Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Kai 86f5763bd6 feat(curator): phase 1 — workspace skills, restricted read, slim prompts
- profile.toml: register 5 workspace skills and review-only restricted read; keep no_skills=true (explicit --skill excludes ~/.agents/skills leak).
- curator-tools.ts: registerRestrictedRead rooted at .pi/skills (.md only, 40k cap); allow read through the guard alongside bridge tools.
- SYSTEM.md/APPEND_SYSTEM.md/SYSTEM.structured.md: slim to a capable-companion identity + safety kernel; describe read outside the generated tool markers; regenerate the 7-tool region.
- skills/{curator-router,books,video,music,sources}/SKILL.md: capable tone, domain workflows, evidence discipline, asymmetric write caution.
2026-08-30 05:02:27 -07:00
Kai b5a29b05e1 docs: mark phase 3 complete, record the skills and caching findings
Two findings that changed the plan rather than confirming it:

  23. Skills require a tool literally named `read`. Curator's tools are all
      domain-specific, so every --skill argument was discarded in silence. The
      planned split into curator-core / video-arr / books-ingest was inert before
      it was written; the policy stays in APPEND_SYSTEM.md. memo-inbox is
      unaffected because it registers a restricted `read` override, which is why
      the earlier note generalised wrongly from it.

  24. A long-lived session is worth far more than the startup it saves: 99.97% of
      input read from cache on a continuing conversation against 0% on a new one.
      That is what makes the generated tool list necessary rather than merely
      tidy -- anything varying at the front of the prompt destroys it -- and it
      makes rotation a cost to be bounded rather than applied eagerly.

profile.toml now describes the phase-3 configuration that is actually deployed,
including that the empty `skills` list is a finding and not an oversight.
pi_rpc gains --system-prompt support and no longer guesses whether a `read` tool
will exist; extension_registers_read has to be stated.

harness-layering.md records what transfers from a widely-shared account of
building a personal coding harness on pi, and what does not. The layering frame
holds and the cache-hit figure was the useful part. Its central recommendation --
installing third-party packages -- is disqualifying for an unattended agent
holding tracker credentials, and its discipline layer (AGENTS.md) is precisely
what we block, because it is discovered from every parent directory.
2026-08-28 01:10:58 -07:00