# pi-grok — Pi scenario profile
#
# STATUS: registered only. Nothing is tracked or deployed for this scenario yet;
# this file exists so that pi-diff.sh and the scenario index know it is here and
# why it is intentionally different from the others.

[scenario]
name        = "pi-grok"
description = "Interactive Grok 4.6 coding agent for user programming projects."
workspace   = "/home/claw/pi-workspaces/pi-grok"
session_dir = "/home/claw/pi-workspaces/pi-grok/sessions"
service     = ""            # no service: launched by hand via bin/pi-grok
launcher    = "/home/claw/pi-workspaces/pi-grok/bin/pi-grok"
tracked     = false

[model]
provider = "zenmux"
primary  = "x-ai/grok-4.6"
thinking = "high"

[isolation]
# This scenario uses a fundamentally different -- and in one respect stronger --
# approach than curator and memo-inbox: a dedicated agent directory.
#
#   export PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR="$PI_GROK_HOME/.pi-agent"
#
# That isolates settings.json, models.json, auth.json, trust.json, extensions/,
# skills/, prompts/ and themes/ in one move, including the provider credential.
# It is the only mechanism here that stops one scenario's auth.json from being
# reachable by another's agent.
#
# Measured limitation: it does NOT cover ~/.agents/skills/, which is a separate
# discovery root. find-skills, modsearch and summarize still load.
# See docs/pi-runtime-notes.md section 10b.
agent_dir_override = "/home/claw/pi-workspaces/pi-grok/.pi-agent"
no_extensions      = false
no_skills          = false   # gap: ~/.agents/skills still leaks
no_builtin_tools   = false   # intentional -- see below
no_context_files   = false

[personality]
# Durable role text is injected with --append-system-prompt pointing at a file,
# which is immune to the parent-directory context walk and needs no project
# trust. See docs/pi-runtime-notes.md section 10c.
append_system_prompt = "/home/claw/pi-workspaces/pi-grok/AGENTS.md"
system_prompt        = ""     # keeps pi's default coding-assistant prompt

# NOTE ON SCOPE
#
# Unlike curator and memo-inbox, this genuinely *is* a coding agent. pi's default
# coding-assistant system prompt and its built-in read/bash/edit/write tools are
# appropriate here, so the isolation baseline in docs/isolation-baseline.md does
# not apply in full. What still applies:
#
#   - the ~/.agents/skills leak is unwanted noise for any narrow task
#   - there is no sandbox, so this agent has the full permissions of the user
#
# Bringing it under management is out of scope for the 2026-08 Curator refactor.