“股东会”的机构，华为神秘地称其为“最高权力机构”。[14] 董事会向股东会汇报。首席执行官也是如此。其他所有人亦然。关于究竟是谁控制着华为这个经久不衰的问题，这或许比表面看起来的含义更深。

Huawei’s claim that the company is controlled by its more than 150,000 employee shareholders through this “Shareholders’ Meeting” is often dismissed out of hand by foreign observers, as it seems patently untrue. After all, the average Huawei engineer or salesperson has no say in the company’s grand strategy. But to dismiss the Shareholders’ Meeting outright may be hasty. Interestingly, a select few of these shareholders actually do hold real power.

华为声称公司由超过 15 万名员工持股者通过这种“持股员工代表会”进行控制，这一说法常被外国观察家不屑一顾，因为它看起来显然不真实。毕竟，普通的华为工程师或销售人员对公司的宏大战略没有发言权。但若就此全盘否定代表会，可能也过于草率。有趣的是，这些股东中极少数人确实掌握着实权。

Every five years, a few dozen shareholders are officially anointed as “Representatives,” giving them the power to make decisions in the name of all shareholders. These Representatives pass judgment on major company decisions. They also pick Huawei’s board of directors, which in turn picks the CEO.

每隔五年，几十名股东会被正式任命为“代表”，赋予他们以全体股东名义做出决策的权力。这些代表对公司的重大决策进行评判。他们还负责选举华为的董事会，而董事会随后会选出首席执行官。

What is curious is who these Representatives are. They are supposedly elected by an open vote of Huawei’s employees, which might lead one to surmise that some random lucky engineers who have rallied votes from their buddies will take turns participating in the company’s rule by employees. This is not the case. Since 2014, when Huawei started disclosing the list of shareholder Representatives, this group has remained largely stable, consisting of Huawei’s most powerful executives.[15] Indeed, the list of Representatives may even better reflect the power dynamic within the company than lists of the board of directors and the executive management team. People who are known to have influence within the company appear on this list, even when they don’t hold other top titles: Ren’s brother, Ren Shulu; his son, Ren Ping; and the party secretary, Zhou Daiqi, for instance, have consistently been listed as Representatives. There is also Sun Yafang. After retiring from her role as chairwoman in 2018, she remained at Huawei but did not appear in other senior management positions. But in the 2023 Representatives list, her name continues to come second, just after Ren’s and ahead of that belonging to the new, less forceful chairman, Liang Hua.[16] Other respected company elders also appear among the Representatives, including Jiang Xisheng, who negotiated the buyout of the company’s original investors.

令人好奇的是这些代表的身份。他们据称是由华为员工公开投票选出的，这可能会让人推测，某些获得同事支持的幸运工程师会轮流参与这种员工共治。事实并非如此。自 2014 年华为开始披露股东代表名单以来，这一群体基本保持稳定，成员皆为华为最有权势的高管。[15] 事实上，代表名单可能比董事会和执行管理团队名单更能反映公司内部的权力动态。在公司内部拥有影响力的人物即使没有担任其他顶级头衔，也会出现在这份名单上：例如，任正非的弟弟任树录、他的儿子任平，以及党委书记周代琪，一直名列代表之中。还有孙亚芳，她在 2018 年卸任董事长一职后留在华为，但未出现在其他高级管理职位中。但在 2023 年的代表名单中，她的名字依然排在第二位，仅次于任正非，且排在现任但权力较小的董事长梁华之前。[16] 其他受人尊敬的公司元老也出现在代表中，包括曾负责谈判回购公司原始投资者股份的江西生。

The Representatives’ Commission “decides on, manages, and monitors major company matters,” and elects the board of directors and supervisory committee, according to the company’s corporate materials. And as it turns out, the Representatives almost invariably elect themselves to directorial and supervisory posts. The directors elect the CEO, always picking Ren, who is also a Representative.

根据公司的企业资料，代表会“对公司重大事项进行决策、管理和监督”，并选举董事会和监事会。而事实证明，这些代表几乎无一例外地选举自己担任董事和监事职位。董事们选举首席执行官，且总是选中同样身为代表的任正非。

Such a system might sound utterly bewildering to foreigners. But it would ring familiar in China: It is strikingly similar to how the nation operates as a whole. Every five years, the National Congress of the Communist Party of China is held, with some two thousand delegates elected by grassroots vote in party units across the nation.[17] These delegates elect a smaller group of around two hundred officials to the party’s Central Committee, which in turn picks twenty-four among them for the Politburo, a subset of seven for the Politburo Standing Committee, and one for general secretary, the party’s highest office. Despite this complex system of elections, scholars of China’s political systems generally believe that the selection of China’s top leaders is predetermined in closed-door meetings among the nation’s most powerful officials.

这样的制度在外国人听来可能完全令人费解。但在中国，这听起来却很熟悉：它与国家的整体运作方式惊人地相似。每五年举行一次中国共产党全国代表大会，约两千名代表由全国各基层党组织投票选出。[17] 这些代表选出约两百名官员组成中央委员会，中央委员会再从中选出二十四名政治局委员，其中七人组成政治局常委会，并选出一名总书记，即党的最高职位。尽管有这套复杂的选举制度，但研究中国政治制度的学者普遍认为，中国最高领导层的选拔是在国家最有权势的官员之间的闭门会议中预先确定的。

As for Huawei’s internal elections, it is unclear why the elected Representatives have remained so consistent. One explanation is that the number of votes an employee gets is weighted to the number of shares held, which would mean that Ren and other senior executives have many more votes than junior staffers. Another explanation is that Ren’s team has succeeded in producing steady dividends for Huawei’s staff, making many of them wealthy, so workers have little incentive to vote him out. Or, perhaps, in a nation that has elections of a sort but is not a democracy, people have developed the survival skill of making sure votes turn out the way they are supposed to.

至于华为的内部选举，目前尚不清楚为何当选代表能保持如此高度的一致性。一种解释是，员工拥有的投票数与其持股数挂钩，这意味着任正非和其他高管的票数远多于初级员工。另一种解释是，任正非的团队成功地为华为员工带来了稳定的分红，使许多人变得富有，因此员工几乎没有动力将其投票出局。或者，也许在一个拥有某种形式选举但并非民主制的国家，人们已经养成了一种生存技能，即确保投票结果符合预期的方向。

This parallel to China’s governance system offers a lens through which an answer to the question of who controls Huawei can finally be hazarded. Here is what we know about China’s government: the collective governance model obscures who, exactly, is making decisions, and this is by design. Many times, it is the core leader making the decisions, due to his centralized power, but esteemed elders often wield considerable influence in the wings. It can even be possible for them to override the nominal leader on decisions. The party’s internal disciplinary mechanism—present for both the government and for Huawei—serves as a powerful stick to keep individual officials in line, as it allows the party to oust those who are ideologically out of step.

这种与中国治理体系的平行关系提供了一个视角，通过它，我们终于可以尝试回答谁控制华为的问题。以下是我们对中国政府的了解：集体治理模式掩盖了究竟是谁在做决策，而这正是设计使然。很多时候，由于权力集中，是由核心领导人做决策，但德高望重的元老往往在幕后施加巨大影响。他们甚至可能在决策上否决名义上的领导人。党的内部纪律机制——在政府和华为中都存在——是维持官员步调一致的强力大棒，因为它允许党开除那些在意识形态上不合拍的人。

Huawei’s goal, like the party’s, is to ensure its own long-term survival. Achieving this goal requires winning enough buy-in from its workers. But maximizing shareholder value—or individuals’ well-being—is not the end in and of itself.

华为的目标与党一样，是确保自身的长期生存。实现这一目标需要赢得员工足够的认同。但股东价值最大化——或个人福祉——本身并不是最终目的。

Such a system has strengths and weaknesses. A strength is its ability to accomplish titanic tasks at almost impossible speeds by getting everyone to pull in unison. A weakness is that such a system is often strong but brittle, and its success can come at crushing costs for the individuals involved.

这样的系统既有优点也有缺点。优点是它能够通过让所有人步调一致，以近乎不可能的速度完成艰巨的任务。缺点是这种系统往往强大但脆弱，其成功可能以参与其中的个人付出惨重代价为前提。

In the 1990s, as they were drafting the Huawei Basic Law, Ren and his deputies asked themselves what sort of company Huawei was.

20 世纪 90 年代，在起草《华为基本法》时，任正非和他的副手们曾自问，华为究竟是一家什么样的公司。

The answer is now clear: Huawei is a company made in the image of its nation, in all its fearsomeness and flaws, in all its courage and poetry.

答案现在已经很明确了：华为是一家按照其国家形象塑造的公司，承载了它所有的可怕与缺陷，也承载了它所有的勇气与诗意。

Acknowledgments

致谢

I’m immensely grateful to my editors and colleagues at The Washington Post for their support of this project and for all that they have taught me. A great big thank-you to Douglas Jehl, Anna Fifield, David Crawshaw, Lily Kuo, and Cameron Barr for their encouragement of my work on this project as I finished my stint in China in 2022, and to Lori Montgomery, Mark Seibel, Alexis Sobel Fitts, Jamie Graff, and Yun-Hee Kim for finding a home for me on The Washington Post’s tech policy team in Washington. I have enjoyed working with both teams so much, and my Post colleagues have helped shape my understanding of China and the world in so many ways. Thanks especially to Kendra Nichols, Katerina Ang, Christian Shepherd, Lyric Li, Pei-Lin Wu, Alicia Chen, Min Joo Kim, Grace Moon, Emily Rauhala, Ellen Nakashima, Drew Harwell, Cate Cadell, Amanda Coletta, Cat Zakrzewski, and Cristiano Lima-Strong for their insights and camaraderie.

我非常感谢我在《华盛顿邮报》的编辑和同事们，感谢他们对本项目的大力支持，以及他们教给我的一切。衷心感谢道格拉斯·杰尔、安娜·菲菲尔德、大卫·克劳肖、郭莉莉和卡梅隆·巴尔，感谢他们在 2022 年我结束驻华任期时对本项目研究的鼓励；感谢洛里·蒙哥马利、马克·塞贝尔、亚历克西斯·索贝尔·菲茨、杰米·格拉夫和金允熙，为我在华盛顿的《华盛顿邮报》科技政策团队找到了归宿。我非常享受与这两个团队共事的时光，我的《邮报》同事们在许多方面帮助我塑造了对中国和世界的理解。特别感谢肯德拉·尼科尔斯、安格、克里斯蒂安·谢泼德、李理、吴培琳、陈艾丽西亚、金敏珠、格蕾丝·穆恩、艾米莉·劳哈拉、艾伦·中岛、德鲁·哈威尔、凯特·卡德尔、阿曼达·科莱塔、卡特·扎克热夫斯基和克里斯蒂亚诺·利马-斯特朗的真知灼见与同僚情谊。

John Pomfret was kind enough to read an early version of my book proposal, and he introduced me to my brilliant agents, Peter and Amy Bernstein, who have guided this idea into concrete reality with expertise and deftness. My editor, Noah Schwartzberg at Portfolio, believed in this story from the start, and I’m very much indebted to him for his thoughtful edits, inspired vision, and staunch support through the many months and vagaries of the project. I’m grateful to Portfolio’s leadership, including Adrian Zackheim and Niki Papadopoulos, for their support and guidance. It has been a delight to work with the Portfolio team, and I’ve appreciated the expertise and attention to detail of Brian Borchard, Nina Brown, Meighan Cavanaugh, Anna Dobbin, Linda Friedner, Jessica Regione, Chris Welch, and Lauren Morgan Whitticom. Brian Lemus designed the beautiful and striking cover. Leila Sandlin has skillfully shepherded the manuscript and kept track of many moving pieces. Ritsuko Okumura has worked tirelessly to bring this book to readers around the world, and Richard Beswick at Abacus has been a champion for it in the UK and Commonwealth markets.

约翰·庞弗雷特不吝赐教，阅读了本书提案的早期版本，并将我介绍给才华横溢的经纪人彼得·伯恩斯坦和艾米·伯恩斯坦，他们以专业和敏锐的眼光引导这一构思变成了现实。我在 Portfolio 出版社的编辑诺亚·施瓦茨伯格从一开始就相信这个故事，我非常感激他深思熟虑的编辑、富有启发性的远见，以及在本项目历经数月的变迁中给予的坚定支持。感谢 Portfolio 的领导层，包括阿德里安·扎克海姆和尼基·帕帕多普洛斯的支持与指导。与 Portfolio 团队合作非常愉快，我十分欣赏布莱恩·博查德、尼娜·布朗、梅根·卡瓦诺、安娜·多宾、琳达·弗里德纳、杰西卡·雷吉奥内、克里斯·韦尔奇和劳伦·摩根·惠蒂科姆的专业精神和对细节的关注。布莱恩·莱姆斯设计了精美且引人注目的封面。莱拉·桑德林巧妙地统筹了原稿，并跟进许多变动环节。奥村律子不遗余力地将本书带给全球读者，而 Abacus 出版社的理查德·贝斯威克一直是本书在英国和英联邦市场的倡导者。

My gratitude goes to Christina Larson, James Palmer, Dan Wang, Matthew Miller, Donald C. Clarke, and Duncan Clark, who read drafts of the manuscript and offered smart critiques that greatly improved it. Sincere appreciation also goes to a person who fell asleep reading the early versions of the 5G passages.

我要感谢克里斯蒂娜·拉森、詹姆斯·帕尔默、丹·王、马修·米勒、唐纳德·C·克拉克和邓肯·克拉克，他们阅读了书稿草案并提出了精辟的批评，使书稿质量大为改观。还要向一位在阅读 5G 章节早期版本时睡着的人表示由衷的感谢。

I have had many mentors in the archival research process—new terrain for me as a newspaper reporter. I want to thank Joseph Torigian, Marc Opper, Joshua Seufert, and the experts of the Library of Congress’s Asian Reading Room for their generosity in sharing their knowledge of the ins and outs of archives. Without their guidance, the early chapters would have been a shadow of themselves. Daniel Bailly, Christophe Bélorgeot, and Philippe Robin from the Association des Retraités de Technip (ARTP) provided some fascinating insights on the Liaoyang Petrochemical Fiber Factory, and Zhou Fengsuo, Maya Wang, Christine Choy, and Ben Klein kindly helped me with research leads. With patience and good cheer, Danica Raguz at the Supreme Court of British Columbia assisted me for weeks with my records requests.

在档案研究过程中——这对我这个报社记者来说是全新的领域——我得到了许多导师的指点。我要感谢约瑟夫·托里吉安、马克·奥珀、约书亚·索弗特以及国会图书馆亚洲阅览室的专家们，他们慷慨地分享了关于档案细节的知识。如果没有他们的指导，前几章的内容将会逊色不少。来自 Technip 退休人员协会 (ARTP) 的丹尼尔·白利、克里斯托夫·贝洛热和菲利普·罗宾提供了关于辽阳石油化纤厂的迷人见解；周锋锁、王松莲、崔明慧和本·克莱因亲切地为我提供了研究线索。不列颠哥伦比亚省最高法院的丹妮卡·拉古兹以耐心和愉快的心情，协助我处理了长达数周的记录调取请求。

I’m deeply grateful to all the telecommunications engineers, executives, government officials, and subject-matter experts who opened up their memories and generously shared their stores of knowledge, insights, and opinions. They include Erdal Arıkan, Christoph Becker, John Bolton, Vince Cable, Duncan Clark, Robert Fox, Gary Garner, George Gilder, Dan Hesse, Dan Hutchison, Michael Joseph, Michel Juneau-Katsuya, Andy Keiser, John Kotter, Michael Kovrig, Keith Krach, Tony Kwong, Richard Kurland, James Lewis, Dongqing Li, Graham Lovelace, Edgar Masri, Simon Murray, Riccardo Nanni, Bill Owens, Jake Parker, Vishu Paul, William Plummer, Chris Powell, Robert Read, Diane Rinaldo, Charles Rollet, Guy Saint-Jacques, Brian Shields, Eric Steinmann, John Strand, Leo Strawczynski, Niels ten Oever, Michael Thelander, Jeffrey Towson, Paul Triolo, John F. Tyson, Wan Runnan, Steve Waterhouse, Eric Zeng, Ken Zita, and Tommy Zwicky. Many others spoke on an anonymous basis. I am especially grateful to the current and former Huawei employees who took the time to share their memories. Any names missing from this list are certainly inadvertent. This project could not have been done without all of you.

我深切感谢所有电信工程师、高管、政府官员和领域专家，他们敞开记忆，慷慨分享了他们的知识储备、见解和观点。他们包括埃尔达尔·阿里坎、克里斯托夫·贝克尔、约翰·博尔顿、文斯·凯布尔、邓肯·克拉克、罗伯特·福克斯、加里·加纳、乔治·吉尔德、丹·赫塞、丹·哈钦森、迈克尔·约瑟夫、米歇尔·朱诺-胜谷、安迪·凯泽、约翰·科特、康明凯、基思·克拉奇、托尼·邝、理查德·库兰德、詹姆斯·刘易斯、李冬青、格雷厄姆·洛夫莱斯、埃德加·马斯里、马世民、里卡多·南尼、比尔·欧文斯、杰克·帕克、维舒·保罗、威廉·普拉默、克里斯·鲍威尔、罗伯特·里德、戴安娜·里纳尔多、查尔斯·罗莱特、赵朴、布莱恩·希尔兹、埃里克·斯坦曼、约翰·斯特兰德、利奥·斯特劳琴斯基、尼尔斯·滕·奥弗、迈克尔·塞兰德、杰弗里·陶森、保罗·特里奥洛、约翰·F·泰森、万润南、史蒂夫·沃特豪斯、埃里克·曾、肯·齐塔和汤米·兹威基。还有许多人以匿名方式接受了采访。我特别感谢那些抽出时间分享回忆的华为现任和前任员工。这份名单中如有任何遗漏，纯属疏忽。没有你们所有人，这个项目就不可能完成。

David Molko and Amanda Coletta generously shared their notes and insights from the Vancouver trial. Steve Stecklow, Bruce Gilley, and Lionel Barber took the time to share recollections of their encounters with Huawei at key junctures in its history.

大卫·莫尔科和阿曼达·科莱塔慷慨地分享了他们在温哥华审判中的笔记和见解。史蒂夫·斯蒂克洛、布鲁斯·吉利和莱昂内尔·巴伯抽出时间分享了他们在华为历史关键时刻与该公司接触的回忆。

My gratitude goes to Mr. Ren Zhengfei and other Huawei executives for answering the questions of my Wall Street Journal team in 2019, and for giving us a look inside the grand halls of Huawei. Thanks to Huawei’s public relations colleagues—especially Guy Henshilwood, Evita Cao, and Di Fan—for their professionalism in fielding my fact-checking requests over several years. Huawei ultimately decided not to provide comment directly for this project, which I regret but understand, given the uncertainty of the current US-China political environment.

我要感谢任正非先生和其他华为高管，感谢他们在 2019 年回答了我所在的《华尔街日报》团队的问题，并让我们参观了华为宏伟的大厅。感谢华为公共关系部门的同事——特别是盖伊·亨希尔伍德、曹依薇和范笛——感谢他们在过去几年中处理我的事实核查请求时表现出的专业精神。华为最终决定不直接为本项目提供评论，我对此表示遗憾，但考虑到当前美中政治环境的不确定性，我也表示理解。

This work owes a major intellectual debt to the Chinese and foreign scholars who have studied Huawei over the years, including Tian Tao, Wu Chunbo, Huang Weiwei, Johann Peter Murmann, Yang Shaolong, Yun Wen, and Donald C. Clarke. Their works are cited in the endnotes, and I encourage anyone with a deeper interest in the company to study their writings. Tian Tao’s work on Huawei is, in particular, unparalleled, and it forms a cornerstone for anyone seeking to understand the company.

这部作品在思想上很大程度上得益于多年来研究华为的中外学者，包括田涛、吴春波、黄卫伟、约翰·彼得·穆曼、杨少龙、云雯和唐纳德·C·克拉克。他们的著作已在尾注中引用，我鼓励任何对该公司有更深兴趣的人去研读他们的作品。特别是田涛关于华为的研究是无与伦比的，它构成了任何想要了解该公司的人的基石。

Mr. Ren has cultivated a unique Renaissance-man strain of corporate culture at Huawei, where employees are encouraged to study history, literature, and philosophy, as well as express their thoughts elegantly on paper. The writings and essays of Huawei’s employees have been my constant companion these past few years. I tip my hat to those at Huawei who have put their own thoughts to paper, and to the many people who have done the extensive work of keeping a detailed record of history through Huawei’s internal periodicals.

任先生在华为培养了一种独特的“文艺复兴式”企业文化，鼓励员工学习历史、文学和哲学，并以优雅的文字表达思想。在过去的几年里，华为员工的著作和文章一直与我相伴。我向那些将自己的思考付诸笔端的华为人致敬，也向许多通过华为内部刊物为记录历史付出大量心血的人们致敬。

My thanks go out to my former Wall Street Journal colleagues, who were my early teachers on Asia’s high-tech industry. When I was based in Taipei, Aries Poon and Yun-Hee Kim showed me the ropes, along with my dear colleagues Jenny Hsu, Lorraine Luk, and Fanny Liu. I’m grateful for all that I learned from the late Carlos Tejada, as well as from Gillian Wong, Josh Chin, Sofia McFarland, John Corrigan, Charles Hutzler, Jeremy Page, Yoko Kubota, Alyssa Abkowitz, Chao Deng, Kersten Zhang, Yang Jie, and many others.

感谢我以前在《华尔街日报》的同事们，他们是我在亚洲高科技行业领域的启蒙老师。当我驻扎在台北时，潘嘉咏和金润熙带我入门，还有我亲爱的同事许嘉宁、陆颂贤和刘静。我非常感激从已故的卡洛斯·特哈达，以及王春翰、裴林、索菲亚·麦克法兰、约翰·科里根、查尔斯·胡茨勒、杰里米·佩奇、久保田洋子、艾丽莎·阿布科维茨、邓超、张洁、杨洁以及许多其他人那里学到的一切。

Further gratitude goes to Jake Adelstein, Chun Han Wong, Josh Chin, Liza Lin, Ted Anthony, James Zimmerman, Bethany Allen, Shibani Mahtani, and Steven Lee Myers for kindly sharing their insights on the brass tacks of a book project. And I thank Chiara Capitanio, Jasmine Tillu, Ryan Morgan, Brian Jackson, Vincent Lee, Yuan Li, Jen Kwon, and Yuan Ren for friendship, commiseration, hot pots, and intellectual exchange.

还要感谢杰克·阿德尔斯坦、王春翰、裴林、林俐、泰德·安东尼、詹姆斯·齐默尔曼、贝塔妮·艾伦、希巴尼·马塔尼和史蒂文·李·迈尔斯，感谢他们慷慨地分享关于书籍项目实际操作的见解。感谢基亚拉·卡皮塔尼奥、贾斯敏·蒂卢、瑞安·摩根、布莱恩·杰克逊、文森特·李、袁莉、詹·权和任远，感谢他们的友谊、同情、火锅和思想交流。

I have had wonderful teachers over the years. The late Jeffrey Nardone was my first journalism teacher, who taught me and my fellow students to be curious about the world, to aspire for change for the better, and to hold an irreverence for authority figures of all stripes. Joe Grimm, Jim Wilhelm, M. L. Elrick, and Jim Schaefer gave me my first glimpse into serious investigative reporting at the Detroit Free Press. Lynda Kraxberger, Amy Simons, Jim MacMillan, Karen Mitchell, and other professors at the Missouri School of Journalism taught me to see the stories in the world around me, and to be scrupulous in note-taking and fact-checking. David Mandy and Jeffrey Milyo at the MU Department of Economics taught me how to start looking at how the world works through the flow of goods and currency. I’ve been exploring it with wonder ever since.

多年来我遇到了许多优秀的老师。已故的杰弗里·纳多内是我的第一位新闻学老师，他教会我和同学们对世界保持好奇，渴望变得更好，并对各色权威人物保持一种不敬畏的态度。乔·格里姆、吉姆·威廉、M. L. 埃尔里克和吉姆·谢弗让我在《底特律自由报》初次领略了严肃的调查报道。琳达·克拉克斯伯格、艾米·西蒙斯、吉姆·麦克米伦、凯伦·米切尔以及密苏里新闻学院的其他教授教会我观察周围世界的故事，并在笔记和事实核查方面保持严谨。密苏里大学经济系的戴维·曼迪和杰弗里·米利奥教会我如何开始通过商品和货币的流动来观察世界的运作方式。从那时起，我便一直怀着好奇心探索至今。

My deepest thanks go to my parents for the opportunities they gave me, and to my brother, Dan, for cheering me on. They are an inspiration.

我最深切的谢意献给我的父母，感谢他们给予我的机会，也要感谢我的兄弟丹为我加油打气。他们是我的灵感源泉。

Last and most, thank you to my beloved husband, Michael, for his love and support throughout this project and in our lives together. He has been a champion of this book from the start, an insightful critic of the early drafts, an unstoppable fount of puns, and a thoughtful interlocutor on issues of history and international affairs. His insights have made this book smarter and better in many ways. He and our sweet cats have rallied me when I felt uncertain, lifted me up when I was down, and pulled me across the finish line.

最后也是最重要的，感谢我亲爱的丈夫迈克尔，感谢他在这个项目以及我们共同的生活中给予的爱与支持。从一开始他就是这本书的坚定支持者，是初稿的深刻批评者，是源源不断的双关语创造者，也是历史和国际事务问题上深思熟虑的对话者。 他的见解在许多方面让这本书变得更睿智、更出色。当我觉得不确定时，他和我们可爱的猫咪们激励着我；当我情绪低落时，他们让我振作；并拉着我冲过了终点线。

Huawei’s Corporate Structure

华为的内部组织架构

Timeline of Events

大事记

July 7, 1937: The Marco Polo Bridge incident, a clash between Japanese and Chinese troops near Beijing, marks the start of World War II in the Pacific theater.

1937 年 7 月 7 日： 卢沟桥事变爆发，中日军队在北京附近发生冲突，标志着二战太平洋战场的开端。

1937: Ren Moxun arrives in Rongxian, Guangxi Province, and opens the July Seventh Bookstore.

1937 年： 任摩逊抵达广西省容县，创办“七七书店”。

1939: Nationalists shut down the July Seventh Bookstore.

1939 年： 国民党查封“七七书店”。

October 25, 1944: Ren Zhengfei is born.

1944 年 10 月 25 日： 任正非出生。

September 2, 1945: Japan surrenders; World War II ends.

1945 年 9 月 2 日： 日本投降；第二次世界大战结束。

1946: The Chinese Civil War resumes.

1946 年： 中国内战全面爆发。

October 1, 1949: Mao Zedong proclaims the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

1949 年 10 月 1 日： 毛泽东宣告中华人民共和国成立。

1950: Ren Moxun arrives in the Guizhou town of Zhenning with an assignment to set up a middle school for children of the Bouyei ethnic minority.

1950 年： 任摩逊抵达贵州省镇宁县，受命为布依族子弟创办一所中学。

October 1957: The Soviet Union launches Sputnik 1, the world’s first artificial satellite, into orbit.

1957 年 10 月： 苏联发射“史普尼克 1 号”（Sputnik 1），这是世界上第一颗进入轨道的造人卫星。

1958: The Ren family moves to Duyun in Guizhou Province, where Ren Moxun becomes dean of Duyun Minority Teachers’ College and joins the Communist Party.

1958 年： 任家迁往贵州省都匀市，任摩逊出任都匀民族师范学校教务主任并加入中国共产党。

1958: Mao Zedong begins the Great Leap Forward campaign.

1958 年： 毛泽东发动“大跃进”运动。

1959–1961: The Great Chinese Famine takes hold.

1959–1961 年： 三年大饥荒时期。

1963: Ren Zhengfei is accepted into the Chongqing Institute of Architecture and Engineering.

1963 年： 任正非考入重庆建筑工程学院。

May 1966: The decade-long Cultural Revolution begins. Ren Moxun and Meng Dongbo are put into labor camps during this period.

1966 年 5 月： 为期十年的“文化大革命”开始。在此期间，任摩逊和孟东波被送入劳改营。

1968: Ren Zhengfei graduates from the Chongqing Institute of Architecture and Engineering and afterward goes to work at Base 011.

1968 年： 任正非从重庆建筑工程学院毕业，随后前往 011 基地工作。

February 13, 1972: Meng Wanzhou is born.

1972 年 2 月 13 日： 孟晚舟出生。

1974: Ren Zhengfei trains at the Xi’an Instruments Factory. He is later dispatched to Liaoyang with the PLA Engineering Corps to build a nylon and polyester factory.

1974 年： 任正非在西安仪表厂接受培训。随后他随解放军基建工程兵部队被派往辽阳，参与建设一座尼龙和涤纶工厂。

September 9, 1976: Mao Zedong dies, ending the Cultural Revolution.

1976 年 9 月 9 日： 毛泽东逝世，“文化大革命”结束。

Around 1977: Meng Wanzhou goes to live with her paternal grandparents in Guizhou.

1977 年前后： 孟晚舟前往贵州与祖父母一同生活。

1978: At the nation’s first National Science Conference, attended by Ren Zhengfei, China’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping, declares the return of science following the Cultural Revolution. Ren joins the Chinese Communist Party. With the construction of the Liaoyang Petrochemical Fiber Factory largely complete, Ren’s troop moves south to Jinan, where Ren becomes deputy director of a research institute.

1978 年： 中国召开首届全国科学大会，任正非出席。中国新任领导人邓小平宣布科学在文革后回归。任正非加入中国共产党。随着辽阳石油化纤厂建设基本完成，任正非所在的部队南迁至济南，他出任某研究所副所长。

1979: Ren Zhengfei publishes A Floating-Ball Precision Pressure Generator—Air Pressure Balance, a book about his invention. Ren Moxun becomes principal of Duyun No. 1 Middle School. Meng Dongbo travels to Europe.

