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Commits
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b5a29b05e1 |
docs: mark phase 3 complete, record the skills and caching findings
Two findings that changed the plan rather than confirming it:
23. Skills require a tool literally named `read`. Curator's tools are all
domain-specific, so every --skill argument was discarded in silence. The
planned split into curator-core / video-arr / books-ingest was inert before
it was written; the policy stays in APPEND_SYSTEM.md. memo-inbox is
unaffected because it registers a restricted `read` override, which is why
the earlier note generalised wrongly from it.
24. A long-lived session is worth far more than the startup it saves: 99.97% of
input read from cache on a continuing conversation against 0% on a new one.
That is what makes the generated tool list necessary rather than merely
tidy -- anything varying at the front of the prompt destroys it -- and it
makes rotation a cost to be bounded rather than applied eagerly.
profile.toml now describes the phase-3 configuration that is actually deployed,
including that the empty `skills` list is a finding and not an oversight.
pi_rpc gains --system-prompt support and no longer guesses whether a `read` tool
will exist; extension_registers_read has to be stated.
harness-layering.md records what transfers from a widely-shared account of
building a personal coding harness on pi, and what does not. The layering frame
holds and the cache-hit figure was the useful part. Its central recommendation --
installing third-party packages -- is disqualifying for an unattended agent
holding tracker credentials, and its discipline layer (AGENTS.md) is precisely
what we block, because it is discovered from every parent directory.
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cf61a72bd2 |
feat(curator): deploy the phase-0 system prompt, and correct a misleading README figure
The workspace now holds .pi/SYSTEM.md and .pi/APPEND_SYSTEM.md and nothing else.
SYSTEM.md is rewritten for what is actually deployed. The version committed in
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07dd648b5f |
feat: scenarios for curator/memo-inbox/pi-grok, deploy and backup tooling
Scenarios - memo-inbox: mirrored by copying; the live directory was not moved or modified and the service was not restarted. All four tracked files match byte for byte (pi-diff.sh reports SAME). Marked deploy = "mirror" so deploy-scenario.sh refuses --apply: applying a mirror would invert the direction of truth and could change a service in daily use. - curator: target configuration, not yet deployed. .pi/SYSTEM.md replaces pi's coding-assistant prompt; durable role text is in .pi/APPEND_SYSTEM.md; profile.toml is the single source of truth for the launch contract. - pi-grok: registered only. It is genuinely a coding agent, so the isolation baseline does not apply in full. Corrections to the documentation, found by testing rather than by reading - AGENTS.override.md does NOT block parent-directory context files; it only shadows its own directory. Verified: with an override file in the workspace, a marker in /tmp/AGENTS.md still reached the system prompt. The only effective switch is --no-context-files, so durable role text must live in .pi/APPEND_SYSTEM.md, which is a system-prompt file and unaffected by -nc. Verified end state: no coding-assistant framing, no pi-docs block, own identity and role text present, no parent pollution, only own skills/tools. - PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR isolates settings/models/auth/trust/extensions/skills/ prompts/themes under the agent directory -- stronger than the --no-* flags because it also repoints credentials -- but does NOT cover ~/.agents/skills. Measured: find-skills, modsearch and summarize still leak. So it complements --no-skills rather than replacing it. - --append-system-prompt accepts a file path, which pi-grok relies on. - cwd is what anchors .pi discovery: a probe that forgot cwd silently lost .pi/SYSTEM.md and kept the coding-assistant persona. Tooling (all dry-run by default; none of them restarts a service) - pi-diff.sh: compares tracked config against the live install in both directions, with a key-redacted comparison for models.json - deploy-scenario.sh: installs a workspace and renders profile.toml into .pi/launch.json, then checks that every referenced path exists - deploy-runtime.sh: renders models.json from its template, refusing placeholder or missing keys. Verified byte-identical to the live file - pi-backup.sh / pi-restore.sh: archives outside the repo, sha256 manifest verified before any restore, live paths preserved rather than overwritten Fixed while testing: pi-backup.sh compared the destination against the repo root literally, so a relative --dest ./backups wrote credential archives into the work tree. Now canonicalised with realpath; ./backups, an absolute in-repo path and ./docs/../backups are all refused. |