Kai b5564e3c60 docs: mark phase 2 complete
Records the risk policy as decided -- low_write only, high_write and destructive
refused outright with no confirmation flow, unclassified actions defaulting to
destructive so a missing classification fails closed.

Also records the measured fact-pack leak (filesystem path, quality profile id,
internal row id and a raw byte count all reaching the model), and the three
problems found while building it: the sqlite3 context manager not closing
connections, the five call sites writing a status the new CHECK constraint
rejects, and fallback_answer maintaining a diverged second copy of the receipt.
2026-08-28 00:05:13 -07:00
2026-08-28 00:05:13 -07:00

pi-agent-config

Authoritative configuration for every Pi agent on this host: the user-level Pi runtime, plus one directory per dedicated agent scenario.

The live locations (~/.pi/agent, ~/pi-workspaces/*) are runtime copies. Changes are made here and pushed out with scripts/deploy-*.sh, never the other way round — except for scenarios explicitly marked deploy = "mirror", which record what a running service already does.

Verified against pi 0.84.3. Re-run the probes after every pi update.

Scenarios

Scenario Purpose Service Status
curator Book / film / TV / music curation agent curator.service target config written, not yet deployed
memo-inbox Routes Telegram/WeChat messages to Calendar, Obsidian todo or journal pi-memo-telegram.service mirror of live config, zero behaviour change
pi-grok Interactive Grok 4.6 coding agent none (manual) registered only

Start here

Document Contents
docs/pi-runtime-notes.md pi 0.84.3 mechanics that the official docs understate, each verified against source or a live probe
docs/isolation-baseline.md The four isolation layers and the flag set every scenario should use
docs/personality-layering.md How to choose between SYSTEM.md, APPEND_SYSTEM.md, AGENTS.md, SKILL.md and the request
docs/gateway-patterns.md Ten patterns for hosting an agent behind a long-running service
docs/plans/ Active work plans

The finding that motivated this repository

pi emits the <available_skills> block only when a tool named read is active (dist/core/system-prompt.js:59,113). The Curator service ran with --no-tools --skill … for its entire lifetime, so:

  • its 64-line media policy never reached the model,
  • --skill was a no-op,
  • and both the README and the deployment runbook described a mechanism that was not happening.

Measured on the real workspace, before and after (evidence):

before after
system prompt 2548 chars 3539 chars
expert coding assistant framing present gone
pointer to pi's own documentation present gone
the 64-line media policy absent present
<available_skills> absent absent
workspace AGENTS.md loaded blocked
parent-directory AGENTS.md leaked blocked

The prompt got larger, and that is the fix rather than its cost: of the original 2548 characters roughly 1.9 KB was pi's coding-assistant scaffolding and a pointer telling the agent to read pi's documentation and follow its cross-references — noise for a media agent, and a ready-made escalation path for injected text — while none of it was Curator's own policy. All 3539 characters now are.

A mechanism demonstration with a stub SYSTEM.md is in docs/evidence/2026-08-27-isolation-probe.md; its 960-character figure measures the stub, not Curator.

Reproduce either with docs/evidence/probe-harness/ — zero model tokens, because a single RPC get_state starts the agent, fires session_start and exits without contacting the provider.

Layout

docs/            mechanics, baselines, plans, reproducible evidence
runtime/agent/   ~/.pi/agent — settings, models.json.template, extensions, prompts
shared/          cross-scenario code
  lib/py/pi_rpc.py            long-lived RPC client with rotation and budgets
  extensions/pi-guard-base.ts path containment, restricted read, capability guard
scenarios/<name>/
  profile.toml   single source of truth for the launch contract
  workspace/     what gets installed into the live workspace
  eval/          recorded golden transcripts
scripts/         diff, deploy, backup, restore, secret guard
secrets/         host-local, untracked

Usage

# What differs between this repository and the host?
scripts/pi-diff.sh
scripts/pi-diff.sh curator

# Push configuration out (dry run first; neither restarts a service)
scripts/deploy-runtime.sh
scripts/deploy-runtime.sh --apply
scripts/deploy-scenario.sh curator --apply

# Back up the live installation (archives land outside this repository)
scripts/pi-backup.sh
scripts/pi-restore.sh --from <backup dir>

# Verify the mechanics still hold after a pi upgrade
docs/evidence/probe-harness/collect-evidence.sh
shared/extensions/tests/run-guard-checks.sh
python3 shared/lib/py/tests/test_pi_rpc_smoke.py

Secrets

Nothing real ever enters this repository. models.json, auth.json, trust.json and every *.env are ignored; secrets/ accepts only .gitkeep, README.md, *.example and *.template.

scripts/verify-no-secrets.sh enforces this as a pre-commit hook. Install it in a fresh clone:

ln -sf ../../scripts/verify-no-secrets.sh .git/hooks/pre-commit
scripts/verify-no-secrets.sh --all

Backups contain plaintext credentials and are written outside the work tree; pi-backup.sh refuses any destination that resolves inside it.

First-time setup on a new host

git clone gitea-45:kai/pi-agent-config.git && cd pi-agent-config
ln -sf ../../scripts/verify-no-secrets.sh .git/hooks/pre-commit

cp secrets/zenmux.env.example secrets/zenmux.env
chmod 600 secrets/zenmux.env && $EDITOR secrets/zenmux.env

npm install -g @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent@0.84.3
scripts/deploy-runtime.sh --apply
scripts/deploy-scenario.sh <scenario> --apply
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