1979 年： 任正非出版了关于其发明的著作《浮球式精密压力发生器——气压平衡》。任摩逊出任都匀一中校长。孟东波出访欧洲。

May 1980: The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is established.

1980 年 5 月： 深圳经济特区成立。

January 8, 1982: The US Justice Department orders the breakup of AT&T, which at the time was the world’s leader in telecommunications research.

1982 年 1 月 8 日： 美国司法部下令拆分 AT&T，该公司当时是全球电信研究领域的领导者。

September 1982: Ren Zhengfei attends the Twelfth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Deng Xiaoping announces the disbandment of the PLA Engineering Corps.

1982 年 9 月： 任正非出席中国共产党第十二次全国代表大会。邓小平宣布撤销解放军基建工程兵。

1982–1984: Ren Zhengfei and Meng Jun move to Shenzhen (date uncertain), and Ren begins work at South Sea Oil.

1982–1984 年： 任正非与孟军迁往深圳（具体日期不详），任正非开始在南海石油公司工作。

1984: Ren Moxun retires from the middle school and devotes his time to compiling a history of the local schools.

1984 年： 任摩逊从中学退休，致力于编纂当地学校的校史。

February 1987: Shenzhen allows individuals to set up minjian private tech companies.

1987 年 2 月： 深圳允许个人创办“民间”私营科技企业。

September 15, 1987: Huawei Technologies Co. is founded.

1987 年 9 月 15 日： 华为技术有限公司成立。

Spring 1988: Ren Zhengfei travels to the Huazhong Institute of Technology in Wuhan to try to recruit researchers to build a switch.

1988 年春： 任正非前往武汉华中工学院，试图招募研究人员研制交换机。

Autumn 1988: Guo Ping, a Huazhong Institute graduate student, arrives at Huawei for an internship.

1988 年秋： 华中工学院研究生郭平来到华为实习。

1990: Huawei holds a shareholder meeting at which there is a severe dispute between Ren Zhengfei and his five original investors.

1990 年： 华为召开股东大会，任正非与最初的五位投资者之间发生了严重分歧。

1990: Meng Wanzhou graduates from high school and enrolls at Shenzhen University as an accounting major.

1990 年： 孟晚舟高中毕业，考入深圳大学会计专业。

1990: Ken Hu joins Huawei.

1990 年： 胡厚崑加入华为。

1991: Military engineer Wu Jiangxing develops the “04 switch,” China’s first homegrown advanced digital switch.

1991 年： 军事工程师邬江兴研制出“04 机”，这是中国首台自主研发的高级数字交换机。

1991: Huawei sets up its chip design center, which is later renamed HiSilicon.

1991 年： 华为成立芯片设计中心，后更名为海思。

1991–1992: Huawei registers as a jitisuoyouzhi, or collectively owned company (exact date unclear).

1991–1992 年： 华为登记为“集体所有制”企业（具体日期不详）。

1992: Steven Ren joins Huawei.

1992 年： 任树录加入华为。

1993: Li Yinan and Eric Xu join Huawei.

1993 年： 李一男和徐直军加入华为。

1993: Huawei begins developing the C&C08, its first advanced digital switch.

1993 年： 华为开始研发 C&C08，这是其首款高级数字交换机。

March 4, 1993: Huawei establishes its first US subsidiary, Ran Boss Technologies, in Santa Clara, California, to work on R&D.

1993 年 3 月 4 日： 华为在加利福尼亚州圣克拉拉成立了首家美国子公司 Ran Boss Technologies，从事研发工作。

April 1993: Huawei launches Mobeco, a domestic joint venture with provincial telecommunication bureaus, promising them high annual investment returns.

1993 年 4 月： 华为推出“莫贝克”（Mobeco），这是一家与各省电信局合资的国内企业，承诺给予投资者高额的年度投资回报。

1994: Sun Yafang is promoted to vice-chairwoman at Huawei.

1994 年： 孙亚芳升任华为副董事长。

May 1994: A first test unit for Huawei’s C&C08 digital switch is set up in Yiwu, Zhejiang.

1994 年 5 月： 华为 C&C08 数字交换机的首台测试机在浙江义乌开通。

June 1994: Ren Zhengfei meets the nation’s leader, Jiang Zemin, in Shenzhen and makes his now-famous statement that “a country without its own program-controlled switches is like one without an army.”

1994 年 6 月： 任正非在深圳会见国家领导人江泽民，并发表了那段著名的言论：“一个国家如果没有自己的程控交换机，就像没有军队一样。”

November 1994: China Merchants Bank announces a new financial product called “domestic buyer’s credit”; Huawei is the first company in the nation able to offer it to customers.

1994 年 11 月： 招商银行推出名为“国内买方信贷”的新型金融产品；华为是全国首家能向客户提供该产品的公司。

January 1, 1995: The World Trade Organization is established; due to US obstruction, China is not a founding member.

1995 年 1 月 1 日： 世界贸易组织成立；由于美国的阻挠，中国未能成为创始成员国。

April 3, 1995: The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications approves Huawei’s C&C08 switch for mass production.

1995 年 4 月 3 日： 邮电部批准华为 C&C08 交换机投入批量生产。

June 1995: Ren Moxun passes away.

1995 年 6 月： 任摩逊逝世。

September 1995: Huawei opens its Hong Kong branch.

1995 年 9 月： 华为成立香港分公司。

1996: Huawei is one of eight companies selected by Beijing for a $1 billion national semiconductor development program.

1996 年： 华为被北京选中，成为参与一项 10 亿美元国家半导体开发计划的八家公司之一。

January 28, 1996: Huawei’s sales team holds a “mass resignation ceremony” led by Sun Yafang.

1996 年 1 月 28 日： 华为销售团队举行由孙亚芳发起的“集体辞职仪式”。

March 1996: Huawei sets up its internal Communist Party branch.

1996 年 3 月： 华为成立内部党支部。

April 1996: China and Russia announce a strategic partnership, and Ren Zhengfei travels to Moscow to open Huawei’s office in the country.

1996 年 4 月： 中俄宣布建立战略协作伙伴关系，任正非前往莫斯科开设华为在俄罗斯的办事处。

June 1996: Huawei seals a deal to sell C&C08 switches to Hutchison Telecom, breaking into the Hong Kong market.

1996 年 6 月： 华为与和记电讯达成销售 C&C08 交换机的协议，成功打入香港市场。

November 1996: While visiting Huawei, Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo suggests that the company try to re-create its success in landline telephone switches with mobile telephony.

1996 年 11 月： 副总理吴邦国在视察华为时建议，公司应尝试在移动通信领域复制其在固定电话交换机上的成功。

1997: Huawei says it changed its legal structure to a limited liability company this year. Huawei also begins negotiating the buyout of its five original investors, a process that takes several years; it cracks into the Beijing market with its first sales of C&C08 switches to the city; and it begins deployment of its first videoconferencing and video-surveillance system, ViewPoint.

1997 年： 华为称其在这一年将法律结构变更为有限责任公司。华为还开始谈判回购其最初五位投资者的股份，这一过程持续了数年；公司凭借向北京市首次销售C&C08 交换机而打入北京市场；并开始部署其首个视频会议和视频监控系统——视讯（ViewPoint）。

February 20, 1997: Deng Xiaoping passes away.

1997 年 2 月 20 日： 邓小平逝世。

April 1997: Huawei’s first international joint venture, Beto-Huawei, is set up in the Russian city of Ufa.

1997 年 4 月： 华为首家国际合资企业贝托-华为（Beto-Huawei）在俄罗斯城市乌法成立。

July 1, 1997: The Hong Kong handover ends 156 years of British colonial rule.

1997 年 7 月 1 日： 香港回归，结束了英国 156 年的殖民统治。

September 1997: As a workaround to China’s Company Law, which restricts the number of shareholders in a limited liability company to fifty, the Shenzhen government suggests that local companies adopt an employee ownership model in which employee shares are held by a “union” that counts as a single shareholder. Around this time, Huawei adopts the suggested structure.

1997 年 9 月： 为了规避当时中国《公司法》中关于有限责任公司股东人数不得超过 50 人的限制，深圳市政府建议当地企业采用员工持股模式，即员工股份由一个被视为单一股东的“工会”代持。大约在此时，华为采用了这一建议的结构。

December 1997: Ren Zhengfei visits IBM and decides to hire the company to consult Huawei on how to grow its international business.

1997 年 12 月： 任正非访问 IBM，并决定聘请该公司为华为提供咨询，指导如何发展国际业务。

1998: Huawei institutes a new policy that requires executives to complete an overseas posting in order to be eligible for promotion.

1998 年： 华为制定了一项新政策，要求管理人员必须完成海外任职才有资格获得晋升。

January 1998: Ren Zhengfei’s daughter Annabel Yao is born.

1998 年 1 月： 任正非之女姚安娜出生。

March 1998: Huawei adopts its “Huawei Basic Law” after two years of drafting.

1998 年 3 月： 经过两年的起草，华为通过了《华为基本法》。

August 1998: IBM consultants begin to arrive at Huawei, where they will remain in residence for a decade.

1998 年 8 月： IBM 顾问开始进驻华为，他们将在那里驻扎十年之久。

1999: Sun Yafang becomes Huawei’s chairwoman.

1999 年： 孙亚芳出任华为董事长。

September 1999: Sun Yafang attends Harvard Business School’s Advanced Management Program for mid-career executives.

1999 年 9 月： 孙亚芳参加哈佛商学院为职业中期管理人员开设的高级管理项目。

1999–2000: Anonymous letters accuse Huawei of illegal business practices, prompting the National Audit Office to audit Huawei’s books.

1999–2000 年： 匿名信指控华为存在非法经营行为，促使国家审计署对华为的账目进行审计。

March 2000: The dot-com bubble bursts.

2000 年 3 月： 互联网泡沫破裂。

August 2000: Huawei opens offices in Mexico and Sweden.

2000 年 8 月： 华为在墨西哥和瑞典设立办事处。

November 2000: Forbes puts Ren Zhengfei at number three on its list of China’s fifty richest entrepreneurs.

2000 年 11 月： 《福布斯》 将任正非列为中国五十位最富有企业家排行榜的第三名。

January 2001: Huawei sets up a subsidiary in Plano, Texas, called Futurewei Technologies, aimed at selling into the US market.

2001 年 1 月： 华为在德克萨斯州普莱诺设立了一家名为 Futurewei Technologies 的子公司，旨在开拓美国市场。

January 2001: Ren Zhengfei accompanies Vice President Hu Jintao on a state visit to Iran.

2001 年 1 月： 任正非陪同国家副主席胡锦涛对伊朗进行国事访问。

February 16, 2001: The Pentagon orders an air strike on a fiber-optic cable network that Huawei is constructing in Iraq, with Huawei accused of violating UN sanctions by working on the project.

2001 年 2 月 16 日： 五角大楼下令对华为在伊拉克建设的光纤电缆网络进行空袭，华为被指控参与该项目违反了联合国制裁。

February 25, 2001: Following the death of his mother the previous month, Ren Zhengfei publishes an essay titled “My Father and Mother,” recounting his family history.

2001 年 2 月 25 日： 在母亲于上月去世后，任正非发表了题为《我的父亲母亲》的文章，追忆家族历史。

September 2001: Huawei is criticized in the foreign media for allegedly building a phone system for the Taliban in Afghanistan.

2001 年 9 月： 华为因涉嫌为阿富汗塔利班建立电话系统而受到外国媒体的批评。

October 2001: Huawei sells Avansys Power—the unit previously named Mobeco that aided its early domestic expansion by bringing municipal telecom bureaus on board as investors—to Emerson Electric in the United States for $750 million.

2001 年 10 月： 华为以 7.5 亿美元的价格将安圣电气（Avansys Power）出售给美国艾默生电气。该部门前身为莫贝克（Mobeco），曾通过吸引地方电信局作为投资者入股，助力了华为早期的国内扩张。

December 2001: China is accepted into the World Trade Organization.

2001 年 12 月： 中国正式加入世界贸易组织。

February 2003: Cisco sues Huawei, alleging intellectual-property violations.

2003 年 2 月： 思科起诉华为，指控其侵犯知识产权。

March 2003: The United States invades Iraq.

2003 年 3 月： 美国入侵伊拉克。

July 2003: With sanctions lifted after the deposing of Saddam Hussein, Iraq issues its first mobile network licenses to three companies, including Asiacell, which Huawei had wooed. Huawei is contracted to supply Asiacell’s network.

2003 年 7 月： 随着萨达姆·侯赛因下台后制裁的解除，伊拉克向三家公司发放了首批移动网络牌照，其中包括华为一直争取的 Asiacell。华为签约成为 Asiacell 网络的供应商。

2004: Huawei’s chip design center is formalized as a subsidiary called HiSilicon.

2004 年： 华为的芯片设计中心正式更名为子公司海思半导体（HiSilicon）。

July 2004: Cisco drops its lawsuit against Huawei.

2004 年 7 月： 思科撤销了对华为的诉讼。

December 2004: Huawei launches a network for its first US customer, the small cellular operator ClearTalk, operating in Southern California and Arizona.

2004 年 12 月： 华为为其次个美国客户——在南加州和亚利桑那州运营的小型蜂窝运营商 ClearTalk——开通了网络。

2005: The China Development Bank allocates $10 billion in financing for overseas customers to purchase Huawei products.

2005 年： 中国开发银行拨出 100 亿美元贷款额度，用于资助海外客户购买华为产品。

April 2005: Huawei lands its first major contract in the West when the UK operator BT picks the company as a supplier for its major network upgrade from dial-up internet to broadband.

2005 年 4 月： 华为赢得了在西方的首个重大合同，英国运营商 BT 选择该公司作为其从拨号上网升级到宽带的大规模网络改造供应商。

2006: Huawei’s chip unit, HiSilicon, launches its first surveillance-camera chip.

2006 年： 华为芯片部门海思推出了首款监控摄像头芯片。

January 2006: North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Il, visits Huawei.

2006 年 1 月： 朝鲜领导人金正日访问华为。

April 2006: A twenty-five-year-old Huawei engineer named Hu Xinyu dies from a brain infection after weeks of overtime work, sparking public backlash against Huawei’s work culture.

2006 年 4 月： 25 岁的华为工程师胡新宇在连续数周加班后死于脑部感染，引发了公众对华为加班文化的强烈抵制。

November 2006: Huawei strikes a deal to sell its stake in H3C, its joint venture with 3Com, back to the US company. Huawei agrees not to compete directly with 3Com’s enterprise networking business for eighteen months.

2006 年 11 月： 华为达成协议，将其在合资公司 H3C（华三）中的股份卖回给美国公司 3Com。华为同意在 18 个月内不与 3Com 的企业网络业务直接竞争。

2007: Huawei begins selling “managed services,” whereby it helps run customers’ networks for a fee.

2007 年： 华为开始销售“管理服务”，即通过收取费用帮助客户运营网络。

May 2007: Huawei enters the submarine cable market with the launch of Huawei Submarine Networks, a joint venture with the UK’s Global Marine Systems.

2007 年 5 月： 华为与英国全球海事系统公司（Global Marine Systems）成立合资企业华为海洋网络，进入海底电缆市场。

July 2007: The FBI interviews Ren Zhengfei at a hotel in New York.

2007 年 7 月： FBI 在纽约的一家酒店审讯了任正非。

September 2007: News breaks that Huawei was planning to buy a stake in 3Com as part of Bain Capital’s takeover of the networking company, sparking controversy in Washington and a review of the deal by CFIUS.

2007 年 9 月： 消息传出华为计划作为贝恩资本收购 3Com 交易的一部分购买其股份，这在华盛顿引发了争议，并导致美国外国投资委员会（CFIUS）对该交易进行审查。

Autumn 2007: Huawei engineers begin working to set up cell service on Mount Everest ahead of the Olympics.

2007 年秋： 华为工程师开始在珠穆朗玛峰上建立蜂窝服务，为奥运会做准备。

December 2007: Through Management Optimization, an in-house newspaper, Huawei announces to staff that the company’s Communist Party committee will now have veto power over executive appointments.

2007 年 12 月： 华为通过内部报纸《管理优化》 向员工宣布，公司党委今后将对高管任命拥有否决权。

2008: Huawei is number one worldwide in patent application filings, the first time a Chinese company has held the title.

2008 年： 华为专利申请量位居全球第一，这是中国公司首次获得该头衔。

2008: Huawei names a new party secretary, Zhou Daiqi, after Madam Chen Zhufang retires.

2008 年： 陈珠芳女士退休后，华为任命周代琪为新任党委书记。

2008: Meng Wanzhou registers as a director of Skycom.

2008 年： 孟晚舟登记成为 Skycom 公司的董事。

January 2008: China’s Labor Contract Law goes into effect, providing employment protections for employees who have worked at the same company for more than a decade. Just before the deadline, sixty-five hundred Huawei employees resign and rejoin the company, wiping out their seniority.

2008 年 1 月： 中国《劳动合同法》正式生效，为在同一家公司工作十年以上的员工提供就业保障。就在截止日期前，6500 名华为员工辞职并重新入职，清空了他们的工龄。

February 2008: Huawei gives up plans to buy a stake in 3Com after CFIUS indicates it will block the deal.

2008 年 2 月： 在美国外国投资委员会（CFIUS）表示将阻挠交易后，华为放弃了收购 3Com 股份的计划。

May 8, 2008: The Olympic torch ascends Mount Everest, with Huawei helping to broadcast the images to the world.

2008 年 5 月 8 日： 奥运圣火登上珠穆朗玛峰，华为协助向全球转播了相关画面。

2009: After extensive delays, China finally rolls out 3G mobile networks, allowing smartphones to fully function in the nation.

2009 年： 经过长时间的延迟，中国终于推出了 3G 移动网络，使智能手机能够在全国范围内充分发挥功能。

2009: Huawei starts selling its Safe City surveillance systems internationally.

2009 年： 华为开始在国际市场上销售其“平安城市”监控系统。

2010: Meng Wanzhou becomes Huawei’s CFO.

2010 年： 孟晚舟出任华为首席财务官（CFO）。

August 2010: Republican lawmakers write to the Obama administration, urging it to block Huawei’s bid to supply Sprint’s network.

2010 年 8 月： 共和党议员致信奥巴马政府，敦促其阻止华为竞标供应 Sprint 的网络。

November 2010: Sprint rejects Huawei’s bid to supply its 4G network.

2010 年 11 月： Sprint 拒绝了华为供应其 4G 网络的竞标。

November 2010: The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), where Huawei will allow the UK government to examine its equipment for cybersecurity vulnerabilities, opens in the United Kingdom.

2010 年 11 月： 华为网络安全评估中心（HCSEC）在英国成立，华为将允许英国政府在此检查其设备的网络安全漏洞。

February 2011: Ken Hu, Huawei’s deputy chairman, pens an open letter inviting the US government to investigate the company so that it can clear its name by proving it is “a normal commercial institution and nothing more.”

2011 年 2 月： 华为副董事长胡厚崑发表公开信，邀请美国政府对公司进行调查，以证明华为“仅仅是一家普通的商业机构”，从而洗清污名。

December 2011: Huawei announces a shift to a rotating CEO system, with Guo Ping, Ken Hu, and Eric Xu taking turns at the helm of the company for six-month stints.

2011 年 12 月： 华为宣布转向轮值 CEO 制度，由郭平、胡厚崑和徐直军轮流执掌公司，每人任期六个月。

March 2012: Australia bans Huawei from bidding for its next-generation broadband network.

2012 年 3 月： 澳大利亚禁止华为竞标其下一代宽带网络。

September 2012: The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) holds a hearing on Huawei and ZTE.

2012 年 9 月： 美国众议院常设情报特别委员会（HPSCI）就华为和中兴举行听证会。

October 2012: The HPSCI issues its report on Huawei and ZTE, recommending that US companies stop buying from the two.

2012 年 10 月： HPSCI 发布关于华为和中兴的报告，建议美国公司停止从这两家公司采购。

2013: Huawei carves out Honor as a stand-alone smartphone brand aimed at the youth market.

2013 年： 华为将“荣耀”剥离为针对青年市场的独立智能手机品牌。

January 2013: In Beijing, Meng Wanzhou holds her first press conference as Huawei’s CFO, promising that the company will be more transparent.

2013 年 1 月： 孟晚舟在北京举行了她作为华为 CFO 的首场新闻发布会，承诺公司将更加透明。

January 2013: Reuters reports that Meng Wanzhou was a Skycom board member.

2013 年 1 月： 路透社报道称孟晚舟曾是 Skycom 的董事会成员。

August 22, 2013: Meng Wanzhou meets with HSBC executives and presents a slide deck about Huawei’s Iran business.

2013 年 8 月 22 日： 孟晚舟会见汇丰银行高管，并展示了一份关于华为伊朗业务的演示文稿。

March 2014: The New York Times and Der Spiegel report that, based on documents leaked by Edward Snowden, the NSA has been infiltrating Huawei for years through a program called “Shotgiant.”

2014 年 3 月： 《纽约时报》 和 《明镜周刊》 报道称，根据爱德华·斯诺登泄露的文件，美国国家安全局（NSA）多年来一直通过一项名为“猎巨人”（Shotgiant）的项目渗透华为。

April 2014: A bomb attack at a train station in Ürümqi triggers the start of a counterterrorism crackdown in Xinjiang.

2014 年 4 月： 乌鲁木齐火车站发生的炸弹袭击触发了新疆反恐严打行动的开始。

June 2014: Meng Wanzhou is detained for secondary questioning at New York’s JFK Airport, and her electronics are copied by US authorities.

2014 年 6 月： 孟晚舟在纽约肯尼迪国际机场被扣留进行二次审查，其电子设备被美国当局复制。

2015: Huawei surpasses Xiaomi in smartphone sales, with only Apple and Samsung ahead of it.

2015 年： 华为在智能手机销量上超越小米，仅次于苹果和三星。

October 2015: Xi Jinping visits Huawei’s offices in the UK.

2015 年 10 月： 习近平访问华为在英国的办公室。

2016: In Dongguan, Huawei begins constructing its Ox Horn Campus, which will have twelve “towns” designed after European cities and regions.

2016 年： 华为开始在东莞建设其溪流背坡村校区（牛角校区），该校区拥有十二个模仿欧洲城市和地区设计的“小镇”。

March 2016: The US Commerce Department sanctions ZTE.

2016 年 3 月： 美国商务部制裁中兴通讯。

November 2016: Huawei gets its polar coding technology included in the 5G standard.

2016 年 11 月： 华为的极化码（polar coding）技术被纳入 5G 标准。

2017: China announces its goal to become a world AI power by 2030.

2017 年： 中国宣布其目标是到 2030 年成为世界人工智能强国。

January 2018: AT&T and Verizon stop carrying Huawei smartphones.

2018 年 1 月： AT&T 和 Verizon 停止销售华为智能手机。

January 2018: French newspaper Le Monde reports that the servers at the African Union’s headquarters were sending data to China each night.

2018 年 1 月： 法国《世界报》Le Monde 报道称，非洲联盟总部的服务器每晚都会向中国发送数据。

March 2018: After serving as Huawei’s chairwoman for nineteen years, Sun Yafang steps down and is replaced by Liang Hua.

2018 年 3 月： 在担任华为董事长 19 年后，孙亚芳卸任，由梁华接任。

July 2018: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute reports that the servers at the African Union’s headquarters were produced by Huawei.

2018 年 7 月： 澳大利亚战略政策研究所报告称，非洲联盟总部的服务器是由华为生产的。

August 2018: President Trump signs into law a defense bill that bans US government agencies from buying Huawei and ZTE equipment.

2018 年 8 月： 特朗普总统签署了一项国防法案，禁止美国政府机构购买华为和中兴的设备。

August 2018: Australia becomes the first country in the world to formally ban Huawei and ZTE from its future 5G network.

2018 年 8 月： 澳大利亚成为世界上第一个正式禁止华为和中兴参与其未来 5G 网络建设的国家。

November 2018: Annabel Yao appears as a debutante at Le Bal in Paris.

2018 年 11 月： 姚安娜在巴黎名媛舞会（Le Bal）上首次亮相。

December 1, 2018: Meng Wanzhou is detained at the Vancouver International Airport.

2018 年 12 月 1 日： 孟晚舟在温哥华国际机场被拘留。

December 10, 2018: The Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor are detained in China.

2018 年 12 月 10 日： 加拿大人康明凯（Michael Kovrig）和迈克尔·斯帕弗（Michael Spavor）在中国被拘留。

December 11, 2018: Meng Wanzhou is released on bail.

2018 年 12 月 11 日： 孟晚舟获准保释。

January 16, 2019: Ren Zhengfei holds his first press conference with international media.

2019 年 1 月 16 日： 任正非举行其首次国际媒体新闻发布会。

January 28, 2019: US prosecutors announce criminal charges against Huawei and Meng Wanzhou.

2019 年 1 月 28 日： 美国检察官宣布对华为和孟晚舟提出刑事指控。

May 2019: President Trump declares a national emergency in telecommunications, ordering federal agencies to take “all appropriate measures.” The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security announces sanctions on Huawei.

2019 年 5 月： 特朗普总统宣布电信领域进入国家紧急状态，命令联邦机构采取“一切适当措施”。商务部工业和安全局宣布对华为实施制裁。

June 2019: Huawei decides to sell its undersea cable subsidiary, Huawei Marine Systems, to a Chinese buyer.

2019 年 6 月： 华为决定将其海底电缆子公司华为海洋系统出售给一家中国买家。

January 20, 2020: Meng Wanzhou’s extradition hearing begins in Vancouver.

2020 年 1 月 20 日： 孟晚舟引渡案听证会在温哥华开始。

Second quarter 2020: For the first time, Huawei becomes the world’s number-one smartphone vendor in sales.

2020 年第二季度： 华为首次在销量上成为全球第一大智能手机厂商。

May 2020: The Commerce Department tightens sanctions on Huawei.

2020 年 5 月： 美国商务部收紧对华为的制裁。

July 2020: The UK announces a reversal of its position on Huawei and says that it will remove all Huawei equipment from the nation’s 5G networks by the end of 2027.

2020 年 7 月： 英国宣布逆转其在华为问题上的立场，并表示将在 2027 年底前从国家 5G 网络中移除所有华为设备。

November 16, 2020: Huawei announces that it will sell its Honor phone brand.

2020 年 11 月 16 日： 华为宣布将出售其荣耀手机品牌。

March 22, 2021: Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor are tried behind closed doors.

2021 年 3 月 22 日： 康明凯和迈克尔·斯帕弗接受不公开审理。

September 24, 2021: Huawei’s CFO, Meng Wanzhou, enters into a plea agreement with the US Justice Department and is allowed to return to China. On the same day, Beijing allows Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor to return to Canada.

2021 年 9 月 24 日：华为首席财务官孟晚舟与美国司法部达成延期起诉协议，获准回国。同日，北京方面允许康明凯（Michael Kovrig）和迈克尔·斯帕弗（Michael Spavor）返回加拿大。

March 2022: Meng Wanzhou is promoted, joining Ken Hu and Eric Xu as one of Huawei’s three rotating chairs. Guo Ping becomes chairman of the supervisory board.

2022 年 3 月：孟晚舟获得提拔，与胡厚崑、徐直军共同担任华为三位轮值董事长之一。郭平转任监事会主席。

April 2023: Meng Wanzhou begins her first half-year tenure as a rotating CEO at Huawei.

2023 年 4 月：孟晚舟开始其作为华为轮值董事长的首次半年任期。

September 2023: Huawei launches the Mate 60 Pro smartphone, which runs on a 5G chip made domestically despite US sanctions.

2023 年 9 月：华为推出 Mate 60 Pro 智能手机，尽管面临美国制裁，该手机仍搭载了国产 5G 芯片。

Additional Reading

延伸阅读

For readers interested in a deeper understanding of these topics, I would like to highlight the following works for further reading. This list is far from comprehensive. The below are books unless otherwise noted.

对于有兴趣深入了解这些话题的读者，我想重点推荐以下作品以供进一步阅读。这份清单远非详尽无遗。除另有说明外，下文所列均为书籍。

Other Works on Huawei in English

其他关于华为的英文著作

The Huawei Way, by Tian Tao with Wu Chunbo, is an early work that explains Huawei’s philosophy and corporate culture to a global audience and, in many ways, remains the standard-bearer for books written with direct input from senior Huawei executives.

《华为之道》（The Huawei Way），由田涛与吴春波合著。这是一部向全球读者阐述华为哲学和企业文化的早期著作，在许多方面，它仍然是获得华为高管直接参与编写的书籍中的标杆之作。

The Management Transformation of Huawei, by Xiaobo Wu, Johann Peter Murmann, Can Huang, and Bin Guo, is an excellent detailed resource on the obscurities of Huawei’s management structure, and its appendix includes a full translation of the Huawei Basic Law.

《华为的管理变革》（The Management Transformation of Huawei），由吴晓波、约翰·彼得·穆曼、黄灿和郭斌合著。这是一部关于华为复杂管理结构的优秀详实资源，其附录包含了《华为基本法》的全译本。

The Huawei Stories series (Pioneers, Explorers, Visionaries, Adventurers, and Spirit), edited by Tian Tao and Yin Zhifeng, is a selection of essays by Huawei employees, many originally published in Huawei People, that offer first-person accounts of key moments in the company’s history.

《华为故事系列》（包括 《先驱》、《探索者》、《远见者》、《冒险家》 和 《精神》），由田涛和印志锋主编。这是一系列由华为员工撰写的文章选集，其中许多最初发表在 《华为人》 报上，提供了公司历史上关键时刻的第一手记述。

Huidu: Inside Huawei, by William B. Plummer, the company’s former US spokesman, is a colorful memoir that sheds light on the company’s response to the House investigation and other crises in the US.

