Kai
07dd648b5f
Scenarios - memo-inbox: mirrored by copying; the live directory was not moved or modified and the service was not restarted. All four tracked files match byte for byte (pi-diff.sh reports SAME). Marked deploy = "mirror" so deploy-scenario.sh refuses --apply: applying a mirror would invert the direction of truth and could change a service in daily use. - curator: target configuration, not yet deployed. .pi/SYSTEM.md replaces pi's coding-assistant prompt; durable role text is in .pi/APPEND_SYSTEM.md; profile.toml is the single source of truth for the launch contract. - pi-grok: registered only. It is genuinely a coding agent, so the isolation baseline does not apply in full. Corrections to the documentation, found by testing rather than by reading - AGENTS.override.md does NOT block parent-directory context files; it only shadows its own directory. Verified: with an override file in the workspace, a marker in /tmp/AGENTS.md still reached the system prompt. The only effective switch is --no-context-files, so durable role text must live in .pi/APPEND_SYSTEM.md, which is a system-prompt file and unaffected by -nc. Verified end state: no coding-assistant framing, no pi-docs block, own identity and role text present, no parent pollution, only own skills/tools. - PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR isolates settings/models/auth/trust/extensions/skills/ prompts/themes under the agent directory -- stronger than the --no-* flags because it also repoints credentials -- but does NOT cover ~/.agents/skills. Measured: find-skills, modsearch and summarize still leak. So it complements --no-skills rather than replacing it. - --append-system-prompt accepts a file path, which pi-grok relies on. - cwd is what anchors .pi discovery: a probe that forgot cwd silently lost .pi/SYSTEM.md and kept the coding-assistant persona. Tooling (all dry-run by default; none of them restarts a service) - pi-diff.sh: compares tracked config against the live install in both directions, with a key-redacted comparison for models.json - deploy-scenario.sh: installs a workspace and renders profile.toml into .pi/launch.json, then checks that every referenced path exists - deploy-runtime.sh: renders models.json from its template, refusing placeholder or missing keys. Verified byte-identical to the live file - pi-backup.sh / pi-restore.sh: archives outside the repo, sha256 manifest verified before any restore, live paths preserved rather than overwritten Fixed while testing: pi-backup.sh compared the destination against the repo root literally, so a relative --dest ./backups wrote credential archives into the work tree. Now canonicalised with realpath; ./backups, an absolute in-repo path and ./docs/../backups are all refused.
59 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML
59 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML
# pi-grok — Pi scenario profile
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#
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# STATUS: registered only. Nothing is tracked or deployed for this scenario yet;
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# this file exists so that pi-diff.sh and the scenario index know it is here and
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# why it is intentionally different from the others.
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[scenario]
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name = "pi-grok"
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description = "Interactive Grok 4.6 coding agent for user programming projects."
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workspace = "/home/claw/pi-workspaces/pi-grok"
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session_dir = "/home/claw/pi-workspaces/pi-grok/sessions"
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service = "" # no service: launched by hand via bin/pi-grok
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launcher = "/home/claw/pi-workspaces/pi-grok/bin/pi-grok"
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tracked = false
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[model]
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provider = "zenmux"
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primary = "x-ai/grok-4.6"
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thinking = "high"
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[isolation]
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# This scenario uses a fundamentally different -- and in one respect stronger --
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# approach than curator and memo-inbox: a dedicated agent directory.
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#
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# export PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR="$PI_GROK_HOME/.pi-agent"
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#
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# That isolates settings.json, models.json, auth.json, trust.json, extensions/,
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# skills/, prompts/ and themes/ in one move, including the provider credential.
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# It is the only mechanism here that stops one scenario's auth.json from being
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# reachable by another's agent.
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#
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# Measured limitation: it does NOT cover ~/.agents/skills/, which is a separate
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# discovery root. find-skills, modsearch and summarize still load.
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# See docs/pi-runtime-notes.md section 10b.
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agent_dir_override = "/home/claw/pi-workspaces/pi-grok/.pi-agent"
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no_extensions = false
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no_skills = false # gap: ~/.agents/skills still leaks
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no_builtin_tools = false # intentional -- see below
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no_context_files = false
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[personality]
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# Durable role text is injected with --append-system-prompt pointing at a file,
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# which is immune to the parent-directory context walk and needs no project
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# trust. See docs/pi-runtime-notes.md section 10c.
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append_system_prompt = "/home/claw/pi-workspaces/pi-grok/AGENTS.md"
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system_prompt = "" # keeps pi's default coding-assistant prompt
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# NOTE ON SCOPE
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#
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# Unlike curator and memo-inbox, this genuinely *is* a coding agent. pi's default
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# coding-assistant system prompt and its built-in read/bash/edit/write tools are
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# appropriate here, so the isolation baseline in docs/isolation-baseline.md does
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# not apply in full. What still applies:
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#
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# - the ~/.agents/skills leak is unwanted noise for any narrow task
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# - there is no sandbox, so this agent has the full permissions of the user
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#
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# Bringing it under management is out of scope for the 2026-08 Curator refactor.
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