《灰度：华为内部》（Huidu: Inside Huawei），由该公司前美国发言人威廉·普拉默（William B. Plummer）著。这是一部精彩的回忆录，阐明了公司对美国众议院调查及其他在美危机的应对。

Huawei Inside Out, by Joseph Smith, presents an interesting view on Huawei from the perspective of one of the early IBM consultants who helped the company internationalize.

《华为里外》（Huawei Inside Out），由约瑟夫·史密斯（Joseph Smith）著。该书从早期帮助华为实现国际化的 IBM 顾问之一的角度，提出了关于华为的有趣见解。

Those interested in exploring varying viewpoints on Huawei’s ownership should start with Christopher Balding and Donald C. Clarke’s paper on Huawei’s corporate structure, “Who Owns Huawei?” (http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3372669), and the detailed rejoinder paper from Chinese professor Wang Jun, as translated by Zichen Wang (https://www.pekingnology.com/p/who-really-owns-huawei-a-response).

有兴趣探索关于华为所有权不同观点的读者，应从克里斯托弗·巴尔丁（Christopher Balding）和唐纳德·克拉克（Donald C. Clarke）关于华为公司结构的论文《谁拥有华为？》（http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3372669）开始，以及中国教授王军的详细反驳论文，由王子辰翻译（https://www.pekingnology.com/p/who-really-owns-huawei-a-response）。

Other Works on Huawei in Chinese

其他关于华为的中文著作

The two volumes of Huawei Interviews [华为访谈录], by Tian Tao, reflect many years of study and research, and they are unparalleled in their insight into the early days of Huawei’s history and the experiences of key members of Ren’s executive team.

田涛的两卷本《华为访谈录》反映了多年的学习和研究，在洞察华为历史早期情况以及任正非执行团队核心成员的经历方面，这些访谈录是无与伦比的。

Former Huawei executive Li Yuzhuo’s memoir, Straight Down the Path: My Business Ideals [一路直行 : 我的企业理想], is a frank and colorful account of life at Huawei and other Chinese high-tech firms, featuring anecdotes about Li’s humorous run-ins with Ren Zhengfei and other industry titans, as well as an explanation of how Huawei’s early domestic joint ventures helped its sales expansion.

前华为高管李玉琢的回忆录《一路直行：我的企业理想》是对华为及其他中国高科技公司生活的坦诚而生动的记述，书中包含了李与任正非及其他行业巨头幽默交锋的轶事，并解释了华为早期的国内合资企业如何帮助其销售扩张。

Huawei’s World [华为的世界], by Wu Jianguo and Ji Yongqing, is a vivid narrative of Huawei’s early rise based partly on the personal experiences of Wu, who served as a deputy to chief engineer Zheng Baoyong at Huawei.

吴建国和冀勇庆合著的《华为的世界》生动叙述了华为早期的崛起，部分基于吴在华为担任总工程师郑宝用助理时的个人经历。

Liu Ping’s [刘平] memoir, Bygone Times at Huawei [华为往事], and Cao Yi’an’s [曹贻安] Miscellaneous Notes on Striving at Huawei [在华为打拼杂记], which both appear to be published only online, provide insights into the personalities and work culture at Huawei. Penned by former Huawei executives, they are well worth reading in their entirety for those interested in the company.

刘平的回忆录《华为往事》和曹贻安的《在华为打拼杂记》（两者似乎都仅在网上发布）提供了对华为人物性格和工作文化的见解。这些作品由前华为高管撰写，对于那些对该公司感兴趣的人来说，非常值得完整阅读。

Zhang Lihua’s [张利华] Huawei R&D [华为研发] provides a detailed account of Huawei’s early switches and other products and how they were developed.

张利华的《华为研发》详细介绍了华为早期的交换机及其他产品，以及它们是如何开发出来的。

Other Works on the Telecommunications Industry

其他关于电信行业的著作

The essay “Who Lost Lucent? The Decline of America’s Telecom Equipment Industry,” by Robert D. Atkinson, is a good place to start for those looking to understand the other half of the story: the long decline of the United States as the unquestioned leader of the industry. See https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2020/08/who-lost-lucent-the-decline-of-americas-telecom-equipment-industry.

罗伯特·阿特金森（Robert D. Atkinson）的文章《谁丢了朗讯？美国电信设备行业的衰落》（Who Lost Lucent? The Decline of America’s Telecom Equipment Industry）是了解故事另一半的良好起点：即美国作为该行业无可争议领导者的长期衰落。参见 https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2020/08/who-lost-lucent-the-decline-of-americas-telecom-equipment-industry。

The Deal of the Century: The Breakup of AT&T, by Steve Coll, explains the origins of the US Justice Department’s 1982 order for the dismantling of AT&T’s telephone monopoly, which in retrospect was the beginning of the end of US reign over the global telecom sector.

《世纪交易：AT&T 的分拆》（The Deal of the Century: The Breakup of AT&T），由史蒂夫·科尔（Steve Coll）著。该书解释了美国司法部 1982 年下令拆分 AT&T 电话垄断地位的起源，回过头看，这正是美国统治全球电信领域终结的开始。

Adventures in Innovation: Inside the Rise and Fall of Nortel, by John Tyson, explores the journey of one of Huawei’s most storied Western rivals and the factors that led to its bankruptcy.

《创新历险记：北电兴衰内幕》（Adventures in Innovation: Inside the Rise and Fall of Nortel），由约翰·泰森（John Tyson）著。该书探讨了华为最著名的西方对手之一的历程，以及导致其破产的因素。

Wireless Wars: China’s Dangerous Domination of 5G and How We’re Fighting Back, by Jonathan Pelson, provides a colorful account of the recent history of the global telecom sector from the perspective of a former executive at US giant Lucent.

《无线战争：中国对 5G 的危险主导以及我们如何反击》（Wireless Wars: China’s Dangerous Domination of 5G and How We’re Fighting Back），由乔纳森·佩尔森（Jonathan Pelson）著。该书从美国巨头朗讯前高管的角度，对全球电信行业的近期历史进行了生动的描述。

3Com, by Jeff Chase with Jon Zilber, includes an insightful chronicle of 3Com’s joint venture with Huawei, which helped Huawei defend itself against the Cisco lawsuit, and also details Huawei’s ill-fated attempt to purchase a stake in 3Com as part of Bain’s attempted takeover.

《3Com》，由杰夫·蔡斯（Jeff Chase）与乔恩·齐尔伯（Jon Zilber）合著。书中包含了一段关于 3Com 与华为合资企业的深刻记录，该合资企业曾帮助华为在思科诉讼中自卫，并详细描述了华为在贝恩资本尝试收购 3Com 期间，试图购买其股份的失败尝试。

Standing Up to China: How a Whistleblower Risked Everything for His Country, by Ashley Yablon, ZTE’s former general counsel in the United States, offers a vivid account of the author’s decision to become a whistleblower to the FBI over the company’s sanctions violations. The book also includes passages about Yablon’s prior work at Huawei.

《挺身对抗中国：一名举报人如何为国家冒一切风险》（Standing Up to China: How a Whistleblower Risked Everything for His Country），由中兴通讯前美国总法律顾问阿什利·亚布隆（Ashley Yablon）著。该书生动记述了作者决定就公司违反制裁规定向 FBI 举报的决策过程。书中还包含关于亚布隆此前在华为工作的篇章。

Other Works on State Surveillance and Technological Espionage

其他关于国家监视和技术间谍活动的著作

Permanent Record, by Edward Snowden, explains Snowden’s studies of China’s surveillance capabilities while he was at the NSA and how they led him to investigate what powers the US government had in this regard.

《永久记录》（Permanent Record），由爱德华·斯诺登（Edward Snowden）著。该书解释了斯诺登在 NSA 期间对中国监视能力的研究，以及这些研究如何引导他去调查美国政府在这方面拥有何种权力。

The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency, by Matthew M. Aid, is a deeply researched history of the NSA based largely on US government records released through Freedom of Information Act requests. It includes an account of the 2001 US bombing of Huawei’s fiber-optic network in Iraq.

《秘密哨兵：国家安全局不为人知的历史》（The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency），由马修·艾德（Matthew M. Aid）著。这是一部基于通过《信息自由法》申请获得的美国政府记录而进行的深入研究的 NSA 历史。书中包含了对 2001 年美国轰炸华为在伊拉克的光纤网络的记述。

No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State, by Glenn Greenwald, reports explosive details about how the NSA implanted back-door surveillance tools in Cisco routers being sent to overseas customers. Greenwald’s reportage is based on classified records leaked by Edward Snowden.

《无处藏身：爱德华·斯诺登、NSA 与美国监视国家》（No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State），由格伦·格林沃尔德（Glenn Greenwald）著。该书报道了关于 NSA 如何在发往海外客户的思科路由器中植入后门监视工具的爆炸性细节。格林沃尔德的报道基于爱德华·斯诺登泄露的机密记录。

Surveillance State: Inside China’s Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control, by Josh Chin and Liza Lin, is a deep dive into contemporary China’s high-tech surveillance apparatus, with a detailed account of the crackdown in the Xinjiang region and a chapter about Huawei’s assistance with state surveillance in Uganda.

由裴珍（Josh Chin）和林琳（Liza Lin）合著的《监控国家：中国打造社会控制新时代的内幕》深入探讨了当代中国的高科技监控机制，详细记录了在新疆地区的镇压行动，并有一章专门讲述了华为协助乌干达政府进行国家监控的情况。

The Sentinel State: Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China, by Minxin Pei, provides historical perspective on China’s intelligence-gathering operations and an explanation of how the country has evolved into its current high-tech state.

裴敏欣所著的《哨兵国家：监控与中国独裁政权的生存》为中国的内部情报搜集工作提供了历史视角，并解释了该国是如何演变成目前的高科技状态的。

Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping, by Roger Faligot, is a deeply researched account of China’s intelligence activities at home and abroad. It is written by a French investigative journalist who has been chipping away at the subject for decades.

罗杰·法利戈（Roger Faligot）所著的《中国间谍：从毛主席到习近平》是一部关于中国在国内外情报活动的深度研究著作。作者是一位法国调查记者，数十年来一直致力于这一课题的研究。

The Secret History of the Five Eyes: The Untold Story of the International Spy Network, by Richard Kerbaj, devotes a chapter to the closed-door negotiations between the Trump administration and the United Kingdom over Huawei.

理查德·克巴伊（Richard Kerbaj）所著的《五眼联盟秘史：国际间谍网络不为人知的故事》中有一章专门讲述了特朗普政府与英国之间关于华为问题的闭门谈判。

Other Works on China’s High-Tech Industry

其他关于中国高科技产业的著作

The Shenzhen Experiment: The Story of China’s Instant City, by Juan Du, is a vivid and richly researched account of the rise of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.

杜娟（Juan Du）所著的《深圳实验：中国即时城市的故事》对深圳经济特区的崛起进行了生动且研究详实的叙述。

China’s Telecommunications Revolution, by Eric Harwit, chronicles the construction of China’s phone and internet networks from 1949 to the modern era.

埃里克·哈威特（Eric Harwit）所著的《中国电信革命》记录了从 1949 年到现代中国电话和互联网网络的建设历程。

Alibaba: The House that Jack Ma Built, by Duncan Clark, is a fascinating window into the Chinese internet giant, told by a real expert on China’s tech industry.

邓肯·克拉克（Duncan Clark）所著的《阿里巴巴：马云打造的帝国》由一位真正的中国科技产业专家撰写，是了解这家中国互联网巨头的一个极佳窗口。

Other Works on US-China Relations

其他关于美中关系的著作

The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present, by John Pomfret, is a nuanced and epic account of how US-China relations have evolved over centuries.

潘文（John Pomfret）所著的《美丽之国与中央之国：美国与中国，1776 年至今》对美中关系数个世纪以来的演变进行了细致入微且宏大的叙述。

Superpower Showdown: How the Battle Between Trump and Xi Threatens a New Cold War, by Bob Davis and Lingling Wei, provides a fly-on-the-wall account of the trade war negotiations between Washington and Beijing, as well as broader context on the history of the US-China relationship.

戴博（Bob Davis）和魏玲灵（Lingling Wei）合著的《超级大国对决：特朗普与习近平之战如何威胁到一场新冷战》对华盛顿与北京之间的贸易战谈判进行了现场感十足的记录，并提供了美中关系史的更广泛背景。

China-US 2039: The Endgame?, by Bill Owens, is a thought-provoking reflection on the risks of a US-China war and how to mitigate them. It is written by the former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs who represented Huawei in its 2010 bid for a Sprint contract.

比尔·欧文斯（Bill Owens）所著的《中美 2039：终局？》对美中战争的风险及如何缓解风险进行了发人深省的反思。作者曾任参谋长联席会议副主席，并在 2010 年华为竞标 Sprint 合同时代表华为。

Governmental Reports

政府报告

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s 2012 report on Huawei and ZTE remains one of the most detailed and frequently cited public US government reports on the companies. The report can be found at https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/huawei-zte%20investigative%20report%20(final).pdf.

美国众议院情报常设特别委员会 2012 年关于华为和中兴的报告，仍然是美国政府关于这些公司最详尽且被引用最频繁的公开报告之一。该报告可在以下网址查阅：https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/huawei-zte%20investigative%20report%20(final).pdf。

The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre Oversight Board’s annual reports for the UK’s national security adviser make for interesting reading, laying out security issues found in tested Huawei equipment each year. The reports can be found at https://www.gov.uk/search/all?keywords=huawei+cyber+security+evaluation+centre+oversight+board+annual+reports&order=relevance.

华为网络安全评估中心监督委员会向英国国家安全顾问提交的年度报告非常值得一读，其中列出了每年在受测华为设备中发现的安全问题。报告可在以下网址查阅：https://www.gov.uk/search/all?keywords=huawei+cyber+security+evaluation+centre+oversight+board+annual+reports&order=relevance。

Photo Credits

图片来源

1: Photo by Arnold Drapkin / ZUMA Wire / Newscom.

1: 摄影：Arnold Drapkin / ZUMA Wire / Newscom。

2: Photo by Gautam Singh / Associated Press.

2: 摄影：Gautam Singh / 美联社。

3: Photo by Paul Yeung / Associated Press.

3: 摄影：Paul Yeung / 美联社。

4: Photo by Lin Hao / Xinhua via Imago / Alamy.

4: 摄影：Lin Hao / 新华社，经由 Imago / Alamy。

5: Photo © Egyptian Presidential Office / APA Images / ZUMA Wire via Alamy.

5: 图片版权 © 埃及总统府 / APA Images / ZUMA Wire，经由 Alamy。

6: Photo by Jakub Strihavka / CTK via Alamy.

6: 摄影：Jakub Strihavka / CTK，经由 Alamy。

7: Photo by Davide Ferreri / Alamy.

7: 摄影：Davide Ferreri / Alamy。

8: middle: Photo by Andreas Landwehr / dpa Picture-Alliance / Newscom.

8: 中：摄影：Andreas Landwehr / dpa Picture-Alliance / Newscom。

9: Photo by Matthew Lloyd / PA Images via Alamy.

9: 摄影：Matthew Lloyd / PA Images，经由 Alamy。

10: Photo by Andy Wong / Associated Press.

10: 摄影：Andy Wong / 美联社。

11: Photo by Pau Barrena / Xinhua via Imago / Alamy.

11: 摄影：Pau Barrena / 新华社，经由 Imago / Alamy。

12: Photo by ImagineChina via Newscom.

12: 摄影：ImagineChina，经由 Newscom。

13: Photo by the author.

13: 摄影：作者。

14: Photo by the author.

14: 摄影：作者。

15: middle: Photo by Heinz Ruckemann / UPI via Alamy.

15: 中：摄影：Heinz Ruckemann / UPI，经由 Alamy。

16: Photo by Jin Liwang / Imago via Alamy.

16: 摄影：Jin Liwang / Imago，经由 Alamy。

17: Photo from the 1959 booklet 重庆建筑工程学院, an internally published overview of the Chongqing Institute of Architecture and Engineering.

17: 图片出自 1959 年小册子《重庆建筑工程学院》，该书为重庆建筑工程学院内部出版的概览。

18: Photo from the Sichuan Daily.

18: 图片出自《四川日报》。

19: Photo by the author.

19: 摄影：作者。

20: Photo courtesy of Wan Runnan.

20: 图片由万润南提供。

21: Photo by David de la Paz / Xinhua News Agency via Imago / Alamy.

21: 摄影：David de la Paz / 新华社，经由 Imago / Alamy。

22: Photo by Joerg Boethling / Alamy.

22: 摄影：Joerg Boethling / Alamy。

23: Photo by J. Scott Applewhite / Associated Press.

23: 摄影：J. Scott Applewhite / 美联社。

24: Photo by ImagineChina Limited / Alamy.

24: 摄影：ImagineChina Limited / Alamy。

25: Photo by Marcel Thomas / ZUMA Press Inc. / Alamy.

25: 摄影：Marcel Thomas / ZUMA Press Inc. / Alamy。

26: Photo by Darryl Dyck / The Canadian Press via Associated Press.

26: 摄影：Darryl Dyck / 加拿大通讯社，经由 美联社。

27: Photo by the author.

27: 摄影：作者。

28: Photo by STR/AFP via Getty Images.

28: 摄影：STR/法新社，经由 Getty Images。

29: Photo by Tao Liang / Imago via Alamy.

29: 摄影：Tao Liang / Imago，经由 Alamy。

Index

索引

The page numbers in this index refer to the printed version of the book. Each link will take you to the beginning of the corresponding print page. You may need to scroll forward from that location to find the corresponding reference on your e-reader.

本索引中的页码对应本书的印刷版。每个链接将带您前往相应印刷页码的开头。您可能需要从该位置向前滚动，以在电子阅读器上找到对应的引用。

Italicized page numbers indicate material in photographs.

斜体页码表示照片中的内容。

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

A

A

Aaronson, Susan Ariel, 328

阿伦森，苏珊·阿里尔 (Aaronson, Susan Ariel)，328

阿伦森，苏珊·阿里尔 (Aaronson, Susan Ariel)，328

Advancement Bookstore, 3

进取书店 (Advancement Bookstore)，3

进取书店 (Advancement Bookstore)，3

Afghanistan, 145–46, 164–65, 206, 255, 256, 375

阿富汗 (Afghanistan)，145–46，164–65，206，255，256，375

阿富汗 (Afghanistan)，145–46，164–65，206，255，256，375

agriculture, 29, 32, 301

农业 (agriculture)，29，32，301

农业 (agriculture)，29，32，301

Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 165

内贾德，马哈茂德 (Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud)，165

内贾德，马哈茂德 (Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud)，165

Aid, Matthew M., 143

艾德，马修·M (Aid, Matthew M.)，143

艾德，马修·M (Aid, Matthew M.)，143

air-pressure generators, 33, 33–36, 369

气压发生器 (air-pressure generators)，33，33–36，369

气压发生器 (air-pressure generators)，33，33–36，369

Al-Ahram, 310

《金字塔报》(Al-Ahram)，310

《金字塔报》(Al-Ahram)，310

Albania, 240

阿尔巴尼亚 (Albania)，240

阿尔巴尼亚 (Albania)，240

Alcatel, 105, 109, 381

阿尔卡特 (Alcatel)，105，109，381

Iraq and, 147

伊拉克与，147

伊拉克与，147

Lucent joint venture, 168, 203, 211, 250

朗讯合资企业，168，203，211，250

朗讯合资企业，168，203，211，250

submarine cable, 168

海底电缆，168

海底电缆，168

阿尔卡特 (Alcatel)，105，109，

381

伊拉克与，

147

朗讯合资企业，168，203，211，

250

海底电缆，168

Algeria, 234

阿尔及利亚 (Algeria)，234

阿尔及利亚 (Algeria)，234

Alouette Correctional Centre for Women, 291, 301

阿卢埃特女子惩教中心 (Alouette Correctional Centre for Women)，291，301

阿卢埃特女子惩教中心 (Alouette Correctional Centre for Women)，291，301

Amerilink, 197–98

Amerilink，197–98

Amerilink，197–98

Ametek, 27, 34

阿美特克 (Ametek)，27，34

阿美特克 (Ametek)，27，34

Android, 134, 202, 303–4, 329, 346–47

安卓 (Android)，134，202，303–4，329，346–47

安卓 (Android)，134，202，303–4，329，346–47

Annan, Kofi, 129

安南，科菲 (Annan, Kofi)，129

安南，科菲 (Annan, Kofi)，129

Anshun, 18

安顺 (Anshun)，18

安顺 (Anshun)，18

Anshun Daily, 17–18

《安顺日报》(Anshun Daily)，17–18

《安顺日报》(Anshun Daily)，17–18

anxiety, 136, 176

焦虑 (anxiety)，136，176

焦虑 (anxiety)，136，176

ANZ Bank, 235

澳新银行 (ANZ Bank)，235

澳新银行 (ANZ Bank)，235

Apple, xl, 244, 246, 262, 264, 265, 329

苹果 (Apple)，xl, 244, 246, 262, 264, 265, 329

苹果 (Apple)，xl, 244, 246, 262, 264, 265, 329

Arab Spring, 205–9, 251

阿拉伯之春 (Arab Spring)，205–9，251

阿拉伯之春 (Arab Spring)，205–9，251

Argentina, 158, 286, 289, 291, 311

阿根廷 (Argentina)，158，286，289，291，311

阿根廷 (Argentina)，158，286，289，291，311

Arıkan, Erdal, 269, 270–71

阿里坎，埃达尔 (Arıkan, Erdal)，269，270–71

阿里坎，埃达尔 (Arıkan, Erdal)，269，270–71

Arsenal Football Club, 262

阿森纳足球俱乐部 (Arsenal Football Club)，262

阿森纳足球俱乐部 (Arsenal Football Club)，262

artificial intelligence (AI), 120, 265–66, 275–77

人工智能 (AI)，120，265–66，275–77

人工智能 (AI)，120，265–66，275–77

Asiacell, 148, 154, 169, 375

Asiacell，148，154，169，375

Asiacell，148，154，169，375

Associated Press, 301

美联社 (Associated Press)，301

美联社 (Associated Press)，301

Athens Olympic Games (2004), 187

雅典奥运会 (2004)，187

雅典奥运会 (2004)，187

atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6

广岛和长崎原子弹爆炸，6

广岛和长崎原子弹爆炸，6

AT&T, 138, 194, 278, 351, 369, 380

AT&T，138，194，278，351，369，380

No. 5 switch, 61, 68

5 号交换机，61，68

5 号交换机，61，68

AT&T，138，194，278，351，369，

380

5 号交换机，61，68

Australia, 156, 187, 267, 278–79, 328

澳大利亚 (Australia)，156，187，267，278–79，328

Huawei ban, 227–28, 281, 378

华为禁令，227–28，281，378

华为禁令，227–28，281，378

澳大利亚 (Australia)，156，187，267，278–79，

328

华为禁令，227–28，281，378

Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 267, 278–79, 380

澳大利亚战略政策研究所 (ASPI)，267，278–79，380

澳大利亚战略政策研究所 (ASPI)，267，278–79，380

Avansys Power, 137, 375

安圣电气 (Avansys Power)，137，375

安圣电气 (Avansys Power)，137，375

B

B

Babiš, Andrej, xxvii

巴比什，安德烈 (Babiš, Andrej)，xxvii

巴比什，安德烈 (Babiš, Andrej)，xxvii

back doors, 154–55, 169–70, 201, 278–79, 350–54

后门 (back doors)，154–55，169–70，201，278–79，350–54

House investigation, 217–28

众议院调查，217–28

众议院调查，217–28

后门 (back doors)，154–55，169–70，201，278–79，

350–54

众议院调查，217–28

Baghdad, 103–4, 116, 143–44

巴格达 (Baghdad)，103–4，116，143–44

巴格达 (Baghdad)，103–4，116，143–44

Bahrain, 205, 207

巴林 (Bahrain)，205，207

巴林 (Bahrain)，205，207

baijiu, 82–83

白酒 (baijiu)，82–83

白酒 (baijiu)，82–83

Bain Capital, 170–72, 227, 377

贝恩资本 (Bain Capital)，170–72，227，377

贝恩资本 (Bain Capital)，170–72，227，377

Balding, Christopher, 312

鲍尔丁，克里斯托弗 (Balding, Christopher)，312

鲍尔丁，克里斯托弗 (Balding, Christopher)，312

Bamford, James, 241–42

班福德，詹姆斯 (Bamford, James)，241–42

班福德，詹姆斯 (Bamford, James)，241–42

Bannon, Steve, 302

班农，史蒂夫 (Bannon, Steve)，302

班农，史蒂夫 (Bannon, Steve)，302

Bao Fan, 295

包凡 (Bao Fan)，295

包凡 (Bao Fan)，295

Barber, Lionel, 207, 285

巴伯，莱昂内尔 (Barber, Lionel)，207，285

巴伯，莱昂内尔 (Barber, Lionel)，207，285

Barr, William, 325

巴尔，威廉 (Barr, William)，325

巴尔，威廉 (Barr, William)，325

Barton, Dominic, 335, 338

鲍达民 (Barton, Dominic)，335，338

鲍达民 (Barton, Dominic)，335，338

Base 011, 17–20, 23–24

011 基地 (Base 011)，17–20，23–24

011 基地 (Base 011)，17–20，23–24

Battle of Triangle Hill, 55

上甘岭战役 (Battle of Triangle Hill)，55

上甘岭战役 (Battle of Triangle Hill)，55

Battle of Waterloo, 310–11

滑铁卢战役 (Battle of Waterloo)，310–11

滑铁卢战役 (Battle of Waterloo)，310–11

BBC, xli, 314

BBC，xli，314

BBC，xli，314

Beihai Park, 8

北海公园 (Beihai Park)，8

北海公园 (Beihai Park)，8

Beijing Netcom, 188, 191–92

北京网通 (Beijing Netcom)，188，191–92

北京网通 (Beijing Netcom)，188，191–92

Beijing Olympic Games (2008), 187–93

北京奥运会 (2008)，187–93

北京奥运会 (2008)，187–93

Beijing Research Institute of Information Technology, 86–87

北京信息技术研究所，86–87

北京信息技术研究所，86–87

Belarus, 106

白俄罗斯 (Belarus)，106

白俄罗斯 (Belarus)，106

Belgrade, bombing of 1999, 114–15

贝尔格莱德，1999 年轰炸，114–15

贝尔格莱德，1999 年轰炸，114–15

Bell, Alexander Graham, 61

贝尔，亚历山大·格拉汉姆 (Bell, Alexander Graham)，61

贝尔，亚历山大·格拉汉姆 (Bell, Alexander Graham)，61

Bell Canada, 326–27

贝尔加拿大 (Bell Canada)，326–27

贝尔加拿大 (Bell Canada)，326–27

Bell-Northern Research, 330

北方电讯研究中心 (Bell-Northern Research)，330

北方电讯研究中心 (Bell-Northern Research)，330

Bell Telephone Company, 59–60, 105

贝尔电话公司 (Bell Telephone Company)，59–60，105

贝尔电话公司 (Bell Telephone Company)，59–60，105

Belt and Road, 250–51

一带一路 (Belt and Road)，250–51

一带一路 (Belt and Road)，250–51

Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidine, 208

本·阿里，齐纳·阿比丁 (Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidine)，208

本·阿里，齐纳·阿比丁 (Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidine)，208

Berkman Klein Center, 327–28

伯克曼·克莱因中心 (Berkman Klein Center)，327–28

伯克曼·克莱因中心 (Berkman Klein Center)，327–28

Best Buy, 202

百思买 (Best Buy)，202

百思买 (Best Buy)，202

Beto-Huawei, 107, 373

贝托-华为 (Beto-Huawei)，107，373

贝托-华为 (Beto-Huawei)，107，373

BH-01, 43–44, 47, 128

BH-01, 43–44, 47, 128

BH-01, 43–44, 47, 128

BH-03, 47–48

BH-03, 47–48

BH-03, 47–48

Biden, Joe, 337, 346, 347

拜登，乔 (Biden, Joe), 337, 346, 347

拜登，乔 (Biden, Joe), 337, 346, 347

big data, 209, 239, 253–58

大数据, 209, 239, 253–58

大数据, 209, 239, 253–58

biometric scanners, 273

生物识别扫描仪, 273

生物识别扫描仪, 273

Black Lives Matter, 210

黑人的命也是命 (Black Lives Matter), 210

黑人的命也是命 (Black Lives Matter), 210

black-swan events, xli, 261, 353–54

黑天鹅事件, xli, 261, 353–54

黑天鹅事件, xli, 261, 353–54

black swans, xli, 261, 310

黑天鹅, xli, 261, 310

黑天鹅, xli, 261, 310

Blair, Tony, 96

布莱尔，托尼 (Blair, Tony), 96

布莱尔，托尼 (Blair, Tony), 96

Blaker, Peter, 32

布莱克，彼得 (Blaker, Peter), 32

布莱克，彼得 (Blaker, Peter), 32

Bloomberg Businessweek, 304

《彭博商业周刊》(Bloomberg Businessweek), 304

《彭博商业周刊》(Bloomberg Businessweek), 304

Bocelli, Andrea, 264

波切利，安德烈 (Bocelli, Andrea), 264

波切利，安德烈 (Bocelli, Andrea), 264

Boeing B-52H Stratofortress, 103

波音 B-52H 同温层堡垒轰炸机, 103

波音 B-52H 同温层堡垒轰炸机, 103

Bolton, John, 280–81, 282, 293, 307

博尔顿，约翰 (Bolton, John), 280–81, 282, 293, 307

博尔顿，约翰 (Bolton, John), 280–81, 282, 293, 307

Bouyei, 5–8, 368

布依族, 5–8, 368

布依族, 5–8, 368

Bo Xilai, 251–52

薄熙来, 251–52

薄熙来, 251–52

Brazil, 112

巴西, 112

巴西, 112

Brezhnev, Leonid, 330

勃列日涅夫，列昂尼德 (Brezhnev, Leonid), 330

勃列日涅夫，列昂尼德 (Brezhnev, Leonid), 330

bribery, 83–84, 251–52

行贿, 83–84, 251–52

行贿, 83–84, 251–52

Britain. See UK

英国。参见 UK

英国。参见 UK

British American Tobacco, 21–22

英美烟草公司, 21–22

英美烟草公司, 21–22

British Telecom (BT), 159–60, 198–99, 243, 376

英国电信 (BT), 159–60, 198–99, 243, 376

英国电信 (BT), 159–60, 198–99, 243, 376

Broadcom, 269

博通 (Broadcom), 269

博通 (Broadcom), 269

Bross, Matt, xix, 160, 198

布罗斯，马特 (Bross, Matt), xix, 160, 198

布罗斯，马特 (Bross, Matt), xix, 160, 198

Bulgaria, 112

保加利亚, 112

保加利亚, 112

Burgess, Mike, 281

伯吉斯，迈克 (Burgess, Mike), 281

伯吉斯，迈克 (Burgess, Mike), 281

Burundi, 111

布隆迪, 111

布隆迪, 111

Bush, George W., 141, 143, 145–46, 148, 165–66

布什，乔治·W (Bush, George W.), 141, 143, 145–46, 148, 165–66

布什，乔治·W (Bush, George W.), 141, 143, 145–46, 148, 165–66

Business Efficiency Solutions, 255

Business Efficiency Solutions 公司, 255

Business Efficiency Solutions 公司, 255

C

Cable, Vince, 201, 244, 326

凯布尔，文斯 (Cable, Vince), 201, 244, 326

凯布尔，文斯 (Cable, Vince), 201, 244, 326

Caesars Palace, 63

凯撒皇宫酒店, 63

凯撒皇宫酒店, 63

Cameron, David, 225

卡梅伦，大卫 (Cameron, David), 225

卡梅伦，大卫 (Cameron, David), 225

Canada, 227, 244, 287, 341–44

加拿大, 227, 244, 287, 341–44

extradition case of Meng Wanzhou. See extradition case of Meng Wanzhou

孟晚舟引渡案。参见 孟晚舟引渡案

孟晚舟引渡案。参见 孟晚舟引渡案

Kovrig and Spavor cases, 292, 320, 323–24, 335–36, 338, 341–43, 381, 382

康明凯和斯帕弗案, 292, 320, 323–24, 335–36, 338, 341–43, 381, 382

康明凯和斯帕弗案, 292, 320, 323–24, 335–36, 338, 341–43, 381, 382

加拿大, 227, 244, 287,

341–44

孟晚舟引渡案。参见

孟晚舟引渡案

康明凯和斯帕弗案, 292, 320, 323–24, 335–36, 338, 341–43, 381, 382

Canadian Justice Department, 292

加拿大司法部, 292

加拿大司法部, 292

Canberra Raiders, 228, 262

堪培拉奇袭者队 (Canberra Raiders), 228, 262

堪培拉奇袭者队 (Canberra Raiders), 228, 262

Canicula Holdings Limited, 180–81, 298

Canicula Holdings Limited, 180–81, 298

Canicula Holdings Limited, 180–81, 298

Cannes, 109

戛纳, 109

戛纳, 109

Cao Yi’an, 310

曹毅安, 310

曹毅安, 310

Capital Construction Management Department, 183

基建管理部, 183

基建管理部, 183

capitalism, 26, 29, 31, 39, 107

资本主义, 26, 29, 31, 39, 107

资本主义, 26, 29, 31, 39, 107

cast of characters, xvii–xxiii

人物表, xvii–xxiii

人物表, xvii–xxiii

Cathay Pacific, xxxvii

国泰航空, xxxvii

国泰航空, xxxvii

Cavill, Henry, 262

卡维尔，亨利 (Cavill, Henry), 262

卡维尔，亨利 (Cavill, Henry), 262

CCTV (China Central Television), 96, 239, 265

CCTV (中国中央电视台), 96, 239, 265

CCTV (中国中央电视台), 96, 239, 265

CDMA (code-division multiple access), 134–35

CDMA (码分多址), 134–35

CDMA (码分多址), 134–35

cellular networks

蜂窝网络

2G, 135, 154, 268, 308

2G, 135, 154, 268, 308

2G, 135, 154, 268, 308

3G, 135, 149, 161, 164–65, 194–95, 202–3, 206, 267–70, 268, 308

3G, 135, 149, 161, 164–65, 194–95, 202–3, 206, 267–70, 268, 308

3G, 135, 149, 161, 164–65, 194–95, 202–3, 206, 267–70, 268, 308

4G, 194–98, 267, 268, 269, 308, 378

4G, 194–98, 267, 268, 269, 308, 378

4G, 194–98, 267, 268, 269, 308, 378

5G, xl, 267–71, 275, 277–78, 280–82, 305–9, 311, 322, 324, 326, 342, 353, 380, 381, 382

5G, xl, 267–71, 275, 277–78, 280–82, 305–9, 311, 322, 324, 326, 342, 353, 380, 381, 382

5G, xl, 267–71, 275, 277–78, 280–82, 305–9, 311, 322, 324, 326, 342, 353, 380, 381, 382

蜂窝网络 2G, 135, 154, 268, 308 3G, 135, 149, 161, 164–65, 194–95, 202–3, 206, 267–70, 268, 308 4G, 194–98, 267, 268, 269, 308, 378 5G, xl, 267–71, 275, 277–78, 280–82, 305–9, 311, 322, 324, 326, 342, 353, 380, 381, 382

censorship, 189, 275, 319

审查制度, 189, 275, 319

审查制度, 189, 275, 319

Central Military Commission, 95

中央军事委员会, 95

中央军事委员会, 95

Chambers, David Ian, 352

钱伯斯，大卫·伊恩 (Chambers, David Ian), 352

钱伯斯，大卫·伊恩 (Chambers, David Ian), 352

Chambers, John, xxi, 150, 151, 152, 242

钱伯斯，约翰 (Chambers, John), xxi, 150, 151, 152, 242

钱伯斯，约翰 (Chambers, John), xxi, 150, 151, 152, 242

Champagne, François-Philippe, 320

商鹏飞 (Champagne, François-Philippe), 320

商鹏飞 (Champagne, François-Philippe), 320

Chandler, Mark, 150, 155

钱德勒，马克 (Chandler, Mark), 150, 155

钱德勒，马克 (Chandler, Mark), 150, 155

Chang, Morris, 325–26

张忠谋 (Chang, Morris), 325–26

张忠谋 (Chang, Morris), 325–26

Charles, Prince of Wales, 96, 224–25

查尔斯，威尔士亲王, 96, 224–25

查尔斯，威尔士亲王, 96, 224–25

Chen, Catherine (a.k.a. Chen Lifang), xx, 84, 309–10

陈黎芳 (Catherine Chen), xx, 84, 309–10

陈黎芳 (Catherine Chen), xx, 84, 309–10

Chengdu, 24–25, 31, 179–80, 285

成都, 24–25, 31, 179–80, 285

成都, 24–25, 31, 179–80, 285

Chengdu Radio Engineering Institute, 86

成都电讯工程学院, 86

成都电讯工程学院, 86

Cheng Yuanzhao, xvii, 5–6, 10, 28, 37, 71–72, 142

程远昭, xvii, 5–6, 10, 28, 37, 71–72, 142

程远昭, xvii, 5–6, 10, 28, 37, 71–72, 142

Chen Jinyang, 43, 128

陈金阳, 43, 128

陈金阳, 43, 128

Chen Qing, 94

陈庆，94

陈庆，94

Chen Zhufang, xix, 40–41, 115, 123–25, 176, 181, 183–84, 184, 222, 377

陈珠芳，xix，40–41，115，123–25，176，181，183–84，184，222，377

陈珠芳，xix，40–41，115，123–25，176，181，183–84，184，222，377

China. See also specific persons and companies

中国。另见特定人物及公司

Company Law, 118, 127, 373

公司法，118，127，373

公司法，118，127，373

Cultural Revolution, 12–15, 22–23, 28, 46, 65, 86, 142, 368

文化大革命，12–15，22–23，28，46，65，86，142，368

文化大革命，12–15，22–23，28，46，65，86，142，368

democracy movement, 49–52

民主运动，49–52

民主运动，49–52

economic reforms, 28–37

经济改革，28–37

经济改革，28–37

Great Famine, 9–10, 11, 22, 142, 164, 368

大饥荒，9–10，11，22，142，164，368

大饥荒，9–10，11，22，142，164，368

Great Firewall, 188–89, 330

防火长城，188–89，330

防火长城，188–89，330

Made in China 2025, 250–51

中国制造 2025，250–51

中国制造 2025，250–51

mass surveillance in. See surveillance

大规模监控。见 监控

大规模监控。见 监控

Ministry of Electronics Industry, 69–70, 74

电子工业部，69–70，74

电子工业部，69–70，74

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 83–84, 145, 292, 310

外交部，83–84，145，292，310

外交部，83–84，145，292，310

Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, 48, 64, 68, 74, 94, 371–72

邮电部，48，64，68，74，94，371–72

邮电部，48，64，68，74，94，371–72

Ministry of State Security (MSS), 68, 76, 85, 130–31, 314, 349–50, 352

国家安全部 (MSS)，68，76，85，130–31，314，349–50，352

国家安全部 (MSS)，68，76，85，130–31，314，349–50，352

reeducation campaigns, 15–16, 19, 25–26, 272

再教育运动，15–16，19，25–26，272

再教育运动，15–16，19，25–26，272

State Security Law, 223–24, 313

国家安全法，223–24，313

国家安全法，223–24，313

US relations. See US-China relations; US-China trade war

对美关系。见 中美关系；中美贸易战

对美关系。见 中美关系；中美贸易战

US trade war. See US-China trade war

美国贸易战。见 中美贸易战

美国贸易战。见 中美贸易战

中国。

另见特定人物及公司

公司法，118，127，

373

文化大革命，12–15，22–23，28，46，65，86，142，

368

民主运动，

49–52

经济改革，

28–37

大饥荒，9–10，11，22，142，164，

368

防火长城，188–89，

330

中国制造 2025，

250–51

大规模监控。见

监控

电子工业部，69–70，

74

外交部，83–84，145，292，

310

邮电部，48，64，68，74，94，

371–72

国家安全部 (MSS)，68，76，85，130–31，314，349–50，

352

再教育运动，15–16，19，25–26，

272

国家安全法，223–24，

313

对美关系。见 中美关系；

中美贸易战

美国贸易战。见 中美贸易战

China Construction Bank, 73

中国建设银行，73

中国建设银行，73

China Daily, 112

《中国日报》，112

《中国日报》，112

China Development Bank, 158, 375–76

国家开发银行，158，375–76

国家开发银行，158，375–76

China Entrepreneur, 44

《中国企业家》，44

《中国企业家》，44

China Great Dragon Telecommunication, 70, 80, 81, 139

中国巨龙通信，70，80，81，139

中国巨龙通信，70，80，81，139

China Huada Integrated Circuit Design, 190

中国华大集成电路设计，190

中国华大集成电路设计，190

China Merchants Bank, 68, 275, 371

招商银行，68，275，371

招商银行，68，275，371

China National Technical Import and Export Corp., 166

中国技术进出口总公司，166

中国技术进出口总公司，166

China Renaissance, 295

华兴资本，295

华兴资本，295

China Research Institute of Radio Wave Propagation, 86

中国电波传播研究所，86

中国电波传播研究所，86

China Semiconductor Industry Association, 190

中国半导体行业协会，190

中国半导体行业协会，190

China Telecom, xxviii

中国电信，xxviii

中国电信，xxviii

China Travel Service, 43

中国旅行社，43

中国旅行社，43

China Unicom, 252

中国联通，252

中国联通，252

Chinese Civil War, 4–5, 6, 24, 79, 367

国共内战，4–5，6，24，79，367

国共内战，4–5，6，24，79，367

Chinese Communist Party

中国共产党

Huawei internal committee of, 41, 122–23, 173, 182, 221–22, 372, 377

华为内部党委，41，122–23，173，182，221–22，372，377

华为内部党委，41，122–23，173，182，221–22，372，377

National Congresses, 356–57

全国代表大会，356–57

全国代表大会，356–57

purges, 78–79

清洗，78–79

清洗，78–79

Ren Moxun joining, 14, 368

任摩逊入党，14，368

任摩逊入党，14，368

Ren Zhengfei joining, 34–35, 36, 369

任正非入党，34–35, 36, 369

任正非入党，34–35, 36, 369

Twelfth National Congress, 36, 369

第十二次全国代表大会，36, 369

第十二次全国代表大会，36, 369

中国共产党

华为内部党委，41，122–23，173，182，221–22，372，

377

全国代表大会，

356–57

清洗，

78–79

任摩逊入党，14，

368

任正非入党，34–35，36，

369

第十二次全国代表大会，36，369

Chinese names, xv–xvi

中文姓名，xv–xvi

中文姓名，xv–xvi

chips. See computer chips

芯片。参见 计算机芯片

芯片。参见 计算机芯片

Chisholm, Don, 330

奇泽姆，唐 (Chisholm, Don)，330

奇泽姆，唐 (Chisholm, Don)，330

Chongqing Institute of Architecture and Engineering, 11, 11–13, 368

重庆建筑工程学院，11, 11–13, 368

重庆建筑工程学院，11, 11–13, 368

Chongqing Medical College, 20–21

重庆医学院，20–21

重庆医学院，20–21

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 114, 143, 167, 238–39, 352

CIA（中央情报局），114, 143, 167, 238–39, 352

CIA（中央情报局），114, 143, 167, 238–39, 352

Cisco, 105, 224

思科 (Cisco)，105, 224

Great Firewall, 188, 330

防火长城，188, 330

防火长城，188, 330

Huawei patent lawsuit, 146, 149–53, 155, 211, 375

华为专利诉讼，146, 149–53, 155, 211, 375

华为专利诉讼，146, 149–53, 155, 211, 375

NSA and Snowden leaks, 241–42

美国国家安全局与斯诺登泄密，241–42

美国国家安全局与斯诺登泄密，241–42

submarine cable, 168

海底光缆，168

海底光缆，168

思科 (Cisco)，105,

224

防火长城，188,

330

华为专利诉讼，146, 149–53, 155, 211,

375

美国国家安全局与斯诺登泄密，

241–42

海底光缆，168

Cisco Systems Inc. v. Huawei Technologies, 149–53, 155, 211, 375

思科系统公司诉华为技术有限公司, 149–53, 155, 211, 375

思科系统公司诉华为技术有限公司, 149–53, 155, 211, 375

Citibank, 235

花旗银行，235

花旗银行，235

CITIC Group, 140

中信集团，140

中信集团，140

Claflin, Bruce, xxi, 152–53

克拉夫林，布鲁斯 (Claflin, Bruce)，xxi, 152–53

克拉夫林，布鲁斯 (Claflin, Bruce)，xxi, 152–53

Clancy, Charles, 169–70, 353

克兰西，查尔斯 (Clancy, Charles)，169–70, 353

克兰西，查尔斯 (Clancy, Charles)，169–70, 353

Clark, Duncan, 109, 112–13

克拉克，邓肯 (Clark, Duncan)，109, 112–13

克拉克，邓肯 (Clark, Duncan)，109, 112–13

Clarke, Donald C., 312

郭丹青 (Clarke, Donald C.)，312

郭丹青 (Clarke, Donald C.)，312

class-4 (04) telephone switch, 60–61, 63, 80, 81, 139, 370

4 类 (04) 电话交换机，60–61, 63, 80, 81, 139, 370

4 类 (04) 电话交换机，60–61, 63, 80, 81, 139, 370

Clean Apps, 328

清洁应用 (Clean Apps)，328

清洁应用 (Clean Apps)，328

Clean Cable, 328

清洁海缆 (Clean Cable)，328

清洁海缆 (Clean Cable)，328

Clean Cloud, 328

清洁云 (Clean Cloud)，328

清洁云 (Clean Cloud)，328

Clean Countries, 328, 346

清洁国家 (Clean Countries)，328, 346

清洁国家 (Clean Countries)，328, 346

Clean Network, 327–28, 346

清洁网络 (Clean Network)，327–28, 346

清洁网络 (Clean Network)，327–28, 346

Clean Store, 328

清洁商店 (Clean Store)，328

清洁商店 (Clean Store)，328

Clear Carrier, 328

清洁运营商 (Clear Carrier)，328

清洁运营商 (Clear Carrier)，328

ClearTalk, 155, 196, 375

ClearTalk，155, 196, 375

ClearTalk，155, 196, 375

Clinton, Bill, 137–38, 191

克林顿，比尔 (Clinton, Bill)，137–38, 191

克林顿，比尔 (Clinton, Bill)，137–38, 191

cloud computing, 273–74

云计算，273–74

云计算，273–74

CNBC, 301

CNBC，301

CNBC，301

CNN, xli, 310, 313

CNN，xli, 310, 313

CNN，xli, 310, 313

Coca-Cola, 211

可口可乐，211

可口可乐，211

Cold War, xxxviii–xl, 9, 106, 368

冷战，xxxviii–xl, 9, 106, 368

冷战，xxxviii–xl, 9, 106, 368

Columbia, 112

哥伦比亚，112

哥伦比亚，112

Commerce Department, US

美国商务部

Bureau of Industry and Security, 303, 381

工业和安全局，303, 381

工业和安全局，303, 381

Huawei and, 19, 131, 144–45, 278, 303–4, 305, 325, 346, 381, 382

华为与，19, 131, 144–45, 278, 303–4, 305, 325, 346, 381, 382

华为与，19, 131, 144–45, 278, 303–4, 305, 325, 346, 381, 382

ZTE and, 231, 257–58, 278, 282, 303, 380

中兴与，231, 257–58, 278, 282, 303, 380

中兴与，231, 257–58, 278, 282, 303, 380

美国商务部

工业和安全局，303,

381

华为与，19, 131, 144–45, 278, 303–4, 305, 325, 346, 381,

382

中兴与，231, 257–58, 278, 282, 303, 380

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), 171–72, 377

美国外资投资委员会 (CFIUS)，171–72, 377

美国外资投资委员会 (CFIUS)，171–72, 377

Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), 154–55

《执法通信协助法》(CALEA)，154–55

《执法通信协助法》(CALEA)，154–55

compass, xl

指南针，xl

指南针，xl

Compression Labs, 94–95

Compression Labs，94–95

Compression Labs，94–95

“compromise and shades of gray,” 35

“妥协与灰色地带”，35

“妥协与灰色地带”，35

computer chips, 62–63, 66, 73–75, 112, 189–90, 243, 303–5, 325–26

计算机芯片，62–63, 66, 73–75, 112, 189–90, 243, 303–5, 325–26

HiSilicon, 189–90, 265, 275–76, 304–5, 325, 346, 370

海思 (HiSilicon)，189–90, 265, 275–76, 304–5, 325, 346, 370

海思 (HiSilicon)，189–90, 265, 275–76, 304–5, 325, 346, 370

计算机芯片，62–63, 66, 73–75, 112, 189–90, 243, 303–5,

325–26

海思 (HiSilicon)，189–90, 265, 275–76, 304–5, 325, 346, 370

Confucius, 14

孔子，14

孔子，14

Cong Peiwu, 337–38

丛培武，337–38

丛培武，337–38

consumer electronics, 202–3

消费电子产品，202–3

消费电子产品，202–3

Consumer Electronics Show, 63

消费电子展 (CES)，63

消费电子展 (CES)，63

controlled process switches, 67

程控交换机，67

程控交换机，67

corruption, 22, 49, 82, 83–84, 251–52

腐败，22, 49, 82, 83–84, 251–52

腐败，22, 49, 82, 83–84, 251–52

Cotton, Tom, 281

汤姆·科顿 (Cotton, Tom)，281

汤姆·科顿 (Cotton, Tom)，281

COVID-19 pandemic, 322, 323–24, 338, 341

COVID-19 疫情，322, 323–24, 338, 341

COVID-19 疫情，322, 323–24, 338, 341

“crossing the river by feeling the stones,” 232

“摸着石头过河”，232

“摸着石头过河”，232

Cuba, 278

古巴，278

古巴，278

Cultural Revolution, 12–15, 22–23, 28, 46, 65, 86, 142, 368

文化大革命，12–15, 22–23, 28, 46, 65, 86, 142, 368

文化大革命，12–15, 22–23, 28, 46, 65, 86, 142, 368

cyberattacks, 188

网络攻击，188

网络攻击，188

Czech Republic, 240

捷克共和国，240

捷克共和国，240

D

Dagens industri, 310

《每日工业报》，310

《每日工业报》，310

Dai Xianglong, 74–75

戴相龙，74–75

戴相龙，74–75

Dalai Lama, 190–91

达赖喇嘛，190–91

达赖喇嘛，190–91

dang’an, 72–73

档案，72–73

档案，72–73

Das Kapital (Marx), 4

《资本论》（马克思），4

《资本论》（马克思），4

Davidson, Alan, 347

戴维森，艾伦，347

戴维森，艾伦，347

DBS Bank Limited, 235

星展银行有限公司，235

星展银行有限公司，235

Deadman, Stephen, 240

戴德曼，斯蒂芬，240

戴德曼，斯蒂芬，240

Deep Blue, 120

深蓝，120

深蓝，120

deep-packet inspection (DPI), 188–89

深度包检测 (DPI)，188–89

深度包检测 (DPI)，188–89

Dell, 238

戴尔，238

戴尔，238

“democratic management,” 57–58

“民主管理”，57–58

“民主管理”，57–58

Deng Xiaoping, xxi, xxii, 26

邓小平，xxi，xxii，26

death of, 89–92, 373

逝世，89–92，373

逝世，89–92，373

democracy movement, 49–52

民主运动，49–52

民主运动，49–52

economic reforms, 30–31, 33, 34–35

经济改革，30–31，33，34–35

经济改革，30–31，33，34–35

purges, 79

清洗，79

清洗，79

邓小平，xxi，xxii，

26

逝世，89–92，

373

民主运动，

49–52

经济改革，30–31，33，

34–35

清洗，79

Denmark, 333

丹麦，333

丹麦，333

depression, 136, 176

萧条，136，176

萧条，136，176

Der Spiegel, 237, 311, 379

《明镜周刊》，237，311，379

《明镜周刊》，237，311，379

Deutsche Telekom, 243

德国电信，243

德国电信，243

Dhillon, Sanjit, 289–90, 334

迪隆，桑吉特，289–90，334

迪隆，桑吉特，289–90，334

Digital Equipment Corporation, 145

数字设备公司，145

数字设备公司，145

Ding, Charles (a.k.a. Ding Shaohua), xx, 216–26, 218

丁少华（Charles Ding），xx, 216–26, 218

丁少华（Charles Ding），xx, 216–26, 218

Disney, xl

迪士尼，xl

迪士尼，xl

Dispatches (TV program), 201–2

《派遣》（电视节目），201–2

《派遣》（电视节目），201–2

“domestic buyer’s credit,” 68, 371

“国内买方信贷”，68，371

“国内买方信贷”，68，371

Dong Cunrui, 99

董存瑞，99

董存瑞，99

Dongguan, 259–61, 358

东莞，259–61，358

东莞，259–61，358

“dongles,” 161, 211

“加密狗”，161，211

“加密狗”，161，211

dot-com bubble, 132–46, 150, 374

互联网泡沫，132–46，150，374

互联网泡沫，132–46，150，374

double criminality, 321–23

双重犯罪原则，321–23

双重犯罪原则，321–23

Duan Yongji, 119

段永基，119

段永基，119

Duda, Andrzej, 303

杜达，安杰伊，303

杜达，安杰伊，303

Duelfer, Charles, 143

迪尔弗，查尔斯，143

迪尔弗，查尔斯，143

duli yundong, 72

独立运动，72

独立运动，72

Duyun City People’s Consultative Conference, 37

都匀市人民政治协商会议，37

都匀市人民政治协商会议，37

Duyun No. 1 Middle School, 29–30, 37, 71, 254, 369

都匀一中，29–30，37，71，254，369

都匀一中，29–30，37，71，254，369

Duyun No. 3 Elementary School, 30

都匀三小，30

都匀三小，30

Duyun Normal College for Nationalities, 9–10, 13–15

都匀民族师范学校，9–10，13–15

都匀民族师范学校，9–10，13–15

E

E

East Hope Group, 140

东方希望集团，140

东方希望集团，140

Ebin, Ewon, xxvi

埃宾，埃文，xxvi

埃宾，埃文，xxvi

Ebola virus disease, 111

埃博拉病毒病，111

埃博拉病毒病，111

economic sanctions. See sanctions

经济制裁。参见 制裁

经济制裁。参见 制裁

Economist, The, 300

《经济学人》，300

《经济学人》，300

Egypt, 169, 240, 244

埃及，169，240，244

埃及，169，240，244

Ehrcke, William, 294, 296, 301

埃尔克，威廉，294，296，301

埃尔克，威廉，294，296，301

Emerson Electric, 137

艾默生电气，137

艾默生电气，137

Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), 312

员工持股计划 (ESOP)，312

员工持股计划 (ESOP)，312

England, Gordon, 198

英格兰，戈登，198

英格兰，戈登，198

Ericsson, 138, 141, 203, 235, 250

爱立信，138，141，203，235，250

bribery, 83

贿赂，83

贿赂，83

layoffs, 158

裁员，158

裁员，158

managed services, 168, 241

管理服务，168，241

管理服务，168，241

mobile and networks, 134, 211, 268, 325, 326

移动与网络，134，211，268，325，326

移动与网络，134，211，268，325，326

telephones, 59

电话，59

电话，59

爱立信，138，141，203，235，

250

贿赂，

83

裁员，

158

管理服务，168，

241

移动与网络，134，211，268，325，

326

电话，59

Eswatini, 328

斯威士兰，328

斯威士兰，328

Ethernet, 152

以太网，152

以太网，152

Etisalat, 154, 206, 219

阿联酋电信，154，206，219

阿联酋电信，154，206，219

European Commission, 266

欧盟委员会，266

欧盟委员会，266

European Parliament, 327

欧洲议会，327

欧洲议会，327

European Union (EU), 235, 267, 347

欧盟 (EU)，235，267，347

欧盟 (EU)，235，267，347

Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 303

《关于确保信息和通信技术及服务供应链安全的行政命令》，303

《关于确保信息和通信技术及服务供应链安全的行政命令》，303

extradition case of Meng Wanzhou, xxxi, xl–xli, 286–96, 299–300, 304–5, 315–24, 317, 353–54, 381

孟晚舟引渡案，xxxi，xl–xli，286–96，299–300，304–5，315–24，317，353–54，381

bail hearing, 294–96

保释听证会，294–96

保释听证会，294–96

courtroom proceedings, 320–24, 333–35, 336

法庭审理程序，320–24，333–35，336

法庭审理程序，320–24，333–35，336

detention at Vancouver Airport, xxxvii–xxxviii, 286–91, 311, 333–35, 381

在温哥华机场被扣留，xxxvii–xxxviii，286–91，311，333–35，381

在温哥华机场被扣留，xxxvii–xxxviii，286–91，311，333–35，381

repatriation, xxxi, 337–40, 382

遣返回国，xxxi，337–40，382

遣返回国，xxxi，337–40，382

孟晚舟引渡案，xxxi，xl–xli，286–96，299–300，304–5，315–24，317，353–54，

381

保释听证会，

294–96

法庭审理程序，320–24，333–35，

336

在温哥华机场被扣留，xxxvii–xxxviii，286–91，311，333–35，

381

遣返回国，xxxi，337–40，382

F

F

Facebook, 155, 168, 243, 253, 255, 268, 328

Facebook, 155, 168, 243, 253, 255, 268, 328

Facebook, 155, 168, 243, 253, 255, 268, 328

facial recognition, 189, 273–74, 331–33

人脸识别, 189, 273–74, 331–33

人脸识别, 189, 273–74, 331–33

Far Eastern Economic Review, 138–40

《远东经济评论》, 138–40

《远东经济评论》, 138–40

Farr, David N., 137

法尔，大卫·N. (Farr, David N.), 137

法尔，大卫·N. (Farr, David N.), 137

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 196, 215, 287, 339

美国联邦调查局 (FBI), 196, 215, 287, 339

Meng’s case, 288, 334

孟晚舟案, 288, 334

孟晚舟案, 288, 334

Ren interview, 169, 298–99, 376

任正非采访, 169, 298–99, 376

任正非采访, 169, 298–99, 376

Thelander and, 277–78

塞兰德与, 277–78

塞兰德与, 277–78

trade war, 297, 298–99

贸易战, 297, 298–99

贸易战, 297, 298–99

wiretapping, 154–55

窃听, 154–55

窃听, 154–55

ZTE Iran investigation, 235, 236

中兴通讯伊朗调查, 235, 236

中兴通讯伊朗调查, 235, 236

美国联邦调查局 (FBI), 196, 215, 287,

339

孟晚舟案, 288,

334

任正非采访, 169, 298–99,

376

塞兰德与,

277–78

贸易战, 297,

298–99

窃听,

154–55

中兴通讯伊朗调查, 235, 236

Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 20, 155, 196

美国联邦通信委员会 (FCC), 20, 155, 196

美国联邦通信委员会 (FCC), 20, 155, 196

Feigenbaum, Evan, 146

费根鲍姆，埃文 (Feigenbaum, Evan), 146

费根鲍姆，埃文 (Feigenbaum, Evan), 146

Fei Min, 178

费敏, 178

费敏, 178

Feng Jugao, 14

冯菊高, 14

冯菊高, 14

Financial Times, 140, 171, 198, 207, 230, 281, 285, 301

《金融时报》, 140, 171, 198, 207, 230, 281, 285, 301

《金融时报》, 140, 171, 198, 207, 230, 281, 285, 301

Five Eyes, 227, 326–27

五眼联盟, 227, 326–27

五眼联盟, 227, 326–27

“flash sales,” 264

“秒杀”, 264

“秒杀”, 264

Floating-Ball Precision Pressure Generator, 33, 33–34, 35, 369

浮球式精密压力计, 33, 33–34, 35, 369

浮球式精密压力计, 33, 33–34, 35, 369

foot-binding, 21

缠足, 21

缠足, 21

Forbes, 140–41, 244, 374

《福布斯》, 140–41, 244, 374

《福布斯》, 140–41, 244, 374

Foxconn, 202–3

富士康, 202–3

富士康, 202–3

Fox & Friends, 307, 324

《福克斯与朋友们》, 307, 324

《福克斯与朋友们》, 307, 324

France, 32, 308, 328

法国, 32, 308, 328

法国, 32, 308, 328

Francis, Pope, 254

方济各，教皇, 254

方济各，教皇, 254

Frater, Robert, 336

弗雷特，罗伯特 (Frater, Robert), 336

弗雷特，罗伯特 (Frater, Robert), 336

Freedom of Information Act, 318

《信息自由法》, 318

《信息自由法》, 318

free speech, 48–49, 118–19

言论自由, 48–49, 118–19

言论自由, 48–49, 118–19

Freuler, Juan Ortiz, 327–28

弗罗伊勒，胡安·奥尔蒂斯 (Freuler, Juan Ortiz), 327–28

弗罗伊勒，胡安·奥尔蒂斯 (Freuler, Juan Ortiz), 327–28

Friedman, Thomas, 312–13

弗里德曼，托马斯 (Friedman, Thomas), 312–13

弗里德曼，托马斯 (Friedman, Thomas), 312–13

Fujitsu, 59, 105, 134, 196

富士通, 59, 105, 134, 196

富士通, 59, 105, 134, 196

Fulbright University, 312

富布赖特大学, 312

富布赖特大学, 312

Futurewei Technologies, 138, 146, 374

Futurewei Technologies, 138, 146, 374

Futurewei Technologies, 138, 146, 374

G

G

G20 Summit (2018), xxxvii–xxxviii, 289, 291–92

G20 峰会 (2018), xxxvii–xxxviii, 289, 291–92

G20 峰会 (2018), xxxvii–xxxviii, 289, 291–92

Gadot, Gal, 262

加朵，盖尔 (Gadot, Gal), 262

加朵，盖尔 (Gadot, Gal), 262

“gag orders,” 350

“禁言令”, 350

“禁言令”, 350

gaokao, 10

高考, 10

高考, 10

Garden of Eden, xli

伊甸园, xli

伊甸园, xli

Garner, Gary, 121, 199–200

加纳，加里 (Garner, Gary), 121, 199–200

加纳，加里 (Garner, Gary), 121, 199–200

GCHQ, 200–201, 239

政府通信总部 (GCHQ), 200–201, 239

政府通信总部 (GCHQ), 200–201, 239

General Motors, 221

通用汽车, 221

通用汽车, 221

Genghis Khan, 244

成吉思汗, 244

成吉思汗, 244

George Washington University, 312, 328

乔治·华盛顿大学, 312, 328

乔治·华盛顿大学, 312, 328

Gephardt, Richard, 198

格普哈特，理查德 (Gephardt, Richard), 198

格普哈特，理查德 (Gephardt, Richard), 198

Germany, 119, 158, 308, 330, 349

德国, 119, 158, 308, 330, 349

德国, 119, 158, 308, 330, 349

Gibb-Carsley, John, 301

吉布-卡斯利，约翰 (Gibb-Carsley, John), 301

吉布-卡斯利，约翰 (Gibb-Carsley, John), 301

Gilley, Bruce, 138–40

吉利，布鲁斯 (Gilley, Bruce), 138–40

吉利，布鲁斯 (Gilley, Bruce), 138–40

Global Marine Systems, 168, 376

环球海事系统有限公司 (Global Marine Systems), 168, 376

环球海事系统有限公司 (Global Marine Systems), 168, 376

Globe and Mail, 274, 343

《环球邮报》, 274, 343

《环球邮报》, 274, 343

Golden Shield, 188

金盾工程, 188

金盾工程, 188

Goldman Sachs, 171

高盛, 171

高盛, 171

Google, 168, 211, 244, 245–46, 268, 303–4, 309, 328, 350

谷歌, 168, 211, 244, 245–46, 268, 303–4, 309, 328, 350

谷歌, 168, 211, 244, 245–46, 268, 303–4, 309, 328, 350

grape wine, 26

葡萄酒, 26

葡萄酒, 26

Great Britain. See UK

大不列颠。见 英国 (UK)

大不列颠。见 英国 (UK)

Great Chinese Famine, 9–10, 11, 22, 142, 164, 368

三年大饥荒, 9–10, 11, 22, 142, 164, 368

三年大饥荒, 9–10, 11, 22, 142, 164, 368

Great Firewall, 188–89, 330

防火长城, 188–89, 330

防火长城, 188–89, 330

Great Leap Forward, 9, 12, 22, 368

大跃进, 9, 12, 22, 368

大跃进, 9, 12, 22, 368

Greenspan, Alan, 246

格林斯潘，艾伦 (Greenspan, Alan), 246

格林斯潘，艾伦 (Greenspan, Alan), 246

Greenwald, Glenn, 242

格林沃尔德，格伦 (Greenwald, Glenn), 242

格林沃尔德，格伦 (Greenwald, Glenn), 242

Griezmann, Antoine, 332–33

格里兹曼，安托万 (Griezmann, Antoine), 332–33

格里兹曼，安托万 (Griezmann, Antoine), 332–33

GSM (global system for mobile communications), 134–35

GSM (全球移动通信系统), 134–35

GSM (全球移动通信系统), 134–35

GSM World Congress (1996), 109

GSM 世界大会 (1996), 109

GSM 世界大会 (1996), 109

Guangzhou, 81, 156, 219

广州, 81, 156, 219

广州, 81, 156, 219

Guangzhou Military Region, 68, 95

广州军区, 68, 95

广州军区, 68, 95

guanxi, 82

关系, 82

关系, 82

Guardian, The, 240

《卫报》, 240

《卫报》, 240

Guizhou, 5, 30, 368

贵州, 5, 30, 368

贵州, 5, 30, 368

gunpowder, xl

火药, xl

火药, xl

Guomao Building, 38

国贸大厦, 38

国贸大厦, 38

Guo Ping, xxvi, xviii, 54, 98–99, 178

郭平，xxvi，xviii，54，98–99，178

background of, 47

背景，47

背景，47

Cisco lawsuit, 150

思科诉讼，150

思科诉讼，150

IBM and, 121

与 IBM，121

与 IBM，121

internship at Huawei, 47, 370

在华为实习，47，370

在华为实习，47，370

at Mobile World Congress, 242

在世界移动通信大会，242

在世界移动通信大会，242

Nortel and, 161, 197

与北电，161，197

与北电，161，197

rotating CEO, 211–12, 340, 378, 382

轮值 CEO，211–12，340，378，382

轮值 CEO，211–12，340，378，382

South Korea protests, 253

韩国抗议，253

韩国抗议，253

submarine cable venture, 168

海底光缆合资企业，168

海底光缆合资企业，168

supervisory board chairman, 340–41

监事会主席，340–41

监事会主席，340–41

US sanctions, 302

美国制裁，302

美国制裁，302

郭平，xxvi，xviii，54，98–99，

178

背景，

47

思科诉讼，

150

与 IBM，

121

在华为实习，47，

370

在世界移动通信大会，

242

与北电，161，

197

轮值 CEO，211–12，340，378，

382

韩国抗议，

253

海底光缆合资企业，

168

监事会主席，

340–41

美国制裁，302

Gutiérrez, Luis, 224

古铁雷斯，路易斯，224

古铁雷斯，路易斯，224

H

H

H3C, 170–72, 376

H3C，170–72，376

H3C，170–72，376

Handelsblatt, 310

《商报》，310

《商报》，310

Han Xin, 150

韩鑫，150

韩鑫，150

Hao Chunmin, 133

郝纯民，133

郝纯民，133

Harbour Networks, 136

港湾网络，136

港湾网络，136

Harvard Ballet Company, 284

哈佛芭蕾舞团，284

哈佛芭蕾舞团，284

Harvard Business School, 129, 374

哈佛商学院，129，374

哈佛商学院，129，374

Harvard College China Forum, 284

哈佛中国论坛，284

哈佛中国论坛，284

Harvard University, 283–84, 313, 323, 325, 327–28

哈佛大学，283–84，313，323，325，327–28

哈佛大学，283–84，313，323，325，327–28

He, Teresa (a.k.a. He Tingbo), xix, 243, 304, 342

何庭波（Teresa He），xix，243，304，342

何庭波（Teresa He），xix，243，304，342

Heathrow Airport, 262

希思罗机场，262

希思罗机场，262

Heidelberg Castle, xli, 260, 310

海德堡城堡，xli，260，310

海德堡城堡，xli，260，310

Hendrick, Mark, 201–2

亨德里克，马克，201–2

亨德里克，马克，201–2

He Shu, 20–21

何曙，20–21

何曙，20–21

Hesse, Daniel “Dan,” xxi, 194–95, 198, 203–4

黑塞，丹尼尔·“丹”，xxi，194–95，198，203–4

黑塞，丹尼尔·“丹”，xxi，194–95，198，203–4

Hewlett-Packard, 145, 231

惠普，145，231

惠普，145，231

HiSilicon, 189–90, 265, 275–76, 304–5, 325, 346, 370

海思，189–90，265，275–76，304–5，325，346，370

海思，189–90，265，275–76，304–5，325，346，370

Hitler, Adolf, 3, 244

希特勒，阿道夫，3，244

希特勒，阿道夫，3，244

Hoekstra, Peter, 171

胡克斯特拉，彼得，171

胡克斯特拉，彼得，171

Holmes, Heather, 337–38

福尔摩斯，希瑟，337–38

福尔摩斯，希瑟，337–38

Hong Kong, 38–40, 92

香港，38–40，92

British handover of 1997, 91–92, 95–98, 373

1997 年英国移交，91–92，95–98，373

1997 年英国移交，91–92，95–98，373

香港，38–40，

92

1997 年英国移交，91–92，95–98，373

Hong Kong Basic Law, 118–19

香港基本法，118–19

香港基本法，118–19

Hong Kong Garrison, 95, 97

驻港部队，95，97

驻港部队，95，97

Hong Tianfeng, 178

洪天峰，178

洪天峰，178

Hoogewerf, Rupert, 140

胡润，鲁珀特，140

胡润，鲁珀特，140

Hopkins, Andrew, 200

霍普金斯，安德鲁，200

霍普金斯，安德鲁，200

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), 214–28, 277, 379

众议院常设情报特别委员会 (HPSCI)，214–28，277，379

Ding’s appearance, 216–26, 218

丁耘的出席，216–26，218

丁耘的出席，216–26，218

report, 226–27, 379

报告，226–27，379

报告，226–27，379

众议院常设情报特别委员会 (HPSCI)，214–28，277，

379

丁耘的出席，216–26，218

报告，226–27，379

House Republican Policy Committee, 171

众议院共和党政策委员会，171

众议院共和党政策委员会，171

Hou Weigui, xx, 113–14, 135, 236, 282

侯为贵，xx, 113–14, 135, 236, 282

侯为贵，xx, 113–14, 135, 236, 282

How the Steel Was Tempered (Ostrovsky), 106

《钢铁是怎样炼成的》（奥斯特洛夫斯基），106

《钢铁是怎样炼成的》（奥斯特洛夫斯基），106

HSBC Holdings, 233–35, 299, 317, 337, 379

汇丰控股，233–35，299，317，337，379

汇丰控股，233–35，299，317，337，379

Hu, Ken (a.k.a. Hu Houkun), xxvii, xviii, 178, 203, 370

胡厚崑（Ken Hu），xxvii，xviii，178，203，370

background of, 84–85

背景，84–85

背景，84–85

cybersecurity, 199, 212–13, 214–15

网络安全，199，212–13，214–15

网络安全，199，212–13，214–15

letter to US government, 285, 378

致美国政府的信，285，378

致美国政府的信，285，378

rotating CEO, 211, 212–13, 244, 276, 340, 378, 382

轮值 CEO，211，212–13，244，276，340，378，382

轮值 CEO，211，212–13，244，276，340，378，382

sales, 84–85, 138, 183

销售，84–85，138，183

销售，84–85，138，183

surveillance, 276

监控，276

监控，276

胡厚崑（Ken Hu），xxvii，xviii，178，203，

370

背景，

84–85

网络安全，199，212–13，

214–15

致美国政府的信，285，

378

轮值 CEO，211，212–13，244，276，340，378，

382

销售，84–85，138，

183

监控，276

Huang Weiwei, 119, 127–28

黄卫伟，119，127–28

黄卫伟，119，127–28

Huang Xuanqian, 14–15

黄宣谦，14–15

黄宣谦，14–15

Huawei. See also specific persons

华为。另见特定人物

allegations of military ties, 60, 95, 139–40

关于军方背景的指控，60，95，139–40

关于军方背景的指控，60，95，139–40

allegations of state support, 65–76, 121–25, 139–40, 173–74, 181–83, 221–22, 223–24, 238–39, 279–80, 314, 331, 350–51, 357–58

关于国家支持的指控，65–76，121–25，139–40，173–74，181–83，221–22，223–24，238–39，279–80，314，331，350–51，357–58

关于国家支持的指控，65–76，121–25，139–40，173–74，181–83，221–22，223–24，238–39，279–80，314，331，350–51，357–58

Arab Spring, 205–9

阿拉伯之春，205–9

阿拉伯之春，205–9

Beijing Olympic Games (2008), 187–93

北京奥运会（2008 年），187–93

北京奥运会（2008 年），187–93

big data, 253–58

大数据，253–58

大数据，253–58

Capital Construction Management Department, 183

基建管理部，183

基建管理部，183

Cisco lawsuit, 146, 149–53, 155, 211, 375

思科诉讼案，146，149–53，155，211，375

思科诉讼案，146，149–53，155，211，375

company oath of, 67

公司誓词，67

公司誓词，67

corporate culture of, 111–12, 125, 136–37, 175–78, 376

企业文化，111–12，125，136–37，175–78，376

企业文化，111–12，125，136–37，175–78，376

corporate structure of, 365

公司结构，365

公司结构，365

Dongguan move, 259–61, 358

搬迁至东莞，259–61，358

搬迁至东莞，259–61，358

early R&D, 53–58, 60–64

早期研发，53–58，60–64

早期研发，53–58，60–64

employee numbering system, 54

员工工号制度，54

员工工号制度，54

ethical oversight, 181–82

伦理监督，181–82

伦理监督，181–82

executive management team (EMT), 178–79, 181–83

执行管理团队（EMT），178–79，181–83

执行管理团队（EMT），178–79，181–83

first mass-resignation ceremony, 77–79, 85, 124, 372

首次集体辞职仪式，77–79，85，124，372

首次集体辞职仪式，77–79，85，124，372

first offices of, 42–43

最初的办公室，42–43

最初的办公室，42–43

future of, 345–58

未来，345–58

未来，345–58

global expansion and markets, 103–16, 156–72

全球扩张与市场，103–16，156–72

全球扩张与市场，103–16，156–72

Global Network Security Committee, 199–200

全球网络安全委员会，199–200

全球网络安全委员会，199–200

House investigation, 216–26

众议院调查，216–26

众议院调查，216–26

IBM consultancy, 119–21, 179, 373–74

IBM 咨询，119–21，179，373–74

IBM 咨询，119–21，179，373–74

internal Communist Party committee, 41, 122–23, 173, 182, 221–22, 372, 377

内部党委，41，122–23，173，182，221–22，372，377

内部党委，41，122–23，173，182，221–22，372，377

Iran affair, 231–36

伊朗事件，231–36

伊朗事件，231–36

jitisuoyouzhi, 56–58, 118, 126–27, 370

集体所有制，56–58，118，126–27，370

集体所有制，56–58，118，126–27，370

leadership and succession plans, 211–14, 230–31, 242–45, 279–80, 340–41, 354–55, 378

领导层与接班计划，211–14，230–31，242–45，279–80，340–41，354–55，378

领导层与接班计划，211–14，230–31，242–45，279–80，340–41，354–55，378

limited liability, 57, 118, 126–27, 372–73

有限责任，57，118，126–27，372–73

有限责任，57，118，126–27，372–73

management evolution, 173–85

管理演变，173–85

管理演变，173–85

management reforms, 117–31

管理改革，117–31

管理改革，117–31

Meng’s extradition hearing, 315–24, 317, 381

孟的引渡听证会，315–24，317，381

孟的引渡听证会，315–24，317，381

military-esque culture of, 20, 111–12

准军事化文化，20，111–12

准军事化文化，20，111–12

name of, 159

名称，159

名称，159

National Audit Office audit, 132–33, 137, 374

国家审计署审计，132–33，137，374

国家审计署审计，132–33，137，374

organizational chart, 355–58

组织架构图，355–58

组织架构图，355–58

origins of, 41–52, 370

起源，41–52，370

起源，41–52，370

overseas postings, 111, 256, 373

海外派驻，111，256，373

海外派驻，111，256，373

ownership structure, 55–56, 69, 117–18, 125–28, 157–58, 229–30, 311–12, 370, 372–73

所有权结构，55–56，69，117–18，125–28，157–58，229–30，311–12，370，372–73

所有权结构，55–56，69，117–18，125–28，157–58，229–30，311–12，370，372–73

patents, xl, 151, 187, 243

专利，xl, 151, 187, 243

专利，xl, 151, 187, 243

revenues, xl, 158, 182, 211, 243, 354

收入，xl, 158, 182, 211, 243, 354

收入，xl, 158, 182, 211, 243, 354

sales, 77–88, 93, 112–13

销售，77–88，93，112–13

销售，77–88，93，112–13

smartphones, 202–3, 261–71, 345–46

智能手机，202–3，261–71，345–46

智能手机，202–3，261–71，345–46

Snowden leaks, 237–42, 246, 379

斯诺登泄密事件，237–42，246，379

斯诺登泄密事件，237–42，246，379

surveillance, xxix, 75–76, 94–95, 168–69, 188–93, 207–10, 253–57, 272–83

监视，xxix，75–76，94–95，168–69，188–93，207–10，253–57，272–83

监视，xxix，75–76，94–95，168–69，188–93，207–10，253–57，272–83

timeline of events, 367–82

事件时间表，367–82

事件时间表，367–82

trade war, 278, 280–83, 297–314, 324–25, 381

贸易战，278，280–83，297–314，324–25，381

贸易战，278，280–83，297–314，324–25，381

UK relations with, 159–60, 198–202, 224–25, 306–7, 327, 328, 376, 378, 382

英国与……的关系，159–60，198–202，224–25，306–7，327，328，376，378，382

HSBC and Iran, 233–35, 299, 317, 379

汇丰银行与伊朗，233–35，299，317，379

汇丰银行与伊朗，233–35，299，317，379

英国与……的关系，159–60，198–202，224–25，306–7，327，328，376，378，

382

汇丰银行与伊朗，233–35，299，317，379

“unnatural” deaths at, 175–77

“非正常”死亡事件，175–77

“非正常”死亡事件，175–77

US relations with, 170–72, 194–98, 203–4, 277–78

美国与……的关系，170–72，194–98，203–4，277–78

Sprint Nextel, 194–98, 203–4, 378

Sprint Nextel，194–98，203–4，378

Sprint Nextel，194–98，203–4，378

美国与……的关系，170–72，194–98，203–4，

277–78

Sprint Nextel，194–98，203–4，378

Winter, 132–46

温特，132–46

温特，132–46

华为。另见特定人物。关于军方背景的指控，60, 95, 139–40；关于国家支持的指控，65–76, 121–25, 139–40, 173–74, 181–83, 221–22, 223–24, 238–39, 279–80, 314, 331, 350–51, 357–58；阿拉伯之春，205–9；北京奥运会（2008 年），187–93；大数据，253–58；基建管理部，183；思科诉讼案，146, 149–53, 155, 211, 375；公司誓词，67；企业文化，111–12, 125, 136–37, 175–78, 376；公司结构，365；搬迁至东莞，259–61, 358；早期研发，53–58, 60–64；员工工号制度，54；伦理监督，181–82；执行管理团队（EMT），178–79, 181–83；首次集体辞职仪式，77–79, 85, 124, 372；最初的办公室，42–43；未来，345–58；全球扩张与市场，103–16, 156–72；全球网络安全委员会，199–200；众议院调查，216–26；IBM 咨询，119–21, 179, 373–74；内部党委，41, 122–23, 173, 182, 221–22, 372, 377；伊朗事件，231–36；集体所有制，56–58, 118, 126–27, 370；领导层与接班计划，211–14, 230–31, 242–45, 279–80, 340–41, 354–55, 378；有限责任，57, 118, 126–27, 372–73；管理演变，173–85；管理改革，117–31；孟的引渡听证会，315–24, 317, 381；准军事化文化，20, 111–12；名称，159；国家审计署审计，132–33, 137, 374；组织架构图，355–58；起源，41–52, 370；海外派驻，111, 256, 373；所有权结构，55–56, 69, 117–18, 125–28, 157–58, 229–30, 311–12, 370, 372–73；专利，xl, 151, 187, 243；营收，xl, 158, 182, 211, 243, 354；销售，77–88, 93, 112–13；智能手机，202–3, 261–71, 345–46；斯诺登泄密，237–42, 246, 379；监控，xxix, 75–76, 94–95, 168–69, 188–93, 207–10, 253–57, 272–83；事件时间表，367–82；贸易战，278, 280–83, 297–314, 324–25, 381；英国与华为的关系，159–60, 198–202, 224–25, 306–7, 327, 328, 376, 378, 382；汇丰银行与伊朗，233–35, 299, 317, 379；“非正常”死亡事件，175–77；美国与华为的关系，170–72, 194–98, 203–4, 277–78；Sprint Nextel，194–98, 203–4, 378；寒冬，132–46

Huawei America Inc., 112

华为美国有限公司，112

华为美国有限公司，112

Huawei Basic Law, 118–19, 121, 125–26, 127–28, 358, 373

华为基本法，118–19，121，125–26，127–28，358，373

华为基本法，118–19，121，125–26，127–28，358，373

Huawei C&C08 SPC Switch, 63–64, 65, 68–69, 75, 81, 93, 107, 371

华为 C&C08 程控交换机，63–64，65，68–69，75，81，93，107，371

华为 C&C08 程控交换机，63–64，65，68–69，75，81，93，107，371

Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), 199–202, 378

华为网络安全评估中心 (HCSEC)，199–202，378

华为网络安全评估中心 (HCSEC)，199–202，378

Huawei Honor, 264, 265, 329, 379, 382

华为荣耀，264，265，329，379，382

华为荣耀，264，265，329，379，382

Huawei Marine Systems, 328, 381

华为海洋系统，328，381

华为海洋系统，328，381

Huawei Mate 60, 345, 382

华为 Mate 60，345，382

华为 Mate 60，345，382

Huawei Oath, 67

华为誓言，67

华为誓言，67

Huawei P9, 261–62

华为 P9，261–62

华为 P9，261–62

Huawei People, 81–82, 87, 91, 95, 97, 122, 124

《华为人》，81–82，87，91，95，97，122，124

《华为人》，81–82，87，91，95，97，122，124

Huawei Submarine Networks, 168, 202, 206, 376

华为海洋网络，168，202，206，376

华为海洋网络，168，202，206，376

Huazhong Institute of Technology, 40–41, 46–47, 54, 85, 98, 123, 370

华中工学院，40–41，46–47，54，85，98，123，370

华中工学院，40–41，46–47，54，85，98，123，370

Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 266

华中科技大学，266

华中科技大学，266

Hu Jintao, xxiii, 115, 149, 158–59, 174

胡锦涛，xxiii，115，149，158–59，174

Iran visit, 141–42, 374

访问伊朗，141–42，374

访问伊朗，141–42，374

胡锦涛，xxiii，115，149，158–59，

174

访问伊朗，141–42，374

human rights abuses, 329–32

侵犯人权，329–32

侵犯人权，329–32

Hungary, 240

匈牙利，240

匈牙利，240

Hung Nien, 44, 92

鸿年，44，92

鸿年，44，92

Hussein, Saddam, 105, 147–48, 153–54, 375

侯赛因，萨达姆，105，147–48，153–54，375

侯赛因，萨达姆，105，147–48，153–54，375

Hutchison Telecom, 93, 372

和记电讯，93，372

和记电讯，93，372

hutu sixiang, 72

糊涂思想，72

糊涂思想，72

Hu Xinyu, 175, 376

胡新宇，175，376

胡新宇，175，376

Hu Yaobang, xxii, 49, 89

胡耀邦，xxii，49，89

胡耀邦，xxii，49，89

hyperinflation, 106–7

恶性通货膨胀，106–7

恶性通货膨胀，106–7

I

IBM, 145, 244, 330

IBM，145，244，330

Huawei consultancy, 119–21, 179, 373–74

华为咨询，119–21，179，373–74

华为咨询，119–21，179，373–74

Smarter Cities, 209–10

智慧城市，209–10

智慧城市，209–10

IBM，145，244，

330

华为咨询，119–21，179，

373–74

智慧城市，209–10

ICT Finance Forum, 245–46

ICT 金融论坛，245–46

ICT 金融论坛，245–46

iFLYTEK, 275

科大讯飞，275

科大讯飞，275

India, 240, 255, 308

印度，240，255，308

印度，240，255，308

Indonesia, 158–59, 347

印度尼西亚，158–59，347

印度尼西亚，158–59，347

Information Engineering Academy, 139–40

信息工程学院，139–40

信息工程学院，139–40

Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB), 241

人权与商业研究所 (IHRB)，241

人权与商业研究所 (IHRB)，241

integrated circuits. See computer chips

集成电路。参见 计算机芯片

集成电路。参见 计算机芯片

Intel, 303–4

英特尔，303–4

英特尔，303–4

intellectual property (IP) and theft

知识产权（IP）与窃取

Clinton and China, 66

克林顿与中国，66

克林顿与中国，66

Huawei and, 47, 113, 124, 196–97, 211–12, 237, 278, 339, 375

华为与，47，113，124，196–97，211–12，237，278，339，375

Cisco patent lawsuit, 146, 149–53, 155, 211, 375

思科专利诉讼，146，149–53，155，211，375

思科专利诉讼，146，149–53，155，211，375

Motorola dispute, 152, 196, 211–12

摩托罗拉纠纷，152，196，211–12

摩托罗拉纠纷，152，196，211–12

华为与，47，113，124，196–97，211–12，237，278，339，

375

思科专利诉讼，146，149–53，155，211，

375

摩托罗拉纠纷，152，196，211–12

ZTE and, 113

中兴与，113

中兴与，113

知识产权 (IP) 与窃取

克林顿与中国，

66

华为与，47，113，124，196–97，211–12，237，278，339，

375

思科专利诉讼，146，149–53，155，211，

375

摩托罗拉纠纷，152，196，

211–12

中兴与，113

International Crisis Group, 292

国际危机组织，292

国际危机组织，292

Internet of Things, 253

物联网，253

物联网，253

iPads, xxxviii, 289, 290

iPad，xxxviii，289，290

iPad，xxxviii，289，290

iPhones, xxxvii–xxxviii, 202–3, 239, 264, 265

iPhone，xxxvii–xxxviii，202–3，239，264，265

iPhone，xxxvii–xxxviii，202–3，239，264，265

IPOs (initial public offerings), 69, 125–26

IPO（首次公开募股），69，125–26

IPO（首次公开募股），69，125–26

IPVM, 331–32

IPVM，331–32

IPVM，331–32

Iran

伊朗

Huawei and, 165–67, 208, 231–36, 278, 290, 298–99, 300, 317, 319, 325, 379

华为与，165–67，208，231–36，278，290，298–99，300，317，319，325，379

华为与，165–67，208，231–36，278，290，298–99，300，317，319，325，379

Hu Jintao visit, 141–42, 374

胡锦涛访问，141–42，374

胡锦涛访问，141–42，374

US sanctions, 141, 165–67, 223, 231, 234, 235, 257, 282, 299, 321

美国制裁，141，165–67，223，231，234，235，257，282，299，321

美国制裁，141，165–67，223，231，234，235，257，282，299，321

ZTE and, 231, 235, 236, 257, 282

中兴与，231，235，236，257，282

中兴与，231，235，236，257，282

伊朗

华为与，165–67，208，231–36，278，290，298–99，300，317，319，325，

379

胡锦涛访问，141–42，

374

美国制裁，141，165–67，223，231，234，235，257，282，299，

321

中兴与，231，235，236，257，282

Iran Electronics Industries, 166–67

伊朗电子工业，166–67

伊朗电子工业，166–67

Iraq

伊拉克

bombing of 1998, 103–5

1998 年轰炸，103–5

1998 年轰炸，103–5

invasion of Kuwait, 104

入侵科威特，104

入侵科威特，104

伊拉克

1998 年轰炸，

103–5

入侵科威特，104

Iraq War, 143–45, 147–48, 149, 153–55, 164, 374, 375

伊拉克战争，143–45，147–48，149，153–55，164，374，375

伊拉克战争，143–45，147–48，149，153–55，164，374，375

Ireland, 240

爱尔兰，240

爱尔兰，240

“iron army,” 111

“铁军”，111

“铁军”，111

ISO 9000, 98

ISO 9000，98

ISO 9000，98

Israel, 308, 328

以色列，308，328

以色列，308，328

J

J

Japan, 119, 328

日本，119，328

Second Sino-Japanese War, 3, 4–5, 367

中国抗日战争，3，4–5，367

中国抗日战争，3，4–5，367

World War II, 3, 6, 367

第二次世界大战，3，6，367

第二次世界大战，3，6，367

日本，119，

328

中国抗日战争，3，4–5，

367

第二次世界大战，3，6，367

Jiang Qing, 21

江青，21

江青，21

Jiangsu Province, 36, 277

江苏省，36，277

江苏省，36，277

Jiang Xisheng, xix, 45, 47, 356

蒋锡生，xix，45，47，356

蒋锡生，xix，45，47，356

Jiang Zemin, xxi, xxii, 65–68, 96, 106, 146, 347, 371

江泽民，xxi，xxii，65–68，96，106，146，347，371

江泽民，xxi，xxii，65–68，96，106，146，347，371

Ji Hui, 286

吉辉，286

吉辉，286

Jinan, 35–36, 37, 369

济南，35–36，37，369

济南，35–36，37，369

Jinglun Hotel, 83

京伦饭店，83

京伦饭店，83

Ji Ping, 178

纪平，178

纪平，178

jitisuoyouzhi, 56–58, 118, 126–27, 370

集体所有制，56–58，118，126–27，370

集体所有制，56–58，118，126–27，370

Johansson, Scarlett, 261, 261–62

斯嘉丽·约翰逊，261，261–62

斯嘉丽·约翰逊，261，261–62

Johnnie Walker Scotch, 83

尊尼获加苏格兰威士忌，83

尊尼获加苏格兰威士忌，83

Jordan, 154, 158

约旦，154，158

约旦，154，158

Joseph, Michael, 162–63, 352

迈克尔·约瑟夫，162–63，352

迈克尔·约瑟夫，162–63，352

July Seventh Bookstore, 3–5, 367

七七书店，3–5，367

七七书店，3–5，367

Juneau-Katsuya, Michel, 170, 343–44

米歇尔·朱诺-卡茨亚，170，343–44

米歇尔·朱诺-卡茨亚，170，343–44

Justice Department, US, 83, 297–300, 324–25, 337

美国司法部，83，297–300，324–25，337

美国司法部，83，297–300，324–25，337

just-in-time production, 119

准时制生产，119

准时制生产，119

K

K

karma, 124

因果报应，124

因果报应，124

Kasparov, Garry, 120

加里·卡斯帕罗夫，120

加里·卡斯帕罗夫，120

Katragadda, Sowmith, 288–90, 334

索米斯·卡特拉加达，288–90，334

索米斯·卡特拉加达，288–90，334

Keiser, Andy, 227

安迪·凯泽，227

安迪·凯泽，227

Kennedy, Robert F., 129

罗伯特·F·肯尼迪，129

罗伯特·F·肯尼迪，129

Kennedy International Airport, 246, 250, 289, 299

肯尼迪国际机场，246，250，289，299

肯尼迪国际机场，246，250，289，299

Kenya, 112, 162–63, 168, 254–55, 352

肯尼亚，112，162–63，168，254–55，352

肯尼亚，112，162–63，168，254–55，352

Key, John, 227–28

约翰·基，227–28

约翰·基，227–28

Khatami, Mohammad, 141, 165

穆罕默德·哈塔米，141，165

穆罕默德·哈塔米，141，165

Khrushchev, Nikita, 9

尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫，9

尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫，9

Kim Jong Il, 164, 376

金正日，164，376

金正日，164，376

Kim Jong Un, 292

金正恩，292

金正恩，292

Kimmitt, Robert M., 171

罗伯特·M·金米特，171

罗伯特·M·金米特，171

King, Martin Luther, Jr., 129–30

马丁·路德·金，129–30

马丁·路德·金，129–30

Kirin 970, 275

麒麟 970，275

麒麟 970，275

Kirkland, Scott, 288–90, 333–35

柯克兰，斯科特，288–90，333–35

柯克兰，斯科特，288–90，333–35

Korean War, 8, 55

朝鲜战争，8，55

朝鲜战争，8，55

Kosovo War, 114–16

科索沃战争，114–16

科索沃战争，114–16

Kotter, John, 129

科特，约翰，129

科特，约翰，129

Kovrig, Clara X., 342–43

康明凯，克拉拉·X.，342–43

康明凯，克拉拉·X.，342–43

Kovrig, Michael

康明凯

detention, xl–xli, 292, 320, 381

拘押，xl–xli，292，320，381

拘押，xl–xli，292，320，381

legal proceedings, 335–36

法律程序，335–36

法律程序，335–36

Meng’s extradition case and, 292, 323–24

孟晚舟引渡案与，292，323–24

孟晚舟引渡案与，292，323–24

release and aftermath, 338, 341–43, 382

释放及后续，338，341–43，382

释放及后续，338，341–43，382

康明凯

拘押，xl–xli，292，320，

381

法律程序，

335–36

孟晚舟引渡案与，292，

323–24

释放及后续，338，341–43，382

Krach, Keith, 280, 305–6, 328

克拉奇，基思，280，305–6，328

克拉奇，基思，280，305–6，328

Kudlow, Larry, 325

库德洛，拉里，325

库德洛，拉里，325

Kunming, 42, 71–72, 108

昆明，42，71–72，108

昆明，42，71–72，108

Kuwait, 104

科威特，104

科威特，104

Kwong, Tony, 62–63

邝东，62–63

邝东，62–63

Kyodo News, 310

共同社，310

共同社，310

L

Labor Contract Law, 177, 377

劳动合同法，177，377

劳动合同法，177，377

Las Vegas, 62, 259

拉斯维加斯，62，259

拉斯维加斯，62，259

LDPC, Inc., 269

LDPC 公司，269

LDPC 公司，269

lean production, 119

精益生产，119

精益生产，119

Le Bal des Débutantes, xxx, 283–84, 381

巴黎名媛舞会，xxx，283–84，381

巴黎名媛舞会，xxx，283–84，381

Lei Jun, 264

雷军，264

雷军，264

Le Monde, 278, 380

《世界报》，278，380

《世界报》，278，380

Lenin, Vladimir, 4

列宁，弗拉基米尔，4

列宁，弗拉基米尔，4

Lenovo, 119, 142, 269

联想，119，142，269

联想，119，142，269

Lewis, James, 19, 131

刘易斯，詹姆斯，19，131

刘易斯，詹姆斯，19，131

Lewis, Julian, 331

刘易斯，朱利安，331

刘易斯，朱利安，331

Le Yucheng, 339

乐玉成，339

乐玉成，339

Liang, Howard (a.k.a. Liang Hua), 279, 356, 380

梁华，279，356，380

梁华，279，356，380

Liaoning Province, 251–52

辽宁省，251–52

辽宁省，251–52

Liaoning Radio Factory No. 3, 44

辽宁无线电三厂，44

辽宁无线电三厂，44

Liaoyang, 24–27, 368

辽阳，24–27，368

辽阳，24–27，368

Liaoyang Petrochemical Fiber Factory, 35, 369

辽阳石油化纤厂，35，369

辽阳石油化纤厂，35，369

Libya, 205, 206–7

利比亚，205，206–7

利比亚，205，206–7

Libyan Civil War, 111

利比亚内战，111

利比亚内战，111

Li Hongyuan, 319

李洪元，319

李洪元，319

Li Jingquan, 22, 23

李井泉，22，23

李井泉，22，23

Li Jingxian, 83–84, 108

李景先，83–84，108

李景先，83–84，108

Li Kashing, 93

李嘉诚，93

李嘉诚，93

Li Lanqing, 75, 90

李岚清，75，90

李岚清，75，90

Limburg-Stirum, Gaspard de, 283

林堡-斯蒂鲁姆，加斯帕德·德，283

林堡-斯蒂鲁姆，加斯帕德·德，283

limited liability companies (LLCs), 57, 118, 126–27, 372–73

有限责任公司 (LLCs)，57，118，126–27，372–73

有限责任公司 (LLCs)，57，118，126–27，372–73

“L’Internationale” (song), 64

《国际歌》，64

《国际歌》，64

Li Peng, xxii, 74, 75–76

李鹏，xxii，74，75–76

李鹏，xxii，74，75–76

Li Rui, 113–14

李锐，113–14

李锐，113–14

Liu, Carlos (a.k.a. Liu Xiaozong), xviii, 179–80, 230, 294, 295, 315–16, 317, 317

刘晓棕，xviii，179–80，230，294，295，315–16，317，317

刘晓棕，xviii，179–80，230，294，295，315–16，317，317

Liu Chuanzhi, xx, 119, 142

柳传志，xx, 119, 142

柳传志，xx, 119, 142

Liu Huaqing, 95

刘华清，95

刘华清，95

Liu Hulan, 99

刘胡兰，99

刘胡兰，99

Liu Ping, 114

刘平，114

刘平，114

Liu Shaoqi, 32

刘少奇，32

刘少奇，32

Liu Yandong, 128

刘延东，128

刘延东，128

Li Yinan, xix, 54, 64, 98, 136, 187, 252, 371

李一男，xix，54，64，98，136，187，252，371

李一男，xix，54，64，98，136，187，252，371

Li Youwei, 73, 117–18

厉有为，73，117–18

厉有为，73，117–18

Li Yu, 49

李玉，49

李玉，49

Li Yuzhuo, 70–71, 119

李玉琢，70–71，119

李玉琢，70–71，119

Li Zibin, 82, 84, 133

李子彬，82，84，133

李子彬，82，84，133

Locke, Gary, 194–95, 203–4

骆家辉，194–95，203–4

骆家辉，194–95，203–4

Los Angeles Times, 43, 310

《洛杉矶时报》，43，310

《洛杉矶时报》，43，310

Lovelace, Graham, 129

洛夫莱斯，格雷厄姆，129

洛夫莱斯，格雷厄姆，129

Lucent Technologies, 105, 138, 155, 168

朗讯科技，105，138，155，168

Alcatel joint venture, 168, 203, 211, 250

阿尔卡特合资企业，168，203，211，250

阿尔卡特合资企业，168，203，211，250

朗讯科技，105，138，155，

168

阿尔卡特合资企业，168，203，211，250

Lu Ke, 157–58

卢珂，157–58

卢珂，157–58

Luo Guangbin, 12–13

罗广斌，12–13

罗广斌，12–13

Luo Zhengqi, 50–51

罗征启，50–51

罗征启，50–51

Lu Xun, 4

鲁迅，4

鲁迅，4

Lyu, Jack, 291–92

吕克，291–92

吕克，291–92

M

McCallum, John, 317–18

麦卡勒姆，约翰，317–18

麦卡勒姆，约翰，317–18

McCaw, Craig, 283

麦考，克雷格，283

麦考，克雷格，283

McCotter, Thaddeus, 171

麦考特尔，萨德斯，171

麦考特尔，萨德斯，171

McDonald’s, 211

麦当劳，211

麦当劳，211

McElroy, Scott, 151

麦克尔罗伊，斯科特，151

麦克尔罗伊，斯科特，151

McKinsey & Company, 335

麦肯锡公司，335

麦肯锡公司，335

McRae, Neil, 270

麦克雷，尼尔，270

麦克雷，尼尔，270

Macron, Emmanuel, 308

马克龙，埃马纽埃尔，308

马克龙，埃马纽埃尔，308

Made in China 2025, 250–51

中国制造 2025，250–51

中国制造 2025，250–51

Malaysia, xxiv, 309, 352

马来西亚，xxiv，309，352

马来西亚，xxiv，309，352

Mali, 206

马里，206

马里，206

Malta, 240

马耳他，240

马耳他，240

managed services, 168–69, 206, 208, 241, 376

托管服务，168–69，206，208，241，376

托管服务，168–69，206，208，241，376

Management Optimization, 101, 166, 176, 182, 183, 185, 377

管理优化，101，166，176，182，183，185，377

管理优化，101，166，176，182，183，185，377

Mandarin Chinese, 6–7, 8, 72

普通话，6–7，8，72

普通话，6–7，8，72

Mandon, Thierry, 266

芒东，蒂埃里，266

芒东，蒂埃里，266

Manley, John, 344

曼利，约翰，344

曼利，约翰，344

Mao Zedong, xxi, xxii

毛泽东，xxi，xxii

Civil War, 4–5, 6, 24, 79, 367

内战，4–5，6，24，79，367

内战，4–5，6，24，79，367

Cultural Revolution, 12–13, 22–23, 46, 368

文化大革命，12–13，22–23，46，368

文化大革命，12–13，22–23，46，368

death of, 28, 368

逝世，28，368

逝世，28，368

Great Leap Forward, 9, 12, 22, 368

大跃进，9，12，22，368

大跃进，9，12，22，368

leadership of, 24, 25

领导地位，24，25

领导地位，24，25

outlawing of foot-binding, 21

废除裹足，21

废除裹足，21

rise to power, 6, 7, 8

掌权，6，7，8

掌权，6，7，8

“rusticated youth” campaign, 15–16

“上山下乡”运动，15–16

“上山下乡”运动，15–16

毛泽东，xxi，

xxii

内战，4–5，6，24，79，

367

文化大革命，12–13，22–23，46，

368

逝世，28，

368

大跃进，9，12，22，

368

领导地位，24，

25

废除裹足，

21

掌权，6，7，

8

“上山下乡”运动，15–16

Marconi, Guglielmo, 61

马可尼，古列尔莫，61

马可尼，古列尔莫，61

Marconi Company, 105, 161, 211, 250, 341

马可尼公司，105，161，211，250，341

马可尼公司，105，161，211，250，341

Marco Polo Bridge incident, 3, 367

卢沟桥事变，3，367

卢沟桥事变，3，367

Martin, David, 294

马丁，大卫，294

马丁，大卫，294

Marx, Karl (Marxism), 4, 117, 175, 221

马克思，卡尔（马克思主义），4，117，175，221

马克思，卡尔（马克思主义），4，117，175，221

mass surveillance. See surveillance

大规模监控。参见 监控

大规模监控。参见 监控

Mauritius, 178–79, 180

毛里求斯，178–79，180

毛里求斯，178–79，180

May, Theresa, 129, 306–7

梅，特蕾莎，129，306–7

梅，特蕾莎，129，306–7

Megvii, 332–33

旷视科技，332–33

旷视科技，332–33

Mei Zhongxing, 43 44–45, 129

梅仲兴，43 44–45，129

梅仲兴，43 44–45，129

Meng Dongbo, xviii, 20–22, 28, 30–31

孟东波，xviii，20–22，28，30–31

孟东波，xviii，20–22，28，30–31

Meng Jun, xviii, 20–21, 86

孟军，xviii，20–21，86

Cultural Revolution, 20–21, 22–23

文化大革命，20–21，22–23

文化大革命，20–21，22–23

marriage and family life, 20–21, 23, 24–25, 32, 36, 41, 86, 97

婚姻与家庭生活，20–21，23，24–25，32，36，41，86，97

婚姻与家庭生活，20–21，23，24–25，32，36，41，86，97

孟军，xviii，20–21，

86

文化大革命，20–21，

22–23

婚姻与家庭生活，20–21，23，24–25，32，36，41，86，97

Meng Wanzhou (a.k.a. Cathy Meng), xxviii, xxxi, 108, 229–31

孟晚舟（又名 Cathy Meng），xxviii，xxxi，108，229–31

Annabel Yao and, 284–85, 339

姚安娜与，284–85，339

姚安娜与，284–85，339

birth and early life of, 24–25, 30, 31–32, 36, 37, 40, 86, 368, 369

出生及早期生活，24–25，30，31–32，36，37，40，86，368，369

出生与早年生活，24–25，30，31–32，36，37，40，86，368，369

death of Cheng Yuanzhao, 142

程远昭之死，142

程远昭之死，142

death of Deng Xiaoping, 90, 91

邓小平逝世，90，91

邓小平逝世，90，91

democracy movement and, 48, 50, 51

民主运动与，48，50，51

民主运动与，48，50，51

detention and extradition case of. See extradition case of Meng Wanzhou

其拘留及引渡案。参见 孟晚舟引渡案

其拘留及引渡案。参见 孟晚舟引渡案

education of, 37, 48, 51, 97–98, 370

教育经历，37，48，51，97–98，370

教育经历，37，48，51，97–98，370

at Huawei, 90, 91, 97, 98, 107, 178–81, 229–31, 250, 342

在华为，90，91，97，98，107，178–81，229–31，250，342

CFO, 213–14, 339–40, 378, 379

首席财务官（CFO），213–14，339–40，378，379

首席财务官（CFO），213–14，339–40，378，379

succession question, 108, 230–31, 245, 284–85, 340–41, 382

接班人问题，108，230–31，245，284–85，340–41，382

接班人问题，108，230–31，245，284–85，340–41，382

在华为，90，91，97，98，107，178–81，229–31，250，342

首席财务官（CFO），213–14，339–40，378，

379

接班人问题，108，230–31，245，284–85，340–41，382

at ICT Finance Forum, 245–46

在 ICT 金融论坛，245–46

在 ICT 金融论坛，245–46

at JFK Airport, 246, 250, 289, 299, 379

在肯尼迪国际机场，246，250，289，299，379

在肯尼迪国际机场，246，250，289，299，379

marriages and family, 97, 179–80, 230, 294, 295

婚姻与家庭，97，179–80，230，294，295

婚姻与家庭，97，179–80，230，294，295

nickname of, 25

绰号，25

绰号，25

return to China, xxxi, 337–40, 382

回到中国，xxxi，337–40，382

回到中国，xxxi，337–40，382

Skycom and Iran, 180–81, 231–35, 298–99, 300, 337, 377, 379

星通（Skycom）与伊朗，180–81，231–35，298–99，300，337，377，379

星通（Skycom）与伊朗，180–81，231–35，298–99，300，337，377，379

孟晚舟（又名 Cathy Meng），xxviii，xxxi，108，

229–31

姚安娜与，284–85，

339

出生与早年生活，24–25，30，31–32，36，37，40，86，368，

369

程远昭之死，

142

邓小平逝世，90，

91

民主运动与，48，50，

51

拘留与引渡案。参见

孟晚舟引渡案

教育背景，37，48，51，97–98，

370

在华为，90，91，97，98，107，178–81，229–31，250，342

首席财务官（CFO），213–14，339–40，378，

379

接班问题，108，230–31，245，284–85，340–41，

382

在 ICT 金融论坛，

245–46

在肯尼迪国际机场，246，250，289，299，

379

婚姻与家庭，97，179–80，230，294，

295

绰号，

25

回国，xxxi，337–40，

382

星通公司（Skycom）与伊朗，180–81，231–35，298–99，300，337，377，379

mercury gauges, 26–27

水银压力计，26–27

水银压力计，26–27

Merkel, Angela, 308

默克尔，安格拉，308

默克尔，安格拉，308

Metcalfe, Robert, 152

梅特卡夫，罗伯特，152

梅特卡夫，罗伯特，152

Mexico, 138, 180

墨西哥，138，180

墨西哥，138，180

microchips. See computer chips

微芯片。参见 计算机芯片

微芯片。参见 计算机芯片

Microsoft, 168, 239, 243, 244, 267, 304, 328

微软，168，239，243，244，267，304，328

微软，168，239，243，244，267，304，328

Milhollin, Gary, 144–45

米尔霍林，加里，144–45

米尔霍林，加里，144–45

Milliken, Helen, 31

米利肯，海伦，31

米利肯，海伦，31

minjian, 42, 56, 370

民间，42，56，370

民间，42，56，370

Mirs Bay, 39

大鹏湾，39

大鹏湾，39

Mobeco Telecom Co. Ltd., 61, 69–70, 71, 95, 132, 137, 371, 375

莫贝克电信有限公司，61，69–70，71，95，132，137，371，375

莫贝克电信有限公司，61，69–70，71，95，132，137，371，375

mobile networks. See cellular networks

移动网络。参见 蜂窝网络

移动网络。参见 蜂窝网络

Mobile World Congress, 242

世界移动通信大会，242

世界移动通信大会，242

Mobily, 169

Mobily，169

Mobily，169

Mohamad, Mahathir, 309, 352

马哈蒂尔·穆罕默德，309，352

马哈蒂尔·穆罕默德，309，352

Molko, David, 321

莫尔科，大卫，321

莫尔科，大卫，321

Mongolia, 7, 338

蒙古，7，338

蒙古，7，338

Monti, Mario, xxviii

蒙蒂，马里奥，xxviii

蒙蒂，马里奥，xxviii

Motorola, 62–63, 105, 109, 123, 134, 145

摩托罗拉，62–63，105，109，123，134，145

Huawei and IP, 152, 196, 211–12

华为与知识产权，152，196，211–12

华为与知识产权，152，196，211–12

摩托罗拉，62–63，105，109，123，134，

145

华为与知识产权，152，196，211–12

Mount Everest, 186–87, 191, 377

珠穆朗玛峰，186–87，191，377

珠穆朗玛峰，186–87，191，377

M-PESA, 162–63, 163

M-PESA，162–63，163

M-PESA，162–63，163

MRP II (manufacturing resource planning), 98

MRP II（制造资源计划），98

MRP II（制造资源计划），98

Murray, Simon, 93

马世民（Simon Murray），93

马世民（Simon Murray），93

“My Father and Mother” (Ren), 142, 374

《我的父亲母亲》（任正非著），142，374

《我的父亲母亲》（任正非著），142，374

Myrick, Sue, 166, 223

迈里克，苏，166，223

迈里克，苏，166，223

N

N

Napoleon Bonaparte, 310–11

拿破仑·波拿巴，310–11

拿破仑·波拿巴，310–11

Narus, Inc., 240

Narus 公司，240

Narus 公司，240

National Audit Office, 133, 374

国家审计署，133，374

国家审计署，133，374

National Congress of the Communist Party, 356–57

中国共产党全国代表大会，356–57

中国共产党全国代表大会，356–57

National Science and Technology Commission, 106

国家科学技术委员会，106

国家科学技术委员会，106

National Science Conference (1978), 34–35, 369

全国科学大会（1978 年），34–35，369

全国科学大会（1978 年），34–35，369

National Security Agency (NSA)

美国国家安全局（NSA）

Huawei and, 105, 143, 161, 169–70, 197–98, 237–42, 245–46, 306

华为与，105，143，161，169–70，197–98，237–42，245–46，306

华为与，105，143，161，169–70，197–98，237–42，245–46，306

Operation Ivy Bells, 167

“常春藤铃”行动，167

“常春藤铃”行动，167

Snowden leaks, 237–42, 246, 379

斯诺登泄密事件，237–42，246，379

斯诺登泄密事件，237–42，246，379

美国国家安全局（NSA）

华为与，105，143，161，169–70，197–98，237–42，245–46，

306

“常春藤铃”行动，

167

斯诺登泄密事件，237–42，246，379

National Security Information Exchange, 159–60

国家安全信息交换计划，159–60

国家安全信息交换计划，159–60

National Security Law, 223–24, 313

《国家安全法》，223–24，313

《国家安全法》，223–24，313

National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 347

国家电信和信息管理局，347

国家电信和信息管理局，347

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 114–16

北约（北大西洋公约组织），114–16

北约（北大西洋公约组织），114–16

Navy, US, 167

美国海军，167

美国海军，167

Navy Tomahawks, US, 104

海军战斧巡航导弹，美国，104

美国海军战斧巡航导弹，104

Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 244

纳扎尔巴耶夫，努尔苏丹，244

纳扎尔巴耶夫，努尔苏丹，244

Nazi Germany, 330, 331

纳粹德国，330，331

纳粹德国，330，331

Netherlands, 240

荷兰，240

荷兰，240

New York Police Department (NYPD), 210

纽约市警察局 (NYPD)，210

纽约市警察局 (NYPD)，210

New York Times, The, xli, 152, 237, 281, 301, 312–13, 379

《纽约时报》，xli，152，237，281，301，312–13，379

《纽约时报》，xli，152，237，281，301，312–13，379

New Zealand, 227–28

新西兰，227–28

新西兰，227–28

Nielsen, Kirstjen, 297

尼尔森，克尔斯滕，297

尼尔森，克尔斯滕，297

Nigeria, 112, 158, 347

尼日利亚，112，158，347

尼日利亚，112，158，347

Nike, xl

耐克，xl

耐克，xl

Nikken Sekkei, 260

日建设计，260

日建设计，260

Nixon, Richard, 24

尼克松，理查德，24

尼克松，理查德，24

Noah’s Ark Lab, 243, 265–66

诺亚方舟实验室，243，265–66

诺亚方舟实验室，243，265–66

Nokia, 105, 134, 141, 211, 235, 250, 268, 326

诺基亚，105，134，141，211，235，250，268，326

Huawei and, 152, 325

华为与，152，325

华为与，152，325

submarine cable, 168

海底电缆，168

海底电缆，168

诺基亚，105，134，141，211，235，250，268，

326

华为与，152，

325

海底电缆，168

Nortel, 59, 64, 170, 211, 330

北电网络，59，64，170，211，330

bankruptcy of, 250, 268

破产，250，268

破产，250，268

bribery, 83

贿赂，83

贿赂，83

Huawei merger talks, 161, 196–97, 341

华为合并谈判，161，196–97，341

华为合并谈判，161，196–97，341

mobile and networks, 105, 195, 196–97

移动与网络，105，195，196–97

移动与网络，105，195，196–97

北电网络，59，64，170，211，

330

破产，250，

268

贿赂，

83

华为合并谈判，161，196–97，

341

移动与网络，105，195，196–97

North American Free Trade Agreement, 344

北美自由贸易协定，344

北美自由贸易协定，344

North Korea, 8, 24, 31, 292, 320, 343

朝鲜，8，24，31，292，320，343

Huawei and, 164, 166, 278, 324–25, 376

华为与，164，166，278，324–25，376

华为与，164，166，278，324–25，376

ZTE and, 257, 278

中兴与，257，278

中兴与，257，278

朝鲜，8，24，31，292，320，

343

华为与，164，166，278，324–25，

376

中兴与，257，278

Northrop B-2 Spirit, 114

诺斯罗普 B-2 幽灵，114

诺斯罗普 B-2 幽灵，114

NSA. See National Security Agency

NSA。参见 国家安全局

NSA。参见 国家安全局

O

O

Obama, Barack, 141, 195–96, 226–27, 242, 378

奥巴马，巴拉克，141，195–96，226–27，242，378

奥巴马，巴拉克，141，195–96，226–27，242，378

Official Secrets Act, 200

《官方保密法》，200

《官方保密法》，200

Open RAN, 346–47

Open RAN，346–47

Open RAN，346–47

Operation Ivy Bells, 167–68

常春藤铃行动，167–68

常春藤铃行动，167–68

Opium War, 95–96, 104

鸦片战争，95–96，104

鸦片战争，95–96，104

Orange SA, 160

奥兰治公司 (Orange SA)，160

奥兰治公司 (Orange SA)，160

Ostrovsky, Nikolai, 106

奥斯特洛夫斯基，尼古拉，106

奥斯特洛夫斯基，尼古拉，106

Owens, William A. “Bill,” xxi, 161, 195–98, 204

欧文斯，威廉·A·“比尔”，xxi，161，195–98，204

欧文斯，威廉·A·“比尔”，xxi，161，195–98，204

Ox Horn Campus, xxx, 260, 310

牛角校区，xxx，260，310

牛角校区，xxx，260，310

P

P

Packingham, Kevin, 198

帕金汉，凯文，198

帕金汉，凯文，198

Pakistan, 146, 209, 255, 276

巴基斯坦，146，209，255，276

巴基斯坦，146，209，255，276

Palmisano, Sam, 210

彭明盛，萨姆，210

彭明盛，萨姆，210

Panasonic, 92

松下，92

松下，92

paper, xl

纸张，xl

纸张，xl

Paris Match, 283, 284

《巴黎竞赛画报》，283，284

《巴黎竞赛画报》，283，284

Park Geun-hye, 253

朴槿惠，253

朴槿惠，253

Patten, Chris, 96

彭定康，克里斯，96

彭定康，克里斯，96

Paulson, Henry, 171

保尔森，亨利，171

保尔森，亨利，171

Peck, Richard, 321, 336

佩克，理查德，321，336

佩克，理查德，321，336

Peking University, 11, 329

北京大学，11，329

北京大学，11，329

Pence, Mike, 281, 303, 313, 325

彭斯，迈克，281，303，313，325

彭斯，迈克，281，303，313，325

People’s Bank of China, 74–75

中国人民银行，74–75

中国人民银行，74–75

People’s Daily, 26, 31

《人民日报》，26，31

《人民日报》，26，31

People’s Liberation Army, 24–25, 95, 139

中国人民解放军，24–25，95，139

中国人民解放军，24–25，95，139

Peppermill Resort Hotel, 267–68

佩珀米尔度假酒店，267–68

佩珀米尔度假酒店，267–68

Pepsi, 39

百事可乐，39

百事可乐，39

Perry, Rick, 198

佩里，里克，198

佩里，里克，198

Pets.com, 133

Pets.com，133

Pets.com，133

Peugeot, 140

标致，140

标致，140

Philippines, 158, 307, 347

菲律宾，158，307，347

菲律宾，158，307，347

Ping An Finance Center, 338–39

平安金融中心，338–39

平安金融中心，338–39

Pioneering Bookstore, 3

先锋书店，3

先锋书店，3

PLA Engineering Corps, 27, 34–37, 368, 369

解放军基建工程兵，27，34–37，368，369

解放军基建工程兵，27，34–37，368，369

Plano, Texas, 138, 198, 219, 374

德克萨斯州普莱诺，138，198，219，374

德克萨斯州普莱诺，138，198，219，374

Plummer, William, 51, 238, 246, 280

普拉默，威廉，51，238，246，280

普拉默，威廉，51，238，246，280

Poland, 3, 303, 307

波兰，3，303，307

波兰，3，303，307

polar coding, 268–70, 380

极化码，268–70，380

极化码，268–70，380

Politburo, 357

政治局，357

政治局，357

Pompeo, Mike, 302, 306–7, 313, 327–28

蓬佩奥，迈克，302，306–7，313，327–28

蓬佩奥，迈克，302，306–7，313，327–28

Pourtalès, Gabrielle de, 283

波塔莱斯，加布里埃尔·德，283

波塔莱斯，加布里埃尔·德，283

Powell, Chris, 200, 201

鲍威尔，克里斯，200，201

鲍威尔，克里斯，200，201

Powell, Colin, 144

鲍威尔，科林，144

鲍威尔，科林，144

PowerHammer, 136

PowerHammer 攻击，136

PowerHammer 攻击，136

private branch exchange (PBX), 43–44

程控交换机 (PBX)，43–44

程控交换机 (PBX)，43–44

profit sharing, 57, 69, 71, 125–26, 128, 157–58, 177, 229–30, 312

利润分享，57，69，71，125–26，128，157–58，177，229–30，312

利润分享，57，69，71，125–26，128，157–58，177，229–30，312

profit tax, 31

利润税，31

利润税，31

Proletarian Revolution, The (Lenin), 4

《无产阶级革命》（列宁），4

《无产阶级革命》（列宁），4

propolis, 83

蜂胶，83

蜂胶，83

Putin, Vladimir, 108, 307–8

普京，弗拉基米尔，108，307–8

普京，弗拉基米尔，108，307–8

Q

Q

Qatar, 240

卡塔尔，240

卡塔尔，240

Qing dynasty, 58

清朝，58

清朝，58

Qiu Zhenbang, 94

邱振邦，94

邱振邦，94

Qi Yushun, 26

齐玉顺，26

齐玉顺，26

Qualcomm, 144–45, 265, 268, 269–70, 303–4, 329

高通，144–45，265，268，269–70，303–4，329

高通，144–45，265，268，269–70，303–4，329

R

R

Raimondo, Gina, 346

雷蒙多，吉娜，346

雷蒙多，吉娜，346

Rajapaksa, Mahinda, 244

拉贾帕克萨，马欣达，244

拉贾帕克萨，马欣达，244

Ran Boss Technologies, 61–62, 90, 112

燃霸科技，61–62，90，112

燃霸科技，61–62，90，112

Read, Robert, 158

里德，罗伯特，158

里德，罗伯特，158

“red-cap,” 118

“红帽子”，118

“红帽子”，118

Red Guards, 12–13, 20, 21, 23, 29, 99

红卫兵，12–13，20，21，23，29，99

红卫兵，12–13，20，21，23，29，99

reeducation, 15–16, 19, 25–26, 272

再教育，15–16，19，25–26，272

再教育，15–16，19，25–26，272

Regent Hong Kong, 92

香港丽晶酒店，92

香港丽晶酒店，92

Ren family, 3–16. See also specific members

任氏家族，3–16。另见具体成员

cast of characters, xvii–xviii

人物表，xvii–xviii

人物表，xvii–xviii

任氏家族，3–16。

另见具体成员

人物表，xvii–xviii

Ren, Steven (a.k.a. Ren Shulu), xviii, 85, 177–78, 356, 370

任树录（Steven Ren），xviii，85，177–78，356，370

construction projects, 183, 260

基建项目，183，260

基建项目，183，260

death of Deng Xiaoping, 91

邓小平逝世，91

邓小平逝世，91

sales, 85, 99

销售，85，99

销售，85，99

succession plans, 213, 245

接班计划，213，245

接班计划，213，245

任树录（Steven Ren），xviii，85，177–78，356，

370

基建项目，183，

260

邓小平逝世，

91

销售，85，

99

接班计划，213，245

Renaissance man, 158

博学者，158

博学者，158

Ren Moxun, xvii, 3–5, 28–29

任摩逊，xvii，3–5，28–29

Cultural Revolution, 13–15, 29

文化大革命，13–15，29

文化大革命，13–15，29

death of, 72, 372

逝世，72，372

逝世，72，372

family background of, 13–14

家庭背景，13–14

家庭背景，13–14

joining Communist Party, 14, 368

入党，14，368

入党，14，368

language revolution, 7–10

语文革命，7–10

语文革命，7–10

retirement of, 71–72

退休，71–72

退休，71–72

teaching career of, 6–11, 14–15, 29–30, 37, 369–70

教职生涯，6–11，14–15，29–30，37，369–70

教职生涯，6–11，14–15，29–30，37，369–70

任摩逊，xvii，3–5，

28–29

文化大革命，13–15，

29

逝世，72，

372

家庭背景，

13–14

入党，14，

368

语文革命，

7–10

退休，

71–72

教职生涯，6–11，14–15，29–30，37，369–70

Ren Ping, xviii, 25, 37, 97, 108, 213, 245, 356

任平，xviii，25，37，97，108，213，245，356

任平，xviii，25，37，97，108，213，245，356

Ren Wanzhou, 98

任晚舟，98

任晚舟，98

Ren Zhengfei, xvii, xxv, xxvi, xxviii, xxxix

任正非，xvii，xxv，xxvi，xxviii，xxxix

alleged ties to state, 65–76, 121–25, 173–74, 181–83

被指与政府的关系，65–76，121–25，173–74，181–83

meeting with Jiang Zemin, 65–68, 371

与江泽民会面，65–68，371

与江泽民会面，65–68，371

Zhang Gaoli and, 73–74

张高丽与，73–74

张高丽与，73–74

被指与政府的关系，65–76，121–25，173–74，

181–83

与江泽民会面，65–68，

371

张高丽与，73–74

appearance of, 18, 300–301

外貌，18，300–301

外貌，18，300–301

Arab Spring and, 205–9

阿拉伯之春与，205–9

阿拉伯之春与，205–9

artificial intelligence and, 243, 265–66, 276

人工智能与，243，265–66，276

人工智能与，243，265–66，276

Beijing Olympics and, 187, 191

北京奥运会与，187，191

北京奥运会与，187，191

big data, 253–57

大数据，253–57

大数据，253–57

birth of, 5, 367

出生，5，367

出生，5，367

cancer surgeries of, 211

癌症手术，211

癌症手术，211

Cisco lawsuit, 146, 149–53, 155, 375

思科诉讼，146，149–53，155，375

思科诉讼，146，149–53，155，375

Cultural Revolution and, 14–15, 18, 19

文化大革命与，14–15，18，19

文化大革命与，14–15，18，19

democracy movement and, 51–52

民主运动与，51–52

民主运动与，51–52

early life of, 5–6, 9, 10

早年生活，5–6，9，10

早年生活，5–6，9，10

early R&D, 53–58, 60–64

早期研发，53–58，60–64

早期研发，53–58，60–64

early scientific research, 33, 33–34, 35

早期科学研究，33，33–34，35

早期科学研究，33，33–34，35

education of, 10–13, 368

教育经历，10–13，368

教育经历，10–13，368

FBI interview of, 169, 298–99, 376

FBI 对其面谈，169，298–99，376

FBI 对其面谈，169，298–99，376

first mass-resignation ceremony, 77–79, 124, 372

首次集体辞职仪式，77–79，124，372

首次集体辞职仪式，77–79，124，372

Forbes and wealth of, 140–41, 374

《福布斯》与财富，140–41，374

《福布斯》与财富，140–41，374

founding of Huawei, 41–52, 370

华为的创立，41–52，370

华为的创立，41–52，370

global expansion, 156–72

全球扩张，156–72

全球扩张，156–72

Huawei’s Winter, 132–46

华为的冬天，132–46

华为的冬天，132–46

international markets, 103–16

国际市场，103–16

国际市场，103–16

international media, xli–xlii, 300–302, 348, 381

国际媒体，xli–xlii，300–302，348，381

国际媒体，xli–xlii，300–302，348，381

Iran affair, 232

伊朗事务，232

伊朗事务，232

joining Communist Party, 34–35, 36, 369

加入共产党，34–35，36，369

加入共产党，34–35，36，369

management evolution, 173–85

管理演变，173–85

管理演变，173–85

management reforms, 117–31

管理变革，117–31

管理变革，117–31

marriages and family life, 20–21, 23, 25, 32, 36, 41, 71–72, 108–10

婚姻与家庭生活，20–21，23，25，32，36，41，71–72，108–10

婚姻与家庭生活，20–21，23，25，32，36，41，71–72，108–10

Meng’s detention, 291–92, 301–2, 335

孟被拘留，291–92，301–2，335

孟被拘留，291–92，301–2，335

military tenure of, 15–16, 17–20, 23–27, 35–36, 368

服役期间，15–16，17–20，23–27，35–36，368

服役期间，15–16，17–20，23–27，35–36，368

move to Dongguan, 259, 260–61

迁往东莞，259，260–61

迁往东莞，259，260–61

move to Shenzhen, 37, 39–40, 369

迁往深圳，37，39–40，369

迁往深圳，37，39–40，369

name of, 5–6

姓名，5–6

姓名，5–6

at National Science Conference (1978), 34–35, 369

在全国科学大会上（1978 年），34–35，369

在全国科学大会上（1978 年），34–35，369

“rusticated youth” campaign, 15–16

“上山下乡”运动，15–16

“上山下乡”运动，15–16

sales machine, 77–88

销售机器，77–88

销售机器，77–88

seventy-seventh birthday of, 339

七十七岁生日，339

七十七岁生日，339

smartphones and, 202–3, 262–63, 265, 271, 329

智能手机与，202–3，262–63，265，271，329

智能手机与，202–3，262–63，265，271，329

South Sea Oil and, 40–41, 42, 44–45, 46, 48, 123, 369

南海石油与，40–41，42，44–45，46，48，123，369

南海石油与，40–41，42，44–45，46，48，123，369

stepping down, 210–11

卸任，210–11

卸任，210–11

succession plans, 211–14, 230–31, 242–45, 279–80, 284–85, 340–41, 354–55, 378

接班计划，211–14，230–31，242–45，279–80，284–85，340–41，354–55，378

接班计划，211–14，230–31，242–45，279–80，284–85，340–41，354–55，378

telephone switches, 1, 42–43, 60–64, 67–68, 70

电话交换机，1，42–43，60–64，67–68，70

电话交换机，1，42–43，60–64，67–68，70

US relations, 194–98, 203–4, 237, 238, 246, 257–58

美中关系，194–98，203–4，237，238，246，257–58

House investigation, 217, 226

众议院调查，217，226

众议院调查，217，226

trade wars, 281–82, 304–5, 310–11, 312–14, 325–26, 328, 329

贸易战，281–82，304–5，310–11，312–14，325–26，328，329

贸易战，281–82，304–5，310–11，312–14，325–26，328，329

美中关系，194–98，203–4，237，238，246，

257–58

众议院调查，217，

226

贸易战，281–82，304–5，310–11，312–14，325–26，328，329

US travels of, 61–63

赴美考察，61–63

赴美考察，61–63

Xinjiang conflict and, 274

新疆冲突与，274

新疆冲突与，274

任正非，xvii，xxv，xxvi，xxviii，

xxxix

被指与政府的关系，65–76，121–25，173–74，

181–83

与江泽民会面，65–68，

371

张高丽与，

73–74

外貌，18，

300–301

阿拉伯之春与，

205–9

人工智能与，243，265–66，

276

北京奥运会与，187，

191

大数据，

253–57

出生，5，

367

癌症手术，

211

思科诉讼，146，149–53，155，

375

文化大革命与，14–15，18，

19

民主运动与，

51–52

早年生活，5–6，9，

10

早期研发，53–58，

60–64

早期科学研究，33，33–34，

35

教育经历，10–13，

368

FBI 对其面谈，169，298–99，

376

首次集体辞职仪式，77–79，124，

372

《福布斯》

与财富，140–41，

374

华为的创立，41–52，

370

全球扩张，

156–72

华为的冬天，

132–46

国际市场，

103–16

国际媒体，xli–xlii，300–302，348，

381

伊朗事务，

232

加入共产党，34–35，36，

369

管理演变，

173–85

管理变革，

117–31

婚姻与家庭生活，20–21，23，25，32，36，41，71–72，

108–10

孟晚舟被捕，291–92，301–2，

335

军旅生涯，15–16，17–20，23–27，35–36，

368

搬迁至东莞，259，

260–61

搬迁至深圳，37，39–40，

369

姓名，

5–6

在全国科学大会上（1978 年），34–35，

369

“上山下乡”运动，

15–16

销售机器，

77–88

七十七岁生日，

339

智能手机与，202–3，262–63，265，271，

329

南海石油与，40–41，42，44–45，46，48，123，

369

卸任，

210–11

接班计划，211–14，230–31，242–45，279–80，284–85，340–41，354–55，

378

电话交换机，1，42–43，60–64，67–68，

70

美国关系，194–98，203–4，237，238，246，

257–58

众议院调查，217，

226

贸易战，281–82，304–5，310–11，312–14，325–26，328，

329

赴美旅行，

61–63

新疆冲突与，274

Reuters, 49, 231–32, 233, 236

路透社，49，231–32，233，236

路透社，49，231–32，233，236

Rodman, Dennis, 292

罗德曼，丹尼斯，292

罗德曼，丹尼斯，292

Rogers, Mike, 214–22, 225–26, 227

罗杰斯，迈克，214–22，225–26，227

罗杰斯，迈克，214–22，225–26，227

“rogue regimes,” 105

“流氓政权”，105

“流氓政权”，105

Romania, 240

罗马尼亚，240

罗马尼亚，240

Romney, Mitt, 170, 227

罗姆尼，米特，170，227

罗姆尼，米特，170，227

Rong Yiren, 140

荣毅仁，140

荣毅仁，140

Ross, Wilbur, 297

罗斯，威尔伯，297

罗斯，威尔伯，297

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 287, 290, 334–35

加拿大皇家骑警 (RCMP)，287，290，334–35

加拿大皇家骑警 (RCMP)，287，290，334–35

Rubio, Marco, 281

卢比奥，马可，281

卢比奥，马可，281

Ruppersberger, Charles “Dutch,” 216–17, 218–19, 222–23

鲁珀斯伯格，查尔斯·“荷兰”，216–17，218–19，222–23

鲁珀斯伯格，查尔斯·“荷兰”，216–17，218–19，222–23

Russia, 83–84, 105–8, 307–8. See also Soviet Union

俄罗斯，83–84，105–8，307–8。另见 苏联

俄罗斯，83–84，105–8，307–8。另见 苏联

S

S

Safaricom, 162–63, 163

萨法利通信，162–63，163

萨法利通信，162–63，163

Safe City, xxix, 208–10, 243, 254–55, 256–57, 276, 378

平安城市，xxix，208–10，243，254–55，256–57，276，378

平安城市，xxix，208–10，243，254–55，256–57，276，378

Saint-Jacques, Guy, 60, 244, 344

圣雅克，盖伊，60，244，344

圣雅克，盖伊，60，244，344

Samsung, 203, 228, 243, 262, 264, 265, 269, 324, 329, 380

三星，203，228，243，262，264，265，269，324，329，380

三星，203，228，243，262，264，265，269，324，329，380

sanctions

制裁

China and Tiananmen, 57, 105

中国与天安门，57，105

中国与天安门，57，105

Huawei and, 104–5, 111, 141, 144–45, 147–48, 164–66, 223, 231, 234, 235, 299, 303–5, 321, 324, 325, 326, 329, 345–46, 353–54, 374, 375, 382

华为与， 104–5, 111, 141, 144–45, 147–48, 164–66, 223, 231, 234, 235, 299, 303–5, 321, 324, 325, 326, 329, 345–46, 353–54, 374, 375, 382

华为与， 104–5, 111, 141, 144–45, 147–48, 164–66, 223, 231, 234, 235, 299, 303–5, 321, 324, 325, 326, 329, 345–46, 353–54, 374, 375, 382

Iran and, 141, 165–67, 223, 231, 234, 235, 257, 282, 299, 321

伊朗与， 141, 165–67, 223, 231, 234, 235, 257, 282, 299, 321

伊朗与， 141, 165–67, 223, 231, 234, 235, 257, 282, 299, 321

Iraq and, 141–42, 147–48, 164, 374, 375

伊拉克与， 141–42, 147–48, 164, 374, 375

伊拉克与， 141–42, 147–48, 164, 374, 375

SMIC and, 345–46

中芯国际与， 345–46

中芯国际与， 345–46

ZTE and, 257–58, 278, 282, 380

中兴与， 257–58, 278, 282, 380

中兴与， 257–58, 278, 282, 380

制裁

中国与天安门，57，

105

华为与，104–5，111，141，144–45，147–48，164–66，223，231，234，235，299，303–5，321，324，325，326，329，345–46，353–54，374，375，

382

伊朗与，141，165–67，223，231，234，235，257，282，299，

321

伊拉克与，141–42，147–48，164，374，

375

中芯国际与，

345–46

中兴与，257–58，278，282，380

SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak, 148–49, 154

非典（严重急性呼吸综合征）爆发， 148–49, 154

非典（严重急性呼吸综合征）爆发， 148–49, 154

Saudi Arabia, 110–11, 112, 169, 206, 208, 219

沙特阿拉伯， 110–11, 112, 169, 206, 208, 219

沙特阿拉伯， 110–11, 112, 169, 206, 208, 219

Saudi Telecommunication Company (STC), 110–11, 207, 219

沙特电信公司 (STC)， 110–11, 207, 219

沙特电信公司 (STC)， 110–11, 207, 219

Schiff, Adam, 223–24, 277

希夫，亚当， 223–24, 277

希夫，亚当， 223–24, 277

Schmidt, Eric, 309

施密特，埃里克， 309

施密特，埃里克， 309

Scindia, Ananya Raje, 283

辛迪亚，阿南雅·拉杰， 283

辛迪亚，阿南雅·拉杰， 283

Second Company of the State Construction Commission, 20

国家建委第二工程公司， 20

国家建委第二工程公司， 20

Second Sino-Japanese War, 4–5, 6, 99

中国抗日战争， 4–5, 6, 99

Marco Polo Bridge incident, 3, 367

卢沟桥事变， 3, 367

卢沟桥事变， 3, 367

中国抗日战争， 4–5, 6,

99

卢沟桥事变， 3, 367

Section 889, 302

第 889 条， 302

第 889 条， 302

Seine River, 262

塞纳河， 262

塞纳河， 262

Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), 326, 329, 345–46

中芯国际集成电路制造有限公司 (SMIC)， 326, 329, 345–46

中芯国际集成电路制造有限公司 (SMIC)， 326, 329, 345–46

sent-down youth, 15–16

下乡知青， 15–16

下乡知青， 15–16

September 11 attacks (2001), 145–46

九一一袭击事件 (2001)， 145–46

九一一袭击事件 (2001)， 145–46

sexism, 87–88

性别歧视， 87–88

性别歧视， 87–88

Shanghai Bell, 59–60

上海贝尔， 59–60

上海贝尔， 59–60

shareholder value, 125–26

股东价值， 125–26

股东价值， 125–26

Sharif, Shehbaz, 276

夏巴兹·谢里夫， 276

夏巴兹·谢里夫， 276

Sharp Eyes, 253

“雪亮工程”， 253

“雪亮工程”， 253

Sharwood, Simon, 327

沙伍德，西蒙， 327

沙伍德，西蒙， 327

Shekou, 39, 40

蛇口， 39, 40

蛇口， 39, 40

Shen Dingxing, xx, 43–44, 128

沈定兴，xx, 43–44, 128

沈定兴，xx, 43–44, 128

Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, 18–19, 23–24

沈阳飞机工业公司， 18–19, 23–24

沈阳飞机工业公司， 18–19, 23–24

Shenyang J-6 III, 23–24

歼-6 III 型飞机， 23–24

歼-6 III 型飞机， 23–24

Shenzhen Bureau of Development Planning, 43

深圳市发展计划局， 43

深圳市发展计划局， 43

Shenzhen Sanjiang Electronics Co., 43, 44–45

深圳三江电子有限公司， 43, 44–45

深圳三江电子有限公司， 43, 44–45

Shenzhen Science and Technology Bureau, 41, 54, 81, 133

深圳市科技局， 41, 54, 81, 133

深圳市科技局， 41, 54, 81, 133

Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ), xxv, 37, 38–52, 65–66, 113

深圳经济特区 (SEZ)， xxv, 37, 38–52, 65–66, 113

founding of Huawei, 41–52, 370

华为的创立， 41–52, 370

华为的创立， 41–52, 370

layout of, 38–39

其布局， 38–39

其布局， 38–39

minjian, 42, 56, 370

民间， 42, 56, 370

民间， 42, 56, 370

深圳经济特区 (SEZ)， xxv, 37, 38–52, 65–66,

113

华为的创立， 41–52,

370

其布局，

38–39

民间， 42, 56, 370

Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 50

《深圳特区报》, 50

《深圳特区报》, 50

Shenzhen University, 49–51, 97–98, 370

深圳大学， 49–51, 97–98, 370

深圳大学， 49–51, 97–98, 370

Shenzhen Youth News, 49

《深圳青年报》, 49

《深圳青年报》, 49

“shock therapy,” 107

“休克疗法”， 107

“休克疗法”， 107

Shotgiant, 237, 379

Shotgiant 行动， 237, 379

Shotgiant 行动， 237, 379

Sichuan Daily, 22

《四川日报》, 22

《四川日报》, 22

Sichuan Province, 11, 31, 251

四川省， 11, 31, 251

四川省， 11, 31, 251

Siemens, 64, 92, 105, 109, 141, 152, 212, 235, 267

西门子， 64, 92, 105, 109, 141, 152, 212, 235, 267

西门子， 64, 92, 105, 109, 141, 152, 212, 235, 267

Sierra Leone, 111

塞拉利昂， 111

塞拉利昂， 111

Silicon Valley, 55, 75, 112, 119–20

硅谷， 55, 75, 112, 119–20

硅谷， 55, 75, 112, 119–20

SingleRAN, 187

SingleRAN， 187

SingleRAN， 187

Sisi, Abdel Fattah el-, xxvii, 244

阿卜杜勒-法塔赫·塞西， xxvii, 244

阿卜杜勒-法塔赫·塞西， xxvii, 244

Skycom Tech Co. Ltd., 337, 377, 379

星通技术有限公司 (Skycom)， 337, 377, 379

Iran and, 180–81, 231–35, 298–99, 300

伊朗与， 180–81, 231–35, 298–99, 300

伊朗与， 180–81, 231–35, 298–99, 300

星通技术有限公司 (Skycom)， 337, 377,

379

伊朗与， 180–81, 231–35, 298–99, 300

Sky News, 274, 310

天空新闻台， 274, 310

天空新闻台， 274, 310

Skype, 188, 208

Skype， 188, 208

Skype， 188, 208

Smartcom, 192, 213, 245

Smartcom， 192, 213, 245

Smartcom， 192, 213, 245

Smarter Cities, 209–10

智慧城市， 209–10

智慧城市， 209–10

smartphones, 202–3, 261–71, 278, 329, 345–46

智能手机， 202–3, 261–71, 278, 329, 345–46

智能手机， 202–3, 261–71, 278, 329, 345–46

Smith, Brad, 304

史密斯，布拉德， 304

史密斯，布拉德， 304

Snowden, Edward, 237–42, 246, 308, 350, 352, 379

斯诺登，爱德华，237–42，246，308，350，352，379

斯诺登，爱德华， 237–42, 246, 308, 350, 352, 379

Song Liuping, 304

宋柳平，304

宋柳平，304

South Africa, 112, 158

南非，112，158

南非，112，158

South Korea, 253

韩国，253

韩国，253

South Sea Oil, 40–41, 42, 44–45, 46, 48, 123, 369

南海石油，40–41，42，44–45，46，48，123，369

南海石油，40–41，42，44–45，46，48，123，369

South Sea Oil Shenzhen Development Service Co., 40, 44–45

南海石油深圳开发服务公司，40，44–45

南海石油深圳开发服务公司，40，44–45

Soviet Union, 106, 330. See also Russia

苏联，106，330。另见 俄罗斯

Cold War, xxxviii–xl, 9, 106, 368

冷战，xxxviii–xl，9，106，368

冷战，xxxviii–xl，9，106，368

collapse of, xl, 106–7

苏联解体，xl，106–7

苏联解体，xl，106–7

苏联，106，330。另见俄罗斯；冷战，xxxviii–xl，9，106，368；苏联解体，xl，106–7

Spain, 240

西班牙，240

西班牙，240

Spavor, Michael

斯帕弗，迈克尔

detention, xl–xli, 292, 320, 381

羁押，xl–xli，292，320，381

羁押，xl–xli，292，320，381

legal proceedings, 335–36

法律程序，335–36

法律程序，335–36

Meng’s extradition case and, 292, 323–24

与孟晚舟引渡案的关系，292，323–24

与孟晚舟引渡案的关系，292，323–24

release and aftermath, 338, 341–43, 382

获释及后续，338，341–43，382

获释及后续，338，341–43，382

斯帕弗，迈克尔

羁押，xl–xli，292，320，

381

法律程序，

335–36

与孟晚舟引渡案的关系，292，

323–24

获释及后续，338，341–43，382

Spavor, Paul, 343

斯帕弗，保罗，343

斯帕弗，保罗，343

SpeedConnect, 219

SpeedConnect，219

SpeedConnect，219

Sprint Nextel, 194–98, 202, 203–4, 378

Sprint Nextel，194–98，202，203–4，378

Sprint Nextel，194–98，202，203–4，378

Sputnik 1, xxxix–xl, 9, 368

人造卫星 1 号，xxxix–xl，9，368

人造卫星 1 号，xxxix–xl，9，368

Sri Lanka, 244

斯里兰卡，244

斯里兰卡，244

Standard Chartered PLC, 235

渣打集团，235

渣打集团，235

standard-essential patents (SEPs), 270

标准必要专利 (SEPs)，270

标准必要专利 (SEPs)，270

Stanford University, 266, 302

斯坦福大学，266，302

斯坦福大学，266，302

Star Trek (movie), 276

《星际迷航》（电影），276

《星际迷航》（电影），276

State Economic and Trade Commission, 74

国家经济贸易委员会，74

国家经济贸易委员会，74

Stecklow, Steve, 231–32

斯特克洛，史蒂夫，231–32

斯特克洛，史蒂夫，231–32

steelmaking, 9–10

炼钢，9–10

炼钢，9–10

Steinmann, Eric, 155

斯坦曼，埃里克，155

斯坦曼，埃里克，155

Stone Group, 32, 50–51, 56–57, 70, 119–20, 349–50

四通集团，32，50–51，56–57，70，119–20，349–50

四通集团，32，50–51，56–57，70，119–20，349–50

Subler, Jason, 236

萨布勒，杰森，236

萨布勒，杰森，236

submarine cables, 167–68, 202, 206, 376

海底光缆，167–68，202，206，376

海底光缆，167–68，202，206，376

Sudan, 278

苏丹，278

苏丹，278

Suffolk, John, 209, 241, 330–31

萨福克，约翰，209，241，330–31

萨福克，约翰，209，241，330–31

suicide, 14, 125, 136–37, 175–77

自杀，14，125，136–37，175–77

自杀，14，125，136–37，175–77

Sunday Communications, 149, 154

星期日电讯，149，154

星期日电讯，149，154

Sun Microsystems, 145

太阳微系统，145

太阳微系统，145

Sun Yafang, xviii

孙亚芳，xviii

alleged ties to Ministry of State Security, 85, 130–31, 279–80, 314

据称与国家安全部的联系，85，130–31，279–80，314

据称与国家安全部的联系，85，130–31，279–80，314

background of, 85–87

背景，85–87

背景，85–87

death of Cheng Yuanzhao, 142

程远昭之死，142

程远昭之死，142

death of Deng Xiaoping, 90

邓小平逝世，90

邓小平逝世，90

at Harvard Business School, 129, 374

在哈佛商学院，129，374

在哈佛商学院，129，374

at Huawei, xxvii, 69, 85–88, 98, 117, 128, 129–31, 137, 201, 224–25, 244

在华为，xxvii，69，85–88，98，117，128，129–31，137，201，224–25，244

management culture, 175, 177–78

管理文化，175，177–78

管理文化，175，177–78

promotion to chairwoman, 129, 178, 374

升任董事长，129，178，374

升任董事长，129，178，374

retirement, 279–80, 356, 380

退休，279–80，356，380

退休，279–80，356，380

在华为，xxvii，69，85–88，98，117，128，129–31，137，201，224–25，

244

管理文化，175，

177–78

升任董事长，129，178，

374

退休，279–80，356，380

孙亚芳，

xviii

据称与国家安全部的联系，85，130–31，279–80，

314

背景，

85–87

程远昭之死，

142

邓小平逝世，

90

在哈佛商学院，129，

374

在华为，xxvii，69，85–88，98，117，128，129–31，137，201，224–25，

244

管理文化，175，

177–78

升任董事长，129，178，

374

退休，279–80，356，380

surveillance, 75–76, 94–95, 168–69, 188–93, 207–10

监控，75–76，94–95，168–69，188–93，207–10

big data and, 253–57

大数据与监控，253–57

大数据与监控，253–57

Huawei’s HiSilicon, 189–90, 265, 275–76, 304–5, 325, 346, 370

华为海思，189–90，265，275–76，304–5，325，346，370

华为海思，189–90，265，275–76，304–5，325，346，370

Huawei’s Safe City, xxix, 208–10, 243, 254–55, 256–57, 276, 378

华为平安城市，xxix，208–10，243，254–55，256–57，276，378

华为平安城市，xxix，208–10，243，254–55，256–57，276，378

modern era of, 272–83

现代时期，272–83

现代时期，272–83

Snowden leaks, 237–42, 246, 379

斯诺登泄密事件，237–42，246，379

斯诺登泄密事件，237–42，246，379

监控，75–76，94–95，168–69，188–93，

207–10

大数据与监控，

253–57

华为海思，189–90，265，275–76，304–5，325，346，

370

华为平安城市，xxix，208–10，243，254–55，256–57，276，

378

现代监控时代，

272–83

斯诺登泄密事件，237–42，246，379

Swarovski, 264

施华洛世奇，264

施华洛世奇，264

Sweden, 138, 158, 328, 374

瑞典，138，158，328，374

瑞典，138，158，328，374

Swift, Kerry, 301

斯威夫特，凯利，301

斯威夫特，凯利，301

Switzerland, 31

瑞士，31

瑞士，31

Symantec, 211–12

赛门铁克，211–12

赛门铁克，211–12

Syria, 278

叙利亚，278

叙利亚，278

T

T

Taiwan, 24, 95, 190, 191, 353

台湾，24，95，190，191，353

台湾，24，95，190，191，353

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), 325–26

台湾积体电路制造公司（台积电），325–26

台湾积体电路制造公司（台积电），325–26

Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, 105–6

1995–1996 年台湾海峡危机，105–6

1995–1996 年台湾海峡危机，105–6

Taliban, 145–46, 165, 375

塔利班，145–46，165，375

塔利班，145–46，165，375

Target, 253

塔吉特，253

塔吉特，253

TASS Russian News Agency, 106

塔斯社，106

塔斯社，106

Taylorism, 119

泰勒制，119

泰勒制，119

Technip and Speichim, 25–27

德希尼布和斯派希姆，25–27

德希尼布和斯派希姆，25–27

technology transfer, 60, 69, 169–70

技术转让，60，69，169–70

技术转让，60，69，169–70

Telefónica, 160, 243

西班牙电信，160，243

西班牙电信，160，243

telegraphs, 58–59

电报，58–59

电报，58–59

telephones, 59–60. See also smartphones

电话，59–60。另见 智能手机

wiretapping, 76, 154–55, 240–41, 352

窃听，76，154–55，240–41，352

窃听，76，154–55，240–41，352

电话，59–60。另见

智能手机

窃听，76，154–55，240–41，352

telephone switches, 42–48, 53–54, 56, 59–64, 67–71, 74, 80–81, 92–93, 98

电话交换机，42–48，53–54，56，59–64，67–71，74，80–81，92–93，98

04 switch, 60–61, 63, 80, 81, 139, 370

04 机，60–61，63，80，81，139，370

04 机，60–61，63，80，81，139，370

BH-01, 43–44, 47, 128

BH-01，43–44，47，128

BH-01，43–44，47，128

BH-03, 47–48

BH-03，47–48

BH-03，47–48

C&C08, 63–64, 65, 68–69, 75, 81, 93, 107, 371

C&C08，63–64，65，68–69，75，81，93，107，371

C&C08，63–64，65，68–69，75，81，93，107，371

SP30, 81

SP30，81

SP30，81

电话交换机，42–48，53–54，56，59–64，67–71，74，80–81，92–93，

98

04 机，60–61，63，80，81，139，

370

BH-01，43–44，47，

128

BH-03，

47–48

C&C08，63–64，65，68–69，75，81，93，107，

371

SP30，81

Telus, 269, 326–27

研科，269，326–27

研科，269，326–27

Teng Hongfei, 252

滕鸿飞，252

滕鸿飞，252

“terminals,” 262–63

“终端”，262–63

“终端”，262–63

Texas Instruments, 325–26

德州仪器，325–26

德州仪器，325–26

Thailand, 158, 319

泰国，158，319

泰国，158，319

Thatcher, Margaret, 96

撒切尔，玛格丽特，96

撒切尔，玛格丽特，96

Thelander, Michael, 268, 270, 277–78

西兰德，迈克尔，268，270，277–78

西兰德，迈克尔，268，270，277–78

3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), 267–70

第三代合作伙伴计划 (3GPP)，267–70

第三代合作伙伴计划 (3GPP)，267–70

“Thirteen Rooms of the Ren Family,” 13–14

“任家十三间”，13–14

“任家十三间”，13–14

Thomas, Alan, 234–35

托马斯，艾伦，234–35

托马斯，艾伦，234–35

Thompson, Terry, 241–42

汤普森，泰瑞，241–42

汤普森，泰瑞，241–42

Thought Guards, 21, 22–23

思想近卫军，21，22–23

思想近卫军，21，22–23

3Com Corporation, 152–53, 170–72, 227, 376, 377

3Com 公司，152–53，170–72，227，376，377

3Com 公司，152–53，170–72，227，376，377

Tiananmen Square protests, 49, 50, 51, 57, 66, 70, 75–76, 89, 90, 91, 105, 115

天安门广场抗议活动，49，50，51，57，66，70，75–76，89，90，91，105，115

天安门广场抗议活动，49，50，51，57，66，70，75–76，89，90，91，105，115

Tianjin, 81

天津，81

天津，81

Tian Qingjun, 252

田庆军，252

田庆军，252

Tian Tao, 45, 47, 48, 123, 136

田涛，45，47，48，123，136

田涛，45，47，48，123，136

Tibet, 7, 190–91

西藏，7，190–91

西藏，7，190–91

Time (magazine), 159

《时代》（杂志），159

《时代》（杂志），159

Timperlake, Edward, 195

廷珀莱克，爱德华，195

廷珀莱克，爱德华，195

Toshiba, 269

东芝，269

东芝，269

trade war. See US-China trade war

贸易战。参见 中美贸易战

贸易战。参见 中美贸易战

traffic surveillance, 275–76

交通监控，275–76

交通监控，275–76

Triolo, Paul, 346

特里奥洛，保罗，346

特里奥洛，保罗，346

Troop 00229, 35–36

00229 部队，35–36

00229 部队，35–36

Trudeau, Justin, 291, 318, 335, 341–42

特鲁多，贾斯廷，291，318，335，341–42

特鲁多，贾斯廷，291，318，335，341–42

Trump, Donald

特朗普，唐纳德

Meng’s case, 291, 292–93, 301, 316–17, 321, 336

孟晚舟案，291，292–93，301，316–17，321，336

孟晚舟案，291，292–93，301，316–17，321，336

Pakistan and, 276

巴基斯坦与，276

巴基斯坦与，276

trade war and bans, 278, 280–83, 297–98, 301–10, 313, 316–17, 321, 324–25, 327–29, 336, 346–47, 380, 381

贸易战与禁令，278, 280–83, 297–98, 301–10, 313, 316–17, 321, 324–25, 327–29, 336, 346–47, 380, 381

贸易战与禁令，278，280–83，297–98，301–10，313，316–17，321，324–25，327–29，336，346–47，380，381

特朗普，唐纳德

孟晚舟案，291，292–93，301，316–17，321，

336

巴基斯坦与，

276

贸易战与禁令，278，280–83，297–98，301–10，313，316–17，321，324–25，327–29，336，346–47，380，381

Trump, Ivanka, 293

特朗普，伊万卡，293

特朗普，伊万卡，293

Tsinghua University, 11, 254, 329

清华大学，11, 254, 329

清华大学，11, 254, 329

tuberculosis, 28

肺结核，28

肺结核，28

Tunisia, 208

突尼斯，208

突尼斯，208

Turkey, 205, 206–7, 240

土耳其，205, 206–7, 240

土耳其，205, 206–7, 240

Turnbull, Malcolm, 281, 353

特恩布尔，马尔科姆，281, 353

特恩布尔，马尔科姆，281, 353

Twitter, 203, 212, 255, 327

Twitter，203, 212, 255, 327

Twitter，203, 212, 255, 327

U

U

UK (United Kingdom)

英国 (United Kingdom)

handover of Hong Kong, 91–92, 95–98, 373

香港回归，91–92, 95–98, 373

香港回归，91–92, 95–98, 373

Huawei and, 159–60, 198–202, 224–25, 306–7, 327, 328, 376, 378, 382

华为与，159–60, 198–202, 224–25, 306–7, 327, 328, 376, 378, 382

HSBC and Iran, 233–35, 299, 317, 379

汇丰银行与伊朗，233–35, 299, 317, 379

汇丰银行与伊朗，233–35, 299, 317, 379

华为与，159–60, 198–202, 224–25, 306–7, 327, 328, 376, 378,

382

汇丰银行与伊朗，233–35, 299, 317, 379

Meng’s visit, 31–32

孟晚舟访问，31–32

孟晚舟访问，31–32

Official Secrets Act, 200

《官方机密法》，200

《官方机密法》，200

Vodafone and, 240

沃达丰与，240

沃达丰与，240

Xi Jinping visit, 249–50, 380

习近平访问，249–50, 380

习近平访问，249–50, 380

英国 (United Kingdom)

香港回归，91–92, 95–98,

373

华为与，159–60, 198–202, 224–25, 306–7, 327, 328, 376, 378,

382

汇丰银行与伊朗，233–35, 299, 317,

379

孟晚舟访问，

31–32

《官方机密法》，

200

沃达丰与，

240

习近平访问，249–50, 380

Ukraina Hotel, 107

乌克兰酒店，107

乌克兰酒店，107

Ukraine, 106, 112

乌克兰，106, 112

乌克兰，106, 112

United Arab Emirates (UAE), 154, 166, 168, 206, 208, 219, 307

阿拉伯联合酋长国 (UAE)，154, 166, 168, 206, 208, 219, 307

阿拉伯联合酋长国 (UAE)，154, 166, 168, 206, 208, 219, 307

United Nations (UN), 24, 104, 129, 351

联合国 (UN)，24, 104, 129, 351

Iraq sanctions, 141–42, 147–48, 164

伊拉克制裁，141–42, 147–48, 164

伊拉克制裁，141–42, 147–48, 164

Oil-for-Food Programme, 104

石油换食品计划，104

石油换食品计划，104

Security Council, 144–45

安全理事会，144–45

安全理事会，144–45

联合国 (UN)，24, 104, 129,

351

伊拉克制裁，141–42, 147–48,

164

石油换食品计划，

104

安全理事会，144–45

United Wireless, 219

United Wireless，219

United Wireless，219

University of California, Berkeley, 266, 302–3

加州大学伯克利分校，266, 302–3

加州大学伯克利分校，266, 302–3

University of Electronic Science and Technology, 130

电子科技大学，130

电子科技大学，130

University of Manchester, 250

曼彻斯特大学，250

曼彻斯特大学，250

University of Oxford, 266, 302

牛津大学，266, 302

牛津大学，266, 302

University of Science and Technology, 108

科技大学，108

科技大学，108

University of Toronto, 123

多伦多大学，123

多伦多大学，123

Ürümqi

乌鲁木齐

attack of 2014, 255–56, 379

2014 年袭击事件，255–56, 379

2014 年袭击事件，255–56, 379

facial recognition, 273–74

人脸识别，273–74

人脸识别，273–74

乌鲁木齐

2014 年袭击事件，255–56,

379

人脸识别，273–74

US-China relations, 245–46, 277–82. See also US-China trade war

美中关系，245–46, 277–82. 另见 美中贸易战

back doors, 154–55, 169–70, 200–201, 217–28, 278–79, 350–54

后门，154–55, 169–70, 200–201, 217–28, 278–79, 350–54

后门，154–55, 169–70, 200–201, 217–28, 278–79, 350–54

Bush and, 141, 143, 145–46, 147–48, 165–66

布什与，141, 143, 145–46, 147–48, 165–66

布什与，141, 143, 145–46, 147–48, 165–66

China entry into WTO, 137–38, 146, 375

中国加入世贸组织，137–38, 146, 375

中国加入世贸组织，137–38, 146, 375

Clinton and, 137–38, 191

克林顿与，137–38, 191

克林顿与，137–38, 191

cybersecurity and cellular network concerns, 194–98, 203–4, 277–78, 346

网络安全与蜂窝网络担忧，194–98, 203–4, 277–78, 346

网络安全与蜂窝网络担忧，194–98, 203–4, 277–78, 346

H3C and 3Com, 170–72

H3C 与 3Com，170–72

H3C 与 3Com，170–72

House investigation, 214–28

众议院调查，214–28

众议院调查，214–28

Nixon visit, 24

尼克松访问，24

尼克松访问，24

Obama and, 141, 195–96, 226–27, 242, 378

奥巴马与，141, 195–96, 226–27, 242, 378

奥巴马与，141, 195–96, 226–27, 242, 378

Snowden leaks, 238–39, 245–46

斯诺登泄密，238–39, 245–46

斯诺登泄密，238–39, 245–46

Trump and. See Trump, Donald

特朗普与。参见 特朗普，唐纳德

特朗普与。参见 特朗普，唐纳德

美中关系，245–46, 277–82. 另见

美中贸易战

后门，154–55, 169–70, 200–201, 217–28, 278–79,

350–54

布什与，141, 143, 145–46, 147–48,

165–66

中国加入世贸组织，137–38, 146,

375

克林顿与，137–38,

191

网络安全与蜂窝网络担忧，194–98, 203–4, 277–78,

346

H3C 与 3Com，

170–72

众议院调查，

214–28

尼克松访问，

24

奥巴马与，141, 195–96, 226–27, 242,

378

斯诺登泄密，238–39,

245–46

特朗普与。参见 特朗普，唐纳德

US-China trade war, xl–xli, 278, 280–83, 297–314

中美贸易战，xl–xli，278，280–83，297–314

Huawei and, 297–314, 324–25, 339–40, 381

华为与，297–314，324–25，339–40，381

华为与，297–314，324–25，339–40，381

Meng’s case, 291, 292–93, 299–300, 301–2, 316–17, 321, 336

孟晚舟案，291，292–93，299–300，301–2，316–17，321，336

孟晚舟案，291，292–93，299–300，301–2，316–17，321，336

中美贸易战，xl–xli，278，280–83，

297–314

华为与，297–314，324–25，339–40，

381

孟晚舟案，291，292–93，299–300，301–2，316–17，321，336

US election of 2012, 226–27

2012 年美国大选，226–27

2012 年美国大选，226–27

US election of 2016, 278

2016 年美国大选，278

2016 年美国大选，278

Utsumi, Yoshio, xxvi

内海善雄，xxvi

内海善雄，xxvi

Uyghurs, 256, 272, 329–33

维吾尔族，256，272，329–33

维吾尔族，256，272，329–33

Uzbekistan, 83, 108, 112

乌兹别克斯坦，83，108，112

乌兹别克斯坦，83，108，112

V

Vancouver International Airport, xxxvii–xxxviii, 286–91, 333–35, 381

温哥华国际机场，xxxvii–xxxviii，286–91，333–35，381

温哥华国际机场，xxxvii–xxxviii，286–91，333–35，381

venture capital, 75

风险投资，75

风险投资，75

Verint Systems, 240

慧锐系统，240

慧锐系统，240

Verizon, 194, 278

威瑞森，194，278

威瑞森，194，278

Versailles, xli, 260, 310–11

凡尔赛，xli，260，310–11

凡尔赛，xli，260，310–11

videoconferencing, 94–95, 97

视频会议，94–95，97

视频会议，94–95，97

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 320

《维也纳外交关系公约》，320

《维也纳外交关系公约》，320

Vietnam, 5

越南，5

越南，5

Vietnam War, 15–16, 18

越南战争，15–16，18

越南战争，15–16，18

ViewPoint, 94–95, 97, 373

ViewPoint，94–95，97，373

ViewPoint，94–95，97，373

Viva Bahrain, 207

Viva Bahrain，207

Viva Bahrain，207

Vodafone, 109, 160–61, 187, 240–41

沃达丰，109，160–61，187，240–41

沃达丰，109，160–61，187，240–41

VoIP, 188–89

VoIP，188–89

VoIP，188–89

W

W

Wall Street Journal, The, xxxiv, 167–68, 208, 301, 309–10

《华尔街日报》，xxxiv，167–68，208，301，309–10

《华尔街日报》，xxxiv，167–68，208，301，309–10

Walmart, 221

沃尔玛，221

沃尔玛，221

Wang Erxiao, 99

王二小，99

王二小，99

Wang Qishan, 73

王岐山，73

王岐山，73

Wang Weijing, 303

王伟晶，303

王伟晶，303

Wan Runnan, xx, 32, 49, 50, 130, 349–50

万润南，xx, 32, 49, 50, 130, 349–50

万润南，xx, 32, 49, 50, 130, 349–50

Warren, Earl, 138

厄尔·沃伦，138

厄尔·沃伦，138

Washington Post, The, xxxiv, xli, 144, 164, 332

《华盛顿邮报》，xxxiv，xli，144，164，332

《华盛顿邮报》，xxxiv，xli，144，164，332

Washington Redskins, 262

华盛顿红皮队，262

华盛顿红皮队，262

Washington Times, The, 195

《华盛顿时报》，195

《华盛顿时报》，195

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 104, 144, 167

大规模杀伤性武器 (WMD)，104，144，167

大规模杀伤性武器 (WMD)，104，144，167

Weibo, 203, 212–13, 339

微博，203，212–13，339

微博，203，212–13，339

Wen Jiabao, xxv, xxiii, 210

温家宝，xxv，xxiii，210

温家宝，xxv，xxiii，210

Wen Tong, xix, 267–68, 270

温彤，xix，267–68，270

温彤，xix，267–68，270

Whitaker, Forest, 283

福里斯特·惠特克，283

福里斯特·惠特克，283

Whitaker, Matthew, 297–98

马修·惠特克，297–98

马修·惠特克，297–98

Whitaker, True, 283

特鲁·惠特克，283

特鲁·惠特克，283

Widener Library, 323

怀德纳图书馆，323

怀德纳图书馆，323

WikiLeaks, 162

维基解密，162

维基解密，162

wireless network technologies. See cellular networks

无线网络技术。参见 蜂窝网络

无线网络技术。参见 蜂窝网络

wiretapping, 76, 154–55, 240–41, 352

窃听，76，154–55，240–41，352

窃听，76，154–55，240–41，352

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 144–45

威斯康星核军控项目，144–45

威斯康星核军控项目，144–45

“wolf culture,” xxxviii–xxxix, 80, 178

“狼性文化”，xxxviii–xxxix，80，178

“狼性文化”，xxxviii–xxxix，80，178

Wolfensohn, James, 198

詹姆斯·沃尔芬森，198

詹姆斯·沃尔芬森，198

World Health Organization (WHO), 154

世界卫生组织 (WHO)，154

世界卫生组织 (WHO)，154

World Trade Organization (WTO), 110, 134, 274

世界贸易组织 (WTO)，110，134，274

China entry into, 137–38, 146, 375

中国加入，137–38，146，375

中国加入，137–38，146，375

establishment of, 66, 371

建立，66，371

建立，66，371

世界贸易组织 (WTO)，110，134，

274

中国加入，137–38，146，

375

建立，66，371

World War II, 3, 6, 8, 304, 330, 367

第二次世界大战，3，6，8，304，330，367

第二次世界大战，3，6，8，304，330，367

Wray, Christopher, 297

克里斯托弗·雷，297

克里斯托弗·雷，297

Wu Bangguo, xxvi, xxiii, 133, 134, 162, 372

吴邦国，xxvi，xxiii，133，134，162，372

吴邦国，xxvi，xxiii，133，134，162，372

Wu Chunbo, 136

吴春波，136

吴春波，136

Wuhan, 40, 46, 47, 98, 266, 322, 370

武汉，40，46，47，98，266，322，370

武汉，40，46，47，98，266，322，370

Wu Huiqing, 43

吴蕙卿，43

吴蕙卿，43

Wu Jiangxing, xx, 81, 139

邬江兴，xx, 81, 139

04 switch, 60–61, 63, 80, 81, 139, 370

04 机，60–61，63，80，81，139，370

04 机，60–61，63，80，81，139，370

邬江兴，xx, 81, 139 04 机，60–61, 63, 80, 81, 139, 370

Wu Jikang, 24

吴继康，24

吴继康，24

Wuxi, 21

无锡，21

无锡，21

X

Xi’an Datang Telephone Co., 70, 80–81

西安大唐电话公司，70，80–81

西安大唐电话公司，70，80–81

Xi’an Instruments Factory, 24, 368

西安仪表厂，24，368

西安仪表厂，24，368

Xi’an Research Center, 185

西安研究所，185

西安研究所，185

Xiaomi, 264, 269, 380

小米，264，269，380

小米，264，269，380

Xidian University, 184

西安电子科技大学，184

西安电子科技大学，184

Xie Fei, 69

谢非，69

谢非，69

Xi Jinping, xxi, xxiii, 249–53, 282, 308, 339

习近平，xxi，xxiii，249–53，282，308，339

anti-corruption campaign, 251–52

反腐运动，251–52

反腐运动，251–52

Beijing Olympics, 187, 193

北京奥运会，187，193

北京奥运会，187，193

G20 Summit (2018), 291

G20 峰会（2018 年），291

G20 峰会（2018 年），291

Made in China 2025, 250–51

中国制造 2025，250–51

中国制造 2025，250–51

Meng’s detention, 291, 339

孟晚舟被拘留，291，339

孟晚舟被拘留，291，339

national security and Sharp Eyes, 252–53

国家安全与“雪亮工程”，252–53

国家安全与“雪亮工程”，252–53

UK visit, xxviii, 249–50, 380

访英，xxviii，249–50，380

访英，xxviii，249–50，380

习近平，xxi，xxiii，249–53，282，308，

339

反腐运动，

251–52

北京奥运会，187，

193

G20 峰会（2018 年），

291

中国制造 2025，

250–51

孟晚舟被拘留，291，

339

国家安全与“雪亮工程”，

252–53

访英，xxviii，249–50，380

Xinhua News Agency, 33, 74, 191

新华社，33，74，191

新华社，33，74，191

Xinjiang conflict, 7, 255–57, 272–74, 329–33

新疆冲突，7，255–57，272–74，329–33

Ürümqi attack of 2014, 255–56, 379

2014 年乌鲁木齐袭击事件，255–56，379

2014 年乌鲁木齐袭击事件，255–56，379

新疆冲突，7，255–57，272–74，

329–33

2014 年乌鲁木齐袭击事件，255–56，379

Xinxiang Liaoyuan Radio Factory, 86

新乡燎原无线电厂，86

新乡燎原无线电厂，86

Xu, Eric (a.k.a. Xu Zhijun), xxvi, xviii–xix, 178, 305

徐直军 (Eric Xu)，xxvi，xviii–xix，178，305

background of, 85

背景，85

背景，85

international marketing, 112

国际营销，112

国际营销，112

joining Huawei, 84–85, 371

加入华为，84–85，371

加入华为，84–85，371

rotating CEO, 126, 211, 212, 245, 281, 340, 378, 382

轮值 CEO，126，211，212，245，281，340，378，382

轮值 CEO，126，211，212，245，281，340，378，382

US ban, 281

美国禁令，281

美国禁令，281

徐直军 (Eric Xu)，xxvi，xviii–xix，178，

305

背景，

85

国际营销，

112

加入华为，84–85，

371

轮值 CEO，126，211，212，245，281，340，378，

382

美国禁令，281

Xu, William (a.k.a. Xu Wenwei), xix, 112, 178, 230, 264

徐文伟 (William Xu)，xix，112，178，230，264

徐文伟 (William Xu)，xix，112，178，230，264

Xu Guotai, 34–35

徐国泰，34–35

徐国泰，34–35

Y

Y

Yablon, Ashley, 215, 232–33, 258

阿什利·亚布隆 (Ashley Yablon)，215，232–33，258

阿什利·亚布隆 (Ashley Yablon)，215，232–33，258

Yan, James (a.k.a. Yan Jingli), xix, 62, 91

严经礼 (James Yan)，xix，62，91

严经礼 (James Yan)，xix，62，91

Yang Jiechi, 144

杨洁篪，144

杨洁篪，144

Yang Jingyu, 99

杨靖宇，99

杨靖宇，99

Yangtze River, 46

长江，46

长江，46

Yanmei Xie, 343

谢艳梅，343

谢艳梅，343

Yao, Annabel (a.k.a. Yao Anna), xviii

姚安娜 (Annabel Yao)，xviii

early life and education of, 108–10, 284, 323, 373

早年生活与教育，108–10，284，323，373

早年生活与教育，108–10，284，323，373

at Le Bal des Débutantes, xxx, 283–84, 381

在巴黎名媛舞会，xxx，283–84，381

在巴黎名媛舞会，xxx，283–84，381

Meng Wanzhou and, 284–85, 339

与孟晚舟，284–85，339

与孟晚舟，284–85，339

姚安娜 (Annabel Yao)，

xviii

早年生活与教育，108–10，284，323，

373

在巴黎名媛舞会，xxx，283–84，

381

与孟晚舟，284–85，339

Yao Ling, xviii, 71–72, 108–10, 283

姚凌，xviii，71–72，108–10，283

姚凌，xviii，71–72，108–10，283

Yellow Fruit Waterfall, 8

黄果树瀑布，8

黄果树瀑布，8

Yeltsin, Boris, 106–7

鲍里斯·叶利钦 (Boris Yeltsin)，106–7

鲍里斯·叶利钦 (Boris Yeltsin)，106–7

Yep, Winston, 287–91

叶文正 (Winston Yep)，287–91

叶文正 (Winston Yep)，287–91

Yichun, 83

宜春，83

宜春，83

Yiwu, 63–64, 371

义乌，63–64，371

义乌，63–64，371

Yixin (Prince Gong), 58

奕訢（恭亲王），58

奕訢（恭亲王），58

Yu, Richard (a.k.a. Yu Chengdong), xx, 263, 263–64

余承东 (Richard Yu)，xx, 263, 263–64

余承东 (Richard Yu)，xx, 263, 263–64

Yudhoyano, Susilo Bambang, 158–59

苏西洛·班邦·尤多约诺 (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyano)，158–59

苏西洛·班邦·尤多约诺 (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyano)，158–59

Yugoslavia, 31, 114–16

南斯拉夫，31，114–16

南斯拉夫，31，114–16

Z

Z

Zafirovski, Mike, xxi, 152

迈克·扎菲罗夫斯基 (Mike Zafirovski)，xxi，152

迈克·扎菲罗夫斯基 (Mike Zafirovski)，xxi，152

Zaire, 31

扎伊尔，31

扎伊尔，31

Zeng Meng, 319

曾梦，319

曾梦，319

Zhang Gaoli, xxiii, 73–74

张高丽，xxiii，73–74

张高丽，xxiii，73–74

Zhang Jinqiang, 69–70

张金强，69–70

张金强，69–70

Zhang Xiangyang, 43

张向阳，43

张向阳，43

Zhang Youde, 177

张有德，177

张有德，177

Zhao Ming, 264

赵明，264

赵明，264

Zhao Ziyang, xxii, 31, 50–51, 66

赵紫阳，xxii，31，50–51，66

赵紫阳，xxii，31，50–51，66

Zheng Aizhu, 55–56

郑爱珠，55–56

郑爱珠，55–56

Zheng Baoyong, xix, 54, 62–63, 98, 112, 136, 245

郑宝用，xix，54，62–63，98，112，136，245

郑宝用，xix，54，62–63，98，112，136，245

Zheng Li, xviii, 85

郑丽，xviii，85

郑丽，xviii，85

Zhenning, 6–7

镇宁，6–7

镇宁，6–7

Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Company. See ZTE

中兴通讯股份有限公司。参见 ZTE

中兴通讯股份有限公司。参见 ZTE

Zhou Daiqi, xix, 184–85, 222, 348, 356, 377

周代琪，xix，184–85，222，348，356，377

周代琪，xix，184–85，222，348，356，377

Zhou Xi, 46–47

周希，46–47

周希，46–47

Zhou Yongkang, 251–52

周永康，251–52

周永康，251–52

Zhuhai Telecom, 43–44, 48

珠海电信，43–44，48

珠海电信，43–44，48

Zhu Jinyun, 219–20

朱进云，219–20

朱进云，219–20

Zhu Jiusi, 46

朱九思，46

朱九思，46

Zhu Rongji, xxii–xxiii, 73

朱镕基，xxii–xxiii，73

朱镕基，xxii–xxiii，73

Zita, Ken, 59, 160, 308

肯·齐塔 (Ken Zita)，59，160，308

肯·齐塔 (Ken Zita)，59，160，308

ZTE Corporation, 112–14, 135, 215, 250, 268, 324

中兴通讯 (ZTE Corporation)，112–14，135，215，250，268，324

Canada and, 343–44

加拿大与，343–44

加拿大与，343–44

Germany and, 349

德国与，349

德国与，349

House investigation, 215, 217, 219–20, 226

众议院调查，215，217，219–20，226

众议院调查，215，217，219–20，226

Huawei competition, 112–14, 132–33

华为的竞争，112–14，132–33

华为的竞争，112–14，132–33

Iran affair, 231, 235, 236, 257, 282

伊朗事件，231，235，236，257，282

伊朗事件，231，235，236，257，282

ownership structure, 113–14

所有权结构，113–14

所有权结构，113–14

telephone switches, 74, 81

电话交换机，74，81

电话交换机，74，81

US sanctions and import ban, 257–58, 278, 280–83, 303, 325, 327, 379, 380

美国制裁与进口禁令，257–58，278，280–83，303，325，327，379，380

美国制裁与进口禁令，257–58，278，280–83，303，325，327，379，380

Yablon, 215, 258

亚布隆 (Yablon)，215，258

亚布隆 (Yablon)，215，258

中兴通讯 (ZTE Corporation)，112–14，135，215，250，268，

324

加拿大与，

343–44

德国与，

349

众议院调查，215，217，219–20，

226

华为的竞争，112–14，

132–33

伊朗事件，231，235，236，257，

282

所有权结构，

113–14

电话交换机，74，

81

美国制裁与进口禁令，257–58，278，280–83，303，325，327，379，

380

亚布隆 (Yablon)，215，258

Zwicky, Tommy, 333

兹维基，汤米 (Zwicky, Tommy)，333

兹维基，汤米 (Zwicky, Tommy)，333

ZXJ10 switch, 81

ZXJ10 交换机，81

ZXJ10 交换机，81

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A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

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